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Chapter 1 Introduction and current state 
of the art of Nanotechnology
This thesis is an interdisciplinary work, and in a sense represents the author’s personal 
journey through the traditional scientific disciplines. A technological description of 
nanotechnology is taken as starting point. This is followed by a social map o f different 
views on the technology and its potential future implications from a variety of stakeholders. 
Ethical issues are examined from a philosophical point o f view. The journey ends with 
recommendations contributing to the policy and stakeholder debate on governance of 
nanotechnology at an international level.
In the process, the author’s understanding of the world has also matured. Originally, she 
observed the world primarily with the eyes of a natural scientist, being trained as a 
physicist. Post-graduate training in (social) science and technology studies and years of 
practical work in technology assessment contributed to understanding o f the role o f societal 
actors. The thesis was a good reason to delve into philosophical ethical theories. The 
philosopher’s way of thinking turned out to be remarkably different from the natural 
scientists’ view of reality. Natural scientists tend to cooperate to produce a common theory 
o f the observable world, always benchmarked to the external measurable reality. 
Philosophy on the other hand consists o f a variety o f competing schools, always returning 
to the same old disputes by attempting to revisit old concepts and proposing new 
arguments. To paraphrase a philosopher in one of those debates: “ask natural scientists to 
solve easy problems, and ask philosophers to think about difficult ones.” This thesis is an 
attempt to combine the best o f both worlds.
This thesis examines how ethically sound governance of nanotechnology may be possible 
in the current global world order. This central research question is inspired by the main 
issue on the agenda o f national and international policy makers in the last decade. How to 
avoid making the same mistake with nanotechnology as with genetically modified food in 
Europe? As for nanotechnology, great public and private investments had been made in the 
development o f GG O’s, but market introduction was inhibited strongly by unexpected 
public resistance. In order to solve the issue of nanotechnology governance, a wide range of 
debates and projects have been started. The author has been engaged in these discussions 
and investigations as a consultant for 15 years.
A lot has been written and said about nanotechnology and its societal and ethical aspects. In 
addition, many projects are currently investigating nanoethics or Ethical, Legal and Social 
Aspects o f nanotechnology and related developments such as converging technologies, 
synthetic biology, Newly Emerging Science and Technology. In the thesis, contributions to 
the debate on ethical and societal issues related to nanotechnology from different parts of 
the world are collected. This is necessary to prepare for the final analysis o f issues on 
international level. The subsequent analysis in this thesis focuses on three ethical issues
1
related to contemporary research on nanotechnology which are currently unresolved: 
nanotechnology and security, sustainable development o f nanotechnology and shifting 
boundaries between natural and artificial. All three have an international dimension. Each 
of these three cases is analysed from the perspective of suitable philosophical theories. 
Classical Just War Theory is adapted to military and dual use nanotechnology development. 
The Theory of Justice and Capability Approach (Nussbaum, Law, Sen) are applied to 
sustainable development o f nanotechnology integrating nanotechnology for the poor and 
environmental aspects. Philosophical Anthropology is applied to implications of 
nanotechnology for the shifting boundary between natural and artificial. All three 
theoretical frameworks seem to assume a modern liberal worldview based on a social 
contract between sovereign states and atomistic individual citizens. Governments and other 
stakeholders who don’t share this liberal philosophy may be inhibited in contributing to 
common governance. A communitarian perspective may contribute to the democratic ethos 
o f such global governance.
1.1 Central research question
The central research question is:
W hat could constitute ethically sound global governance of nanotechnology in a multi­
stakeholder world order?
Before being able to answer this central research question, the following sub-questions 
must be explored first:
1) a) W hat is nanotechnology currently? and
b) W hich future expectations have leading scientists, technology policy 
analysts, technology and risk assessment specialists, N G O ’s and politicians 
expressed so far in different parts o f the world?
2) W hich ethical and societal aspects o f nanosciences, nanotechnologies and 
related technologies have been discussed from the year 2000 among 
stakeholders in specific countries in Europe, Asia and the Americas?
3) Are there differences in the topics being discussed by distinct groups or in the 
views on which characteristics o f technology, applications and societal 
implications are and would be acceptable or desirable?
4) W hat do philosophical ethical theories imply for currently unresolved ethical 
issues posed by nanotechnology?
5) Does the underlying modern worldview influence the normative judgements 
inherent in these theories and hence its acceptance by different stakeholders in 
different parts o f the world?
6) W hat could a communitarian worldview contribute to common agreement on 
norms and standards for global governance o f nanotechnology?
The countries from which most contributions to the discussion are collected are the 
European Union and member states with a national nanotechnology research strategy, as 
well as India and Latin American countries. Additional information originates from the
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USA and Japan but also Israel, Korea, China, Russia, Iran and South Africa where 
identified.
Materials collected include public statements by politicians and the policy debates in 
parliaments and organized by government departments. Other sources are government 
related technology assessment and research policy agencies and institutes. These sources 
are on the one hand most visible from outside the countries themselves, and on the other 
hand reflect the norms and values of the groups who shape the technologies under 
development as well as the regulatory framework governing them and thereby influence the 
future societal implications.
To begin with, the meaning and scope of the term nanotechnology is explained, and current 
trends in nanotechnology research and applications are explored. Subsequently, future 
scenarios for nanotechnology and its implications for society proposed by different types of 
stakeholders are explored. Thirdly, current debates on ethical aspects o f nanotechnology are 
analysed and a selection is made of three issues which are not discussed sufficiently: 
nanotechnology and security; sustainable development o f nanotechnology; and shifting 
boundaries between natural and artificial. The philosophical ethical theories are used to 
analyse the three cases: for nanotechnology and security, Just W ar theory (Michael Walzer, 
Paul Virilio), for sustainable development o f nanotechnology, the capability approach 
developed by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and for shifting boundaries between 
natural and artificial, philosophical anthropological concepts, Human Dignity, Human 
Rights and Responsibilities. In the final chapter, a proposal is made for ethically sound 
global governance o f nanotechnology.
In this overview o f the state o f the art o f nanotechnology, no complete history of the 
emergence of nanotechnology is presented. Just how nanotechnology has become what it is 
now is not really relevant to the ethical aspects related to nanoscience and technology and 
its applications in present and future products and systems. A n explanation is given of 
nanotechnology, and of differences in definitions relevant to the development o f the science 
and technology. Some key aspects of the research practices, including instruments, 
disciplines, and types o f actors involved in scientific discovery, technology development 
and public debate about its applications and societal consequences are also presented.
1.2 What is nanotechnology?
Definitions of nanotechnology depend on the disciplinary background and professional 
working environment o f the person using the term. The most common and broadest 
definition is: “Human made materials and devices having functional features with a length 
scale between one tenth and several hundreds o f nanometres, in one, two or three 
dimensions.” One tenth of a nanometre, or one Angstrom, is the diameter o f a hydrogen 
atom, the smallest type of atom (10-10m). Nanotechnology therefore does not deal with 
subatomic particles. As time progressed, the lower limit was commonly increased to one
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nanometre. This adaptation highlighted the intermediary character o f nanotechnology 
between ordinary chemistry and the micrometer level.
In the 1990s, when nanotechnology emerged as a separate area of research, a hundred 
nanometres was considered the smallest size of functional features on a microchip. 
Nanotechnology was seen as a possible way to shrink those features beyond the limits of 
conventional lithography. Does nanotechnology therefore originate from micro-electronics, 
as a fruit o f M oore’s law (1965), which predicted that the smallest features on a microchip 
should double every 18 m onths?1 Yes, but not only2.
Nanotechnology, or miniaturisation, has been discussed since the 1960s, but only became 
seriously possible after the invention of Scanning Probe Microscopes in the 1980s by 
Binnig and Rohrer at IBM Zurich. These types of instruments enable visualisation of 
“invisible” objects and structures on a surface which are smaller than the wavelength of 
light, down to individual atoms and molecules. These scanning probe instruments measure 
different physical interactions and use these to create images. One type is called Atomic 
Force Microscope (AFM), which measures the forces between a nano-object on the surface 
and the tiny tip o f the AFM, which scans across the surface and can move up and down as a 
response to these forces. Through a piezoelectric crystal, conversion between movements o f 
the probe and electronic signals is enabled. This signal forms the input to a monitor, which 
can visualise it as a picture of the atomic structure o f the surface, just like a TV screen 
transforms the electronic signal received into moving images. Other types of Scanning 
Probe Microscopes use the tunnelling of electrons, other forces, or even visible light. The 
use of visible light seems paradoxical, because the molecules visualised are smaller than the 
wavelength o f the light used. But a Scanning Near Field Optical Microscope (SNOM) uses 
near fields at the junction between tip and sample through which the light can tunnel. This 
is a quantum mechanical phenomenon, enabling scientists to make visible images, not just 
representations of force fields. Several types of SPMs can not only be used to visualise 
matter down to the atomic scale, but also to manipulate it, for instance by picking and 
placing xenon atoms on a surface at cryogenic conditions (Crommie, Lutz & Eigler, 1993), 
or by cutting and pasting DNA molecules (Henderson, 1992). To name just a few examples 
of the games scientists have been playing with their high tech instruments. (E.g. Malsch, 
2002)
1 For the semiconductor industry, a scenario called “M oore’s law” is the guiding principle 
for miniaturisation. Gordon M oore is co-founder o f Intel, a large computer chip 
manufacturer. In 1965, he predicted that the number o f transistors per square inch on a 
computer chip would double every year, leading to ever more powerful computers and the 
application o f “intelligence” in many consumer products. This miniaturisation trend in the 
semiconductor industry is still continuing today, with a doubling every few years, and the 
limits to “M oore’s law” are still not in sight.
2 See Ineke Malsch, “Nanotechnology in Europe: Scientific Trends and Organisational 
Dynamics”, in: Nanotechnology 10 (1999) 1-7, IOP publishers, London, for a discussion of 
the different sub disciplines in nanotechnology, end of the 1990s.
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The first person to coin the term “Nanotechnology” was not a physicist, but a precision 
engineer. Taniguchi (1974) used it in 1974, meaning the more and more precise top down 
finishing and machining of materials. The concept o f top-down manipulating matter on a 
very small scale was introduced earlier by the physicist Richard Feynman in a dinner 
speech to the American Physical Society on 29 December 1959: “There is plenty of room at 
the bottom” . There he predicted that scientists could manage to write the whole 
Encyclopaedia Britannica on the head of a pin by making tiny hands that could make even 
tinier hands that could eventually build structures of molecular scales. (Feynman, 1959)
Nanotechnology may be rooted in physics and mechanical (or precision) engineering, but 
the research done in nanoscience and technology is inherently interdisciplinary in character, 
and includes at least parts o f chemistry, biology and materials science, if not more 
disciplines. The chemical roots o f nanotechnology research lay in Supra Molecular 
Chemistry, which aims to build structures o f large chemical molecules using weak Van der 
Waals forces to bind the molecules together in more or less stable structures o f tens to 
several hundreds of nanometres in diameter. (Lehn, 1995) Nanochemistry, as it is also 
sometimes called, constitutes a bottom-up route to nanotechnology. For chemists, the 
challenge is not to make macroscopic objects smaller, but to make molecular structures 
bigger. They have mainly the size range of the nanostructures and devices they aim to build 
in common with the physicists and engineers. Also, most real applications including 
nanomaterials and technologies can only be developed by interdisciplinary collaborations 
involving for example chemists and physicists.
Biologists work with biological materials like DNA, proteins, cells, etc. Biological 
molecules including DNA and proteins typically are in the size range o f tens to several 
hundreds of nanometres. One could say that biologists are archetypical nanotechnologists, 
even if they don’t create the materials but may try to force existing biomaterials to adapt an 
artificial shape or function, as in using DNA as a scaffold or drug delivery vehicle. 
Biologists may also mimic the shape or functions of a biological material using artificial 
molecules or structures, which is called biomimetics. Nanobiotechnology or 
bionanotechnology is a relatively recent sub area of the broader field of nanosciences and 
technologies. (Wevers and Wechsler, 2002) Others have also used the term 
nanotechnology, such as K. Eric Drexel, founder and president of the Foresight Institute, 
USA, but the substance of his concept o f “M olecular Nanotechnology” consists more of 
long term future scenarios than o f real research. Drexler’s and other future scenarios of 
nanotechnology, its applications and future consequences are discussed later.
1.3 From nanoscience to nanotechnology
In the early phases of the development o f nanotechnology, in the 1990s up until 2005 most 
of the activity was in rather basic research. The main aim of the research policy makers 
responsible for setting priorities in nanoscience and technology funding was to stimulate 
interdisciplinary research among physicists, chemists, materials scientists, biologists and
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other relevant disciplines. The reason is that innovation occurs mostly on the borders 
between established disciplines. In this early phase the definitions should be rather vague 
container terms which stimulate the imagination, such as “nanotechnology” . The priority in 
that period was to fund projects with medium to long term application aims. Then, learning 
to understand the terminology and research practices o f other disciplines was a major 
outcome. Scientific inventions and technological breakthroughs were of course also 
important. Another reason for keeping the definitions vague was that funding research with 
taxpayer’s money must be accounted for. This can be done by showing concrete benefits 
for society in the form of new products based on the technology or new scientific 
breakthroughs with public interest. With a broad definition it is easier to include results of 
scientific and technological developments which have been ongoing for several decades 
already, albeit under different names. A n example is colloids, which are now often renamed 
nanoparticles. Colloids are small organic particles which are suspended in fluids such as 
paints or milk. Keeping the definition vague enables nanotechnology promoters to 
showcase anti graffiti coatings, nanocatalysts and other products including materials or 
devices with functional structures between the atom and some hundreds of nanometres as 
existing applications of nanotechnology. More fundamental researchers protest, and stress 
that there is nothing new to these materials and products, and that real nanotechnologies 
must imply that the structures are not only very small, but that the smallness o f the 
structures actually gives rise to new physical phenomena, which could not be achieved with 
larger structures or particles. However, as long as most nanotechnology was basic research, 
the real definition was more the result o f successful project applications than based on 
physical characteristics.
Since a few years, the first applications have been available and research is no longer 
primarily funded by governments, but to a considerable and growing percentage by major 
industrial companies. In this phase, the need has become more pressing for better and more 
precise definitions o f nanoscience, nanotechnology and sub areas of this multidisciplinary 
field of research. A first attempt at developing such more concrete definitions was made at 
a conference organised by the European Patent Office EPO in November 2004. (EPO, 
2004) The Patent Offices have developed class number B82 for Nanotechnology including 
subclasses for nano-structures (B82B and applications of nanotechnology (B82Y). In this 
class, “ ‘nano-size’ or ‘nano-scale’ relate to a controlled geometrical size below 100 
nanometres (nm) in one or more dimensions. ‘Nano-structure’ means an entity having at 
least one nano-sized functional component that makes physical, chemical or biological 
properties or effects available, which are uniquely attributable to the nanoscale.” (IPC, 
2011)
The original definition coined in 2004 was is not sufficiently precise to enable a clear 
selection of nanotechnology patents. One of the reasons was that funding organisations, 
industries and other stakeholders used other definitions for nanotechnology. Therefore the 
EPO installed a working group of technical experts who decided which patent should be 
classified as a nanotechnology patent and which not. The Japanese JPO developed a 
classification o f nanophysics, entitled ZNM. In 2003, Japan selected nanophysics as one
6
out o f four national R&D priorities, which stimulated the JPO to develop the ZNM  patent 
classification.
Another forum where definitions o f nanotechnology and its sub areas are being developed 
is formed by the standardisation bodies, including ISO (global), CEN (Europe), ASTM 
International (USA), Standard Administration o f China. The Chinese have taken the lead in 
nanomaterials standardisation, by imposing the first seven nanomaterials standards on 1 
April 2005. They covered nanoscale Nickel powder, Zinc Oxide, Titanium Dioxide, 
Calcium Carbonate, testing of gas absorption (2x) and the granularity o f nanopowders. 
(People’s daily, 2005) These standards cover nanomaterials which are already being 
applied on a considerable scale in products. The other standards bodies have all set up 
committees developing new nanotechnology standards in 2005. It will take some time until 
the discussions in these committees lead to new voluntary standards and definitions for 
nanomaterials, measurements and components. The priorities for the European CEN 
Technical Committee 166 on nanotechnologies were: to calibrate nanometre scale 
measurement instruments; to develop definitions for different types of nanotechnologies; 
and to identify potential health, safety and environmental impacts o f nanotechnologies. 
(Hatto, 2005) Ideally, before marketing products including nanoparticles, nanostructured 
materials or nanodevices, a consensus should be reached on the definition of a nanometre 
and on a methodology to measure it. In 2005, the same nanostructure measured by a 
Scanning Probe Microscope from one manufacturer had a different size than if it was 
measured by the same instrument o f another manufacturer, or even by the same instrument 
with another tip. Also, one producer o f a nanoparticle could use a totally different 
categorisation for the same material, or the same category for a different material. By 2011, 
ISO Technical Committee TC229 on nanotechnologies published eleven nanotechnology 
related standards including terminology. (ISO, 2011)
As long as the toxicity of nanoparticles for human health and the environment is not clear, 
manufacturers putting products including these materials on the market risk loosing their 
investment or having to pay for unforeseen damages. The European Commission has been 
inviting expert and stakeholder opinions to identify the gaps in measurement methods for 
identifying these health and environmental hazards due to nanotechnologies and other 
related issues since 2005. (SCENIHR, 2005-2010)
Governments and funding bodies are also developing more and more precise 
nanotechnology classifications and sub categorisations. The German Engineering 
Association VDI developed an analysis o f the market potential o f nanotechnology. (Luther 
et al, 2004) They subdivided the technology in:
- Nanomaterials
- Nanoelectronics
- Nano-optics
- Nanobiotechnology
- Nano-instruments /  Nano-analytics.
These technological sub areas are also used by other policy makers and analysts to 
categorise nanotechnology.
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Nanotechnology can also be classified according to the main industrial sectors in which the 
nanomaterials and devices are or will be applied:
- Chemicals
- Optics
- Automotive
- M edical and Life Sciences
- Electronics. (Luther et al, 2004)
The main application sectors differed per country, depending on the national industrial 
strengths. E.g. in the Netherlands automotive is less important than in Germany, with a 
strong national automotive industry, but agro food applications receive more interest than 
in other countries, due to a strong and highly innovative national agro food sector. In the 
USA, defence and security is much more important than in Germany, for historical and 
cultural reasons. Also, the subdivision of these sectors may be useful for measuring 
economic impact o f the emergence o f nanotechnology, but it is less suitable for analysing 
how the lives of consumers, patients and other people may be affected in the future. The 
latter is necessary to identify the key ethical issues which should be discussed in public.
Lux Research (2009) used a more business-oriented classification of nanotechnology into 
nanomaterials, intermediaries and nano-enabled end-products. They foresaw major 
applications o f nanotechnology in four sectors:
- materials and manufacturing (automotive, construction, chemical industry)
- electronics and IT
- healthcare and life sciences
- energy and environment.
Nanoforum, the European Gateway to Nanotechnology, applied a longer, more 
encompassing list o f nanotechnologies and application areas. This categorisation was not 
based on a prior selection of economically most relevant sectors:
- Chemistry & Materials
- Nanotools & metrology
- Information & Communication
- Health & Nanobio
- Transport & Space
- Energy
- Consumer Products
- Construction
- Agriculture & Food
- (Basic) Science
- Safety & Environment
- Society issues
- Strategy
- Economy.3
3 Nanoforum website: www.nanoforum.org
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Society issues, strategy and economy are combined in one category because they overlap. 
This categorisation plus “Defence & Security” is used to organise the rest o f this section on 
the state o f the art of nanotechnology. Defence and Security are not covered by Nanoforum, 
because under the Fifth European Framework Programme for Research and Technology 
Development, EU funding could not be used for defence related research. However, 
especially in the USA Defence and Security are important areas of application for 
nanotechnology, and since the end of the Sixth Framework Programme, civil security 
research is funded under the EU Framework Programmes.
1.4 Chemistry & Materials
The subfield o f nanomaterials is the most advanced in terms o f real applications, if  the 
definition o f nanotechnology is interpreted broadly. In a broad sense, nanomaterials can 
include colloids (small particles suspended in solution, such as paint or milk) and thin films 
or coatings consisting of layers on a surface with a thickness below 100 nanometres. These 
particles or coatings have been in development long before the term “nanotechnology” was 
in common use. Natural forms of nanoparticles have been around even since times 
immemorial, and by 2005 the nanoscale soot particles in diesel exhaust gases were high on 
the political agenda as a major health risk in Europe. The small size and surface effects of 
these carbon particles have been proven to cause different materials properties than micron 
size carbon particles. The available measurement instruments to monitor air quality in cities 
and around major roads were not adequate to measure these size and surface effects, as they 
only measure the mass of particles below 100 micron in size. Also, the norms for air quality 
are based on the particulate mass, not on size and surface effects.
These unintended waste products o f cars, buses and diesel trains have the same size as 
consciously produced nanoparticles (10-100 nanometres). Furthermore, consciously 
produced nanoparticles are already available on the market as part o f consumer goods 
including cosmetics (e.g. titanium dioxide and zinc oxide nanoparticles in sun creams). 
These products include nanoparticles of the same chemical substance as other sun creams, 
and therefore have been introduced on the market without testing their health, safety and 
environmental effects. The ETC group, a global environmental NGO and Prince Charles 
(UK) have put this issue on the international political agenda in 2003, by pleading publicly 
for a moratorium on the inclusion o f engineered nanomaterials in marketed products until it 
is clear that the risks are negligible. (ETC, 2003b) 4 The size effects o f nanoparticles have 
been demonstrated to lead to new properties o f the materials, which can be desirable, and 
therefore make them attractive for inclusion in new products. E.g. nanoparticles o f titanium 
dioxide are transparent instead of white, as are micron size particles o f the same material. 
This makes them attractive to include in cosmetics. However, the size effects and larger 
surface to volume ratio o f nanoparticles might also give rise to higher toxicity. Whether this
4 See for an overview o f the debate in the UK after Prince Charles’ intervention: 
www.nanotec.org.uk (last accessed 20-01-2011)
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is the case and for which types of nanomaterials is the subject o f intensive research 
worldwide. It may also lead to the introduction of new legislation for products including 
nanoparticles in the next few years. (SCENIHR, 2005) The European Parliament is already 
incorporating nano in recast directives for consumer products including cosmetics 
(European Union, 2009), food and biocidal products. The latter were still under negotiation 
at the beginning of 2011. (European Parliament 2011, 2011a and 2011b)
Engineered nanomaterials, currently under development or already available in products, 
can take the form o f nanoparticles, coatings, bulk materials and nanostructures. All 
nanomaterials have functional feature sizes between 0.1 and 100 nanometre in 1, 2 or 3 
dimensions. These features lead to different properties than materials with the same 
chemical composition, but larger feature sizes. Nanomaterials can consist o f carbon, metals 
and alloys, ceramics, polymers, biological materials, glass or composite materials including 
at least two of the other categories o f materials.5 By 2010, new unanticipated materials 
including graphene and metamaterials have been discovered. (Roco, 2010)
Carbon buckminsterfullerenes or buckyballs consist o f 60 carbon atoms, neatly ordered in a 
soccer ball shape, like the dome of the building designed by the architect Buckminster 
Fuller. A related material is called carbon nanotubes or buckytubes, which consists of a 
rolled up sheet o f carbon atoms ordered in hexagons. Buckyballs were first discovered in 
soot by Richard Smalley, Robert Curl (Rice University, USA) and Sir Harold Kroto 
(University o f Sussex, UK), who received the Nobel prize for it. More recently, graphene, a 
new form o f carbon consisting of one flat atomic layer o f carbon was invented. In 2010, 
Andre Geim and Konstantin Novoselov received the Nobel Prize for it. The properties 
make it very suitable for many applications including electronics. (Nobel Prize 2010) By 
2010, Graphene or carbon electronics is a promising area of research. (Roco, 2010)
In 2005, most nanomaterials were being produced by small start up SMEs, which could 
produce limited amounts o f nanomaterials for R&D or inclusion in products for niche 
markets (e.g. tennis balls). The prices were typically high and the quality variable. The first 
large scale factories were being built and large multinational materials producers such as 
Bayer, Degussa and Qinetiq were investing in producing nanoparticles. Other materials 
companies and end-user companies were experimenting with inclusion of these 
nanoparticles in other materials or in products such as cars, aircraft, medical devices and 
pharmaceuticals and energy producing, storage or saving technologies.
The general trend in the area o f Nanochemistry and nanomaterials is to move from almost 
accidentally developing a new material or substance, then testing its properties and looking 
for potential applications and markets to “designer materials” . The need for new materials 
properties is taken as the starting point. With the aid of Computer Aided Design and 
Computer Aided Manufacturing techniques, the desired chemical composition and three 
dimensional structures o f the particles or molecules are predicted. E.g. a new active
5 Based on the categorisation developed in the EU funded NanoroadSM E project (2004­
2006), see: http://www.nanoroad.net/index.php?topic=progress (last accessed 20-01-2011)
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substance for a drug could be developed much quicker in this way, thereby potentially 
reducing the cost o f new  pharmaceuticals. (Chemical Industry, 2003) By 2010, the 
objective to make nanomaterials by design has not been realised, “because the direct theory, 
modelling, and simulation tools and measurement techniques with sufficient resolution 
were not ready.” This research should continue over the next decade. (Roco, 2010 p lv-lvi)
The main issues in the public and political debate about Nanochemistry and nanomaterials 
are related to potential health and environmental risks of these materials. Ethical, legal and 
social aspects are related to the public perception of the risks of these new materials and 
substances, compared to the risks o f not introducing these materials, but sticking with old 
technology. (Grunwald, 2005) The latter aspect tends to be overlooked in the public debate, 
where fear for the unknown is more common than rejection o f unhealthy and polluting 
goods which enable our pleasant consumerist lifestyle o f today. The omnipresence of 
proven deadly cigarettes is a case in point.
1.5. Nanotools & metrology
Doing research and developing products including nanomaterials and components relies 
heavily on instruments and techniques such as the abovementioned scanning probe 
microscopes to work on such small scales. Metrology, or being able to measure a 
nanometre in a reliable and standardised way, is a key prerequisite before new products 
with nano inside or nanomaterials can be brought to market on a substantial scale. The 
latter is still a problem. Nanotools may have existed for twenty years or more, but 
calibrating the instruments and really establishing how small a nanometre is independent of 
an individual machine or instruments sold by different manufacturers is still not resolved. 
National and International standardisation bodies including ISO and CEN (European) have 
installed working groups to discuss nanostandards in 2005 (see chemistry and materials). 
This paragraph reviews different types of instruments dedicated to nanoscience and 
technology and what has been done to achieve a standardised nanometrology. The market 
for research instruments for nanotechnology is currently one of the largest nanotechnology 
markets.
Scanning Probe Microscopes have been discussed above. There are several more different 
types available. These instruments are used in research in universities and research centres, 
but also in industrial quality control. Nano lithography is the term for lithographic 
instruments to write small structures on surfaces, e.g. on a silicon wafer. Currently, 
industrial lithography instruments working with light o f a wavelength o f 193 nanometres 
can write lines as small as 45nm in diameter by submerging the system in a liquid. A prime 
example of further development in nanolithography instruments is the Extreme Ultra Violet 
(EUV) lithography machine developed by a consortium including the Dutch semiconductor 
instrument maker ASML. Contrary to earlier lithographic instrument, the extreme 
ultraviolet light beam with a wavelength o f 13.5 nanometre can not be focussed with 
optical lenses. These lenses are not transparent to this type of hard UV radiation. The 
radiation is even absorbed by air. ASML collaborated with Carl Zeiss to develop a system
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of ultra smooth mirrors in a vacuum. By 2010, two experimental EUV are set up to allow 
customers to try the instrument and the first instrument has been shipped to a customer by 
end of 2010. (ASML, 2005, 2011)
By 2010, Scanning Probe based experimental lithography included dip-pen 
nanolithography, polymer-pen lithography and beam-pen lithography. Even lithography 
writing on a very thin nano wire is now the focus of research. (Roco, 2010) Dip pen 
lithography is directly writing nanometre thin lines on a surface by dipping an AFM  tip in 
the substance to be deposited and then writing the tip across the surface. This enables 
making very fine structures, but only in series, hence very slow. Nano Imprint Lithography 
(NIL) enables mass production o f devices with a surface structuring in the nanometre 
range. A structure is stamped onto the surface by direct contact w ith a mask. No direct 
ethical issues related to nanotools & metrology, have been identified so far. These 
technologies and knowledge are used by researchers and in industrial production or quality 
control. Issues o f health, safety and environmental impact o f using such instruments on the 
work floor may occur.
1.6Information & Communication
“Nanoelectronics” is the name for top down miniaturisation of active features on 
microchips in the semiconductor industry, plus bottom up alternatives to developing 
switches and electronic devices based on single molecules, for tunnelling single electrons 
(SET), using biological molecules or carbon nanotubes as switches, etc. Nanoelectronics is 
commonly divided into three domains: More Moore (continued miniaturisation of features 
on semiconductors below the current 45 nm standard), More than Moore (integrating other 
functional elements on a chip (System-on-Chip) or in a Package (System-in-Package), and 
Beyond Moore or Beyond CMOS (using other materials for switches). (NanoNed, 2009, 
ITRS, 2010)
Several other terms are used for parts of the research to develop applications of 
nanotechnology for information and communication technology. M olecular electronics: 
uses one (organic) molecule as a switching device. This technology is still in an early stage 
of research. By 2005, the state o f the art o f research was demonstrated by a publication by 
researchers from Penn State, Rice University and the University o f Oregon. They 
discovered how to flip the switch from one state to the other. This technology can only ever 
be used if researchers find a way to connect such minute switches to an electronic system. 
Current electronic wires are way too large. (Weiss et al, 2005) Bioelectronics uses a 
biological molecule as a switch. Single electron tunnelling lets a transistor operate by 
allowing the passing of only one electron at a time. Nanoelectronics is a general term for 
miniaturising feature sizes on microchips below 100 nanometre. Currently, the state o f the 
art is 45 nm, so in a sense all microelectronics is already nanoelectronics. Opto-electronics 
refers to devices where an incoming light signal is translated to an electronic signal or vice 
versa. This can be part in fibre optic telecommunication systems for enabling electronic 
switching or signal strengthening, after which the signal is translated again into a light
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signal for fast broadband telecommunication. Photonics encompasses devices for 
transmitting, switching or processing light in telecommunication systems or optical 
memory devices. This includes nanophotonics and plasmonics (where surface effects are 
the unit o f information). RFID (Radio Frequency Identification) chips can be read and 
written on by a radio signal on a short distance (around 1 metre). Currently, there are three 
types of computer memories SRAM (high Speed, high cost Random Access Memory), 
DRAM, average in speed and costs, and Flash (low-cost, low speed memories that retain 
the data when switched off). Nanomagnetism is a future development utilising magnetic 
data storage based on small magnetic islands. A recent trend is graphene or carbon 
electronics. This has become a popular research topic since the isolation of graphene, a one 
atomic thin layer o f graphite with remarkable electronic properties. (See also Roco, 2010).
Applications of nanoelectronics include data storage, data processing, data transmission but 
also sensors. Information and Communication applications of nanotechnology include data 
storage media where huge amounts o f data can be stored on smaller and smaller devices. 
Nanotechnology is included in the continuing miniaturisation and higher information 
content of such storage media, such as CD-ROM, DVD, memory sticks, etc. One example 
o f a nano storage device is the Millipede being developed by IBM  in Zurich. This device 
consists o f 64x64=4096 small Atomic Force Microscope (AFM) tips on a flexible 
cantilever, which can each individually be controlled. The writing device is 6.4x6.4 mm 2 in 
diameter. This device is used to print small holes in a polymer surface, which code for a 
digital dataset. The polymer memory can be erased again by the same AFM  tips and reused 
thousands of times. This millipede chip can store 1 Terabit of date per square inch. (1 
terabit (Tbit) = 1000 Gigabit = 1,000,000,000,000 bits). This enables storage o f 25 DVDs 
on an area the size of a postage stamp. The prototype was first released on the CeBIT fair in 
M arch 2005, but it has been in development since the late 1990s. (IBM, 2005) By 2010, 
nanoelectronics was expected to contribute to the development o f a universal memory 
combining the properties of the three existing types o f memories in one device. (Ristinen & 
Kauhanen, 2010)
Computer processor chips will also be miniaturised further thanks to nanolithography or 
other nanoelectronics developments. This allows faster computing and processing of much 
higher amounts o f data. It may also contribute to new data processing methods such as 
quantum computing. The ethical implications are mainly indirect, and related to the 
applications such compact supercomputers are being used for.
Nanotechnology can be applied in telecommunication networks, for example in signal 
switching or processing devices in fibre-optic telecommunication networks. Chips for 
wireless communication may also include nanotechnology elements, e.g. for translating an 
electronic signal in a radio signal or vice versa. Nanotechnology components are already 
included in GSM-phones on a large scale, in the communication part and in rechargeable 
battery material. By 2010, powering mobile devices and embedded electronics has become 
a major issue for semiconductor industry research. Nanotechnology is expected to deliver 
solutions. Roco, 2010)
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Radio Frequency Identification tags (RFID) are already applied in logistics and retail to 
track the route ordered goods take, to enable automatic ordering o f goods which run out of 
stock, or as electronic barcodes. The whole contents o f a shopping cart can be priced and 
automatically billed. RFID tags can also be used to track the motions of the customer after 
buying the goods, if the tag is not disabled after payment. RFID tags can store a lot more 
information on a cheap plastic chip than ordinary barcodes, enabling the use as chipper 
wallets. In some clubs, RFID chips with a credit have been injected in VIP clients so they 
can order drinks without bringing their wallet. (DMEurope, 2004) Nanotechnology is not 
really part o f these RFID chips, but the technology is related to other Information and 
Communication and end products usually consist of a combination of nano, bio, info 
technology and cognitive sciences. Nanotechnology is expected to contribute to future 
generations RFID chips.
“Smart dust” or also “Embedded Network Sensing Systems (ENS)” is a concept o f 
miniaturising a Micro System including a camera or other data gathering devices with 
information processor, storage and short range wireless communication devices and a 
battery or energy harvesting device in a “mote” which should become as small as a grain of 
sand (1 mm 2). The motes operate in swarms and are controlled by special software which 
can work on such minute devices with low power. A signal perceived by one mote can be 
sent wireless to the nearest other mote, and thus passed on to a central computer which can 
process the collected data from the swarm to an assembled picture. Smart dust can be 
applied in defence, to gather information of the position and movements of enemy tanks, or 
to quickly detect the presence o f nuclear, biological, chemical or explosive substances on 
the battle field. Other potential applications are in remote weather or earthquake 
monitoring, monitoring of air, soil and water quality and of industrial accidents, etc. Or to 
control and store data on the movements o f individual citizens unaware of the fact that they 
are being spied upon by a government or private organisation. The devices are 
Microsystems with typical feature sizes in the micrometer range. However, for types of 
smart dust which will have to detect chemical or biological substances, nanotechnology is 
needed for the active sensing layer, using similar technology to diagnostic chips described 
above. (Pfister, 2001)
Ethical issues related to nanoelectronics are more or less the same as with other information 
and communication technologies, and include privacy and security issues. These issues can 
become more pressing in the case of smart dust or other RFID chips integrated in products, 
clothes or even human or animal bodies, because the spy ware is invisible. Advantages or 
reasons for developing such small autonomous data collecting and transmitting devices 
include defence, environment and industrial safety monitoring. In the current political 
climate, the security and environmental benefits weigh heavier than the privacy issues. This 
may change if the fear o f terrorist attacks and natural or human made disasters subsides in 
the future.
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1.7Health & Nanobiotechnology
Pharmaceuticals and medical devices are the end products that have been considered the 
most important markets for nanotechnology during the first decade o f the 21st century. 
Chemistry, Materials, Biotechnology and Information and Communication Technologies 
may be larger potential markets, but these are all interim products, which themselves are 
included in end user products for markets such as healthcare. (Nanoforum, 2004) By 2011, 
governments were stimulating the development o f nanotechnology for a broader range of 
societal “grand challenges” including healthcare, food, environment and energy.
The pharmaceutical sector and the medical device sector are regulated differently, and the 
industrial structures and innovation cycles are different. Therefore applications of 
nanotechnology in pharmaceuticals and in medical devices are discussed separately. The 
pharmaceutical sector is dominated by large multinational firms, and innovation typically 
takes place in their R&D labs and in small spin-off R&D companies which are attempting 
to commercialise inventions from industrial or academic research. W hen these SMEs are 
successful, they are typically bought by the large pharmaceutical industries, which take care 
o f marketing the new drugs. A  new drug, additive or drug delivery mechanism has to pass 
through a lengthy and elaborate process o f three phases of preclinical and three phases of 
clinical tests, before it can be allowed on the market. This procedure takes several years. 
Once on the market, a new drug is protected by patent law until twenty years after its 
original invention, allowing the company to earn a large enough return on investment. The 
innovation cycle in the pharmaceutical sector is therefore rather slow.
The medical devices sector consists of thousands o f small or medium sized companies. 
Products range from hospital beds to pacemakers. The regulations for bringing a new 
product to the market are less strict than for pharmaceuticals. The innovation cycle is 
typically eighteen months, because producers tend to continue R&D to improve a product 
after its first release. (Eucomed, 2011) E.g. pacemakers have been miniaturised a lot since 
their first introduction in the 1950s. Elsewhere, the market for nanotechnology in the 
pharmaceutical and medical devices sectors are being explained in more depth. Therefore 
the present overview can be rather brief and focused on applications where most ethical 
issues can be expected to emerge. (Malsch, 2005, Nanoforum, 2003, ObservatoryNano, 
2009)
In pharmaceuticals, nanotechnology either takes the form of novel drug delivery 
mechanisms, or is included in the active layer in biochips used in genomics and proteomics 
research to identify new active drug candidates, or for targeted therapeutics. 
Nanotechnology therefore does not in itself lead to new medicine. Nano drug delivery 
mechanisms can contribute to less side effects o f existing drugs, e.g. in the case of 
chemotherapy. Other forms of nano drug delivery may enable passing the blood-brain 
barrier, which can improve the chances of brain tumour patients. Also, the particle size of a
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non-soluble drug can be miniaturised to nanometre scale, to make them better soluble. Such 
nano drugs can then be ingested or inhaled in stead of being injected. By 2010, about 50 
pharmaceuticals including nano drug delivery mechanisms were available on the market, 
but many more products including nano drug delivery are already in the preclinical or 
clinical test phase or have entered commercial development. In 2008, Nanodrug delivery 
had a market share of 4%, expected to grow to 11% by 2012. (Nanobiotechnews, 2006, 
ObservatoryNano, 2009, 2010, Moore 2008)
In biochips, biological molecules including DNA or proteins can be used in the active layer 
of a sensor. Nanosensors can be used to measure minute traces o f an analyte. These 
biochips can be used in high throughput screening of new active drug compounds, or in 
diagnostic chips for personalised medicine. In the latter case, the DNA of a patient is 
screened for genetic properties which make her or him sensitive to particular drugs. This 
enables better prescription of pharmaceuticals with fewer side effects. (van Est, Malsch, 
Rip, 2004) Beginning of 2006, 125 devices and diagnostics tests based on nanotechnology 
had entered preclinical and clinical trials or commercial development. (Nanobiotechnews, 
2006) Nanotechnology is a driver o f Next Generation Sequencing, expected to enable the 
sequencing o f a complete human genome for US$1000 or less. This will make personalised 
medicine a reality. (Moore & Gloeckler, 2010)
Nano drug delivery mechanisms imply the deliberate introduction of nanomaterials in the 
human body of sick patients who have a weaker health than the average healthy person. 
Paradoxically, the use of nano drug delivery mechanisms might lead to increased health 
risks for these patients. (Health Council, 2006) Even if they are safe during use, it is not 
clear what will happen with the nanoparticles in the body after delivery of the medication. 
Will they be removed from the body through the liver or remain in cells, potentially causing 
inflammation, cancer or other diseases later on? Specifically mechanisms to pass the blood 
brain barrier might inadvertently lead to new brain diseases. Nano drug delivery 
mechanisms might also be abused for new types of biological weapons.(BW PP, 2004, 
Nixdorf, 2010) Ethical, legal and social aspects o f nano-pharmaceuticals are mainly related 
to privacy issues and the right (not) to know, risks of illegitimate use (bioweapons), and the 
nano-divide between haves and have-nots.
In medical devices, nanotechnology can be applied in a wide range of products, from new 
antibacterial layers on wound dressings to drug eluting layers and electrodes in active 
implants. Some categories o f medical devices may give rise to new ethical, legal or social 
issues. These include:
- M olecular imaging, where nanoparticles are introduced in the body as contrast 
fluid;
- Nano diagnostics for personalised medicine or early diagnostics;
- Prostheses, tissue engineering and passive implants;
- Active implants including pacemakers, cochlear and eye implants, neural implants, 
drug dispensing implants.
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The use of nano contrast fluid in new molecular imaging systems could give rise to 
unintended health risks including cancer if the particles remain in the body, similar to nano 
drug delivery mechanisms. This may be a more important reason for banning such 
nanoparticles, because they are generally used for screening healthy people, not for curing 
the sick. The long term health risk is then no longer cancelled out by the immediate positive 
effect o f curing the present disease. However, currently it is not clear what happens to the 
particles after use, and what may be the long term effects on human health or the 
environment.
Ethical, legal and social implications of molecular imaging may occur because such new 
machines enable earlier identification of possibly cancerous cells, when a tumour is only a 
few cells in size. The proponents expect that this may contribute to the total eradication of 
cancer. On the other hand it could contribute to medicalisation of healthy people if 
preventive screening becomes more accepted, and may not be the most cost effective way 
of improving global healthcare. (Biesboer, 2004b, Malsch & Hvidtfelt-Nielsen, 2010)
Nano diagnostics can be introduced using similar lab on a chip techniques as discussed 
above under drug screening in the pharmaceutical industry. The active layer is sensitised 
for proteins or other markers which are specific for a disease. These diseases can be 
infectious diseases such as Tuberculosis, Measles, HIV/AIDS etc. or diseases caused by 
environmental factors (e.g. lung cancer due to active of passive smoking or air pollution), 
but also genetic diseases. Especially related to genetic diseases for which there is no cure a 
number of ethical issues which are already being discussed apply also to nano-diagnostics. 
These include the right to know versus the right not to know, privacy and insurance. 
(Biesboer, 2004b) Nano-diagnostics may also be applied for pharmacogenomics, which 
enables the emergence of personalised medicine. This can help reduce side effects of 
medication because it takes into account the sensitivities and allergies o f an individual 
patient. The same ethical issues apply as in early diagnostics, as well as the earlier 
mentioned medicalisation o f healthy people.
Prostheses, tissue engineering and passive implants is a field of research aiming to develop 
better replacement bone, skin, artery, and organ tissue for disabled people. This obviously 
is not a new field of research, since thousands of people are already walking around with 
artificial hips, knees, or other prostheses and implants. Nanotechnology can be applied as 
coatings on artificial implants, or as improved bulk materials or even to enable tissue 
engineering inside the human body, in which replacement tissue is grown inside the body 
from an artificial precursor material. However, nanotechnology is not the only option for 
improving tissue engineering, prostheses and implants, and may not be compatible with 
current surgical practices or conform with existing legislation. E.g. a surgeon may use a 
hammer to put a hip implant in place, which will not leave much nanostructure on its 
surface. Some materials such as nylon, which are being developed for applications in 
implants, are not permitted for use in medical devices.6
Currently, the debate about ethical, legal and social implications of tissue engineering, 
prostheses or passive implants for medical applications tends to focus on more long term 
predictions of Human Enhancement. If  tissue engineering will be placed inside the body 
rather than in vitro, this may lead to debate about risks and risk perception. The debate on
6 John Janssen, University Medical Centre Nijmegen, personal communication, 2004.
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ethics of regenerative medicine is just emerging. (Pavesio, 2005, Malsch & Hvidtfelt- 
Nielsen, 2010, Besselaar & Gurney, 2009)
Active implants have been incorporated in the human body for decades, since the first 
pacemakers in the 1950s. Cochlear implants which connect a hearing aid to the nervous 
system in the inner ear have also been in use for several years, and some experimental 
artificial eyes or retina implants are implanted in patients. The first generation of these 
active implants were large devices, connected to a portable computer outside the body for 
signal processing, and requiring frequent replacement of the device or at least the battery. 
Nanotechnology may be applied in such medical devices as surface structuring, drug 
eluting coating, compact battery material, or as highly porous material in electrodes, which 
allow the precise transmission of relatively high current in a small volume. Researchers 
expect that nanotechnology can improve the biocompatibility or life time of the devices, 
reduce the need for and impact of surgery, and reduce inflammation in the tissue 
surrounding the device. Batteries might be recharged from the outside by an 
electromagnetic field or they may be controlled externally by radiofrequency radiation 
(RFID chips).
New generations of active implants may be more and more reliant on nanotechnology. E.g. 
neural implants are being investigated for rehabilitation of paralysed patients or for deep 
brain stimulants for Parkinson patients. Paralysed patients may benefit from electrodes 
placed on their skull or implanted in their brain which enable them to control a computer or 
tools including a wheelchair. Different techniques are being investigated which may use 
similar processes as lie-detectors. These include sweating, neural electronic phenomena 
related to thought processes, etc. Other techniques aim at restoring the severed connections 
in the neural system. Another type of active implant is constituted by drug delivery 
implants, which can release a drug in the bloodstream after an external signal. Chronic 
patients such as diabetes-sufferers may benefit. The signal can be internal to the body, such 
as the blood sugar content, or externally controlled by a doctor or the patient. In all future 
generations of active implants, nanotechnology will not constitute the whole device, only 
some key components and materials.
The application of nanotechnology in medical implant technologies has led to some 
discussion on the boundary between the legislation relevant for pharmaceuticals and the 
legislation relevant for medical devices since 2004. The former is much stricter than the 
latter, but there was some uncertainty about the proper classification of an implant with a 
drug eluting coating or surface structure. Should it be tested as a pharmaceutical or as a 
medical device before market entry? According to some, this issue has been resolved by 
testing such a drug eluting device as a pharmaceutical.7 The issue of the borderline between 
the relevant legislations is still being investigated by governments and their advisory 
committees. (Dorbeck-Jung, 2010) Other issues related to active implants include health 
risks for the patient, such as interference with external magnetic fields in detection gates,
7 George Robillard, BIOMADE, Groningen, personal communication, 2004.
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and epileptic seizures due to electrical overload of the nerve connections. Such risks are 
sufficiently covered by current medical device legislation.
More fundamental ethical issues are related to human-machine interactions in general. 
When more and more artificial devices are incorporated in a human body and nervous 
system, the boundary between a human being and a machine becomes blurred. This issue is 
not only related to nanotechnology, but may become more pressing when the integration of 
the human body and mind with machines and even the internet is enabled by medical 
devices which rely critically on nanocomponents and nanomaterials. As long as such active 
implants are applied to rehabilitate disabled or heal the sick, there is relatively little 
discussion on ethics. But some intend to incorporate active implants also in healthy people, 
for human enhancement or even just for fun. The European Group on Ethics has issued 
related opinions on ICT implants and on nanomedicine. (EGE, 2005, 2007)
1.8 Transport & Space
The automotive industry is one of the main users of nanomaterials and nanodevices, 
incorporating these nanotechnologies in different parts of cars driving around already. 
Nanoparticles are incorporated in tires to reduce wear or keep them airtight. Paints and 
lacquers incorporate nanosized colloids. Windows and lighting are covered by nanometre 
thin antireflective coatings. Airbag sensors contain nanotechnology elements. Light 
Emitting Diodes based on nanotechnology are much more energy efficient than light bulbs. 
These LEDs are included in car headlights. Bumpers and other plastic parts are 
strengthened by mixing natural or synthetic nanoclay particles into the polymer. The 
exhaust fumes are cleaned by a catalytic converter based on nanocatalysts. Additives such 
as cerium oxide nanoparticles are added to diesel fuel to improve engine efficiency and 
hence fuel saving. Light and strong materials are being developed to allow lower energy 
use of vehicles. Plastics may be made fire retardant by incorporating nanoparticles. By 
using them in cars, the risks for the passengers of burning after an accident are reduced. 
Some traffic lights include LEDs in stead of light bulbs, with lower energy consumption. 
Aerospace can benefit from light and strong materials, heat resistant coatings in the engines 
to allow higher combustion temperatures and efficiency, electronic components, solar 
energy panels (in spacecraft), fire retardant materials etc.8
8 See for more examples Nanoforum, Benefits chapter in “Benefits, Risks, Ethical, Legal 
and Social Aspects of Nanotechnology”, 2004/2005, published online at 
www.nanoforum.org (accessed 28-11-2005); NanoroadSME project, “SWOT analysis 
concerning the use of nanomaterials in the automotive sector”, and “SWOT analysis 
concerning the use of nanomaterials in the aeronautics sector”, 2005, published online at 
www.nanoroad.net (accessed 28-11-2005); Wolfgang Luther, “Applications of 
Nanotechnology in Space Developments and Systems”, 2003, VDI-Technology Center 
Düsseldorf, can also be downloaded from www.zukuenftigetechnologien.de
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Cars and planes incorporating nanotechnology look exactly the same as other cars and 
planes. Including nanotechnology in transport and space does not introduce new ethical 
questions, other than general issues related to sustainable development and risk perception 
which are not specific to nanotechnology. Nanotechnology may lead to benefits such as 
saving energy and raw materials used in transport and space, or give rise to new specific 
health or environmental risks of the nanoparticles, nanostructured materials or nanodevices. 
The benefits may be cancelled out if transport and space technologies incorporating 
nanotechnology lead to lower costs and therefore higher use of transport and space 
technologies. Such rebound effects have occurred in the past and are likely to occur again. 
(Ellen et al, 2005) The risks may be remediated by introducing new risk assessment 
methods and regulations before bringing the nano-inclusive technologies to market. 
(SCENIHR, 2005, IRGC, 2006)
1.9 Energy
Nanomaterials and nanodevices can be applied for energy applications in a broad range of 
different forms. Both new sustainable energy production and existing fossil or nuclear 
energy production methods can become more efficient or cheaper by incorporating 
nanomaterials and devices. Nanotechnologies can be applied in energy production 
technologies, in energy saving, transportation, storage and energy consuming technologies. 
Energy production technologies benefiting from nanotechnologies may be solar 
Photovoltaic cells incorporating nanostructured thin film materials rather than sawn 
crystalline silicon plates. Combustion of fossil fuels can become more efficient by applying 
high energy resistant nanostructured coatings, or by nanocatalysts. Both allow more 
efficient combustion at a higher temperature. An example of an energy saving 
nanotechnology is nanofoam which is transparent to visible light, and reflects heat 
radiation. Nanofoam can consist of polymer strengthened by nanoclay platelets. The 
material is about to enter the market, and may be applied in greenhouses or double glazing. 
Energy transportation can benefit for example from fire retardant cable insulation materials. 
Energy storage can be improved by nanostructured rechargeable battery materials or 
materials for hydrogen storage. Energy conversion technologies which may benefit from 
nanomaterials include fuel cells, where hydrogen can be produced by splitting water 
electronically, or electricity and water can be produced by recombining hydrogen with 
oxygen. Energy consumption technologies benefiting from nanomaterials and devices 
include LED lighting. (Nanoroadsme, 2005, ObservatoryNano, 2009a)
In these energy applications, nanomaterials and devices are only a potential part of the new 
technologies, and other alternative materials and devices are also being developed for the 
same applications. “Nano-energy” will not become available, but “nanotechnology may
ObservatoryNano website, General Sector Reports: Aerospace, Automotive & Transport, 
www. observatorynano. org
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help solve the world’s energy problems” in the future, as the title of a report of Nanoforum 
on the topic states. (Nanoforum, 2003/4)
Ethical issues related to applications of nanotechnology in energy technologies include the 
(nano) technology divide. The current global debate on “nano and the poor” focuses on 
issues including access to cheap and sustainable energy production for people in off-grid 
areas in developing countries. Cheaper, more efficient and more reliable solar energy 
production can contribute more to a higher standard of living in developing countries than 
to more sustainable energy production in Western countries with a high availability of 
electricity and other conventional sources of energy. This can be realised by making the 
right choices in funding research on energy applications of nanotechnologies towards the 
needs of people in off grid areas in developing countries rather than the niches in western 
energy production. Other ethical issues related to energy applications of nanotechnology 
include sustainable development and risk perception of applying nanomaterials in energy 
applications. These issues are not specific to nanotechnology or aggravated by the inclusion 
of nanotechnology in energy applications.
1.10 Consumer Products
Many applications of nanomaterials and nanotechnologies remain in the business to 
business sphere. This is because these materials and devices are not an end product, and 
especially in the early stages of development, most consumers didn’t get confronted with 
products incorporating nanotechnologies. There were a few notable exceptions, such as cars 
(discussed above). Textiles may incorporate nanofibres or nanostructured fibres, which can 
make them water repellent, antimicrobial, or electrically conducting. They are used in 
products like raincoats or self cleaning trousers, odourless socks, or possibly jackets in 
which the mobile phone is woven into the textile. The sports sector is also highly 
innovative and many products include nanomaterials in some way. Examples include ski 
wax, airtight tennis and golf balls, stronger tennis rackets, and snow glasses with anti­
reflection coatings. Nanoparticles have found their way into cosmetics such as sun creams 
or anti-wrinkle creams. The marketing of sun creams including Titanium Dioxide and Zink 
Oxide nanoparticles by companies such as L’Oreal triggered a call for a moratorium by the 
Etc-group and prince Charles in the UK. This marked the intensification of the debate on 
risks and ethical, legal and social aspects of nanotechnology in 2003. By 2011, hundreds of 
consumer products incorporating nanomaterials were available on the market and in several 
countries, governments have initiated public and stakeholder dialogues to identify the 
issues at stake and what would constitute a precautionary approach.
Ethical issues which have already been identified in relation to applications of 
nanotechnologies in consumer goods are mainly related to risk perception, the 
precautionary principle, and whether or not nanotechnology leads to a need for new 
legislation, norms and standards for these consumer products.
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1.11 Construction
Nanomaterials and technologies may also be applied in building and construction. This 
application area is not considered a very important potential market for nanotechnology, 
especially not in the short to medium term. Potential products incorporating 
nanotechnology include improved concrete, paints and coatings. Anti-graffiti or water 
repellent coatings are based on nanotechnologies. Sustainable and smart building materials 
can also incorporate nanomaterials and nanodevices. Examples include the already 
mentioned nanofoam as insulation material in double glazing. Organic solar cells 
incorporating titanium dioxide nanoparticles may be integrated in roofing tiles or office 
fronts. The efficiency of these types of solar cells is still markedly lower than of 
conventional silicon solar cells, but by incorporating the solar cells in the surface of 
building materials, the building itself may generate electricity out of sunlight. Often, 
nanotechnologies which will be applied in construction are being developed primarily for 
other markets, such as energy or information and communication. (see also 
ObservatoryNano, 2009b) Currently, no ethical issues related to nanotechnology in 
construction have been identified. General issues such as risk perception and sustainable 
development also apply here.
1.12 Agriculture & Food
Applications of nanotechnology in agriculture and the food industry comprise a relatively 
new area of research. The Dutch Wageningen University and Research Centre WUR plays 
a leading role in developing and discussing nanotechnology for agro food applications in 
the Netherlands. Also in the UK, USA and China this topic receives a lot of interest. 
Applications where nanostructured materials and nanodevices may be applied include all 
aspects of the “farm to fork” production chain.
Greenhouses or agricultural plastic may become more efficient in trapping heat by 
including a layer of nanofoam or aero gel between double glazing. These types of 
nanostructured materials are transparent to sunlight, but reflect heat radiation.(Luinge,
2005, Schultz et al, 2005) Crops grown in such greenhouses or under such plastic can be 
harvested sooner than other crops, leading to direct benefits for the farmer. Sensors for 
monitoring crop and veterinary diseases may include nanostructured active layers. These 
sensors can be integrated in a physical network or distributed in the fields as the smart dust 
described above. The food and beverage packaging industry is introducing nanocomposite 
coatings with better barrier properties to slow the dissemination of oxygen and water 
vapour through the packaging material.9 (Avella et al, 2005) Active coatings are also being 
developed, which can be antibacterial or oxygen scavenging.10 (Malsch, 2005a)
9 Hay & Shaw, “Nanocomposites 2000”, . . Gordon Graf, “The nanomaterials market is 
climbing the growth curve”, in Small Times, 28 August 2003, www.smalltimes.com
10 E.g. in the European SOLPLAS project,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/research/industrial technologies/articles/article 735 en.html;
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The food or beverages themselves can also include nanoparticles or be structured at 
nanometre scale, either naturally (e.g. colloids in milk) or as novel foods. Fanta is an 
example of a product which is already on the market and includes nanoparticles of carotene, 
which can remain suspended in the liquid because they are so small. A Dutch SME is 
experimenting with removing the fat from colloids in milk and filling them with water to 
make low-fat milk with the same taste as full milk. Some years ago, Kraft Foods was 
developing “designer drinks”, transparent liquids incorporating different ingredients 
encapsulated in nanocapsules. At home, the consumer can “zap” the drink, e.g. in a 
microwave, to change the colour or taste to become anything he or she likes. Water might 
be changed to wine or whisky. (Nanobioraise, 2007) But after some public discussion, 
nothing was heard from this project anymore.
Nanofiltration membranes may be applied for water desalination as well as water 
purification. (Peres, 2004, Hamed, 2005) A more recent overview of the state of the art of 
nanotechnology for agrifood applications is given by ObservatoryNano (2009c).
The main ethical aspects related to nanotechnology in food and agriculture are related to 
risk perception and potential for abuse of nanotechnology for agro-warfare. As in public 
perception of GMO foods, consumers may be concerned about the risks of introducing 
technologies in their food. The ETC group has already published a report covering 
nanofood and agriculture in which they demand a moratorium and prior debate about 
potential risks of introducing nanomaterials in foods and beverages, pesticides, fertilizers 
and soil treatments. They also point out issues of ownership as the topic for debate before 
market introduction of these technologies. (ETC, 2004) By 2011, the discussion has moved 
to the European political level in the form of a controversy between the European 
Parliament and Council on incorporation of nanolabelling and risk assessment in repealed 
regulations for novel food.
1.13 Defence and Security
In the USA, over 25% of the budget for nanotechnology research since 2000 has been 
defence related. (NNI, 2011) In Europe, the UK and Sweden have smaller specific nano­
defence research programmes. Other countries are less open about military nanotechnology 
or may not be working on nanotechnology for defence purposes. MIT in the USA hosts an 
Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies. The main public priority for their research is the 
development of an armour for soldiers which may enhance their physical capabilities (e.g. 
lift 150 kg with one arm), and protect them against bullets. The armour may also protect the 
soldiers against attacks with chemical or biological agents by automatically administering 
antidotes. (MIT, 2011)
TNO, “Bioswitch”, in Leads in Life Sciences 22/2003, Food production Daily 10 January 
2005
23
Jürgen Altmann published a review of military nanotechnology potential applications and 
preventive arms control, based on a literature review and analysis of future scenarios for 
applications in the short (<5 years), medium (5-10 years), long term (10-20 or longer) and 
speculative (what is theoretically allowed by the laws of physics but not the topic of 
substantial public research efforts). He also analysed how preventive arms control of the 
developments he foresaw could be organised given the present status of international 
disarmament treaties or by developing new treaties. (Altmann, 2006)
Most of the military nanotechnology R&D, described by Altmann, took place in the USA. 
His analysis of public information found intelligence agencies and the military involved or 
interested in applications of nano-electronics, materials and bionanotechnology. 
Applications included detection of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Explosive 
agents (sensors for biodefence). Miniaturisation of micro-electronics in general is useful for 
military applications as well. Smaller robots were being developed for autonomous or 
remote controlled weapon systems. In 2003, DARPA (the Defence Advanced Research 
Projects Agency) funded nanotechnology research in new computing systems and 
communication technology, embedded software and pervasive computing, biological 
warfare defence, tactical technology, materials and electronics technology under applied 
research. Under advanced technology development, they invested in nanotechnology for 
advanced aerospace systems, advanced electronics technology, command, control and 
communications systems, sensor and guidance technology, marine technology, land warfare 
technology, classified (=secret) programmes and network centric technology. (Altmann,
2006, table 3.4, p44-45) Naval, Army and Air force laboratories as well as civil universities 
were also involved in nanotechnology research for defence purposes. Simonis & 
Schilthuizen (2006, 2009) gave similar overviews of technological trends.
Altmann found some evidence of existing or planned military nanotechnology research 
activities in the UK, Sweden, Germany, France, EU, NATO, Israel and Australia. He also 
suspected the Netherlands, Russia, China, India and Pakistan to have plans for military 
nanotechnology, even though clear evidence was missing. He did not believe Cuba, Iran, 
Libya or North Korea to be remarkably active in civil nanotechnology, let alone to have 
military nanotechnology ambitions. However, Iran did start a national nanotechnology 
programme in 2005, aiming to collaborate internationally and to be among the top 15 
nanotechnology countries in the world in ten years time. (Mojtaba Mesgari Mashhadi, 
2005) They were not very clear about the priorities in research and a lot of the information 
on websites was only in Farsi (Persian). In 2006, the website of TAVA (Industrial 
Research, Training & Information Projects) mentioned “studying the military aspects of 
technology” as part of the second of a three step evaluation of the potential of 
nanotechnology. (TAVA, 2006)
The military applications incorporating nanotechnologies Altmann expected to become 
available by 2010  include generic technologies that can be applied in civil as well as 
military applications: electronics, photonics and magnetics, computers, memories and 
communication systems, software and artificial intelligence, energy sources and energy 
storage, propellants and explosives. He expected distributed sensors that can be connected
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to equipment or for surveillance on fixed locations. Distributed sensors that can be used for 
verification in the field were expected to be in the size range of centimetres and mostly not 
yet include nanotechnology. Conventional weapons improved by nanotechnology expected 
to become available by 2010 included armour piercing materials. Auxiliary systems for 
nuclear weapons could be improved by nanotechnology. Sensors, membranes, absorption 
and neutralization of chemical and biological weapons may benefit from nanotechnology as 
well. Altmann expected more military applications of nanotechnology in the period 2010­
2015, 2015-2025 and after 2025. (Altmann, 2006, table 4.1, p 106-108)
Ethical aspects related to nanotechnology for defence and security partly depend on the 
political opinion of the person involved. Pacifists will reject all military applications, 
whereas defence staff may welcome weapon improvements through new technologies 
including nanotechnology. There may be a general cause for concern and new international 
treaties or national lawmaking concerning potential applications of nanotechnologies for 
improving weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological and nuclear weapons), or for 
developing new weapons of mass destruction. The development of active implants, drugs or 
other technologies based on nanotechnology for application inside the body of a soldier 
need careful ethical scrutiny. This is a common concern for human enhancement, not only 
limited to improving the body of a soldier. Autonomous weapons (be they large or 
miniaturised) or military robots can also become available thanks to nanotechnology and 
other new technologies. Altmann also pointed out ethical concerns related to non-metallic 
weapons, more effective explosives or other improvements in conventional weapons. These 
issues will be discussed more in depth in later chapters.
1.14 Science
Being able to work on a scale of individual atoms and molecules can not only lead to new 
or improved products, but also contribute to progress in fundamental science, without clear 
practical use. Many Nobel Prize winners of the last two decades or so have contributed to 
the advancement of nanosciences in different disciplines. Binnig and Rohrer have been 
awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1986 for their design of the Scanning Tunnelling 
Microscope. Even today, these and other types of scanning probe microscopes are still 
mainly used in scientific research and technology development. Jean Marie Lehn won the 
Nobel prize in Chemistry in 1987 for his contributions to the new field of supramolecular 
chemistry. His dream is to improve biology by chemistry. Smalley, Curl and Kroto received 
the Nobel prize in Chemistry in 1997 for discovering C60 Buckminster Fullerenes and 
André Geim and Konstantin Novoselov the Nobel prize in Physics 2010 for 
“groundbreaking experiments regarding the two-dimensional material graphene”. In the 
younger generation, Cees Dekker of the Technical University of Delft is engaged in a long 
term research programme studying what makes a biological cell a living cell.11 He does not 
expect to know the answer even after twenty years, but does consider it worthwhile to make
11 Personal interview, 2005
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a career. Between 2000 and 2010, investments in nanoscience had contributed more than 
expected to progress in several fields such as “plasmonics, metamaterials, spintronics, 
graphene, cancer detection and treatment, drug delivery, synthetic biology, neuromorphic 
engineering and quantum information systems.” (Roco, 2010 p lv) New challenges remain.
As long as the nanosciences are still nanosciences, it is difficult to foresee the eventual 
ethical issues which may be caused by the market introduction of products based on the 
fundamental knowledge discovered today. On the other hand, many speculations are being 
discussed about long term future implications of today’s research in the labs. Scientists and 
the governments and companies funding their work defend the investment in research by 
presenting long term future scenarios of how they may one day benefit society. Futurists 
and technology critics foresee other, sometimes negative scenarios of potential risks of 
technologies getting out of control. Science fiction authors and film script writers also 
speculate about future worlds where life has been transformed in totally unrecognisable 
ways, for better or for worse. All these “images of science” (Beaufort, 2005) may influence 
the public opinion on nanosciences and therefore the funding strategies of governments 
which pay the research out of taxpayers’ money.
1.15 Safety & Environment
Nanotechnology may improve product safety and offer opportunities for a cleaner 
environment. And nanotechnology may introduce new risks for human health and the 
environment. The currently known potential health and environmental risks of 
Nanochemistry and nanomaterials have been discussed above. Another safety issue related 
to nanoparticles is the risk of dust explosions. Alumina nanoparticles are being developed 
on purpose as additive to explosives, because they give a bigger bang than micron size 
alumina particles. Other nanoparticles may explode accidentally during dry storage in bulk. 
Potential risks of nano-dust explosions are still not very well known.
Potential environmental benefits of nanotechnology have been discussed already under 
energy, transport & space applications and information & communication above. 
Nanotechnology may also be applied in environmental technologies including monitoring 
of air, water and soil quality, air and water purification and environmental remediation. 
Nanofiltration membranes or membranes with pores with nanometre dimensions are very 
suitable for environmental applications. Nanocatalysts may help clear air or water, or 
remediate soil. Nanosensors may be applied to monitor environmental quality. A soil 
remediation product which forms a solid crust including seeds which can cover bare 
hillsides after a fire to avoid erosion and stimulate reforestation was already available on 
the market by 2003. However, the ETC-group has criticised the use of this product because 
it was marketed and introduced into the environment without prior testing for health and 
environmental safety. This was possible because the product consists of the same chemical 
composition as earlier versions of the same product with larger particles sizes. (ETC, 
2003f) By 2010, environmental groups continue to be interested in the potential
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environmental benefits while insisting on a precautionary approach to potential risks for the 
environment and human health. (e.g. EEB, 2009)
Ethical issues related to Nanosafety & Environment are related to risk perception, 
sustainable development and the (nano) technology divide between rich and poor. Risk 
perception of nanoparticles is new, as has been discussed already above. The precautionary 
principle and different interpretations of this concept is already widely debated in relation 
to nano-including products. The other issues are not specific for nanotechnology and there 
are no indications that the emergence of nanotechnology will aggravate these ethical issues.
1.16 Society, Strategy and Economy
In many countries and the European Union, policy makers and politicians are discussing 
possible risks and ethical, legal and social aspects of nanotechnology with the aim to 
develop new or adapt existing legislation and norms and standards. At the same time, social 
studies of science or other investigations of nanotechnology from a perspective of social 
sciences and humanities is being stimulated by governments. (Nanoforum, 2005, Bonazzi, 
2010) National and international networks of social and human scientists studying 
nanotechnology are emerging since 2003 or so. Governments worldwide stimulate the 
emerging of such a field of ELSA studies of nanotechnology.12
Nanotechnology is one of the first areas where the debate on ethical, legal and social 
aspects of the technology starts at a time when most of the research is still quite 
fundamental. Other areas where this occurs are genomics and “converging technologies”. 
This puts pressure on scientists and science promoters to learn to communicate about their 
research agenda’s and future expectations in dialogue with a general public of lay people. 
At the same time it asks of lay people to develop more interest in science and what 
scientific discovery and technology development may mean for society in general and their 
personal interests in particular. The participants in the dialogue are faced with the task to 
develop new ethical norms and reach decisions on what is allowed and what not in their 
society and on a global scale. They have to do this at a time when it is unknown which of 
the dreams and nightmares of future nanotechnologies will be realised eventually. The 
development of the scientific field of “nano-ethics” is a real adventure in itself. (Grunwald,
12 See a.o. the website of the National Nanotechnology Initiative in the USA 
www.nano.gov , Nanoforum www.nanoforum.org, ObservatoryNano 
www.observatorynano.org > societal aspects, http://ec.cordis.eu/nanotechnology and 
http ://ec.europa.eu/nanotechno logy of the European Commission, the investigation of 
ethical, legal and social aspects of nanotechnology by the Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering in the UK, www.nanotec.org.uk , TAB and ITAS in Germany, 
http://www.itas.fzk.de/ , http://www.tab.fzk.de/ , the Rathenau Institute, TA NanoNed and 
Nanopodium in the Netherlands, www.rathenau.nl, www.nanoned.nl, www.nanopodium.nl
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2005, Dupuy, 2004) Springer launched the Journal Nano-ethics: Ethics for Technologies 
that Converge at the Nanoscale in 2007.13
Since the societal issues related to nanotechnology are either related to the material 
properties or to the applications of nanotechnology, they are discussed under the specific 
application domain rather than under this heading of “society issues”. The debate on risks 
and ethical, legal and social aspects of nanotechnology starts in an unprecedented early 
stage of technology development. This may itself give rise to ethical issues, if it turns out 
that the development of nanotechnology and beneficial societal impacts has been hampered 
globally or in some countries or world regions because of the stimulation of an unfounded 
fear of consequences which later turned out never to materialise. After all, predicting is 
difficult, especially the future. With hindsight, other technology developments which also 
take place today may turn out to be more harmful or lead to more severe ethical 
implications than nanotechnology, without getting the same amount of attention of the 
general public or social and human scientists. So how ethical is the field of nano-ethics 
itself?
Technology foresight and policy making for nanotechnology development and regulation 
are loosely categorised under the heading “strategy”. This implies the development of 
technology roadmaps, research agenda’s, codes of conduct for research, norms and 
standards for measuring and testing nanomaterials, nanotechnologies and products 
incorporating them. Ethical issues related to strategy are the already mentioned issue 
whether early debate about nanotechnology and society will stimulate or hamper the 
responsible development and uptake of technology in society. Also, some future scenarios 
such as Moore’s law in the semiconductor industry tend to become a self fulfilling 
prophecy because all industrial stakeholders involved participate in regular updates of a 
normative future roadmap for the development of the technologies used in the industry. 
Whether such a powerful technology driven wave of social changes and innovation leads to 
ethical outcomes or not, is an issue for debate.
Economical aspects are of course related to all applications of nanotechnology, when they 
eventually make it to the market. Under the heading economy, the process of technology 
transfer of nanotechnologies from research organisations to industrial producers is covered. 
Also public and private investments in nanoproduct development and the related practices 
and regulations find a place here. These practices of innovation, technology transfer and 
early stage venture capital are not specific for nanotechnology, but the first specialised 
technology transfer consultants and venture capitalists for nanotechnologies have entered 
the scene. An investor who takes the risk to put his money in nanotechnology has to have 
enough insight and information about the field to give him at least a reasonable chance to 
“pick the winners”.
Ethical issues related to market uptake of nanotechnology are in the general field of 
“business ethics”. This includes not only complying with the existing laws of the countries
13 http://www.springer.com/social+sciences/applied+ethics/journal/11569
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where the companies are active, but also Corporate Social Responsibility, which means 
contributing to sustainable development, but also warning governments about potential 
emerging risks or ethical issues related to the technologies the companies are developing. 
Such whistle blowing by companies as well as individuals is encouraged and sometimes 
incorporated in national legislation. Currently, the responsibility of the research community 
as well as industry is a key element of the debate about ethical, legal and social aspects of 
nanotechnology. More and more scientists, NGO’s and policy makers are questioning the 
secrecy around risk assessments of consumer products incorporating nanoparticles done by 
industry. They call for publication of these results in the public domain or more publicly 
funded research projects. In several more recent nanotechnology research programmes, 
funding for risk assessment is a considerable part of the budget (e.g. 15% in the Dutch 
NanoNext programme 2011-2015). European Parliament and national parliaments in 
several countries are currently very critical about nanosafety.
1.17 Conclusions: State o f the Art
This chapter has explored what constitutes nanotechnology. Even though the technology 
development has progressed, the main landscape is still more or less the same in 2 011 as it 
was five years ago. It appears that there is not one clear technological field called 
“nanotechnology” separate from other technologies. Nanoscience is an interdisciplinary 
area of research, where physicists, chemists, biologists and other scientists collaborate in 
projects working with a wide variety of materials (such as metals, carbon nanotubes or 
buckyballs, chemical macromolecules or biological materials). The products which will 
eventually result from the research may be applied in almost any sector of the economy or 
society in general. It is not so easy to identify a common denominator in all this.
What may be considered characteristic for nanotechnology is the sheer size of the 
nanostructures which gives rise to new observable properties of the nanomaterials or 
nanodevices and the products they are used in. The surface and other size-effects of the 
nanostructures cause a distinctly different behaviour from the same materials in the gas 
phase or in bulk or with coarser grain size. Not all materials which are structured on a 
nanoscale demonstrate new properties.
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Chapter 2 Inventory of nanoscenarios
Now that it has become clearer what nanotechnology is currently, it is time to broaden the 
exploration to future expectations of what nanotechnology may become in the future. As 
has been remarked in the introduction, nanotechnology is still mainly in the research phase. 
Future ethical and societal issues could be caused by new applications in products and 
systems that are currently under development. Future expectations may already give some 
insight in what issues may have to be confronted some day. This chapter answers research 
question 1b: Which future expectations of nanotechnology developments have different 
stakeholders expressed so far in different parts of the world? 14 Many authors have written 
about the future developments and societal implications of nanotechnology. In this review, 
five groups are distinguished: leading scientists, technology policy analysts, technology and 
risk assessment specialists, NGO’s and politicians. The reason to distinguish the groups is 
that each group’s role in the governance of nanotechnology is different. The groups are:
1) Leading scientists and engineers with a good reputation that develop a vision of 
where there research area is heading in the long term. These visions can motivate 
and influence younger researchers to work towards these aims. The perspectives 
are usually of a “technology push” nature, where the future society is receiving the 
new technologies and changing as a result. In some cases the vision is limited to 
technology and does not deal with societal implications at all.
2) Science and Technology Policy analysts and committees developing foresight, 
roadmaps, scenario studies, strategic research agenda’s, Delphi studies etc. in the 
framework of government or private company policy making on R&D. 
Traditionally, these planning vision only cover technological and market aspects, 
but nanotechnology is one of the first areas of research where risks, ethical, legal 
and social aspects are taken into account in an early stage of development of the 
technology.
3) Experts in Technology Assessment or related areas such as risk assessment, 
environmental impact assessment, life cycle analysis, social studies of science, 
technology ethics, bio-ethics, etc have traditionally studied the societal 
implications, including risks, ethics, legal aspects, social consequences, public 
acceptance etc after a technology had been introduced on the market and the 
public debate had started. These experts are now involved in an earlier stage of 
development in the case of nanotechnology, which means they will have to 
develop new tools to handle unknown risks which may or may not occur in the 
future.
14 This part is an updated and expanded version of Ineke Malsch, “Nanotechnologie en Cult 
(Nanotechnology and Cult)”, presentation for Studium Generale Maastricht, April 2003
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4) Representatives of NGO’s develop (sometimes pessimistic, sometimes optimistic) 
scenarios of our future society or the environment under the influence of 
technological developments. These authors usually don’t have a high reputation as 
a scientist, but act out of concern for potential threats or missing opportunities for 
a particular societal or environmental interest. Their aim may be to stimulate 
public debate. Some lobby for higher investments in the promising technology, 
and other plead for a strict interpretation of the precautionary principle and the 
development of legislation to restrict the potential negative consequences of the 
technology on society.
5) Politicians with an interest in innovation or science and technology develop 
personal visions of how society can benefit from technology development. Not 
many politicians are interested in science and technology, but there are notable 
exceptions.
6) Science fiction authors write stories and film scripts about a future world which 
may be changed because of a revolutionary technology development. These 
authors are mostly not interested in the technological feasibility, but more 
concerned with ethical dilemma’s the new technological possibilities lead to. And 
these authors want to write a good book, of course.
It is useful to place different published “nano-fantasies” in this typology, because it helps to 
evaluate the credibility of the prediction of nanotechnology developments included in each 
vision. The six types can be placed in a two dimensional scheme. The horizontal axis 
encompasses the consistency of the prediction with the contemporary scientific and 
technological state of the art and R&D projects and programmes in progress (high 
consistency on the left, low on the right). The vertical axis encompasses the relevance of 
the technology developments for actual markets or existing societal needs (high below, low 
above).
Figure 1: Typology o f future visions
Technology realism: high; 
societal realism: low
Leading scientists
Technology realism: low; 
societal realisms: low
Science fiction
Technology realism: high; 
societal realism: high
Technology policy analysts
Technology Assessment
Technology realism: low; 
societal realism: high
NGO’s
Politicians
Because we are dealing with new developments which may only be realised after many 
years, this schedule can not be used to decide on what will happen in 20 years or so. It does 
enable making a selection of likely and unlikely developments in the short to medium term
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(5, 10 years). The experience of technology foresight specialists is that long term future 
scenarios are usually too conservative, but short term scenarios are too optimistic. Future 
expectations about technological and societal developments may well become self fulfilling 
or self denying prophesies. (See also Lente, 1993)
2.1 Visions o f leading scientists
In this part, some influential visions are summarised that have been published by leading 
natural scientists and engineers. The visions discuss the future developments of 
nanoscience and technology or of sub areas of this interdisciplinary research field. Most of 
these visions have been widely debated by scientists and other stakeholders to the 
technology development. These debates will not be covered because that would be out of 
scope of this chapter. The current chapter should prepare the ground for an analysis of 
potential ethical issues related to the future development of nanotechnology. This section 
gives an overview and analysis of different influential visions highlighting the ethical 
consequences discussed in them.
Visions of future developments of nanotechnology of four leading scientists and 
industrialists from the USA were examined. Two of the visions, from Feynman and Moore, 
are mainly technical and economic in nature, and discuss developments in the medium to 
long term. These visions are included because they are still highly influential determinants 
of current nanotechnology development. The visions date back to 1959 and 1965. The other 
two visions are clear attempts at foreseeing potential implications for society in the long to 
very long term (30 or 50 years). Smalley is optimistic and Joy is pessimistic about what 
nanotechnology may one day have in store for us. All scientists discussed here are better at 
describing what is technologically feasible than in what is realistic from a societal point of 
view. Furthermore seven visions of future developments of nanotechnology of leading 
scientists and industrialists from different European countries were examined. This 
overview was completed with one Indian vision and one vision from an international group 
of scientists. The time scales of their visions vary between short and long.
Richard Feynman: manipulating and controlling nano-objects
In 1959, physicist and Nobel Prize winner Richard Feynman held the Dinner Speech 
entitled “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, at the Annual Meeting of Caltech. 
(Feynman, 1959) He philosophised about future possibilities to “manipulate and control 
objects on a small scale”. In his lecture he set the target to write all 24 parts of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica on the head of a pin, and to fabricate machines as small as a 
biological cell. At that time, the instruments necessary to work on such a small scale did not 
exist. Feynman proposed therefore to make a small machine and to train this machine to 
make a smaller machine, which could make an even smaller machine, all the way down to 
the level of individual atoms and molecules. He promised two prizes of $1000,-. The first 
prize was for the first researcher who could print a legible page of a book on 1/25000th of 
the original size. The other prize was awarded to the first who could make a working
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electromotor of 1764th of an inch3 (0.256 cm3). Both prizes have been claimed a long time 
ago. Both challenges were feasible with the instruments available at the time the speech 
was delivered. These instruments included electron microscopy and lithographic and 
precision engineering techniques. Feynman also speculated about how smaller structures 
and instruments could be made, without violation the laws of physics, but requiring 
techniques and instruments which were not available in 1959. Feynman’s calculations led 
him to predict that all the books in the world could be stored in a cube of 17200th of an inch 
wide (0.1 mm). He prescribed the development of better electron microscopes, which could 
allow one to see individual atoms directly. These instruments would enable faster progress 
in molecular biology. Computers would be miniaturised, and he suggested making ten 
hands 174000th the size of our hands which could each be remote controlled to make ten 
hands 174000th their own size and so on. Feynman discussed technical objections and 
possible solutions and remarked that making things small would lead to much less 
consumption of raw materials. He also foresaw a kind of competition between physicists 
and chemists to be the first to make designer chemical substances. The chemists could do 
this by improving methods of chemical synthesis and reactions, the physicists by improving 
instruments for working mechanically on the scale of molecules and atoms. Motives for 
working on such a small scale could be scientific curiosity or economic usefulness.
Feynman’s vision was purely a scientist’s view of the future of science and technology. He 
does not really consider what it may mean for society, except for general remarks about 
saving raw materials and economic applicability of the foreseen inventions.
Gordon M oore’s law dictates nano-miniaturisation
Gordon Moore is one of the co-founders in 1968 of the microchip manufacturing company 
Intel. In 1965 Moore made a prediction about miniaturisation of the minimum feature sizes 
on a microchip which more or less still predicts progress in the semiconductor industry 
today. (Moore, 1965) Moore predicted that “integrated electronics” would enable the 
uptake of integrated circuits in a wide range of products, including home computers, 
automatic controls for automobiles, personal communications equipment and electronic 
wristwatches. ICs had high potential in large systems such as telecommunication systems 
and more powerful computers. At the time he wrote the article, integrated electronics was 
mainly being applied in military systems, but commercial computer companies were also 
developing machines including integrated electronics. The advantages he saw were 
increased reliability, reduced system costs, more general availability throughout society. 
The main driver for the development of future generations IC’s was reducing the 
manufacturing cost per component. Based on progress of the number of components per 
integrated function between 1962 and 1965, he predicted that: “the complexity for 
minimum component costs [will] increase [with] a factor of roughly two per year... it will 
[...] remain nearly constant for at least 10 y e a r s .” (Moore, 1965, p 2) Moore predicted 
that by 1975, 65000 components could be included in an area of 0.25 inch2 on a silicon 
wafer. Silicon would remain the material of choice (as it still is today). Moore prescribed 
that this progress in miniaturisation in the semiconductor industry should be governed by
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cost minimization. He foresaw mass production of individual components and modular and 
automated design of systems.
The current successor of Moore’s law is the bi-annual International Technology Roadmap 
for the Semiconductor Industry in which all companies and research groups involved 
develop a plan for the further miniaturization of minimum feature sizes on microchips has 
already progressed below 100 nm. It also expected to move from silicon based systems to 
molecular electronics by 2015.
Moore does not discuss any ethical issues, but the technology push paradigm which has 
been governed by his law for the past forty years has led to huge economic and societal 
impact, with many ethical dilemmas connected to them. These issues are not specific for 
nanoelectronics and have been debated elsewhere at length. The next two American nano­
experts of a later generation (1990s) imagine contrasting future nano-societies.
Richard Smalley: nano saves humankind
Nobel Prize winner for the discovery of “Buckminsterfullerenes”, (football shaped C60 
molecules, also known as buckyballs or fullerenes) Richard Smalley of Rice University, 
USA has been lecturing and publishing extensively about the potential of nanotechnology 
to solve major global problems, especially energy production. In a lecture to the Board of 
Councillors of the University of Dallas, on 7 December 1995, he talked about 
“Nanotechnology and the Next 50 Years”. In it, he extrapolates the trend in world 
population growth since the industrial revolution and predicts that the world population will 
eventually stabilise around ten billion people. He also reflects on the fact that about two 
billion people have no access to an electricity grid and around four billion people live 
below the poverty line. He also presents forecasts of global warming, indicating that we 
will have to replace our fossil dominated energy production with one which does not 
release more greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. To give so many people a dignified life 
in a way which is sustainable on our planet, the current energy supply will have to be 
replaced by non-fossil energy sources. Nuclear energy is not a long term sustainable option 
because the uranium and plutonium resources will be depleted rapidly as well, and the 
production can hardly be made safe in many developing countries, if this is at all possible 
in Western countries. Nuclear fusion is not expected to be feasible in 50-100 years, and 
there is not enough wind in the world to cover the needs with wind energy. This leads 
Smalley to the conclusion that solar energy production must bring the solution in the next 
50 years. He calculates that putting solar panels with 10% efficiency on a surface of 
100x 100 miles should be enough to cover the long term energy needs of the word, and 
argue that this energy production can be realised by nanotechnology. (Smalley, 1995)
Ethical aspects were quite prominent in this visionary speech. Smalley appeared to have a 
utilitarian viewpoint on ethics. He believed that all ten billion people who will inhabit the 
earth in his future vision have a right to a decent life, and was optimistic about the potential 
of (nano) technology to contribute to this. He also included non-technological factors that 
could contribute to sustainable development such as women’s emancipation. This made his 
vision broader than just a scientist’s perspective.
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Bill Joy: nano-future without humankind
In April 2000, cofounder and Chief Scientist of SUN Microsystems Bill Joy wrote a 
worrying article in Wired, entitled “Why the future doesn’t need us”, which raised much 
discussion and concern. Politicians such as the then European Commissioner for Research 
Philippe Busquin were also alarmed. In this article, Bill Joy explained how he started to 
worry about the potential devastating consequences of unbounded progress in Genetics, 
Nanotechnology and Robotics. Joy’s concerns were raised in discussions with techno­
enthusiasts like Ray Kurzweil, and by reading books by Molecular Nanotechnology 
proponent K. Eric Drexler. This made him think about the consequences of progress in 
micro-electronics, computer science, genetic engineering and nanotechnology. Joy argued 
that he certainly is not a Luddite, completely opposed to any technological progress. On the 
contrary, Joy had been a convinced leading developer and proponent of software and other 
technologies as co-founder and chief scientific officer of SUN Microsystems. Joy saw a 
clear parallel to the development of nuclear weapons and the subsequent arms race. This 
raised his concern about the chances that scientific and technological progress may lead to 
extinction of the human race perhaps even in this century. Joy was convinced that 
continuing miniaturisation in the semiconductor industry according to Moore’s law would 
lead to thinking machines by 2030. To avert disaster, Joy proposed a global debate on 
which technological developments are allowed and which are to be banned. Bans should be 
enforced by verification regimes similar to those for the biological and chemical weapons 
conventions. Joy also cited authors in bioethics debates organised by Pugwash, and the 
Dalai Lama. He pleaded for broadening the debate on these issues outside the circles of 
bioethics experts since they are a grave concern for all humanity. (Joy, 2000)
American scientists and industrialists are not the only ones dreaming about the future 
implications of their work. Several leading European nanoscientists have also contributed 
their views to the discussion. In these contributions, the disciplinary background of the 
individual tends to leave its mark. Two prominent supramolecular chemists see nature in 
molecular terms.
Jean Marie Lehn and David Reinhoudt: improve biology with chemistry
In a text book for students on Supramolecular Chemistry, Nobel Prize winner prof. Jean 
Marie Lehn of Strasbourg University included a visionary introduction. The eventual aim 
of the field of supramolecular chemistry should be to improve nature, by combining the 
complexity of biological systems with the breadth and diversity of chemistry. (Lehn, 1995)
A few years later, in a lecture to commemorate the Dies Natalis of the University of 
Twente, David Reinhoudt, professor in Organic Chemistry and director of the MESA+ 
research lab in Microsystems and Nanotechnology discussed future prospects of 
nanotechnology. Most of the lecture discussed down to earth plans for nanotechnology 
research in his lab. Reinhoudt did include some forward thinking. “It is too early to talk
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about a grown up nanotechnology, but the future perspective is enormous. In a few years 
time, the production of scanning probe microscopes has developed from zero to a high tech 
industry with an annual turnover of over US$200 million.” “It is tempting to speculate what 
are the possibilities of computers which are orders of magnitude faster and7or smaller than 
the current PC or supercomputer. Or about functional materials which have been built up 
with supramolecular precision, or about complex laboratories on a chip of one by one 
millimetre which analyse and steer medical and (bio) chemical processes.” “By the 
molecular nanotechnology which enables fabricating functional, complex structures with a 
molecular precision, the boundary between the biotic and abiotic world will become fuzzy.” 
“Nanostructures which are completely biocompatible may replace or repair all kinds of 
essential body fu n c tio n s .” (Reinhoudt, 1999)
Physicists and engineers tend to have a more mechanical view of nature. This is apparent in 
visions proposed by Cees Dekker and Kevin Warwick.
Cees Dekker: Nature is a machine
Professor Cees Dekker specialises in molecular biophysics at the Kavli Institute for 
Nanoscience of Delft University of Technology in the Netherlands. He is a leading Dutch 
nanoscientist, member of the Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences KNAW and other learned 
bodies, with international reputation. He is not only active in scientific research, but also 
plays a leading role in the debate on science and religion in The Netherlands, where he 
promotes the concept of “Intelligent Design”.
Dekker considers bionanotechnology to be a prime argument for the thesis of Intelligent 
Design: “Modern biology of the living cell has revealed a miraculous micro-cosmos. The 
cell turns out not to be just a blob of gel, but is propped up with fascinating 
nanotechnology. Each cell has a minimal complexity with thousands of tiny molecular 
protein machines, each precisely carrying out its function. It is an insurmountable challenge 
if you want to base the evolution of this on merely random mutations as creative, driving 
force. The structure of the cellular nanomachines points rather to a design.” (Dekker, 2005, 
translation IM)
Kevin Warwick: I Cyborg
Professor Kevin Warwick of Cybernetics at the University of Reading, UK, experiments on 
himself with electrodes implanted in his nervous system, enabling direct wireless electronic 
human-machine communication, as well as direct human-human communication of sensory 
perceptions with his wife. He wrote “I Cyborg”, a book outlining his vision of upgrading 
the human body. (Warwick, 2002)
Potential future advantages Warwick sees are memory enhancement, sensory enhancement 
such as Infrared or X-ray vision or direct sensing of the position of objects by the nervous 
system, and enhancing human understanding by enabling thinking in more than 3 
dimensions. He also proposes direct brain to brain communication, avoiding the 
cumbersome step of translating thoughts into speech and then translating it back again. 
Computers might also send signals directly to the human brain, as in the film “The Matrix”.
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He believes simple control by the brain of instruments such as a wheelchair is possible. He 
is not sure whether communication of an image from one brain to another will ever be 
possible, as the brain capacity may not be sufficient for such broadband communication. 
Warwick considers him self to be a technological person, and believes society should deal 
with the ethical questions. (Warwick, 2007)
W olfgang Heckl: nanomeat saves animals
Wolfgang Heckl is a professor at the Maximilian University in Munich and Director of the 
German Museum. He has won the European Descartes prize 2004 for Science 
Communication.15 Except publishing in scientific journals, he has made a name for 
excellent presentations about ethical, legal and social implications of nanotechnology 
development for the general public, including a short video playing a scene from Michael 
Crichton’s novel “Prey” .16 One of his favourite future visions implies that our 
grandchildren will eat artificial meat tasting the same as natural meat, and be shocked that 
we were actually chasing and butchering animals to acquire a steak.
Sylvia Speller: glamorous nanoscience
Professor Sylvia Speller is a professor in Solid State Physics at the Radboud University in 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Speller is the Captain of the Flagship “Advanced 
Nanoprobing” in the Dutch national nanotechnology programme NanoNed. Speller has 
published articles about nano-ethics. In both articles, she demonstrates an optimistic vision 
of nanotechnology, believing the technology can bring more benefits than disadvantages for 
society. However, she is aware of the potential risks for human health and the environment 
as well as for potential abuse of nanotechnology for new biological or chemical weapons, 
and by governments trying to influence the weather or spying on their citizens, and should 
be taken seriously. She is against stopping research in Europe, because then the research 
will move to less democratic countries, frustrating the public control over its safety. The 
best approach according to her is a public debate about nanotechnology. Academic 
researchers should take a leading role in this debate, which can’t be left to others. Military 
and commercial researchers have no interest in openness, according to her. Sylvia Speller 
has a pessimistic view of the rationality of lay persons discussing risks of nanotechnology. 
She pleads for a more extensive participation of nanoscientists in the public debate, to 
explain the facts about nanoscience and nanotechnology. Science should be made 
glamorous again. She also would like scientists to have access to popular movie makers, to 
avoid future scenarios based on scientifically impossible ideas such as hearing explosions 
in space. (Speller, 2004, 2005)
McKeown: nano-opportunities for developing countries
15 http:77ec.europa.eu/research7science-awards7communic-prize7winner4 en.htm (last 
accessed 26-01-2011)
16 See below under science fiction.
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The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO, 1997) published an 
article on nanotechnology in a series of emerging technologies. The author, professor 
McKeown (UK) reviewed the state of the art of nanotechnology, its potential economic 
impact, likely applications, relevance for developing countries and need for training a 
professional workforce. He briefly discussed opportunities for developing countries to 
benefit from nanotechnology or to participate in R&D. The high cost of the facilities for 
nanoresearch would limit participation of developing countries in the research. 
Nevertheless, he does advise developing countries to hire trained nanoengineers and 
scientists who can advise them on priorities in applications and in a later phase, investment 
in technology development in their own countries. Relevant priorities he mentions are: 
controlling and cleaning the environment and improving healthcare. He does not 
specifically elaborate on the needs of people in developing countries which nanotechnology 
may alleviate. He does stress the need for education and training of nanotechnology R&D 
staff.
CNR Rao: nanotechnology develops India
Prof. C.N.R. Rao is India’s most distinguished scientist working on nanotechnology. He 
strongly believes that India should aim to play a leading role in nanoscience and 
nanotechnology development worldwide. He warns that India has missed the opportunity to 
play a leading role in the microelectronics revolution and pleads for investment in basic 
nanoscience research. (Rao, 2007) The country should not only focus on software and the 
IT bubble. “If every science graduate wants to become an IT professional or a ‘software 
coolie,’ it is only indicative of erosion of the foundations in science and engineering. The 
day the IT bubble bursts, there will be nothing to fall back on.” C.N.R. Rao believed that 
only fundamental science and university education could help India reach the level of the 
advanced nations. (Rao, 2000, 2007a)
Kavli foundation: synthesize the future
Global leading researchers in nanotechnology and synthetic biology aimed to "synthesize 
the future." During the Kavli Futures symposium 'The merging of nano and bio: towards 
cyborg cells,' 11-15 June 2007 in Ilullisat, Greenland, they developed a vision for 
converging synthetic biology and nanotechnology. By supporting both targeted 
foundational research in synthetic biology and nanotechnology and research on societal 
impacts and public dialogue, the scientists expected that in fifty years, synthetic biology 
will be as pervasive as electronics is today. (Kavli foundation, 2007)
Summary
The numbers of visions of leading scientists from different parts of the world are too small 
and the variety in each group is too large to make any comparisons based on national 
differences. Many leading scientists and industrialists restrict themselves to technological 
developments and implicitly or explicitly leave it up to society to deal with the ethical 
implications. This is apparent in the visions of Richard Feynman, Gordon Moore and Kevin
39
Warwick. Scientists like Sylvia Speller in favour of public debate on societal aspects of 
their work, reserve a leading role for scientists who they believe understand the issues at 
stake better than lay people. McKeown and Rao are representatives of a growing group of 
nanoscientists interested in the potential of (nano) technology to contribute to the 
development of emerging economies and developing countries.
When scientists discuss societal and ethical implications of their work, the disciplinary 
background of the individual scientist tends to be clearly visible. Chemists employ 
remarkably different models of nature and technology than physicists and engineers. 
Chemists like Jean-Marie Lehn and David Reinhoudt see the world in molecular terms and 
have the ambition to improve biology or develop cyborg cells. On the other hand, physicists 
like Cees Dekker see the world as a machine that they can study and re-assemble. Such a 
mechanical view of nature can be part of quite different worldviews. At least around 2005, 
Cees Dekker saw nanobiotechnology as a demonstration of the intelligent design 
hypothesis contributing evidence to the existence of God the Creator. But others like Bill 
Joy and Kevin Warwick start from a similar mechanical worldview expecting or fearing the 
transformation or extinction of the human race as we know it. The technology push 
scenario is dominant in many views, but some leading scientists including Richard Smalley 
and Wolfgang Heckl explicitly start with societal problems and propose technological 
solutions such as decent living conditions for a growing world population and food 
respecting animal rights. The latter two can be placed in a utilitarian ethical tradition.
2.2 Forward looking reports by Science and Technology Policy 
analysts and committees
Government organisations responsible for funding Scientific Research and Development, 
regularly engage in forward looking studies of the technological trends and potential 
economic impacts of specific areas of research they fund. The same goes for companies 
with their own R&D departments. These studies can be carried out by individual analysts, 
but also by committees of experts. A number of methodologies for research are available 
for such studies, including Foresight, Scenario Analyses, Delphi Studies, Trend Analyses, 
Roadmaps, etc. Since approximately 1995, a number of such forward looking reports 
covering nanotechnology have seen the light. Some relevant reports by European, North 
American and other National and International bodies are covered in this section. The 
reports are discussed in chronological order of publication. In the 1990s, most reports 
focused on funding basic and strategic research in nanosciences, and stimulating 
interdisciplinary collaborations on the borders between different scientific disciplines. The 
main question was whether nanotechnology should be considered a generic enabling 
technology with potential to revolutionise innovation and technology development in many 
industrial sectors or not. Future expectations were kept rather general if they were included 
at all. Potential risks and public debate was not an issue then. In the new millennium, 
potential applications are clearer and the debate on societal aspects of nanotechnology 
including risks, benefits, ethical, legal and social aspects is high on the political agenda.
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2.2.1 USA
The policy analysis reports that laid the foundation for the US National Nanotechnology 
Initiative (launched in 2000) dealt mainly with practical research policy issues. Among the 
original research priorities were a number of Grand Challenges, to focus the developments 
on national needs. Only one new potential ethical issue is apparent in these plans: Some 
questions may be raised by the intention to shift towards bottom-up manufacturing based 
on self-assembly of materials, devices and systems.
The National Science and Technology Council advised the President of the United States of 
America on new R&D strategies. The subcommittee on Nanoscale Science, Engineering 
and Technology NSET of this council has been preparing and giving directions for the US 
National Nanotechnology Initiative since the mid-1990s. In 1996-1998 it carried out a 
study to determine the global state of the art of research and a strategy for the US research 
funded by all relevant federal funding bodies. This resulted in two reports published in 
1999: “Nanostructure Science and Technology”; and “Nanotechnology Research 
Directions”.
The study on “Nanostructure Science and Technology” reviewed nanotechnology research 
carried out around the world in the period 1996-1998. The aims of the report were to:
1) “provide the worldwide science and engineering community with a broadly 
inclusive and critical view of this field;
2) identify promising areas for future research and commercial development;
3) help stimulate development of an interdisciplinary international community of 
nanostructure researchers;
4) encourage and identify opportunities for international collaborations”.
The report concluded that at the time of writing, scientists were able to “nanostructure 
materials for novel performance”; in other words: actually work at a nanometre scale. 
Furthermore, nanoscience and technology is intrinsically interdisciplinary, involving 
physicists, chemists, biologists, engineers etc. Most opportunities for innovation occur at 
the boundaries between traditional disciplines. The study identified what were considered 
the main nanotechnologies with important present and potential impacts. The technologies 
highlighted were dispersions and coatings, high surface area materials and consolidated 
materials, nanodevices and additional biological aspects. Potential impacts were at that time 
foreseen in pharmaceuticals (drug delivery, gene therapy) and medical devices 
(prosthetics), biosensors and DNA sequencing, materials and coatings and solar energy.
The report on “Nanotechnology Research Directions” laid the groundwork for the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative announced by President Clinton in 2000. A key aspect of this 
NNI was a doubling of the federal government’s investment in nanotechnology R&D in 
Fiscal Year 2001. This was followed by substantial increases each subsequent year. This 
report detailed R&D challenges and application opportunities for the US NNI. These 
challenges ranged from fundamental research questions to support measures for building
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research infrastructure and educating the nanotechnology workforce. The report also 
included explanations of potential applications in several fields.
In Materials and Manufacturing, NSET foresaw that nanotechnology would fundamentally 
change the way materials and devices will be produced. The implications were not 
discussed in detail in this report.
Subsequently, the White House issued an implementation plan for the National 
Nanotechnology Initiative in 2000. The plan included seven “grand challenges” for 
research in nanotechnologies:
■ “containing the entire contents of the Library of Congress in a device the size of a 
sugar cube;
■ making materials and products from the bottom up, that is, by building them up 
from atoms and molecules. Bottom-up manufacturing should require less material 
and create less pollution;
■ developing materials that are 10 times stronger than steel, but a fraction of the 
weight for making all kinds of land, sea, air and space vehicles lighter and more 
fuel efficient;
■ improving the computer speed and efficiency of minuscule transistors and memory 
chips by factors of millions making today’s Pentium III’s seem slow;
■ detecting cancerous tumours that are only a few cells in size using nanoengineered 
contrast agents;
■ removing the finest contaminants from water and air, promoting a cleaner 
environment and potable water at affordable cost; and
■ doubling the energy efficiency of solar cells.” (NSTC7NSET, 2000)
These challenges were predominantly of a technology push character, promising 
improvements of technological systems in different industrial sectors. Some societal goals 
were however explicitly mentioned including combatting cancer and contributing to 
sustainable energy and environment.
A few years later, the sub domain of nanomedicine was introduced into a broader strategy 
for healthcare innovation by the National Institutes of Health (NIH). In 2003, the five year 
budget for funding Life Sciences research in the USA by NIH was doubled. This prompted 
the organisation to develop a new and integrated strategy in the form of an NIH roadmap 
process. Through a wide-ranging consultation, they identified three major themes: “New 
Pathways to Discovery”, “Research Teams of the Future” and “Re-engineering the Clinical 
Research Enterprise”. One of the sub themes under “New Pathways to Discovery” was the 
“Nanomedicine Implementation Group”, which planned the installation of new 
Nanomedicine research centres. NIH planned to launch a series of nanomedicine centres in 
2005. “These centres will focus on quantitative measurement of biological processes at the 
nanoscale and the engineering of new tools to intervene at the nanoscale or molecular level. 
This research will help scientists construct synthetic biological devices such as miniature, 
implantable pumps for drug delivery or tiny sensors to scan for the presence of infectious 
agents or metabolic imbalances.” (Zerhouni, 2003)
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NIH also started a new funding strategy for the roadmap initiatives. Whereas before each 
individual institute making up the NIH decided on its own priorities in funding in isolation, 
from then on all institutes collaborated to co-fund the priorities of the Roadmap. For each 
priority NIH appointed one responsible institute. NIH also guaranteed long term funding 
stability. In the process of priority setting NIH involved a wide range of stakeholders 
including representatives of the general public.
In the same year, the US Congress adopted the 21st century nanotechnology research and 
development act. This act called for a strategic plan for the federal nanotechnology R&D 
programme. The National Nanotechnology Initiative Strategic Plan is such a strategy for 
the next 5-10 years. “The vision of the National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) is a future 
in which the ability to understand and control matter on the nanoscale leads to a revolution 
in technology and industry.” The vision aims to achieve responsible and sustainable 
economic benefit, to enhance the quality of life, and to promote national security.
The NNI’s goals are:
1) Maintain a world class R&D programme aimed at realising the full potential of 
nanotechnology;
2) Facilitate transfer of new technologies into products for economic growth, jobs 
and other public benefit;
3) Develop educational resources, a skilled workforce, and the supporting 
infrastructure and tools to advance nanotechnology;
4) Support responsible development of nanotechnology.
The original nine grand challenges of the NNI implementation plan of 2001 were no longer 
a central element of the strategic plan. Instead, seven Programme Component Areas (PCAs) 
were distinguished. These included fundamental nanoscale phenomena, nanomaterials, 
nanosystems, instrumentation, nanomanufacturing, research infrastructure and societal 
aspects. “R&D that focuses on practical applications such as energy, homeland security, 
healthcare, food and agriculture, and the environment, may cut across multiple PCAs.” 
(NSTC, 2004) In the 2007 strategic plan, the PCA on societal aspects was divided into two: 
the Environment, Health and Safety PCA and the Education and Societal Dimensions PCA. 
For the rest, the policy was not changed fundamentally until 2010. (NSTC, 2007)
In 2005, President Bush ordered a review of the NNI by the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). PCAST found that the USA was the 
acknowledged global leader in nanotechnology, but competition was increasing. The US 
federal funding was deemed to be very well spent and “continued robust funding is 
important for the Nation’s long term economic well being and national security.” The NNI 
strategic plan (2004) was deemed appropriate for managing the programme. Environment, 
Health and Safety aspects, Education and other societal dimensions were being investigated 
and discussed. There was room for improvements. Technology transfer should be 
stimulated, through two key recommendations: “The NNI’s outreach to and coordination 
with the States should be increased. The NNI should examine how to improve knowledge 
management of NNI assets.” Environmental and Health Implications should be addressed 
through toxicological research, review of legislation and international cooperation.
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Education and workforce preparation should be fostered by establishing relations between 
NNI and the Departments of Education and Labour, for K-16 education (tertiary level), as 
well as professional associations and societies for mid-career training of professionals. 
Societal implications must be studied and the public must be informed about 
nanotechnology. (PCAST, 2005)
In 2011, the National Nanotechnology Initiative was again adapted. In addition to the 
PCA’s, three new R&D “signature initiatives” were introduced where interagency 
cooperation was particularly stimulated. These included Nanotechnology Applications for 
Solar Energy, Sustainable Manufacturing and Nanoelectronics for 2020 and Beyond. This 
could be completed by other “signature initiatives” and improvements of innovation 
ecology and societal outcomes of nanotechnology. (NSET, 2010, Roco, 2010)
In the US research policy advice over the last decade, technology push remained 
predominant. Still, efforts were made to take into account societal and environmental 
aspects. This appeared to be more attempts at improving acceptance of nanotechnology 
than to target the technology towards societal needs.
2.2.2 Latin America
In Latin America, research policy making for nanotechnology started a few years later than 
in Europe, the USA and Japan. The emphasis was on scientific research and expected 
economic benefits for the countries. The Argentinean government has emphasised 
responsible development of nanotechnology in policy documents from 2005. No ethical 
issues were foreseen in these documents, discussed below.
The Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology (MCT) installed a working group of 
scientists and industrialists in 2003. This working group prepared a strategic plan for 
nanosciences and nanotechnology development in the period 2004-2007. Impacts were 
foreseen until 2011. The main emphasis of the plan was on investments in research, 
infrastructure and education. The main expectations were economic, including development 
of high tech start up companies, uptake of nanotechnology in products and benefits to the 
socio-economic development of the country. (MCT, 2003) In the period 2008-2025, a 
foresight study published by ABDI recommended to the Brazilian government to focus on 
49 sustainable strategic research topics in six areas. These areas included nanomaterials, 
nanoelectronics, nanophotonics, nanobiotechnology, nanoenergy and nanotechnology and 
environment. (ABDI, 2008)
In Argentina, the Secretariat for Science, Technology, and productive innovation SECYT 
of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology developed a Strategic plan for 
science, technology and innovation (2005-2015). This plan was oriented towards the global 
millennium development goals (UN General Assembly, 2000). It included plans for societal 
as well as economic and technological development. Nanotechnology was explicitly 
included as one of five key technologies (along with biotechnology, ICT, space technology
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and nuclear technology). The plan had been developed in consultation with interested 
parties. These actors emphasised the responsibility of the Argentinean State for establishing 
thematic priorities, regulating scientific activity and fixing ethical codes for research. 
Among the specific objectives proposed for nanotechnology were fostering research, 
educating human resources for nanotechnology, international collaboration with Brazil, 
other Latin American countries (in MERCOSUR), Europe and the USA. Another objective 
was “promoting an ethical, responsible attitude in use of nano-objects in habitat, science 
and education, taking into account its social implications.” (SECYT, 2005) Since the end of
2007, the secretariat has been a ministry. This upgrading reflected a higher political interest 
in research and innovation. A new national plan for science, technology and innovation 
2011-2014 was announced for mid-2011. (MINCYT, 2010)
2.2.3 Europe
2.2.3.1 The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, policy analysts have been making plans for nanotechnology research 
policy since 1995. In the 1990s, the plans focused on priorities in research. From 2004, 
responsible nanotechnology development and handling potential risks and ethical, legal and 
social aspects have been discussed in research policy circles. This was in response to 
activities from the Rathenau Institute for parliamentary technology assessment. The 
application areas that were targeted until 2008 are nanoelectronics, nanomedicine, materials 
and agro food.
Some new potential ethical issues were raised in these Dutch plans, but not discussed in 
detail. Nanomedicine was expected to raise both more practical societal and ethical issues 
as identified by RIVM (2005): medical nanotechnology may influence detection, diagnosis, 
therapy and prevention of diseases. But already in 1998, a study by the Study Centre for 
Technology Trends STT predicted that medical applications of nanotechnology could in the 
long term change our views on what constitutes “life”.
Related to agro food applications, nanotechnology may in the long term be applied in 
selection and processing technologies of plant and animal products. Monitoring product 
quality is another potential application. (NRLO, 1999) Some years later, representatives of 
Microsystems and nanotechnology companies, food industry and researchers prepared a 
roadmap for micro- and nanotechnology in food. The roadmap predicted a need for 
governance regarding food safety aspects of nanotechnology. Furthermore, it called for 
policy to balance the interests of all stakeholders in the foodchain from R&D and farm to 
fork. (MinacNed, 2006) Implications of nanotechnology for environmental sustainability 
were deemed unclear by consultants of TNO (2005). An association of nanoelectronics 
industry and research foresaw the need to address privacy aspects as a result of 
developments in nanoelectronics and ambient intelligence. (Point One, 2007)
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Detailed historical overview o f Dutch technology policy reports 1996-2010
In the following text, more details are given of the outcomes of a series of reports by policy 
analysts and public-private nanotechnology associations that are summarised in the 
paragraph above. The next section may be skipped by readers who are not interested in the 
details.
Already in the 1990s, the Dutch and Flemish nanotechnology research community joined 
efforts and wrote a future study on nanotechnology. This project was organised by 
Netherlands Study Centre for Technology Trends. (STT, 1996-1998) The study gave 
overviews of the state of the art and future applications and market estimates in a variety of 
sub areas of nanotechnology. These were nanoelectronics, nanomaterials, scanning probe 
microscopy, and molecular nanotechnology (or bionanotechnology and Nanochemistry). 
The study included foresight of future developments. These foreseen applications were 
mostly restricted to the evolutionary developments in the areas mentioned. These are 
expected to gradually become available in the following 20 years. The report foresaw self 
cleaning textile as a medium term application. By 2006, such textile was already available 
on the market. In the long term the authors expected ethical issues to emerge, when medical 
applications of nanotechnology would change societal views on what constitutes “life”. 
Since the start of the new millennium this has become the topic of debate among social and 
human scientists and policy makers. The authors were sceptical about more revolutionary 
scenarios proposed in the 1990s such as the “diamond age”. In this scenario the production 
costs of manufacturing materials and products such as diamond would be reduced 
dramatically. In the area of molecular nanotechnology, the study extrapolated trends in 
bionanotechnology. These trends included work on ‘molecular motors’ existing in nature, 
and attempts to recreate such motors artificially. The study didn’t exclude Drexler’s vision 
of molecular assemblers, but considered those to be a long term option. At the end of the 
STT project in 1998, the Dutch and Flemish research ministers officially installed a 
Netherlands-Flanders nanotechnology platform with secretariat at the Flemish research 
council IWT. However, the ministers forgot to dedicate a budget for this platform. Lacking 
funding the initiative failed to get off the ground.
One year later, the National Council for Agricultural Research (NRLO) advised to stimulate 
nanoscience for agro food applications, as a follow up to the STT study on nanotechnology. 
The authors assessed nanoscience to be still relatively far from practical applications (5-25 
years). They advised to stimulate academic research on agro food applications in the 
Netherlands, because this is a niche market which received little attention globally. 
Potential applications they foresaw included: studying and modifying plant and animal 
biology, developing precision instruments (as sensor technologies) and computer 
technologies. These technologies were in the long term expected to be applied in selection 
and processing technologies of plant and animal products. Monitoring product quality
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during production and in the food production chains was another foreseen application. Both 
were deemed to be long term developments. (NRLO, 1999)
During the next few years, the Dutch government did not show much interest in 
nanotechnology. This changed after the nanoscientific community managed to acquire 
funding for the NanoNed research programme (2003-2010). Another event that attracted 
government interest was the international debate on potential risks of nanomaterials, 
sparked off by the Canadian NGO ETC group and Prince Charles in the UK. This debate 
was first picked up by the Rathenau Institute. The government responded by asking several 
groups of experts for advice, including the KNAW, RIVM and TNO.
The Royal Netherlands’ Academy of Sciences KNAW issued an opinion on 
nanotechnology at the request of the Dutch minister of Education, Culture and Research in
2004. KNAW concluded that nanotechnology has a great potential and the government 
should invest in it. The academy also discussed potential risks for humans and the 
environment and recommended relevant research and possibly adapting implementation 
guidelines (Algemene Maatregelen van Bestuur). Public dialogue on nanotechnology 
should be stimulated. The academy considered it highly unlikely that it will ever be 
possible to construct molecular machines (nanobots). (KNAW, 2004)
The ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports VWS requested two reports on medical 
nanotechnology from the National Institute for Public Health and Environment (RIVM) in
2005. The first report reviewed the state of the art of nanomaterials and medical 
applications of nanotechnology. The authors limited themselves to carbon based materials 
and inorganic nanomaterials. They discuss applications of nanotechnology in surgery, 
cancer diagnostics and therapy, identification of disease specific markers in the body, 
imaging, implants, tissue engineering and drug administration, proteins, genes and radio 
nuclides. They concluded that most applications were still under development and 
increasingly in the (pre)clinical test phase. They expected that nanotechnology will deeply 
influence the detection, diagnosis, therapy and prevention of diseases. (Roszek et al, 2005)
A group of Technology Policy Analysts of the Dutch national public research centre TNO 
investigated opportunities of nanotechnology for the Environment at the request of the 
ministry of Public Housing, Public Planning and Environment VROM in 2005. The authors 
concluded that nanotechnology offered several environmental opportunities. These included 
saving raw materials, recycling, fighting pollution of air and water, and fighting climate 
change. Especially developments of nanomaterials, nanoelectronics, opto-electronics and 
ICT were expected to contribute to a cleaner environment.
The authors also foresaw threats to the realisation of these opportunities. Most 
nanoresearch was still in an early stage, making the eventual applications and their 
environmental impact impossible to predict. Nanotechnology is an enabling technology. 
Therefore the environmental impacts are not only dependent on the nanomaterials and 
nanocomponents used. The whole life cycle of a product must be taken into account in 
assessing the environmental impacts. Life cycle assessment is only possible when the 
product is available on the market. There were concerns about environmental impacts of
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production of nanomaterials and nanostructures, and the potential toxicity of nanoparticles. 
After introduction of environmentally friendly nanoproducts rebound effects may occur. 
E.g. lighter planes thanks to nanomaterials could be loaded with heavier cargo. This would 
lead to the same fuel consumption as with ordinary planes. Most environmental benefits 
were expected from non-specific environmental applications, like faster electronics or 
cheaper products or materials. The authors recommended to investigate if the development 
of nanotechnology for environmental applications could lead to positive effects in other 
sectors. (Ellen et al, 2005)
In the same period, the research community and industry also entered the policy debate by 
developing roadmaps and strategic research agendas. An overview of these reports is given 
below.
An interdisciplinary group of nanoscientists led by prof. Dave Blank of the UT developed a 
strategy document for a long term Dutch national nanoscience programme (NanoNed). 
(Blank, 2005) NanoNed recommended clustering the nanoscience research in three lines: 
Nanomedicine; Beyond Moore (nanoelectronics) and Functional nanoparticles and nano­
patterned surfaces. This more structural nanoscience programme should complement the 
current NanoNed programme funded from the Natural Gas Benefits (FES).
The report treated each of the three themes separately. It included a general overview, 
national and international context and expected future developments, followed by 
recommendations for the Dutch nanoscience programme. In Nanomedicine, relevant 
activities in Universities, Research Centres and large and small firms were described. 
Molecular imaging, drug delivery and diagnostics were strategic research domains for the 
Netherlands. The authors recommended NWO to take the initiative for developing a 
national nanomedicine roadmap following the examples of the US NIH nanomedicine 
roadmap and the ESF roadmap. Before publishing the roadmap NWO was asked to start a 4 
year nanomedicine “seed” research programme.
In “Beyond Moore”, Blank et al pointed to academic as well as industrial interest in 
nanoelectronics. Philips, ASML and FEI were leading Dutch companies in this field. The 
research was coordinated in the EUREKA programme MEDEA+. Future trends they 
foresaw in Dutch research included lighting, displays, storage, novel integrated circuits, 
design and fabrication techniques and sensors and actuators. The academic potential in the 
Netherlands was also great. The authors recommended NWO to start a “Beyond Moore’ 
research programme. This should include nanoscale photonic7electronic phenomena, from 
organics to bio-electronics, GHz 7THz electron and spin dynamics.
In “Functional nanoparticles and nanopatterned surfaces”, Blank et al reviewed a rich 
landscape of academic research in nanoparticles and materials. Some large companies had 
nanomaterials research programmes, and there were also two SMEs specializing in 
nanoparticles. Future research should focus on the properties of individual nanoparticles, 
controlled positioning and addressing, controlled design of nanostructured materials, and 
the interaction between the nanoparticles and living cells and tissues.
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The authors recommended NWO to improve the collaborations between the research of 
good quality present in the Netherlands in a European and global context. The 
nanomaterials research should also be integrated with the research in the other two themes. 
NWO should also explore opportunities for a Small Business initiative. A national 
programme on “Functional Nanostructured Materials” should focus on “Construction of 
finite nano-architectures and defined materials” and “Investigation of the properties of 
nanoparticles”.
The report included more detailed outlines for sub-areas of research in these three themes, a 
discussion of the industrial impact of nanosciences plus the survey contributions. (Blank et 
al, 2005)
The Microsystems and Nanotechnology Cluster of companies MinacNed published a 
roadmap for applications of Microsystems and nanotechnology in the food industry. The 
association wanted to bring together clusters of technology providers and food producers in 
three areas. These were ‘sensors and detection systems’, ‘emulsions and emulsion-related 
textures’ and ‘filtration and fractioning’. The roadmap included fourteen “roads” for 
developing specific innovations in the period 2006-11. Some applications promised to bring 
added value for consumers willing to pay more. Others were deemed to enable product 
innovations that were impossible with the production processes current at the time of 
writing. The applications were relevant to several sub sectors of food and nutrition. 
Furthermore the technological barriers were clear and expected to be solvable, and ongoing 
R&D in leading Dutch food companies was relevant to achieving them.
In 2006, about ten Dutch companies were experimenting with micro and nanotechnology 
for food and nutrition. Some thirty to forty other companies with their own R&D budget as 
well as many more SMEs without in-house R&D were expected to benefit from 
collaborating in pre-competitive consortia. Because the roadmap focused on the border 
between two sectors, the collaborations were likely to be international. Both Microsystems 
and nanotechnology developers and food producers could possibly find more suitable 
partners abroad. There was also room for system integrators to join the emerging consortia. 
Eventual upscaling of the production of a new nanofood product would require investment, 
but it was not clear by whom. MinacNed called upon the Dutch government to stimulate 
innovation by creating the right conditions including regulation. MinacNed’s roadmap was 
limited to applications in food, but there were clear overlaps with pharmaceuticals and 
agriculture. (Prisma & partners, 2006) By 2011 the same roadmap was still highlighted on 
the website of MinacNed. Funding for food and health applications was included in the 
NanoNext research programme starting in 2011.
In 2007, the Competitiveness Pole on nanoelectronics and embedded systems Point-One in 
Eindhoven published a strategic research agenda. The focus is on technology developments 
in nanoelectronics, embedded systems and semiconductor related equipment for six societal 
relevant application domains:
- Health. Nanoelectronics was expected to contribute to preventive, personalised 
and telemedicine, which is seen as a solution to the rising costs of healthcare. .
- Mobility 7 transport. Nanoelectronics was expected to contribute to a number of 
products for safety, mobility and sustainable power train in the automotive sector.
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The drive-by wire concept proposed gave rise to similar privacy issues as other 
applications of ICT.
- Security. Nanoelectronics was expected to contribute to solutions for personal 
emergency and home security systems as well as prevention of crime and 
terrorism. Three types of products were foreseen:
o Low cost personal and home security systems for consumers, 
o Systems for airports, transportation, seaports and shopping malls, 
o Distributed information systems such as for secure banking and paying, 
and for health information.
- Communication. Nanoelectronics was expected to become part of ambient 
intelligence: making large amounts of information available to anyone anywhere 
anytime, for an affordable price and while ensuring privacy and safety.
- Education 7 entertainment.
- Energy 7 environment. Nanoelectronics was expected to contribute to energy 
saving and to environmental monitoring, thereby reducing the impacts of natural 
and human-made disasters. (Zhang, Begeer & Hartman, 2007)
In a Cabinet Vision on Nanotechnology, the Dutch government was convinced that 
nanotechnology would contribute to strengthening the Dutch economic structure and 
competitiveness. The technology was deemed to offer solutions for healthcare, food, 
environment, privacy and defence. (Netherlands government, 2006) At that time, the 
research programme NanoNed approached its end. Therefore the scientific and industrial 
community started developing a Netherlands Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) and the 
government prepared an action plan. The action plan included proposals for research and 
innovation, managing risks, ethical aspects, societal dialogue and communication, and legal 
aspects. The research and innovation part mainly referred to the NNI. At that time this 
initiative was still under preparation by a consortium consisting of the research and 
industrial community interested in nanotechnology. The government demanded that at least 
15% of the research budget should be reserved for risk assessment. (Netherlands 
government, 2008) The Netherlands Nano Initiative strategic research agenda included four 
generic themes: Beyond Moore (nanoelectronics), nanomaterials, bionanotechnology and 
nanofabrication. These generic themes were complemented with four application domains: 
nanomedicine, food and health, energy and clean water. As ordered, 15% of the proposed 
budget (€100 million in ten years) was reserved for risk and technology assessment. The 
agenda was developed in consultation with 170 representatives of research groups and large 
and small SMEs. (NanoNed, 2008)
Between 1996 and 2011, the emphasis in the Dutch nanostrategy has broadened. In the 
beginning the policy was restricted to nanoscience for applications in ICT and medicine. 
Under the new NanoNext programme (2011-2014) the scope has broadened to include 
grand challenges in four societal application domains (health, food, energy and water) and 
more emphasis on risks.
50
2.2.3.2 EU
At the level of the European Union, research policy discussions on nanotechnology have 
been held since around 1995. Nanotechnology research has been stimulated over the years 
mainly in three thematic research programmes. These programmes have dealt with 
materials and industrial production, life sciences and ICT. From 2004, the EU has been 
developing a nanotechnology R&D policy. This policy explicitly aimed at responsible 
nanotechnology development complemented with public and international dialogue. The 
research and innovation strategy has evolved into support for the research agendas of 
European Technology Platforms, dominated by large multinational companies with 
headquarters in Europe. For nanotechnology, the nanoelectronics ETP ENIAC and the ETP 
on nanomedicine were most important. Other relevant strategies dealt with stimulating 
applications of nanomaterials for health, (renewable) energy, automotive and aerospace.
Also in other European countries, technology policy documents for nanotechnology 
development have been issued. The documents dealt with research policy issues and 
potential economic benefits. Ethical issues were not discussed, except briefly in a German 
report on security applications of nanotechnology. These national documents are not 
included here because they don’t contribute additional insights to the research question.
Detailed historical overview o f EU technology policy reports 1996-2010
In the 1990s, research policy and a technology push dominated strategic discussions on 
nanotechnology in policy advice at the level of the European Union. Already in 1996, the 
European Parliament’s Research Committee requested a study on nanotechnology from 
STOA (Scientific and Technological Options Assessment). The aim was to assess the 
options for stimulating nanoscience and nanotechnology under the Fifth EU Framework 
Programme for Research and Technology Development (1998-2002). The study included 
an overview of potential applications of nanotechnology in the short (0-5), medium (5-10) 
and long term. The long term, speculative applications included: novel electronic device 
technology and architectures; artificial neural networks, molecular computer components 
and systems, advanced surgical techniques, techniques to speed up or realise healing, new 
vaccines, quantum computer, targeted cellular destruction (of cancer cells), new energy 
storage and conversion technologies, implanted biosensors and targeted drug delivery. Ten 
years later many of these speculative applications had been realised or closer to market 
introduction.
This study was followed by a Delphi study published by the EU Institute for Prospective 
Technology Studies. This investigated the opinions of 22 European experts on definitions 
and sub-areas of nanotechnology. The study demonstrated that there was no common 
definition of nanotechnology at that time. Even in 2011, such a common definition was 
lacking. Most forward looking statements of the scientists dealt with proposals for EU
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funding and networking support for nanoscience, and stressed the interdisciplinarity of the 
research. (Malsch, 1997, 1999)
In 2000, an expert group of researchers working on nanoelectronics devices and 
technologies in European Union funded projects collaborated on a “Technology Roadmap 
for Nanoelectronics”. This report was edited by Ramón Compaño, a European Commission 
project officer. The roadmap discussed progress in the ongoing nanoelectronics projects 
within the Future and Emerging Technologies area of the Information Society Technologies 
programme. A range of nanoelectronics devices and fabrication technologies were placed in 
the framework of the global Semiconductor Industry Roadmap. The opportunities that these 
devices and technologies could be incorporated in microchips, integrated circuits, memory 
devices and manufacturing processes in the semiconductor industry by 2006 and 2012 were 
forecast. The roadmap concluded that several nanoelectronics devices were already finding 
their way into niche markets by 2000. Some of the nanoelectronics devices were expected 
to become the dominant technologies in the future. A key bottleneck was their 
manufacturability using standard semiconductor manufacturing processes, simulation tools 
and design rules. The roadmap did not discuss any ethical aspects, only market forecasts for 
specific applications of microelectronics including computers, memories, mobile phones 
etc. These market forecasts were based on the Semiconductor industry roadmap 1999 and 
other sources. In 2001, the Semiconductor Roadmap incorporated this nanoelectronics 
roadmap as a long term direction for R&D.
Some years later, the European Commission developed a vision and action plan for 
responsible development of nanotechnology taking into account risks, environmental and 
societal aspects and public debate. These documents were prepared in common workshops 
together with the US National Nanotechnology Initiative and influenced by the public 
debate on risks of nanomaterials. The EU Action Plan for Responsible Development of 
Nanosciences and Nanotechnologies (2005-2009) included activities aiming at the 
following goals:
- Fostering excellent nanoscience research and industrial technological exploitation
- Develop research infrastructure for working at world level
- Stimulate interdisciplinary and entrepreneurial nanotechnology education and 
training
- Stimulate nanotechnology based innovation
- Addressing societal expectations and concerns
- Public Health, Safety, Environmental and Consumer protection
- International Cooperation. (EC, 2005)
In 2007 and 2009, the action plan was evaluated. By 2011 a new SNAP Action Plan 2010­
2015 was under development. It was expected to be published Spring of 2011 and to focus 
more on innovation and technology transfer to industry than the first action plan.
One of the key issues faced by European policy makers was the European paradox: There 
was a perceived gap between excellent research and lagging industrial valorisation. Policy 
makers attempted to solve this paradox by stimulate the formation of European Technology 
Platforms led by major industry. These ETPs were given the task to develop long term
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strategic research agendas for a wide range of high tech sectors. The priorities in EU funded 
research would be targeted towards those research agenda’s. Two of the ETPs were 
explicitly related to nanotechnology: ENIAC (Nanoelectronics) and Nanomedicine.
A High Level Groups advised the European Commission about setting up a European 
Technology Platform in nanoelectronics in “Vision 2020”. The motivation was mainly 
technological and economic. In order to remain its global competitive position, Europe was 
recommended to invest strongly in innovation in micro and nanoelectronics and systems. 
The value of the global electronics market was €800 billion annually and €5000 billion if 
also the turnover of industries depending on electronics was taken into account. The main 
societal benefits the group mentioned were wealth and employment creation.
The group recommended to provide the following:
■ “a competitive supply chain with no major missing links
■ a competitive environment and infrastructures capable of supporting visionary and 
industrially relevant research activities
■ strategic public-private partnerships in which strong industries share their long 
term visions with research partners and mobilise a critical mass of resources
■ a favourable legal and financial environment
■ an education system delivering a skilled, multi-disciplinary research, design and 
production workforce.” (European Commission, 2004b)
The Strategic Research Agenda of ENIAC focused on society’s needs in five key 
application domains:
■ Health, including active implants (hearing, sight, neuroprosthetics) and personal 
biosensors for (remote) monitoring of personal health status
■ Mobility and Transport, including traffic management systems for road safety, 
road pricing and vehicle tracking, fuel efficient transport and alternative energy 
vehicles
■ Security and Safety, including government protection against crime and terrorism 
as well as business and home security systems
■ (Wireless broadband) Communications anywhere anytime
■ (Mobile) Education and Entertainment. (ENIAC, 2006)
In the area of nanomedicine, both the academic European Science Foundation and the 
industry led ETP Nanomedicine published their strategies more or less simultaneously. The 
European Science Foundation (ESF, 2005) published a Forward Look on Nanomedicine. 
This was prepared by a group of leading European experts lead by prof. Ruth Duncan and 
prof. Wolfgang Kreyling. The study included recommendations on priorities and strategies 
of European research on nanomedicine in the short and longer term. It furthermore stressed 
the need to focus on novel therapeutics and drug delivery systems, toxicology, clinical 
applications and regulation. The authors foresaw a pressing need for trained researchers in 
nanomedicine and recommended to give the exploitation of nanomedicine more attention. 
Research results were recommended tol be presented on transdisciplinary conferences to 
stimulate multidisciplinary collaborations. The scientific community was recommended to
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improve its communication with politicians and the general public about potential benefits 
of nanomedicine, and to understand public concerns. (Duncan & Kreyling, 2005)
A year later, the European Technology Platform on Nanomedicine published its strategic 
research agenda in November 2006. (European Commission, 2006) In September 2005, its 
main vision driving the research agenda had already been presented in the ETP 
Nanomedicine vision paper. (ETP Nanomedicine, 2005) The strategic research priorities 
were diagnostics, targeted delivery and regenerative medicine. The priorities were 
subdivided in applications targeted at some key diseases characterised by the highest 
numbers of patients and economic impact in the European Union. These diseases were 
cardiovascular diseases, cancer, mucoskeletal & inflammatory diseases, neurodegenerative 
diseases and diabetes. Enabling technologies were also targeted.
No ETP was dedicated to nanoenergy. However, this does not mean that energy 
applications of nanotechnology are not being developed. It just indicates that nanomaterials 
don’t play a decisive role in energy technologies. The European Commission initiated two 
European Technology Platforms in renewable energy: the European Photovoltaic 
Technology Platform and the European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform. The 
European Photovoltaic Technology Platform published a vision document by September 
2004. (PV-TRAC, 2004) Nanotechnology was included as a promising emerging 
technology. Nanostructured layers could be applied in silicon photovoltaics to reduce the 
costs and material use. Other nanostructured materials could also be applied in low cost 
solar cells. The advisory committee responsible for the vision document stressed the need 
for collaborations between the PV sector and other sectors including the nanotechnology 
sector.
The European Hydrogen and Fuel Cell Technology Platform published its strategic 
research agenda in July 2005. Nanomaterials were included as hydrogen storage media for 
transport. The materials included activated nanoporous carbon. Also the doped or nano 
forms of the other 2000 know storage materials were to be investigated. (HFC, 2005)
No separate European Technology Platform on Nanomaterials has been initiated. It is 
therefore unclear what will become of the roadmaps for nanomaterials developed in two 
projects funded by the EU: NanoroadSME and Nanoroadmap. NanoRoadSME was an EU 
funded Strategic Support Action which has developed roadmaps on nanomaterials until 
2015 for the benefit of SMEs in four sectors including Health, Energy, Automotive and 
Aerospace. The main purpose of the roadmaps was to assist SMEs considering the use of 
new nanomaterials in their products. These SMEs were expected to benefit from a roadmap 
detailing improved properties, times to market, barriers for market entry and forecasts of 
costs and market sizes of a number of key materials in seven categories up to 2015. The 
materials categories were carbon based materials; polymers; metals and alloys; ceramics; 
biomaterials; composites; and glass nanomaterials. The roadmap was adapted to the needs 
of three types of SMEs: nanomaterials developers, nanomaterials producers, and user 
companies. The roadmap for the Medical and Health sector included an analysis of trends 
in promising materials for applications in drug discovery, drug delivery, diagnostics,
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imaging, implants, active implants, tissue engineering, surgery, cosmetics, food, genomics 
and proteomics. The Energy roadmap included nanomaterials for three types of 
applications: energy conversion and production; energy storage and energy saving. The 
Automotive sector roadmap was divided in seven domains of the car where nanomaterials 
could play a role in the future. These domains were: Frames and Body parts; Engines and 
Power train; Paints and Coatings; Suspension and Braking Systems; Lubrication; Tires; 
Exhaust Systems and Catalytic Converters; Electric and Electronic Equipment. The 
roadmap for the Aeronautics sector included nanomaterials for four domains: Airframe and 
components; Paints and Coatings; Engines and Engine Components; Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment. (Nanoroadsme, 2006) Another EU funded nanoroadmap project 
gave similar results, but distinguished applications of nanomaterials in Materials, Health & 
Medical and Energy. (Nanoroadmap, 2006)
2.2.4 Conclusions science and technology strategies
In the 1990s, science and technology policy was mainly limited to issues of funding and 
research policy including fostering interdisciplinary research. Societal implications were 
mainly limited to potential applications and chances for innovation in several industrial 
sectors. In the new millennium potential benefits and risks for society were increasingly 
integrated in research strategies. These included not only economic aspects such as jobs and 
competitiveness, but also implications for health and the environment. This could be a 
response to public debates initiated by NGO’s, politicians and technology assessment 
specialists. Those contributions will be reviewed in later sections below. Even in more 
recent technology policy strategies, technology push trends remain predominant. Since 
around 2005, EHS aspects, ethical and societal issues and public dialogue have increasingly 
been integrated with research and innovation policies in one comprehensive national (or 
EU) strategy. The trend in risk and technology assessment of nanotechnology from 2000 
until 2010 will be discussed in the next section.
2.3 Technology Assessment o f Risks and Societal aspects o f  
nanotechnology
Technology assessment and other research into ethical, legal and social aspects of 
technology, nanoethics, risk assessment etc have traditionally focused on societal and 
environmental implications of existing technologies. Therefore publications and 
discussions in this category don’t always include future scenarios. When these publications 
discussed future scenarios, this was mostly in reaction to future visions expressed by other 
authors. Technology Assessment publications that included original future scenarios of 
nanotechnology are included in the following section. More technology assessment studies 
and meetings will be analysed in a later section of this thesis. This other section will consist 
of a systematic inventory of publications and events on ethical aspects of nanotechnology.
55
2.3.1 The Americas
In the USA, NSF and other organisations active in Technology Assessment have stimulated 
discussions and investigations of any possible risk or ethical, legal or social implication of 
nanotechnology from 2000. The Canadian Centre for Bioethics and the Brazilian network 
RENANOSOMA have focused on implications for developing countries.
Ethical issues discussed include:
- nanotechnology impact on life expectancy and human physical capabilities (NSF)
- implications for sustainable development, who controls technology (NSF, JCB, 
Renanosoma)
- potential unintended consequences due to uptake of nanotechnology in new 
sectors / products by start-up companies (NSF)
- implications for sacredness and potential harm (Marburger)
- ethical implications of stopping nanotechnology (Bond)
This short list summarises the main findings of the reports discussed in more details below. 
Readers who are not interested in these details can skip the following overview.
Detailed historical overview o f American technology assessment reports 2000-2010
Already in 2000, the US National Science Foundation organised a workshop on societal 
implications of nanoscience and nanotechnology (Arlington, VA, Sept. 2001). The 
participants came up with a number of goals for nanotechnology. The projected total 
market value was expected to be $1 trillion by 2010-15. Manufacturing materials with new 
properties that can’t be created with traditional chemistry were expected to have a market 
impact of $340 billion per year by 2010. (Hitachi Research institute) Nanotechnology was 
expected to generate annual turnover of $600 billion in the semiconductor and Integrated 
Circuit industries by 2010-2015 (R. Doering). “Nanotechnology will help prolong life, 
improve its quality and extend human physical capabilities.” About half of all 
pharmaceutical production ($180 billion) was expected to depend on nanotechnology by 
2010-2015. (E. Cooper) Nano structured catalysts were expected to be used in petroleum 
and chemical processing industries, valuing $100 billion by 2010-15. Nanomaterials and 
nanoelectronics were expected to lead to more energy efficient and safer transportation, 
including a market value of $70 billion in the aerospace sector by 2010 (Hitachi). 
Nanotechnology was deemed to contribute to sustainability, by higher yield of agriculture, 
water filtration and desalination, renewable energy, less need for raw materials and 
pollution. Nanoscience was also expected to contribute to new knowledge and scientific 
understanding of nature. (Roco &Bainbridge, 2001, p 3-4)
The workshop also resulted in a list of foreseen implications. Basic nanoscience was 
expected to contribute to better understanding of nature and economic benefits. Through 
healthcare applications, nanotechnology might help prolong life, improve its quality, extend 
human physical capabilities. Medical nanotreatments were expected to be initially only 
available to the rich. Nanotechnology offered also promises for sustainable development,
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by dramatic changes in use of natural resources, energy and water. Waste and pollution 
might also be minimised and materials, energy and water recovered or reused. An impact 
on energy efficiency, storage and production was also foreseen and more energy efficient 
water purification and desalination. On the other hand, nanotechnology could have a 
potential risk of environmental pollution. Advancements in agriculture, space exploration 
and protection of national security were among the expected benefits. However, the 
introduction of nanotechnology in industry could have implications for the workforce and 
generate a need for nano-education. Unintended consequences could also occur due to 
uptake of nanotechnology in new sectors/products by start-up companies. On a 
macroscopic level, a shift in government structures could arise. (Roco &Bainbridge, 2001)
Three years later, on 3-5 December 2003, NSET organised a National Nanotechnology 
Initiative Societal Implications workshop. The aim was to help them identify opportunities 
for maximising benefit to humanity and addressing potential risks. The report of the 
workshop addressed the question: “How does society design and employ advances for a 
better tomorrow, while preserving what is highly valued by citizens today?” (NSET, 2003, 
p 1) Director John Marburger III of the Office of Science and Technology Policy believed 
Congress took societal and ethical issues very seriously. Congress had charged a 
Presidential advisory committee to report biannually whether these issues are adequately 
addressed and asked for studies by the National Research Council. Congress wanted to 
know whether existing mechanisms to deal with potential risks of new technologies were 
adequate for nanotechnology. Marburger distinguished two types of ethical issues, those 
dealing with sacredness and those dealing with potential harm. But he did not see anything 
completely new in both categories. (NSET, 2003, p 14-15) Philip Bond, [former] 
undersecretary for Technology at the US Department of Commerce expressed ten strong 
messages on the future of nanotechnology. These included: “Nanotechnology is coming 
and it won’t be stopped,” and “even if it could be stopped, it would be unethical to stop it.” 
He had a very optimistic vision about the future potential of nanotechnology for solving 
some of the world’s greatest needs. Bond furthermore seemed to be in favour of addressing 
ethical, legal and social implications in order to avoid public fear and political opposition to 
nanotechnology. (NSET, 2003, p16-21)
Until 2010, the NNI had been funding several risk and technology assessment projects. In 
the period 2 0 1 1 -2020, the aim was not just to stimulate nanotechnology for material 
progress. In addition, “moral progress” was aimed at, including cognitive, social and 
environmental value. Governance of nanotechnology was expected to be institutionalised 
and global coordination was deemed necessary for standardisation, EHS and ELSI research. 
(Roco, 2010, p 442)
Other relevant projects in the USA were organised by the Meridian Institute (nano and the 
poor) and the Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies (on risks and societal implications).
The Joint Centre for Bioethics of the University of Toronto, Canada discussed nanoethics 
and focused on implications for developing countries. These institutes saw many 
opportunities for applications of nanotechnology in e.g. the medical, energy and
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environmental remediation sectors. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and 
Cuba were also expected to improve their employment by investing in nanotechnology 
from an early stage. This would enable them to compete with Western economies. These 
countries could be supported in this through a global internet based network for 
nanotechnology and development. (Mnyusiwalla et al, 2003)
In a later publication, 63 experts participating in a Delphi study carried out by researchers 
from the same group ranked the ten most important applications of nanotechnology for 
achieving the eight UN Millennium Development Goals. The top three were:
1) Energy Storage, production and conversion;
2) Agricultural productivity enhancement;
3) Water treatment and remediation.
They also indicated some potential sources of funding for developing these 
nanotechnologies. (Salamanca-Buentello et al, 2005)
In Brazil, Paulo Martins of the network on nanotechnology, society and environment 
RENANOSOMA criticised the Brazilian strategic plan for nanotechnology, as elaborated 
by a working group of policy makers, researchers and industrialists for the ministry of 
science and technology MCT. Martins’ main criticism was the absence of social and human 
scientists in the networks and research proposed. Martins made concrete suggestions to 
include these. He included some references to future expectations, including quotes of the 
US NSF workshop on societal aspects of nanotechnology and ETC group’s little BANG 
theory of potential risks of converging technologies. Martins’ main concern appears to be 
with who controls the technology. He expected that by 2015, those who control 
nanotechnologies will be the major players in the world economy. (Martins et al, 2007)
2.3.2 Europe
In Europe, there is an extensive tradition in Technology Assessment since the 1980s. This 
research area has been focusing on stimulating public debate and decision making about 
technologies which exist already and are causing controversy. Some projects included 
future scenarios of implications of nanotechnology for society. Most focus was on potential 
risks of nanomaterials or long term visions of converging technologies. Ethical issues 
discussed in Europe included:
- military, dual use or security applications of nanotechnology (Altmann, NL 
government, de Vriend)
- develop short to medium term research agenda for governance of nanotechnology 
(Wood, Jones, Geldart, Royal Society)
- human enhancement (Gordijn, de Vriend)
- synthetic biology (de Vriend)
- risk governance of simple, complex, uncertain and ambiguous risks of four 
generations of nanotechnologies (Health Council NL, IRGC)
Detailed historical overview o f European technology assessment reports 2004-2010
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In 2006, the EU funded project Nanologue developed three future scenarios for 
nanotechnology development until 2015, in order to stimulate public debate. The first 
scenario was “disaster recovery”. In this scenario, society has been confronted by severe 
environmental and health impacts due to nanotechnology release, and there are many 
protests. The second scenario was “now we’re talking”. There, the development of 
nanotechnology has been accompanied from the beginning by dialogue between scientists 
and the general public. This dialogue has slowed down the development but not led to 
controversy. The third scenario was “powering ahead”. In it, nanotechnology has 
contributed to replacement of fossil fuels by renewable energy (solar) and distributed rather 
than centralised energy production. (Nanologue, 2006)
Jürgen Altmann (2006) analysed trends in nanotechnology R&D that may be used for 
military applications. His analysis included defence as well as civil research, because a lot 
of research can be used for both. The applications included:
- Distributed sensors,
- Armour/protection,
- Conventional weapons,
- Soldier Systems,
- Armed autonomous systems,
- Mini-/micro-robots,
- Small satellites and launchers,
- Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons." (Altmann, 2006)
The Swiss Technology Assessment organisation TA-Swiss carried out a Delphi study on 
nanomedicine in 2003. Applications included diagnostics, pharmaceuticals and implants 
and prosthetics. They considered the likelihood that nanotechnology would contribute to 
therapies for a number of diseases including cancer, heart-disease, bacterial infections, 
autoimmune disease, viral infections, and Alzheimer. (Baumgartner, 2003)
The UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) found that the debate about 
societal aspects of nanotechnology tended to focus more on very long term speculative 
utopian and dystopian scenarios. On the other hand the research in the labs was aimed more 
at improvements in existing products. ESRC recommended a research agenda for research 
in economic and social aspects of nanotechnology. This should include governance of 
technological change, social learning and the evaluation of risk and opportunity under 
uncertainty, and the role of new technology in ameliorating or accentuating inequity and 
economic divides. (Wood, Jones & Geldart, 2003)
The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering carried out a well known study on 
societal aspects of nanotechnology in 2003-2004. This study included some foresight on 
applications of nanotechnology in nanomaterials, metrology, electronics, optoelectronics 
and ICT, bionanotechnology and nanomedicine and industrial applications. The report 
recommended substantial investment in research on environmental and health impacts the 
next ten years. It furthermore recommended monitoring social and ethical impacts and
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stimulating public dialogue. Examining whether existing legislation was relevant to the new 
properties of nanomaterials was also deemed necessary. (Dowling, 2004)
In the Netherlands, the Rathenau Institute has stimulated public and political debate on 
nanotechnology since 2004. Then, it published a working document and organised 
workshops and a meeting in the Parliament. In the working document several trends in 
nanotechnology development and future applications were highlighted that required public 
debate on the societal consequences. These included risks of engineered nanomaterials, 
ambient intelligence and nanoelectronics, bio-electronics and enhancement, nanomedicine 
and military nanotechnology. (van Est, Malsch & Rip, 2004)
In 2004, the Committee on Genetically Modified Organisms COGEM published an expert 
advice on Potential Risks of Bio-Nanotechnology for Humans and the Environment. It 
included a foresight study of present and future applications of bionanotechnology in 10-20 
years. It furthermore discussed unlikely and science fiction scenarios and focused on 
potential risks for health and the environment. The COGEM concluded that self-replicating 
bio-nanobots would not be possible in the short term and that risks of engineered 
nanoparticles were a more pressing concern. (Kampers & Sudholter, 2004)
In 2005, RIVM published a report on possible health risks of medical nanotechnology. This 
was requested by the Dutch ministry of Public Health, Welfare and Sports VWS. The 
authors analysed the literature on health risks of nanoparticles used in medical implants and 
drug delivery systems. They also reviewed the existing legal framework for the market 
access of medical products. The legal framework that obliged manufacturers of medical 
products to follow a risk management strategy was deemed sufficient to manage the risks of 
medical nanoparticles. The manufacturers, designated authorities and governments were 
held responsible for carrying out a specific nanotoxicological risk assessment. The 
European Union was requested to develop guidelines for the safety assessment of medical 
products based on nanotechnology.
Medical nanoparticles were incorporated in drugs and implants introduced into the bodies 
of a limited number of patients. This could be by operation, injection, swallowing, 
inhalation, or through the skin. Medical technology was the subject of a more extensive risk 
assessment procedure than other products. The authors warned that there was little 
knowledge about toxicological risks of products incorporating nanoparticles. This was 
deemed problematic because the products were already on the market. There were 
indications that nanoparticles of a certain chemical composition could be more toxic than 
larger particles of the same material. It was too early to draw conclusions about the risks. 
Nanoparticles in medical implants were normally fixed in or on the surface of the implant. 
Only in case of wear they could move through the body. Which risks this could imply to the 
health of the bearer was unknown. Free nanoparticles in drug delivery systems were 
deemed potentially more dangerous. Existing toxicological tests did not investigate the 
toxicity of the empty drug delivery systems. These tests only assessed the improvement 
compared to the toxicity of the medication without nano drug delivery. Uptake of 
nanoparticles through the skin or through the placenta in unborn babies had hardly been 
investigated at all. (de Jong et al, 2005)
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The Health Council of the Netherlands explored future expectations of developments in 
nanotechnology with implications for human health in the medium to long term. It included 
developments in early diagnostics, molecular imaging, drug delivering, antimicrobial 
wound dressing and coatings for implants, active implants, agro food and water 
applications. The council also discussed potential risks of engineered nanomaterials. 
(Health Council, 2006)
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) distinguished four generations of 
nanotechnologies, each giving rise to different kinds of “risks”. The first generation had 
been on the market since 2000. These were passive nanostructures with properties that were 
quasi-constant for the whole life cycle of the product. The second generation were active 
nanostructures, with a function that evolved during its life time. Examples were reactive 
nano structured materials and sensors and targeted cancer therapies. They were being 
introduced on the market since 2005. The third generation was integrated nanosystems such 
as artificial organs built from the nanoscale, which were expected to become available from 
2010. The fourth generation consisted of heterogeneous molecular nanosystems such as 
nanoscale genetic therapies or molecules designed to self-assemble. These were expected 
from 2015 or 2020. (IRGC, 2006)
Bert Gordijn (2005) distinguished three scenarios of human enhancement, or “post­
humanity” as he called it. These were fusion of human and machine, transformation of 
humans, and scanning brains to digitalise the information, and establish our software 
intelligently. In relation to this, a Dutch-Flemish group of technology assessment specialists 
analysed trends in existing literature including heaven, hell and “prevail” scenarios and 
current trends in convergence of pairs of technologies (info-cogno, bio-info, nano-bio, 
nano-info-materials). (Casert and Deboelpaep, 2006)
The Rathenau Institute contributed to the emerging discussion on Synthetic Biology by 
publishing a working document and organising a workshop with the KNAW. Synthetic 
biology combines research aiming to reduce living organisms and cells to the minimum 
genetic information necessary and research aiming to construct artificial life. Future 
expectations includes live therapeutic agents (adapted bacteria and viruses), microbial and 
natural plant drug factories, programming stem cells, biosensors, genetic circuits, rational 
bio molecular design and directed evolution as a tool. There are clear bio security risks 
because of high dual use potential for developing biological weapons of mass destruction. 
The notion of developing artificial life implies urgent need for public debate on ethics. 
Other ongoing discussions on bioethics such as on stem cells and enhancement also apply. 
(De Vriend, 2006)
Until 2010, the Rathenau Institute continued with technology assessment activities related 
to nanotechnology. These included a strong emphasis on governing risks of nanoparticles in 
general and food applications in particular, public dialogue, and nanomedicine in the 
context of broader debates on converging technologies, Human Enhancement and synthetic 
biology. (Est & Walhout, 2010)
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2.3.3 Summary Technology Assessment
The discussions by Technology Assessment specialists of ethical and societal aspects of 
nanotechnology were either general or focused on one particular aspect or application 
domain. The general discussions remained rather superficial, merely listing the issues rather 
than analysing them in depth. The more in-depth analyses were of three kinds. Some 
focused on risk governance of engineered nanomaterials. Others discussed long term 
speculative scenarios of converging technologies, human enhancement or synthetic 
biology. And yet others were ongoing discussions of ethical and societal aspects of sectors 
where nanotechnology could be applied such as security and militarization, medical ethics 
or the technology divide between rich and poor.
2.4 Non Governmental Organisations
Several Non Governmental Organisations issued statements on or taken part in discussions 
on nanotechnology. The concerns were mostly about what nanotechnology may mean for 
the societal interests they represent. Some organisations like the Foresight Institute and the 
Transhumanism association promoted high technology driven societal change in the very 
long term (e.g. fully recyclable molecular manufacturing, improving humans and life 
extension). Some of their views were ethically offensive to other groups in society, such as 
the World Council of Churches.
Other NGOs were concerned with two issues. The first was handling risks of 
nanotechnology and interpretations of the precautionary principle, grey or green goo 
hypothesis. The second was sustainable nanotechnology development (environment, 
developing countries).
The Canadian-based international NGO ETC group (Erosion, Technologies and Control) 
has probably been the most active NGO in the international public debate on 
nanotechnology. It is certainly the one responsible for setting the agenda for the debate on 
risk governance. Already in 2003 it pointed to the potential environmental and safety risks 
of “Green Goo”. This included applications of nanobiotechnology that could behave 
unpredictably and create unforeseen biohazards. (ETC group, 2003)
ETC group drew the attention of NGOs and the general public to developments in 
nanotechnologies and converging technologies down to atomic scale in a critical report in 
January 2003. It expected both uptake of nanomaterials in a wide range of products and the 
emergence of “bionic organisms” by 2015. It highlighted concerns about potential 
unforeseen risks of engineered nanomaterials for health and the environment and the lack of 
awareness and a forum for public debate about societal aspects. It recommended a 
moratorium on commercial production of new nanomaterials and evaluating the 
environmental, health and safety consequences. Molecular manufacturing in their view
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posed “enormous environmental and safety risks and should not proceed -  even in the 
laboratory -  in the absence of broad societal understanding and assessment. ETC group 
recommended government and civil society organisations to establish an International 
Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies ICENT. (ETC group, 2003b) The plea 
for a moratorium on commercial production of engineered nanomaterials was reiterated in 
an occasional paper in April 2003. (ETCgroup, 2003d) Subsequently, Prince Charles voiced 
concerns about the grey goo hypothesis, after reading the ETC group report “The Big 
Down”. (ETC group, 2003e)
Also in 2003, the ETC group critically discussed the converging technologies scenarios 
proposed in the NSF funded workshop on Converging technologies in 2001 (see Roco & 
Bainbridge, 2002). ETC group launched a pessimistic version of the NBIC (Nano-Bio-Info- 
Cogno) scenario entitled the little BANG (Bits, Atoms, Neurons, Genes) scenario. It 
criticised the inherent aim towards economic growth and American military hegemony. 
ETC group furthermore pleaded for a strict interpretation of the precautionary principle and 
broad societal dialogue before any of the projects or the general approach towards 
converging technologies should go forward. (ETC group 2003c)
In November 2004, ETC group issued another critical report on agro food applications of 
nanotechnology and synthetic biology. It reiterated its plea for broad public debate, 
regulation and toxicology research, and a moratorium: “in keeping with the Precautionary 
Principle, all food, feed and beverage products (including nutritional supplements) 
incorporating manufactured nanoparticles should be removed from the shelves until such 
time as regulatory regimes are in place that take into account the special characteristics of 
these materials, and until the products have been shown to be safe.” It also asked for a 
moratorium on environmental release of nanopesticides and on laboratory research and 
environmental release of synthetic biology. The group repeated their plea for an 
International Convention for the Evaluation of New Technologies. (ETC group, 2004)
In October 2006 the Latin American Regional Secretariat Rel-UITA of the International 
Union of Agriculture and Food Workers IUF voted in favour of a resolution calling for 
public debate on nanotechnology. In March 2007, the same resolution was also approved 
by the 25th congress of the whole IUF, representing 12 million workers in 122 countries 
worldwide. The IUF resolution included six points:
1) “to mobilize our affiliate organisations and urge them to discuss with the rest of 
society and governments the possible consequences of nanotechnology
2) to demand that governments and international organisations concerned apply the 
precautionary principle, prohibiting the sale of food, beverages and fodder, and all 
agricultural inputs which contain nanotechnology, until it is shown that they are 
safe and to approve an international system of regulation specifically designed to 
analyse these products
3) to demand that national and international patent organisations like the World 
International Patent Organisation (WIPO), decline to register all patent 
applications utilizing nanotechnology in the food industry and agriculture, until
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larger issues such as their social and environmental impact have been assessed 
with the participation of all stakeholders
4) to demand that the World Health Organisation WHO and the United Nations Food 
and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) update the Codex Alimentarius, taking into 
account the use of nanotechnology in food and agriculture
5) to request the WHO to initiate short and long-term studies into the potential effects 
of nanotechnology -especially nanoparticles -  on the health of the technicians and 
workers that produce them, users and consumers
6) to request the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to carry out an urgent study 
into the possible impact of nanotechnology on conditions of work and employment 
in agriculture and the food industry. Following completion of the study, a 
Tripartite conference on the subject must be convened as soon as possible.” 
(Foladori & Invernissi, 2007)
Even though many NGO’s tend to focus on the risk governance of nanomaterials, not all 
are of the same opinion. An example of a more nuanced vision is the primary reaction of 
Greenpeace UK. In 2003, this organisation issued a balanced report assessing current and 
future developments in nanotechnology, artificial intelligence and robotics. Greenpeace 
found that the research which was taking place in the labs could lead to innovations in ICT, 
pharmaceuticals and renewable (solar) energy. The Grey Goo scenario was deemed 
unlikely. Greenpeace was more concerned about the potential development of “Green Goo” 
by convergence of nanotechnology and biotechnology. They were also worried about 
potential risks of engineered nanomaterials. Greenpeace favoured continued monitoring of 
developments and accompanying public debate. (Arnall, 2003) Later Greenpeace adopted a 
more critical stance.
Religious groups don’t just focus on the risk debate. Such groups also tend to discuss 
converging technologies and long term visions about radical impacts on human 
enhancement and society. To give an example, a group of experts of the World Association 
for Christian Communication and the World Council of Churches issued a report on 
convergent technologies in 2005. The authors analysed trends in convergent technologies 
and visions about the power of nanotechnology. The report explained why government and 
commercial interests seek to control it. Enhancement visions were expected to transform 
the social group of people with disabilities. Five models of disability were presented. The 
first model was the Medical Model of “Disability/Impairment”. In this model, disability is 
considered to be a defect to be cured, and the disabled person a subnormal patient. The 
second model was the Medical model/social determinants/social well-being combination 
model of “disability/impairment”. In this model, the social circumstances of disabled 
people should be changed to accommodate their needs. The Medical 
model/transhumanist/enhancement determinants/social well-being combination model of 
“disability/impairment” considered disabled people as inherently defective, and open to 
enhancement to or even beyond the norm for species-typical boundaries. The pure 
transhumanist model of “disability/impairment” saw every human body as defective and in 
need of improvement beyond species typical boundaries. Everyone was deemed to be 
disabled. The final Social model of disability saw disabled people as a variation of being,
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not in need of fixing, but to be surrounded by the right societal climate to accommodate 
their biological reality. The distinction between disabled and non-disabled was blurred by 
the increasing emphasis on individualised interventions. (Lee and Robra, 2005)
These examples of NGO-contributions to the debate does not give a comprehensive 
overview. It is enough to give an idea of the general priorities of civil society actors who 
take the trouble to get involved in the debate on nanotechnology. Most NGOs stay out of 
the debate because of lack of time and resources. Or it could be because they don’t see the 
relation with their concerns. In the last few years several governments have actively 
stimulated NGO participation, sometimes even funding their participation in projects. The 
European Commission funded the NanoCAP17 project (2006-2009). This project aimed to 
assist trade unions and environmental groups to develop their own position. Furthermore 
the Dutch Societal Dialogue on Nanotechnology subsidised 35 projects by civil society and 
companies in 2010.18
2.5 Politicians
Not many politicians have taken interest in nanotechnology and discussed potential societal 
and ethical aspects. Only few ethical issues were discussed by politicians until 2007. Most 
interest was apparent in issues of governance and responsible nanotechnology 
development. These issues were discussed by US President Clinton, Israel’s President 
Peres, India’s President Kalam, the Brazilian president, EU Research Commissioner 
Potocnic and Parliaments in Argentina and the UK. The French Senate was in particular 
concerned about the ethics of nanomedicine. Israel’s President Peres and the Argentinean 
Parliament discussed military and dual use nanotechnology and foreign military funding. 
Longer term aspects were also discussed. The US Congress was concerned about 
unpredictable societal impacts after 2020 and UK Prince Charles and the Brazilian 
parliament were concerned about the grey goo hypothesis. The reader who is not interested 
in more detailed information on the different positions can skip the following section.
Summaries o f politician’s views
USA
In 2000, President Bill Clinton of the USA announced the National Nanotechnology 
Initiative in a more general speech on the US federal science and technology policy: “My 
budget supports a major new nanotechnology initiative worth $500 million ... Just imagine, 
materials with 10 times the strength of steel and only a fraction of the weight; shrinking all 
the information at the Library of Congress into a device the size of a sugar cube; detecting 
tumours that are only a few cells in size. Some of these research goals will take 20 or more
17 http://www.nanocap.eu/Flex/Site/Page4662.html?PageID=%26Lang=
18 www.nanopodium.nl
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years to achieve. But that is why ... there is such a critical role for the federal government.” 
(Clinton, 2000)
At the end of his speech, Clinton discussed ethics of science and technology: “It is up to all 
of us to figure out how to use the new powers that science and technology give us in a 
responsible way. Just because we can do something doesn’t mean we should. It is 
incumbent, therefore, upon both scientists and public servants to involve the public in a 
great debate to ensure that science serves humanity -  always -  and never the other way 
around.” “I think the supreme irony of our time is that I can come here as President and 
have the high honour of discussing these unfathomable advances wrought by the human 
intellect, that have occurred and the even greater ones yet to occur, in a world where the 
biggest social problem is the oldest demon of human society -  we are still afraid of people 
who aren’t like us. And fear leads to distrust, and distrust leads to dehumanization, and 
dehumanization leads to violence.” ... “You have the power to put science and technology 
at work advancing the human condition as never before. Always remember to keep your 
values at the core of what you do. And tell every one of your fellow citizens, and indeed 
people with whom you come in contact all across the world, that every single scientific 
advance confirms over and over again the most important fact of life -  our common 
humanity.” (Clinton, 2000)
The 21st century nanotechnology research and development act was adopted by the US 
Congress on 3 December 2003. The act outlines a comprehensive National Nanotechnology 
Initiative plan (FY2005-FY2008) including a budget. Research on ethical, legal and social 
aspects of nanotechnology is incorporated in the Act. (US Congress, 2003)
A few years later, the Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress analysed current 
trends and future expectations of nanotechnology and its societal impact. They reviewed the 
governments' current nanotechnology policy and made some suggestions for improvement. 
The report started with an explanation of nanotechnology and available products. Then, 
they analysed the progression of nanotechnology from passive nanostructures (2000-2005), 
via active nanostructures (2005-2010), systems of nanosystems (2010-2015), molecular 
nanosystems (2015-2020) as proposed by Roco. They added a fifth phase, the singularity 
(2020 and beyond), where nanotechnology will have generated unpredictable changes in 
society. The report continued with an analysis of the structure of nanotechnology, and 
found that the present structure of independent research funding bodies was unsuitable for 
funding truly interdisciplinary research in nanotechnology. It recommended more authority 
for the National Nanotechnology Initiative in resource allocation. The report also discussed 
potential threats of nanotechnology for society, and recommended more emphasis on public 
dialogue and research on ethical, legal, social aspects and environment, health and safety to 
enable informed decision making involving all stakeholders. (Saxton, 2007)
Argentina
In Argentina, the president launched the Argentinean Nanotechnology Foundation (FAN) 
by decree 380/2005 on 29 April 2005. This gave rise to much political and public debate, 
including in congress, the Argentine Physics Association and the National Committee on
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Ethics in Science and Technology (Foladori, 2006). The main issues are political, including 
fear of foreign military funding, and economic. The FAN was launched without the need 
for approval by the congress. The government announced an investment of $10 million in 
it.
According to Alejandro Fainstein of CNEA (personal communication, 15 January 2008) the 
FAN involved an agreement with Lucent Technologies (US), which implied that the local 
researchers and engineers would have preferential access to the Lucent (state-of-the-art) 
fabrication facilities in New Jersey. In the case that Lucent people, or their facility, was part 
of a development, of course Lucent would have rights on the products as in any C&T 
agreement between parts. The rights were shared with FAN, the details depending on the 
specific development. On the other hand, the FAN was completely free to make other 
agreements with whatever other Company in the world they wished, and to use any other 
fabrication facility as the foundries typically used by MEMs developers. In these latter 
cases, Lucent had no involvement whatsoever in the patents or products developed.
In June 2005, the congress discussed a ten year nanotechnology development plan proposed 
by the technology commission headed by Mrs. Lilia Puig de Stubrin. (Sametband, 2005) 
Several congress delegates have proposed “proyectos de ley” (legislative projects in 2005 
and 2006) which indicates that there is still a lot of political interest in nanotechnology and 
its implications for the Argentinian economy and society. On 31 March 2005, Jorge Raul 
Giorgetti proposed creating the “Argentinian Institute of Nanotechnology,” before the 
Presidential decree which was issued a month later. On 13 May 2005, the congress adopted 
a resolution asking the executive for information about the objectives of science policy and 
the creation of the FAN. On 2 June 2005, Lilia Puig de Stubrin and colleagues proposed the 
abovementioned “ten year strategic plan for developing micro and nanotechnologies.” One 
and a half years later, Miguel Dante Dovena and Jorge Raul Giorgetti tabled a proposal 
entitled: “Nanotechnology, regime for its industry,” on 7 December 2006. The 
parliamentarians participating in the debate demonstrate concerns about how to ensure that 
Argentinian companies and the economy and society at large can benefit from the 
investment in nanotechnology. They cite several articles by international scholars about 
applications of nanotechnology for developing countries. Puig de Stubrin and colleagues 
propose to collaborate with Brazil, Chile and Mexico in funding joint nanotechnology 
facilities. Dovena and Giorgetti propose to install the Argentinian Nanotechnology Institute 
IANATEC, which should develop and manage a national nanotechnology development 
plan with annual government funding of 0.05% of the budget of the national administration. 
The main aim is to enhance the productivity of the Argentinian economy, by enhancing the 
access of the Argentinian public and private sector to key technologies including 
nanotechnology. This should contribute indirectly to poverty reduction and the existing 
disparities in the Argentinian society. (Source: Argentinian Parliament website)
The Member of the Chamber of Representatives Edson Duarte of PV-BA tabled a proposal 
for a law on nanotechnology in 2005. This proposal aimed to cover research and use of 
nanotechnology in the country, to create a national technical committee for nanosecurity 
(CTNano), and to install a fund for development of nanotechnology (FDNano). The main 
concern of the representative was to prevent the potential risks of artificial nanobots which
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might in the future replicate in an uncontrolled way and pose unimagined risks for 
humanity and the environment. He based his vision on the support of dozens of experts, 
especially Dr Eliana Moreira, professor in environmental governance of the University 
Centre of Para and professor Paulo Martins of the Institute for Technological Research IPT 
of Sao Paulo. (Duarte, 2005)
His colleague, Representative Leo Alcantara, analysed the proposal and recommended the 
Committee for Economic Development, Industry and Commerce of the Chamber of 
Representatives to reject it, which they did on 24 August 2005. The main arguments were 
that nanotechnology represents the new frontier in science, and will permeate many 
different sectors and technologies, but that it was still too early to predict concrete impacts, 
and regulating nanotechnology at this moment might inhibit the development and potential 
benefits for Brazil. Besides, the federal government had already installed a General 
Coordination of nanotechnology policies and programmes CGNT, and a national 
nanotechnology programme 2004-2007 existed already. There was no consensus in the 
country how to regulate nanotechnology. Alcantara argued furthermore that several relevant 
laws were already in place and regulated bio security, sanitary oversight, environmental 
protection and patenting life, which were also relevant to nanotechnology. (Alcantara, 
2005)
Brazil
The President of Brazil decided on a policy for biotechnology development and created a 
national committee for biotechnology and other provisions in February 2007. 
Nanotechnology and nanobiotechnologies were explicitly mentioned as important future 
technological developments. Foreseen applications were in biomaterials and future 
technologies for human health, agriculture (especially controlled release of animal feed, 
vegetal nutrition and pesticides), and industrial biotechnologies. The President proposed to 
install national research networks in several areas including nanobiotechnology. (Presidente 
da republica, 2007)
UK
As mentioned before, in April 2003, Prince Charles sparked fierce debate about 
nanotechnology in the UK. He called a crisis meeting with scientists at his home in 
Highgrove, and expressing fears about the Grey Goo scenario and its potential for 
destroying life on earth. (Rhodie 2003) Prime Minister Tony Blair had promoted 
nanotechnology. He said it was in the interest of the UK and could in the future be used in 
cures for diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria, during a speech to the Royal Society in 
May 2002. (Blair 2002) The Chairman of the Commons Science Committee, Ian Gibson 
asked Prince Charles not to interfere in the public debate. (Rhodie, 2003) Science minister 
Lord Sainsbury reacted and said the grey goo scenario was science fiction. He trusted that 
realistic potential risks of nanotechnology would be covered by existing legislation. The 
government planned to look into the relevance of existing legislation. (BBC, 2003) Lord
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May, President of the Royal Society announced a study by the Royal Society and Royal 
Academy of Engineering on societal aspects of nanotechnology. (Highfield, 2003)
In the course of this project, Prince Charles published an article in the Independent on 
Sunday, expressing agreement with the activities of the Royal Society and Royal Academy 
of Engineering to stimulate public debate. (Royal Society, 2004)
After Prince Charles put nanotechnology on the political agenda in the UK, the House of 
Commons debated the issues in July 2003. Dr Andrew Murrison of Westbury introduced 
the topic: “I am delighted to have the opportunity to lead the first debate in Parliament on a 
technology that has the potential to revolutionise the way we live.” He was not convinced 
by horror scenarios like Michael Crichton’s novel Prey and Prince Charles’ fears for Grey 
Goo. However he remarked that nanotechnology was already used in existing products such 
as antibiotics. Nanotubes might pose new occupational health risks, which could 
presumably be dealt with by existing legislation. Murrison stated: “It appears to have 
dawned on the Government later than on most that nanotechnology could revolutionise 
manufacturing and commerce and that we had better address it.” He considered 
nanotechnology to be more pervasive than Genetic Modification. Murrison furthermore 
supported the roadmap included in the UK strategy report on nanotechnology (DTI, 2002). 
Murrison criticised the Royal Society study on societal aspects of nanotechnology chaired 
by Professor Ann Dowling for being “not entirely clear what more Ministers hoped to get 
from that”. He was concerned that the study would emphasise the potential risks and 
regulations more than the opportunities. However, Murrison was in favour of public debate. 
He highlighted the need for proper funding and to take into account possible European 
Union initiatives for regulating nanotechnology. He stressed that the government should 
learn from the GM debate.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Trade and Industry Nigel Griffiths 
explained the government plans for investing £184 million in nanotechnology including 
£90 new funding for the next 6 years. This was in accordance with the roadmap proposed in 
the UK strategy report. The study by the Royal Society should explore current and future 
developments in nanotechnology and whether the technology raised new ethical, health and 
safety, environmental or social issues. (House of Commons, 2003)
European Commission
The European Commission announced its Action Plan for nanosciences in June 2005. 
Commissioner for Research Janez Potocnik explained the reason for this action plan as 
follows: “Europe needs to invest in knowledge to maintain its competitive edge in the 
global economy. Nanotechnology is a key area where Europe is in the lead and we must 
ensure that we stay there. Nanotechnology has enormous potential for European industry 
and for society in general, so a clear strategy and decisive action is needed for research in 
this area. At the same time we must take into account any possible health, safety and 
environmental risks and address them as early as we can.” (European Commission press 
release, 2005)
69
In 2007, Potocnik emphasised the importance of an international code of conduct for 
nanotechnology in two speeches. During the 3rd International Nanotechnology Conference 
on Communication and Cooperation, Brussels, 17 April 2007, he said: “We are active in 
many international forums, addressing new issues and trying to develop a ‘code of good 
conduct’. This is an important point. Legislation and regulation can’t cover everything in 
such a broad and fast moving area. We need to rely on a responsible approach, which 
allows nanotechnology the freedom it requires to develop. But we also need the safeguards 
to ensure it works for our benefit as a whole. One of the best ways of doing this is to have a 
clear code of good conduct, in which everyone can participate, which can act as a blueprint 
for the nanotechnology field. This not only provides clarity and an inclusive approach, it 
also avoids the need for a top down attitude for nanotechnology from lawmakers.” 
(Potocnik, 2007a)
During the conference on Ethics, Research and Globalisation, 15 May 2007 in Brussels, 
Potocnik presented his vision on what globalisation means for ethics in research: 
“Globalisation of research requires better implementation of international ethics 
guidelines. new areas such as nanomedicine . also call for new or adapted standards.” 
Major ethical challenges were expected from benefit sharing and data protection. The EU’s 
leading role in discussing an international code of conduct for nanotechnology was a case 
in point. Potocnik stressed the need for partner countries to implement international ethics 
guidelines in their national legislation. He also offered help in capacity building from the 
EU that has experience in assisting candidate countries integrate in the European Union. 
(Potocnik, 2007b)
France
The Parliamentary Office for Technology Assessment OPECST studied the potential and 
societal aspects of Nanomedicine. Two Senators wrote an extensive report. They analysed 
trends in nanobiotechnology research and potential medical applications. They also 
assessed the relative investment in France in nanotechnology compared to the USA, Japan, 
EU and other European and Asian countries. The authors concluded that Europe and France 
needed to invest more to protect their competitive position. They also discussed potential 
risks of nanotechnology, and considered the health and environmental risks of 
nanomaterials a serious issue. However they dismissed the need for a precautionary 
approach to the science fiction scenario of self replicating nanobots. Other ethical issues 
they discussed include respect for private life in the case of early diagnostics (genetic 
privacy), human enhancement, multiplication of personal data stored in databases, cost of 
and access to medical care, and military applications. The main practical issue was the lack 
of trained nanoscientists and engineers. (Lorrain & Raoul, 2004)
Israel
Israel’s senior leading politician Mr. Shimon Peres expressed his vision of future 
applications of nanotechnology addressing the societal needs of Israel. These included 
applications in water desalination as well as warfare. His first speech on nanotechnology
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dates from Spring 2003, in the Knesset (Israel’s Parliament). Peres called for focusing on 
science and technology rather than territories, because science and technology have “turned 
into the present-day meal ticket for mankind.” He pleaded for approaching technology in 
the context of values and considered that technology demands transparency, truth and 
democracy. He considered that science is very suitable for a small country like Israel since 
it does not require a large territory for creating wealth. Peres considered nanotechnology to 
be the civil version of the atomic bomb. “Nanotechnology is the re-alignment of nuclear 
structures and molecular structures, making it possible to produce new materials, new 
dimensions, new engines, new energies, unknown to the world beforehand.” And “The 
pursuit of nanotechnology is an extension of the nuclear policy in a constructive form.” He 
mentioned examples of future applications given in the announcement of the US National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (Clinton, 2000). Other foreseen benefits were water desalination, 
conserving fruit and vegetables, textiles, digital manufacturing and military: “It might be 
possible to create military units without soldiers. After all, unmanned aircraft already 
exist.” Peres declared that Israel needed to be among the leading nations in nanotechnology 
development and commercialisation. (Peres, 2003) He went on an international mission to 
raise $300 million for the Israeli National Nanotechnology Initiative (INNI).
In 2006, after the war in Lebanon, Peres mentioned the future opportunities offered by 
nanotechnology in advanced surveillance techniques to identify terrorists hiding in civil 
neighbourhoods. “A terrorist might be deterred by the knowledge that new surveillance 
tools have been developed that could identify him, even in a large crowd; that his weapon 
could be detected without his knowledge. This kind of deterrent could be based on 
miniaturised arms or on remote-control robots operating on the battlefield; perhaps even on 
a kind of intelligence hitherto unknown, grounded in revolutionary nanotechnology.” 
(Peres, 2006)
The Israeli government installed a committee of 15 top thinkers to develop plans for 
futuristic weaponry, including tiny wireless sensors to be scattered around battlefields 
(“pearls of wisdom”), mini drones equipped with camera’s and even weapons (‘intelligence 
wasps”), and sensors to detect suicide bombers in public places. (Space war, 2006)
India
India’s President Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam mentioned the opportunities nanotechnology was 
expected to offer for India’s economy and society in speeches on many occasions. On 18 
April 2006, he discussed the energy independence of India in an inaugural lecture to the 
South Asian Conference on Renewable Energy in New Delhi. India has no oil reserves, and 
is dependent on imports for much of its energy supply. India aimed at Energy security by 
2020 and energy independence by 2030. The Indian electricity generating capacity had to 
increase from 130,000 MW to 400,000 MW in 2030. This should include 50,000 MW 
hydroelectricity, 55,000 MW solar, 50,000 MW nuclear, and conventional and other 
renewable energy sources. Therefore, there was great interest in the development of 
sustainable energy technologies. These included solar cells and hydrogen storage based on 
carbon nanotubes and energy efficient solid state lighting.
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In 2007, president Kalam discussed trends in research in nanotechnology and converging 
technologies. He considered Richard Feynman, K. Eric Drexler and India’s top­
nano technologist C.N.R. Rao to be “three scientists who have laid the foundation for 
nanoscience and nanotechnology” .19 President Kalam foresaw potential applications of 
nanotechnology in aerospace and in healthcare. He expected convergence of 
nanotechnology and biotechnology to lead to Intelligent Bioscience, and “a disease free, 
happy and more intelligent human habitat with longevity and high human capabilities”. He 
believed that convergence of nanotechnology, ICT and aerospace technologies may enable 
inter-planetary transportation.
2.6 Conclusions inventory o f  nanoscenarios
In this chapter, an overview was given of future expectations of nanotechnology 
development with potential ethical and societal implications published between 1995 and 
2010. Five types of scenarios were distinguished, because they were proposed by 
stakeholders in different positions and for different purposes.
The first type of stakeholders was leading scientists and industrialists who had either had 
great impact on the later development of nanotechnology or expressed visions of ethical 
and societal implications beyond merely technological aspects. Visions from these 
scientists with ethical implications include:
- Utilitarian ethics: using nanotechnology so that the earth can support decent living 
conditions for 10 billion people (Smalley), Artificial meat (Heckl);
- Post humanism: technology may contribute to the extinction or transformation of 
the human race, Human enhancement by creating cybernetic organisms (Joy, 
Warwick);
- Improving biology with chemistry, making the boundary between the biotic and 
abiotic world fuzzy, developing cyborg cells (Lehn, Reinhoudt, Kavli 
Foundation);
- Seeing nature as a machine, demonstrating intelligent design (Dekker).
The second type was science and technology policy analyses. In the 1990s, science and 
technology policy was mainly limited to issues of funding and research policy including 
fostering interdisciplinary research. Societal implications were mainly limited to potential 
applications and chances for innovation in several industrial sectors. In the new millennium 
potential benefits and risks for society including not only economic aspects such as jobs 
and competitiveness, but also implications for health and the environment were 
increasingly integrated in research strategies. This could be a response to public debates 
initiated by NGO’s, politicians and technology assessment specialists. Even in later
19 Interestingly, Drexler’s concept of molecular nanotechnology appears to be taken 
seriously by the Indian nanotechnology community, contrary to his hostile reception among 
the nanotechnology research community in Europe and the USA.
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strategies, technology push trends remain predominant. In several countries, the science and 
innovation policies are increasingly integrated with risk and technology assessment and 
public dialogue.
The third type was technology assessment specialists. The discussions by Technology 
Assessment specialists of ethical and societal aspects of nanotechnology until about 2006 
were either general or focused on one particular aspect or application domain. The general 
discussions remained rather superficial, merely listing the issues rather than analysing them 
in depth. The more in-depth analyses were of three kinds. Some focused on risk governance 
of engineered nanomaterials. Others discussed long term speculative scenarios of 
converging technologies, human enhancement or synthetic biology. And yet others were 
ongoing discussions of ethical and societal aspects of sectors where nanotechnology could 
be applied such as security and militarization, medical ethics or the technology divide 
between rich and poor.
The fourth type was NGOs. Several Non Governmental Organisations have issued 
statements or taken part in discussions on nanotechnology. The concerns are mostly about 
what nanotechnology may mean for the societal interests they represent. Some 
organisations like the Foresight Institute and the Transhumanism association promote high 
technology driven societal change in the very long term (e.g. fully recyclable molecular 
manufacturing, improving humans and life extension). Some of their views are ethically 
offensive to other groups in society, such as the world council of churches. Other NGO’s 
are concerned with two issues. The first is handling risks of nanotechnology and 
interpretations of the precautionary principle, grey or green goo hypothesis. The second is 
sustainable nanotechnology development (environment, developing countries).
The last type was politicians. Not many politicians have taken interest in nanotechnology 
and discussed potential societal and ethical aspects. A short list of ethical issues was 
discussed by politicians until 2007. Most interest was apparent in issues of governance and 
responsible nanotechnology development. This was discussed by US President Clinton, 
Israel’s President Peres, India’s President Kalam, the Brazilian president, EU Research 
Commissioner Potocnic and Parliaments in Argentina and the UK. The French Senate was 
in particular concerned about the ethics of nanomedicine. Israel’s President Peres and the 
Argentinean Parliament discussed military and dual use nanotechnology and foreign 
military funding. Longer term aspects were also discussed. The US Congress was 
concerned about unpredictable societal impacts after 2020 and UK Prince Charles and the 
Brazilian parliament were concerned about the grey goo hypothesis.
Science fiction films and books about long term potential implications of nanotechnology 
were not considered here because the relationship between the nanoscience and technology 
developed in the laboratories is not clear.
The reason for discussing this variety of future visions in this chapter is that the big promise 
of nanotechnology for industry and society at large is still mainly a future dream. Visions of 
leading scientists, technology policy analysts, technology assessment specialists, NGO’s
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and politicians from different parts of the world were analysed and compared. As was 
assumed beforehand leading scientist were more realistic in their assumptions of 
technological trends. NGO’s and politicians were more realistic in their assumptions of 
societal circumstances and developments in which nanotechnology will have to be 
embedded. Technology policy analysts and technology assessment specialists were 
expected to combine understanding of technological as well as societal trends. This turned 
out not really to be the case. Technology policy analysts tended to focus on practical 
research policy questions and technology assessment specialists on issues related to more 
mature technologies. Since the start of the new millennium, the perspectives of technology 
policy analysts and technology assessment specialists have gradually become more 
integrated in overall government strategies, at least in the Netherlands and European Union. 
For other countries insufficient information was collected to see if a similar trend occurred. 
The overview presented in this chapter includes visions and reports from different parts of 
the world on purpose. This is needed to be able to contribute to global governance of 
nanotechnology, the central research question of this thesis. For answering this question it 
is not enough to just explore what different persons and organisations think about what 
should be done. The thesis intends to contribute to ethically sound governance. Therefore in 
the next chapter an analysis is made of the ethical and societal issues that have been 
discussed so far in order to identify a small number of issues that have not been discussed 
sufficiently. These issues will then be the topic of philosophical ethical analysis in later 
chapters.
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Chapter 3 Choice for ethically relevant 
aspects of nanotechnology
This thesis examines how ethically sound governance of nanotechnology may be possible 
in the current global world order. This central research question can not be addressed 
without prior clarification of the ethical aspects of nanotechnology that have already been 
identified in debates and projects organised so far. Therefore this chapter is dedicated to a 
review of the state of the art of research and discussions on ethical, legal and social aspects 
of nanotechnology, nano-ethics and other relevant investigations. The empirical data 
consists of scientific and policy publications as well as reports from relevant events. After 
the review, an analysis is made of ethical aspects that are not currently discussed 
sufficiently. This analysis forms the basis for a selection for the key topic that will be 
examined more in depth in this thesis.
3.1 Systematic inventory o f publications and events on ethical 
aspects o f nanotechnology
Ethical aspects of nanotechnology have been discussed by researchers and policy makers 
since approximately 2000. There was no noticeable debate on ethical, legal and social 
aspects of nanotechnology with relevance to strategic choices in funding or research 
priorities before the first workshop on Societal Implications of Nanoscience and 
Nanotechnology organised by NSET in the USA, 28-29 September 2000. Therefore, the 
analysis will start with the report on that event. K. Eric Drexler and his Foresight Institute 
had been discussing societal aspects of molecular nanotechnology already from the 1980s, 
but they were not widely taken seriously by the scientific and policy making communities 
involved in decisions on nanotechnology. Besides, the concept of “Molecular 
Nanotechnology” advocated by Drexler c.s. is different from the definitions guiding 
mainstream nanoscience and nanotechnology funded by governments worldwide.
Since 2000, policy makers in the USA and Europe who were interested in promoting 
nanotechnology tried to identify any possible ethical issues or risks related to 
nanotechnology. This was done in an attempt to avoid controversies in a later phase around 
nano-enabled products. They tried to learn from the negative public reception of GMO 
food, particularly in Europe. During the first three years the participants in their workshops 
did not identify pressing risks or ethical, legal or social aspects of nanotechnology. In 2003, 
the ETC group discovered that products such as sun creams including novel nanoparticles 
had been introduced on the market without prior testing. This was possible because the 
chemical composition was the same as in sun creams with larger particles of the same 
materials. ETC group asked for a moratorium on marketing products incorporating 
nanoparticles, until they were proven to be safe. In its plea, ETC group adhered to a strong
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version of the “precautionary principle”. This is commonly accepted to be the best way to 
handle potential risks of innovative products (at least in Europe). It succeeded in getting the 
issue on the political agenda. This led to a number of projects and publications. These were 
not only aimed at assessing the scientific risks of nanoparticles, but also at identifying other 
possible ethical, legal and social aspects (or implications) of nanotechnology. The latter 
ELSA or ELSI projects and publications are being reviewed and systematised in the 
following section. Risk Assessment will only be included as far as risk perception and risk 
governance are at stake. Scientific projects to establish quantifiable hazards and exposure 
scenarios are beyond the scope of this thesis.
The relevant publications, events and projects on Ethical, Legal and Social aspects of 
nanotechnology and on nanoethics can be classified in different ways. The year of 
publication makes it possible to follow trends and progress in the discussion to achieve a 
better understanding of the issues at stake. The country or region where different events or 
projects are taking place enables the identification of possible national differences in 
perception of the issues at stake. Related to this, the religious or philosophical tradition in 
which individual authors or spokespersons taking a position on ethical aspects of 
nanotechnology could be a third relevance criterion. The technological concepts or 
properties that give rise to ethical discussions are a fourth relevance criterion. The 
technology itself is in most cases not the cause of ethical concerns. Therefore, the 
application domain where nanotechnology is included and the ongoing ethical debates 
related to those applications are a fifth variable in this systematic review. The technology or 
application may not even be the subject of ethical debate. This is the case in discussions 
about control or strategic choices governing the development of nanotechnology. A sixth 
variable is therefore ethical considerations concerning the network of stakeholders involved 
in decisions. Relevant decisions can be about funding, research priorities, uptake in product 
development and manufacturing, and legislation relevant to nanotechnology. The choice of 
these aspects is related to the central research question aiming for ethically sound global 
governance in a multi-stakeholder world.
3.1.1 W hich ethical aspects o f nanotechnology have been 
addressed?
Many discussions on nanoethics have been of an exploratory nature, especially in the 
beginning of the debates in the first years of the 21st century. The main aim of relevant 
workshops and conferences has been to integrate different disciplines in networks. These 
networks should bring together nanoscientists and social science experts in ethical, legal 
and social aspects of technologies, applied ethics, philosophy of science and other 
humanities. Several of these discussions and projects have merely identified a broad sweep 
of possible ethical issues. These were mainly aimed at extending the scope of ongoing 
debates on ethical aspects of more mature technologies such as biotechnology to 
incorporate also progress in nanosciences and nanotechnologies. Several research projects 
investigating philosophical, ethical or societal aspects of nanotechnology have been
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running since 2003 in the USA, UK, Netherlands, Belgium and other countries. The 
number of PhD theses and scientific publications discussing these issues from all angles has 
steadily increased. One question relevant to nanotechnology as a whole is: “Is 
nanotechnology inherently continuous or disruptive?” Another issue which is relevant to all 
of nanotechnology is the need to “Develop nano-nomenclature and risk categories”. 
(Meridian Institute, 2004) This short summary of the common trend in the debate on ethical 
and societal aspects of nanotechnology in the first decade of the 2 1 st century will be 
expanded in the rest of this chapter. There, contributions to the debates on the identified 
ethical issues will be presented in historical order.
3.1.2 New issues related to nanospecific technological concepts or 
properties
3.1.2.1 Risk governance of nanotechnologies
The most pressing new policy issue that is specific for nanotechnology is risk governance 
of engineered nanoparticles. This includes risk assessment and management and how to 
handle risk perception by the public. This issue is mainly discussed and investigated as a 
toxicological and risk assessment problem. This requires better understanding of the 
mechanisms determining toxicology of engineered nanoparticles and the discovery of 
science based evidence to determine hazards and exposure of humans and the environment 
to these particles. However, ethical and social aspects related to nanoparticles are also being 
debated and investigated. Social aspects include risk perception by the public and risk 
communication by governments, industries and researchers.
Ethical issues include the interpretation of the precautionary principle and the identification 
of which actions should follow from it. Other issues are the distribution of risks and 
benefits over societal groups and the determination of acceptable risks. The question which 
stakeholders are involved in decision making on acceptable risks is also the topic of current 
debate. As these are not specific to risks of engineered nanoparticles, the debate about these 
ethical aspects of risk governance will be discussed under “Scientific and techno ethics 
related to the social networks involved in nanotechnology” below.
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) distinguished four generations of 
nanotechnologies, each giving rise to different kind of what they call risks. The first 
generation nanotechnology has been introduced on the market since 2000. This generation 
consists of passive nanostructures with properties that are quasi-constant for the whole life 
cycle of the product. The risk governance context for these kinds of “Frame 1” products 
and processes is limited to acquiring scientific knowledge and improving the present 
Environment, Health and Safety legislation and practices. These are the classic risk 
assessment practices aimed at reducing complexity. The higher generations of products and 
processes are considered to give rise to “Frame 2” risks. The risks governance strategy for
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those risks is characterised by “concern assessment”. This also involves uncertainty and 
ambiguity.
IRGC puts generations two to four of nanotechnologies in the “frame 2” risk governance 
category. The second generation nanotechnology consists of active nanostructures, with a 
function that evolves during its life time. Examples are reactive nano structured materials 
and sensors and targeted cancer therapies. These technologies have been introduced on the 
market since 2005. The third generation was integrated nanosystems such as artificial 
organs built from the nanoscale. These were expected to become available from 2010. The 
fourth generation was expected to consist of heterogeneous molecular nanosystems such as 
nanoscale genetic therapies or molecules designed to self-assemble. These are expected 
from 2015 or 2020. Ethical implications and controversies were expected to arise 
increasingly, mainly in response to the second to fourth generation nanotechnologies. IRGC 
proposed a risk governance strategy implying stakeholder debate and scenario studies. 
(IRGC, 2006, 2009)
In later years, the discussion on this risk governance model has continued in different 
national and international forums. This has given rise to proposals for new models for 
innovation in nanotechnology. Especially governance of 3rd and 4th generation nanosystems 
was expected to require more nano EHS and ELSI research to be integrated. (Roco, 2010)
3.1.2.2 Engineered nanoparticles/nanomaterials
Discussion at international level
The first time the need to determine the environmental impact of engineered nanoparticles 
was mentioned in a policy debate was as recent as 2002: “Environmental impact of 
manufactured nanomaterials must be determined. Evidence for transport and uptake into 
living systems of nanomaterials has been obtained. There may be harmful effects on living 
organisms.” This issue had been identified by Vicky Colvin of Rice University, a leading 
specialist in Nanotoxicology. (Roco & Tomellini, 2002) The risks of nanoparticles to the 
environment were later identified as having the potential to become “the next asbestos”, 
without arguments why this comparison would be justified. (Anisa Mnyusiwalla et al, 
2003) The shape of asbestos fibres and carbon nanotubes is comparable, but asbestos are 
about 1000x larger than nanotubes and made of a different material.20 The potential risks of
20 By 2008, toxicologists had found evidence that some long and straight Carbon Nanotubes 
behaved similar to asbestos fibres. This gave rise to avoiding those CNTs and and using 
smal or curled CNTs instead. The asbestos metaphor could be suitable as an argument to 
plead for early risk assessment of nanomaterials, to avoid a scenario where CNTs would be 
incorporated in many products before severe health or environmental damage was 
demonstrated and had to be remedied at high societal costs.
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nanoparticles for the environment and human health were also identified as a short term 
issue in a Swiss Technology Assessment study on nanomedicine. (Baumgartner, 2003)
The ETC group picked up the issue and asked for a moratorium on the use of engineered 
nanoparticles until they were proven to be safe. (2003) This NGO favours the application of 
the strict interpretation of the precautionary principle to nanoparticles. In the UK, Prince 
Charles publicly agreed with them, leading to the start of a broad investigation and public 
debate on societal aspects of nanotechnology by the Royal Society and Royal Academy of 
Engineering. At the end of this process, they recommended taking a precautionary approach 
to the potential risks of engineered nanoparticles. They did not see a need for imposing a 
full moratorium on market introduction of all nanoparticles. (Dowling, 2004)
In the Netherlands, the Rathenau Institute tabled the issue in 2004 by organising an expert 
and stakeholder workshop on benefits and risks of nanoparticles. The scope of this 
workshop was mainly limited to establishing the scientific evidence base for assessing 
potential risks of these nanoparticles, and identifying what should be done and by whom 
(governments, industry or other stakeholders). A participant in another workshop on ethical 
aspects of nanomedicine noticed that a risk benefit-analysis should be used to determine for 
which applications potential risks of nanoparticles would acceptable. Applications such as 
of drug delivery mechanisms for terminal patients would be acceptable sooner than other 
applications with less clear benefits to the consumer. (Rathenau workshop biomedical 
nanotechnology, 2004)
Emmanuelle Schuler (2005) has outlined the six options for risk management strategies 
related to nanoparticles:
- Regulation through the market, basically making the consumer responsible for 
assessing the risks he wants to take with products including nanoparticles. This is only 
feasible in case of a well informed public, or will lead to irrational choices either based 
on unjustified trust or unfounded fear;
- Application of current regulation. This is the present situation and is expected to 
remain so in general on the level of laws. Policy makers and experts expect that 
changes will be necessary on the level of implementation guidelines;
- Regulation through accident. This is a rather cynical approach, making the consumer 
the involuntary participant in a clinical test of the product;
- Regulatory capture, where a company seeks regulation in stead of avoiding it. Several 
leading industries are in fact taking this approach to risks of nanoparticles, by actively 
lobbying for regulation and collaborating with policy makers and researchers in 
projects to determine not only the scientific risks but also how to handle them;
- Self-regulation, making industry responsible for working out codes of conduct for 
handling the potential risks among themselves;
- Ban or moratorium. This is currently only proposed by some NGO’s for all or some 
specific applications of nanoparticles (notably nanocosmetics).
The European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified 
Health Risks (SCENIHR) published a critical opinion on the appropriateness of existing
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risk assessment methods for assessing the hazards associated with engineered 
nanomaterials. It considered the methods appropriate to assess many hazards, but expressed 
doubts that these methods were sufficient to address all the hazards. It recommended that: 
“the current risk assessment procedures require modification for nanoparticles”. Most 
respondents to a public consultation on this SCENIHR opinion agreed. However, some 
business representatives thought the existing risk assessment methodologies were sufficient 
for nanotechnology products with minor modifications. SCENIHR also stated that “there is 
insufficient knowledge and data concerning nanoparticle characterisation, detection and 
measurement, the fate (and especially the persistence) of nanoparticles in humans and in the 
environment, and all aspects of toxicology and environmental toxicology related to 
nanoparticles, to allow for satisfactory risk assessments for humans and ecosystems to be 
performed”. They listed the major gaps in knowledge that need to be filled in relation to 
improved risk assessment for the products of nanotechnology. Respondents to the 
consultation agreed and added some more issues to the list. They stressed the need for 
coordinated and global actions on nanosafety. (SCENIHR, 2006)
The OECD established a working party on manufactured nanomaterials in the Chemicals 
Committee, on 14 September 2006. This decision followed after two meetings and 
deliberations during 2005, discussing the aims and scope of such a working party. This 
OECD working party should address human health, environment and safety aspects of 
manufactured nanomaterials, in the chemicals sector.21 This forum was generally expected 
to take the lead in regulating environment, health and safety aspects of engineered 
nanomaterials. Representatives of a variety of stakeholders participated in the deliberations. 
OECD closely collaborated with other organisations taking care of related issues. The 
International Standardisation Organisation ISO coordinated the work on developing a 
standard nomenclature as well as measurement and health and environmental risk 
assessment methodologies. These global organisations acted as the spiders in a broader 
network of national and continental committees and organisations working on the same 
issues. (Malsch, 2006)
UNESCO published a popular brochure explaining nanotechnology and its ethical aspects 
to a lay audience (UNESCO, 2006). The ethical issues related to engineered nanoparticles 
they mentioned are consumer awareness, labelling and the promotion of standards and 
regulations. A key issue was consumer trust in the information they are given. The question 
if engineered nanoparticles should be considered to be entirely new or as subsets of existing 
materials should be resolved. ISO and national standards bodies will have to determine 
what makes nanoparticles different from larger structures of the same chemical 
composition. UNESCO noted that there is no global consensus on what acceptable risks are 
and who should carry the burden of assessing potential risks of nanoparticles: governments 
or industry. The US and EU held different interpretations of the precautionary principle.
21 OECD website, 20 September 2006,
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en 2649 37015404 1 1 1 1 1,00.html (last 
accessed 16-10-06)
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The European Parliament (2006) “recommends that lists of ingredients in consumer 
products identify the addition of manufactured nanoparticulate material”. ... “Emphasises 
that understanding of the potential damage to health and the environment of new, synthetic 
nanoparticles is still limited and that, consequently, the effects of nanoparticles that are not 
readily soluble or biodegradable should be investigated, in accordance with the 
precautionary principle, before such particles are put into production and placed on the 
market.”
Discussion in the Netherlands
The Health Council of the Netherlands made a distinction between degradable and non- 
degradable engineered nanoparticles. It classified each type in different risk governance 
categories as defined by the IRGC. Degradable nanoparticles were classified in the category 
“simple risks”. This implies that known risk management approaches should be applied. 
Only experts employed by competent government bodies should be invited to discuss how 
to handle the risks. Non-degradable nanoparticles should be put in the “uncertain” risk 
category. It recommended to follow a weak precautionary approach to these uncertain risks. 
The debate about risk governance should not only include certified experts and other 
scientific and experience experts in the discussion, but also relevant stakeholder groups 
including industry, environmental groups and trade unions. The weak precautionary 
approach is the one favoured by the European Union. It can be achieved by performing life 
cycle analyses on products that contain nanoparticles to determine possible release during 
production, use and disposal. Another element of the approach is to limit release as much as 
possible. Furthermore risk benefit analyses should be performed before market 
introduction. Market introduction should only be allowed if potential benefits 
counterbalance the risks. Nanoparticles of known substances should be treated as if they are 
new substances under the new European Chemicals regulation REACH. Internationally 
coordinated toxicology research and the development of new tests for mass, number of 
particles and surface area should be stimulated. (Health Council of the Netherlands, 2006)
On 9 May 2006, the Rathenau Institute organised an expert meeting on “Environment and 
Health Risks of Nanoparticles: towards a prudent policy”. This meeting had several aims. 
The gaps in scientific evidence, measuring instruments and current regulations for 
governing these risks should be clarified. The division of responsibility for carrying out 
different actions among policy makers, industry and other stakeholders should also be 
clarified. The main conclusions included that it will take at least ten years before new 
standardised measuring methods for Nanotoxicology have been developed. At the same 
time, there were already at least several hundreds of consumer products incorporating 
nanotechnology on the market, and this was increasing exponentially (Woodrow Wilson 
database of nanoproducts, 2 0 0 6 ).
The meeting gave rise to the following conclusions: Governments can’t regulate until the 
measurement methods are available. In this light, all stakeholders should take their 
responsibility for a precautionary approach to nanosafety. The Dutch government, relevant 
agencies and individual experts should participate in international efforts for regulating
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nanosafety in OECD, ISO, CEN, SCENIHR and other relevant bodies. They should 
coordinate their contributions in an informal network. The experts followed the 
recommendation of the Health Council to apply a weak interpretation of the precautionary 
principle. However, there is no consensus among all stakeholders, and the European 
interpretation is different from the North American one. Therefore more debate on this 
interpretation was recommended with stakeholder groups including industry, trade unions, 
environmental and consumer associations. The IVAM institute of the University of 
Amsterdam was leading an EU project, Nanocapacities. This project helped trade unions 
and environmental groups to acquire the necessary expertise to participate in such debate. 
(Malsch, 2006)
After the meeting, director Jan Staman of the Rathenau institute sent a letter to the Dutch 
Parliament stating that “the government has no time to waste to develop a clear strategy for 
building up a knowledge base on Nanotoxicology. If the government does not take visible 
action now, the risk is great that trust of societal organisations as well as industry will 
decline. Incidents may negatively influence the emerging public opinion forming on 
nanotechnology.” (Staman, 2006) This issues has been discussed in parliament since the 
autumn of 2 0 0 6 .
The Netherlands government (2006) aimed for a balanced development of 
nanotechnologies. The government installed an observation post for nanosafety at RIVM 
(State Institute for Public Health and Environment). It also installed an interdepartmental 
discussion forum for nanotechnologies to improve coordination within the government.
Discussion in the UK
In the UK, all relevant government departments were collaborating in a public policy 
development on nanosafety. The Department on Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(DEFRA), coordinated the activity. It published a reply to the Royal Society report arguing 
which recommendations they intended to take over and which not. In 2006, it set up a 
voluntary reporting scheme for engineered nanoscale materials asking industry to submit 
research results and other relevant evidence to support regulating these materials. The UK 
government perceived that “there is currently very little evidence on which to determine the 
potential risks posed by engineered nanoscale materials. It is therefore difficult to assess the 
extent to which current controls and regulations cover these materials, or the type of 
additional measures that may be necessary to control potential risks.”
Civil society groups participating in a consultation on the voluntary reporting scheme were 
worried that the government’s overall approach demonstrated insufficient precaution in the 
absence of a scientific evidence base. Animal welfare groups stressed the need for non­
animal testing. The government agreed, but did not believe non-animal tests would be 
sufficient. It did not impose extra animal tests over the ones required according to existing 
regulations.
On the other hand, industry was worried about disclosing trade secrets and especially SMEs 
protested against the administrative burden. The government stressed that the information
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would be treated confidential and only made public in aggregate anonymous form, and that 
the scheme was voluntary and not over-bureaucratic. (DEFRA, 2006)
The Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering (2006) warned that the uncertainty 
about health and environmental impacts of engineered nanomaterials had not been reduced 
in the two years since the publication of their report on “Nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties”. It called for directed funding to reduce 
these uncertainties.
Discussions in the USA
In the USA, the Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) did not develop a plan for handling 
nanosafety by 2006. On 10 October, 2006, they organised a consultation meeting for all 
interested parties. The aim was to collect comments on how to handle environmental and 
health risks of nanomaterials. The comments came down to: take precautions, but don’t 
inhibit progress. The purpose of the meeting was to help FDA further its understanding of 
developments in nanotechnology materials that pertain to FDA regulated products. 
(Associated Press, 10 October 2006)
Eight NGOs including Friends of the Earth, Greenpeace and ETC group asked FDA to 
amend its regulations for nanocosmetics and other products incorporating engineered 
nanoparticles. FDA was requested to change its regulations concerning nanotechnology in 
general and its Over the Counter Sunscreen Drug Product Monograph in particular. In the 
short term, the NGOs wanted FDA to declare all currently available sunscreen products 
containing engineered nanoparticles of zinc oxide and titanium dioxide as an imminent 
hazard to public health. FDA should also order a cease of manufacturing these products 
until FDA sunscreen drug and broader nanotechnology regulations would be developed and 
implemented. Furthermore, FDA was asked to request manufacturers to recall all available 
sunscreen products containing engineered nanoparticles of titanium dioxide and/or zinc 
oxide until new drug applications for these products have been approved by FDA. (Friends 
of the Earth, 2006)
Discussions in India
The Department-Related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science & Technology, 
Environment & Forests of the Parliament of India debated about potential risks of 
nanotechnology in 2005. In the 140th report on demands for grants (2005-2006) of the 
Department of Science and Technology (25 April 2005), the committee discussed 
investment in nanoscience and nanotechnology as well as potential risks of nanoparticles. 
The committee expressed the opinion: “that it is extremely vital that both positive and 
negative effects of nanotubes should [...] be assessed with equal potential and efficiency.” 
It furthermore felt: “that a suitable mechanism should be put in place to assess the toxicity 
of particles before the findings of the research of nanotechnology are transferred to industry 
for applications for production of consumer products particularly cosmetics.” The 
committee also proposed “a guiding document containing the details of safety tests and
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precautionary measures to be taken by industries before the applications of novel properties 
of nanoparticles.” It requested minimizing environmental release of nanoparticles until their 
adverse effects are suitably understood. It demonstrated particular concern for occupational 
nanosafety measures in particular, and asked for international exposure standards to be 
imposed. The committee requested “a moratorium on the release of new nanoparticles into 
the environment until lab protocols can be established and until toxicology studies can be 
undertaken and their results verified.” Industry should be asked to reveal the results of 
nanosafety tests.
The committee furthermore asked the Department of Science and Technology “to develop 
an educational programme so that future engineers and scientists could understand the 
adverse health consequences of nanotechnology.”
In the 149th report of the same committee (22 December 2005), the DST replied by 
explaining the international scientific uncertainty concerning health hazards and toxicology 
effects of nanoparticles. It indicated that “India may be in an advantageous position to deal 
with such environmental risks of nanotechnology,” because nanoparticles are only being 
produced on a small scale in laboratories. Scientists were being educated about the 
environmental and toxicity aspects of nanotechnology and laboratories must show relevant 
safety protocols before being allowed to start projects. The committee accepted the plans of 
DST. 22
Later contributions to the debate on engineered nanomaterials worldwide
In later years, risks of engineered nanomaterials have continued to dominate the stakeholder 
and public dialogues on nanotechnology in different parts of the world. By 2011, the debate 
focused on the lack of a common definition, regulation versus voluntary measures, handling 
uncertain risks and interpreting the precautionary principle, and transparency versus 
confidentiality. (See also Rip, 2008)
3.1.2.3 Designer chemistry and goo hypotheses
Awareness has increased among insiders that nanotechnology may in the longer term 
become a revolutionary breakthrough technology. Nanotechnology could in the long term 
enable manufacturing anything anywhere in any quantity, and potentially complete 
recyclability. Many experts believe that nanotechnology has more potential than just as a 
source of incremental improvements of existing products. Bottom up chemical and 
biological approaches are expected to lead to a completely new concept of designer 
chemistry. However, this is not going to happen in the next decade or so, and the vision is 
still being contested. It has been discussed on several occasions. A key example is this 
quote: “Fabrication and understanding of materials properties at atomic and molecular scale
22 A shorter version of this paragraph has been published in Malsch, 2007.
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will change dramatically. Society as a whole, healthcare, the environment, sustainability 
and almost every industry will be affected profoundly.” (Roco and Bainbridge, 2001)
Several experts and stakeholders have proposed visions of self-replicating nanoscale 
machines. A typical quote is the following: “a new form of life different from that known 
(i.e. carbon based) would be a dramatic change that is not foreseen in the near future.” (and 
would require unlikely breakthroughs in science) (Roco and Bainbridge, 2001) The 
question if nanotechnology could spin out of control was also discussed later, as a more 
general issue: How to assess potential risks of “Green Goo”? This term designates the use 
of micro-organisms for mass-producing nanosystems. How to control these processes? (van 
Kasteren, 2004) In the discussions such scenarios were never deemed completely 
impossible, but nobody has so far suggested any serious policy recommendations for 
governing them.
3.1.2.4 Conclusions new issues
The stakeholder debates on risk assessment of nanotechnology focused on two main issues: 
engineered nanomaterials and bottom up self assembly. Most actors discussed practical 
ways for handling uncertain risks and what would be the right interpretation of the 
precautionary principle. These issues are related to government, regulation and governance. 
The discussion of these issues will stop here. In the next section 3.1.3, the assessment of the 
ethical issues currently in debate will continue with a second type of discussions. These are 
ethical issues related to the products and systems in which nanotechnology is or may be 
applied.
3.1.3 Ethical issues related to particular application domains 
which are also relevant to nanotechnology
Other ethical issues related to nanotechnology are related to the application areas. These 
include healthcare, defence, sustainability, ICT, etc. The following quote is an example of 
how they have been discussed: “Initially, discoveries in nanosciences will change society 
indirectly through confluence of old and new technologies in a context of evolving 
economic and social needs.” (Roco and Bainbridge, 2001) In the following discussions on 
nanomedicine, human enhancement, agro food, water and environment, ambient 
intelligence and military nanotechnology will be represented.
3.1.3.1 Nanomedicine
The area of “nanomedicine” or applications of nanotechnology in the medical or health 
sectors is probably the most discussed, as these applications are not only a priority area in
85
R&D funding, but also harbour the most sensitive and controversial ethical aspects. 
Nanomedicine touches on questions like what it means to be human, matters of life and 
death, what is healthy and what not, etc.
In 2003, the Swiss and German Technology Assessment organisations TA Swiss and TAB 
published reports including discussion of ethical aspects of nanomedicine. One of the main 
issues in the Swiss study was: “Progress in nanomedicine could lead to erosion of 
fundamental values of our society (e.g. stem cell therapy).” (Baumgartner, 2003)
The German study considered most ethical concerns related to nanotechnology had to do 
with interfering in the human body. This was deemed to give rise to most questions for 
human self-understanding and identity. Questions highlighted in the report include the 
following: How far are we allowed to go in changing the human body? It is inherently 
human to change nature and oneself. When does the natural application of tools cross the 
border of unacceptable manipulation of human life? What does it mean to be human? 
Neuroimplants which influence individual thoughts and other artificial changes of the 
human person are considered problematic. At the borderline between therapy and 
enhancement, societal decisions are needed. Not only should the impact on the individual, 
but also on society as a whole be taken into account. The broader questions including 
distributive justice and the possibility for societal desirable improvements are to be 
discussed. It might be useful to distinguish between (biological) human being and (Kantian) 
person, who can never be seen as a means but only as an end in himself, and has the right to 
develop himself. It may then be possible to give human/machine mixed beings the right to 
be treated as persons.
Can the human body be considered a biological machine in need of repairs? There is no 
commonly accepted definition of human health. The WHO definition: “state of complete 
physical, psychological and social well being” can be interpreted to define ageing as a 
disease and the body as a machine in need of repair, e.g. with nanoimplants. Could 
neuroimplants lead to the development of artificial brains and what defines intelligence? 
(Paschen, 2003)
A year later, the Dutch Rathenau Instititute also examined ethical aspects of nanomedicine, 
and identified the following issue: All medical applications including early diagnostics, 
gene specific pharmaceuticals and targeted drug delivery lead to the basic question: will 
they create more disease or prevent disease? This is the issue of medicalisation of healthy 
people. (Rathenau workshop nanomedicine, 2004)
The European Technology Platform on Nanomedicine also contributed to the discussion. 
According to them, nanomedicine gives rise to ethical questions including sensitivity of 
genetic information, gap between diagnosis and therapy, health care resources and tensions 
between holistic and functional medicine. In-depth ethical analysis is needed including on 
human dignity (non-instrumentalisation, privacy, non-discrimination, informed consent, 
equity, precautionary principle) and value conflicts. (ETP Nanomedicine, 2005)
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The European Group on Ethics debated ethics of nanomedicine with about seventy experts 
and stakeholder representatives.23 Professor Ruth Duncan of Cardiff University 
summarized the strategy for nanomedicine developed by the EU Technology Platform on 
Nanomedicine and in the ESF Forward Look on Nanomedicine. She stressed the long time 
scale of 20-30 years and many uncertainties in the development process of new 
pharmaceuticals. Professor Arie Rip of the University of Twente criticized the optimistic 
hype created by researchers and other promoters of nanotechnology, and advocated a new 
approach to develop more realistic socio-technical scenarios involving representatives of all 
stakeholders. He was responsible for a Technology Assessment project in the Dutch 
NanoNed research programme, doing just that. Mary Baker of the European Patients’ 
Organizations stressed the need for a global partnership for development of nanomedicine 
in the interest of humanity. Professor Stig Olsen of the TU Denmark reviewed the state of 
the art in Nanotoxicology and risk assessment research. Professor Nigel de Cameron of the 
Illinois Institute of Technology presented the debate on human enhancement in the USA. 
There is less optimism about improving human beings with nanomedicine than Europeans 
tend to believe. More conservative groups in society want nanotechnology to be applied in 
healing the sick, not creating cyborgs. His aim is to involve civil society in a debate on 
risks, ethical, legal and social aspects of nanotechnology. The subsequent debate focused 
more on general science governance issues: who should be responsible for ethical 
development of sciences and technologies: scientists, ethicists, civil society or politicians? 
How can we go from a nano-hype to realistic scenarios for the future development of 
nanomedicine? Is the current risk management approach for nanomedicine adequate? Can’t 
we stop popular individual scientists who experiment on themselves to test risky new 
technologies? The story of Professor Kevin Warwick who tested a neural implant for 
remote controlling a computer and for communicating intimate feelings with his wife is a 
case in point. The Helsinki convention on medical experiments on humans does not cover 
scientists using themselves as guinea pigs. Dr Donald Bruce of the Church of Scotland 
strongly stressed the need to regulate such questionable practices.
We should learn from the debates on ethics of stem cells and Genetically Modified 
Organisms to take into account the needs of patients and other societal concerns during the 
whole process of nanomedicine development. This debate can be facilitated by ethicists as 
well as science fiction writers, according to Professor Inez de Beaufort of the Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam, and member of the EGE.
Several participants stressed their interest in a global stakeholder debate on the real long 
term implications of nanomedicine and other nanotechnologies. This debate should include 
the question on human nature and human dignity, as well as addressing the real needs of 
patients, and global justice: focusing more on the needs of people in developing countries.
A systematic comparison of ethical aspects of two examples of modern brain therapy leads 
to quite different conclusions about their acceptability. Deep brain stimulation for the
23 EGE Roundtable ethics of nanomedicine: from hype to responsible development, 21 
March 2006 in Brussels, http://ec.europa.eu/european group ethics/index en.htm (last 
accessed 23-10-06) The following report is published as online news on 23 March 2006 at 
www.nanoforum.org.
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treatment of Parkinson disease gives rise to many more ethical concerns than Magnetic 
Fluid Hyperthermia with Ferro fluid nanoparticles for the therapy of malignant brain 
tumours. The main concern of the deep brain stimulation is that it tends to lead to changes 
in personality, especially moral consciousness. (Sabine Müller, 2006)
The European Parliament “emphasises the need to respect high ethical principles and 
welcomes the planned reviews on issues such as non-therapeutic human enhancement and 
links between nanosciences and nanotechnologies and individual privacy; expects the 
reviews to be public and to include a thorough analysis of nanomedicine.” (European 
Parliament, 2006)
The European Group on Ethics (EGE) presented its opinion on ethics of nanomedicine to 
European Commission president Barroso on 24 January 2007. Mr Barroso welcomed the 
document and promised to ensure that European Commission staff would implement the 
opinion. EGE chairman professor Goran Hermerén and his colleagues acknowledged the 
promises nanomedicine offers to healthcare by applications in diagnostics, treatment and 
preventive methods. They insisted on imposing adequate safety measures, stimulating 
public participation and prospective technology assessment and research on ethical, legal 
and social implications of nanomedicine. Public participation should be stimulated by 
opinion surveys as well as academic and public debates on problems and possibilities of 
present and near-future nanomedicine.
The EGE expected the current legal framework to be adequate in principle for governing 
nanomedicine. These regulations could have to be adapted to accommodate specific 
properties of nanomedicine products. Policy makers would have to investigate applications 
falling under overlapping regulations. The EGE called for comparative research on 
intellectual property rights and nanomedicine, especially concerning the balance between 
knowledge protection and information dissemination. The opinion extensively reviewed the 
state of the art of nanomedicine, the legal background at EU and global level and problems 
and concerns of ethics, governance and policies. They explicitly addressed toxicology and 
human health, bioethical questions and social ethics. EGE adopted the definition of 
nanomedicine coined by the European Science Foundation (ESF): The science and 
technology of diagnosing, treating and preventing disease and traumatic injury, of relieving 
pain, and of preserving and improving human health, using molecular tools and molecular 
knowledge of the human body. Nanomedicine development should be governed by existing 
fundamental values and rights as stated in many European and international documents. 
Safety should be safeguarded by the competent authorities and institutes through proper 
risk assessment, controlling the safety and security aspects of nanomedicine and capacity 
building for addressing accidents. Risk assessment should be carried out before market 
introduction of nanomedicine products. Policy makers should examine if existing 
regulations should be amended to this end, especially for nanocosmetics. Safety, security 
and social implications including in developing countries of nanomedicine should be 
examined by prospective technology assessment, not just post-factum. The EGE addressed 
legal issues, especially the impact of nanomedicine on shifting the balance between 
knowledge protection and information dissemination and the interests of industry versus
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developing countries. The availability of nanomedicine tests, information and consent in 
clinical trials, economics and research funding, communication and public trust, and 
medical as well as non-medical uses were also addressed. The EGE proposed a number of 
measures including a web portal on ethics of nanomedicine, stimulating nanoethics research 
and networking and a database to stimulate information sharing. (EGE, 2007)
Ageing population
Several groups addressed implications of nanotechnology for the ageing population and the 
costs of healthcare. “Nano-based medical treatments may enhance lifespan and quality of 
life for elderly, possibly requiring changes in pension systems, health insurance, increasing 
retirement age or secondary careers for the elderly.” (Roco and Bainbridge, 2001) How to 
deal with possible dramatic improvement of public health? (Roco & Tomellini, 2002) Will 
application of nanotechnology increase or decrease the costs for healthcare? (Rathenau 
biomedical workshop, 2004)
Diagnostics
Another relevant potential application of nanomaterials and nanodevices is in early 
diagnostics. This could contribute to longer healthy life expectance in the long term. 
Experts expected no medium term relief for healthcare costs and an increasing divide 
between haves and have-nots. This application can contribute to the “transparent citizen” 
and its related ethical aspects such as the right not to know and risk of abuse of information. 
Especially in the short term, nanodiagnostics can widen the gap between diagnostics and 
therapy. Will there be more euthanasia as a result of incurable disease prognoses? 
(Baumgartner, 2003)
Medical/pharmaceutical applications, including early diagnostics, predictive medicine, 
acceptability of early diagnostics without therapy, affordability, right not to know, 
implications for relations, abuse of genetic information. (van Est, 2004)
How reliable are diagnostics and how do test results influence health insurance. Does the 
patient keep the right to choose? Should funding be dedicated to developing early 
diagnostics tests or to enhancing understanding of early disease mechanisms? The choices 
in research priorities should be more transparent, and interested parties should be honest 
about realistic technological benefits and testing on humans. (Rathenau biomedical 
workshop, 2004)
Louis Laurent (2005) noticed a tendency to modern predestination, in which early 
diagnostic tests determine the future life of an individual.
Medical self tests pose simple to complex ethical issues. Ambiguous risks include the 
divide between diagnostics and therapy and advanced home care technology. (Health 
Council, 2006)
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Summary nanomedicine issues
This overview gives an indication of the breadth of issues discussed in relation to 
nanomedicine. It should be noted that these discussions were already ongoing before 
nanotechnology entered the scene. It is not so clear whether nanotechnology brings new 
issues into the debates. In the following an even broader and longer term debate on human 
enhancement is presented. What different groups or individual experts have contributed to 
examining the impact of nanotechnology on this debate is the topic of the next section 
3.2.1.2.
3.1.3.2 Human enhancement
A key issue that has been discussed more than before since the emergence on the policy 
agenda of nanomedicine is human enhancement. However, the human enhancement debates 
remains a more general debate. It is related to incorporating technology in the human body, 
and to general progress in life sciences. Nanotechnology is one of four converging 
technologies currently under development in the real world. The fact that the technologies 
are actually being developed makes scenarios of human enhancement more than just a long 
term future vision. The debate on human enhancement enabled by nanotechnology and 
converging technologies is mostly recent. It was sparked by the reports on converging 
technologies by the US National Science Foundation (Roco and Bainbridge, 2003, 
Bainbridge and Roco, 2006) and European Commission High Level Expert Group 
(Nordmann, 2004).
Adherents to the transhumanist movement, supporters of the US based Foresight institute, 
and others have been thinking and writing about these issues since approximately the 
1980s. Ethicists, philosophers and theologians have taken interest in nanotechnology and 
converging technologies for human enhancement since about 2002. Some religious groups 
have so far tabled discussions on enhancement, nanotechnology or converging 
technologies. These include the Church of Scotland (Donald Bruce, 2005), the World 
Council of Churches and World Association of Christian Communication (2005), the 
German Evangelical Church and the European Bishops Conference COMECE.
More recently, the debate on Human Enhancement has returned to a more general level. 
This discussion addressed philosophical questions like how human identity may change 
under the influence of a wide range of technologies. These technologies may range from 
cups of coffee to futuristic post-humanist scenarios. Nanotechnology is only a minor aspect 
of this discussion (Swierstra et al, 2009, Malsch & Hvidtfelt-Nielsen, 2010)
Who may be enhanced?
Some groups have discussed proposals not to limit the use of technologies to medical uses. 
These include the Transhumanists, organizers and participants in NSF’s workshops on 
converging technologies for human enhancement in the USA, and the US President’s
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Council on Bioethics (2003). Advocates of human enhancement think that the human body 
and mind as we know it not are not perfect, but can be improved. The body of a healthy 
person could be improved by incorporating nano, info, bio and neurotechnologies. As the 
development of nano and other technologies progresses, this discussion becomes less 
theoretical and more realistic. Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chips are already 
implanted on a voluntary basis in Mexican domestic workers, Japanese schoolchildren and 
Dutch and Spanish beach club visitors who don’t want to carry a purse. Other people can 
track their movements without being noticed by the person carrying the chip. (van den 
Hoven, 2006)
More or less voluntary enhancement opportunities are also being discussed for the military, 
sports and cosmetic surgery. Nanotechnology has not yet been applied for enhancement in 
these areas. However, drugs keeping soldiers awake for several days and doping in sports 
are already used. Reasons for enhancing soldiers may be to improve command and control 
through more direct communication on the battlefield, or to give the individual soldier a 
physical advantage over the enemy. Sports professionals are already inclined to use 
technologies in legitimate, and sometimes also illegitimate, ways to improve their chances 
of winning. From time immemorial people have been using artificial means to enhance 
their beauty: from dying hair to surgical operations. Bert Gordijn (2006) warns that 
enhancement in sports is better regulated than cosmetic enhancement, at least in the 
Netherlands.
Even more controversial is the potential for forced enhancement of “designer babies”, to 
remedy negative physical or mental characteristics, or to incorporate desirable traits 
(Fukuyama, 2002). Such ideas are very similar to eugenics, historic attempts at breeding 
“super humans” in Nazi-Germany. Eugenics has been prohibited since the end of World 
War II for very good reasons.
Views on enhancement
In the 1980s some researchers speculated about artificial intelligence, robotics, explanations 
of human intelligence and nanotechnology. These included Marvin Minsky (1985), K. Eric 
Drexler (1986) and Hans Moravec (1988). At that time, the technologies they based their 
future visions on where still very immature. Therefore, the discussion remained rather 
“academic” or rather in the realm of science fiction, according to mainstream thinkers. 
Minsky (1985) developed a theory of human intelligence as a computer programme. This 
was based on studies of child psychology and his own attempts at building robots with 
artificial intelligence. Moravec (1988) saw humans today merely as the product of genetic 
development over the last 100 million years. He predicted that human beings will be 
replaced by “post biological” or “supernatural” life forms: future generations of the 
intelligent machines we are developing today. These machines could be made to remember 
almost everything about humans, perhaps even the detailed workings of individual human 
minds. The human mind might be “rescued” from the limitations of a mortal body. It could 
be modified to be continually adaptable in a machine, consisting of hardware and software. 
He foresaw a post biological world dominated by self-improving, thinking machines.
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Approximately since the start of the new millennium, progress in genetic engineering and 
other life sciences sparked new debate on enhancement, eugenics and other attempts at 
incorporating technologies in the human body or brain to improve them. These authors 
included Peter Sloterdijk (1999), Bill Joy (2000), Jürgen Habermas (2001), Francis 
Fukuyama (2002) and Jean-Pierre Wils (2004).
Sloterdijk (1999) considered humans as “animals under influence” always balancing 
between inhibiting and liberating or animalising tendencies, and in need of the right kinds 
of influencing. He posed the question of an antropodicee: a determination of humankind in 
light of his biological openness and moral ambivalence. How a human can become a true or 
real human should be asked as a communal and communicative media question. Sloterdijk 
discussed Heidegger’s letter on humanism (1946). Heidegger emphasised the difference 
between humans and animals and strongly rejected the vision seeing humans as rational 
animals. Human dignity roots in the philosophical vision of Humans as the one spoken to 
by Being itself. Sloterdijk interpreted Heidegger’s complicated ideas as seeing fascisms as 
the paradoxical synthesis of humanism and bestialism. Sloterdijk asked some major 
questions. What is capable of taming humanity, if humanism as school of taming humans 
has failed? What will tame humanity if all his prior attempts at taming himself have only 
led to attempts to take power over all that is? What will tame humanity if after all prior 
experiments with raising humankind it remains unclear who or what raises the parents to 
what purpose? Or can’t we competently ask the question of taking care of and educating 
humanity within the framework of mere theories of taming and upbringing?
Sloterdijk attempted to answer these questions by analysing the history of humankind, 
explaining how animal sapiens became homo sapiens. He distinguished two distinct story 
lines coming together in this open space. The first story tells how we became animals open 
to the world able to control the world. The second is a social history about taming. This will 
help humans to experience themselves and to concentrate on responding to the whole. In 
the coming period we will have to face the dilemmas posed by “antropotechnology”, or the 
genetic and other technical means enabling us to plan human properties and change the 
characteristics of humanity. Can humanity shift from birth-fatalism to birth-planning and 
prenatal selection? Sloterdijk argued that the concept of such antropotechnology is based on 
Plato’s thoughts in “the State”.
The US President’s council on bioethics (2003) argued that the drive for human 
enhancement is inherent in the enlightenment. It furthermore traces the quest for 
improvement of the human condition back all the way to Descartes. The council translated 
this to the present day desires for longer life, stronger bodies, happier souls, superior 
performance and better children. These causes may also be furthered with life sciences, if 
pursued with caution. After careful consideration, the council concluded by taking a stance 
against enhancement.
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Nanotechnology specific issues in the debate on Human Enhancement
From 2003, the longer term Human Enhancement debate has incorporated visions on 
nanotechnology. A group of experts in Switzerland discussed enhancement and other 
ethical aspects of nanomedicine in 2003: “These developments [in human enhancement] 
make the distinction between human and machine unclear. Only constructive intentions are 
legitimate, risk assessment procedures must be followed, no infringement of human rights 
or autonomy in case of interference in human procreation, mind or sensory perception is 
acceptable. Eugenics and neurochips must be avoided.” (Baumgartner, 2003)
In the Netherlands, the Rathenau Institute has also tabled this discussion in an expert 
workshop. Incorporating diagnostics chips inside the body cold be applied in telecare, 
linking pacemakers, diabetes sensors etc. to a wireless communication system. This could 
give rise to issues like loss of human contacts, vulnerability for technological malfunctions, 
loss of knowledge of one’s own body, freedom of choice. Questions raised include: How 
can we guarantee reliability of biomedical nanotechnology? How to build in controls for 
malfunctioning or use biodegradable materials? (Rathenau biomedical workshop, 2004)
The UK Royal Society considered human enhancement a speculative development, 
touching upon the question what constitutes a human being. Its report in 2004 pleaded for 
separating hype from real ongoing research. It criticised especially parts of the US report on 
Converging Technologies, (Roco & Bainbridge, 2003) that included a long term vision of a 
human cognome project, but contained little mainstream neuroscience. Does society have 
the appropriate mechanisms for anticipating and deliberating some of the more radical 
enhancement proposals if and when they were to become practical realities? (Dowling,
2004)
Others have also raised similar questions: How to deal with life prolonging or organ or limb 
replacement tools and life extension? (Meridian, 2004) The human-machine interface in the 
form of brain chips or implants was deemed to be a sensitive issue. (ETP Nanomedicine,
2005) Human enhancement was expected to give rise to ambiguous risks. (Health Council,
2006) Bert Gordijn (2005) distinguished three scenarios of human enhancement, or “post­
humanity” as he called it: fusion of human and machine, transformation of humans, and 
scanning brains to digitalise the information, and establish our software intelligently. The 
last idea had been discussed also by Hans Moravec (1988, p 108-112). The enhancement 
scenarios make the question what constitutes a human being more relevant. Gordijn did not 
see a major difference between biomedical ethics and ethics of nanomedicine. 
Nanomedicine was expected to be incorporated in biomedical technologies and gradually 
change their functionality.
Converging technologies
The debate on human enhancement has continued also in later years, but mostly under the 
name of converging technologies (nano-bio-info-cogno). Nanotechnology as such became 
less important.
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Gregor Wolbring (2005) analysed the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
information technology and cognitive sciences and its challenges for health technology 
assessment and policy making. The concepts of enhancement medicine, disabled people 
and the concept of health and their interconnections were studied. Wolbring intended to 
stimulate proactive debate on the issues and problems society may be confronted with in 
the coming years by this convergence. Wolbring favoured a more just and fair 
implementation. Wolbring distinguished two challenges. The first related “to the ever 
increasing ability of science and technology research and development R&D products to 
modify the appearance and functioning of the human body beyond existing norms and 
species-typical boundaries and to modify the appearance of a third generation model and 
determinants of health, disease, disability and well-being, which incorporate, condone and 
even support human performance enhancement beyond species typical boundaries. The 
other challenge related to the changing role of disabled people in the public and policy 
sphere from a passive recipient role toward and active, participatory and shaping role.” He 
concluded that: “Two opposite views of health exist”. The World Health Organisation sees 
health as an umbrella term for a state of complete physical, mental and social well being. 
On the other hand, the Canadian interpretation is “the absence of disease and illness”. 
Progress in science and technology made both concepts loose their endpoint. Furthermore 
there was a trend towards an individualistic approach to health and the “health consumer”. 
Wolbring expected it to become more and more difficult to distinguish therapy and 
enhancement. Enhancement medical goods might become normal medical goods. He feared 
that people in developing countries would not benefit from basic health interventions. The 
relations between individuals and the community were decreasingly taken into account. He 
criticized the current health technology assessment models of disabled people. These 
models tend to consider disabled people as patients and ignore social determinants of 
disability. Implications of enhancement are not covered.
Gregor Wolbring (2006) analysed the potential impacts of nanotechnology and converging 
technologies on disabled people. Wolbring urged the involvement of disabled 
representatives in the debate on nanotechnology development. He assessed trends in 
nanotechnology which will affect the lives of disabled people, 80% of whom are living in 
developing countries. The analysis included nanowater and nanotechnology and converging 
technologies in general that could influence the lives of disabled people. He argued that 
disabled people were missing in nanotechnology policy making, and made practical 
suggestions for including them.
A group of experts of the World Association for Christian Communication and the World 
Council of Churches issued a report on convergent technologies. (Lee and Robra, 2005) 
Gregor Wolbring was among them. The authors analysed trends in convergent technologies 
and visions about the power of nanotechnology. They explained why they think 
government and commercial interests seek to control it. They then challenged “mainstream 
thinking” behind both technology development and ethical principles. The authors argued 
that there are different interpretations of such principles and called for broader debate on 
what is considered ethical by different groups. After analysing five models of disability,
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they proposed a new research agenda. This should address the new understanding of 
disability, the needs of disabled people and other marginalised groups, the emergence of the 
transhumanist model of health and disease and the increased medicalisation / 
transhumanisation of human beings and their characteristics. The report ended with “a fresh 
perspective on ethics and theology,” that was rather pessimistic about the societal 
consequences of technology development and economic uptake. They were highly critical 
of some of the thinking behind converging technologies, even calling some of it 
“blasphemous”. They seemed to prefer African holistic worldviews without technology to 
the thinking behind contemporary technological development. The report was intended to 
stimulate religious communities to develop a position regarding convergent technologies 
and enhancement. (Lee and Robra, 2005)
Philip Lee (2006) of the World Association for Christian Communication criticised the 
political and economic power convergent technologies offer. He raises the question who 
will control these technologies and who will be ethically responsible for their application 
and use. Lee analysed historic trends in converging technologies in a broad sense. These 
included the changing nature of human memory, capturing sounds and images, digital 
convergence and cyber immortality. Lee then discussed global responsibility for scientific 
and technological developments and their impacts, including the roles of scientists as well 
as the general public.
A Dutch-Flemish group of technology assessment specialists analysed trends in existing 
literature including heaven, hell and “prevail” scenarios and current trends in convergence 
of pairs of technologies (info-cogno, bio-info, nano-bio, nano-info-materials). The group 
discussed the outcomes in a meeting in the European Parliament. This discussion left the 
“converging technologies community” with four key questions according to chairwoman 
Corbey (MEP):
1) “Who is in the driving seat, determining the future of the developments in 
converging technologies?
2) Where are converging technologies headed and to what extent can [the 
development] be contained?
3) What are the values of converging technologies and what is the impact on society?
4) How can we organise the debate arena? And in particular: how can the public get 
involved and how can mutual trust between society, scientists and technology 
developers be built?” (Casert and Deboelpaep, 2006)
Richard Saage (2006) analysed the discourse on converging technologies in the USA and 
Europe by investigating the sources for the utopian and dystopian scenarios. He focused 
mainly on the reports on converging technologies by the National Science Foundation and 
the European Union High Level Expert Group on Converging Technologies, but also 
referred to Drexler c.s. and Joy. Saage remarked that the visions are more inspired by 
science fiction than by philosophical authors such as Francis Bacon. Based on his analysis, 
he concluded that the European vision was a viable alternative to the American. The 
European vision opened up the decision making on converging technologies to the wider 
civil society, enabling a new social contract.
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Christopher Coenen (2006) analysed the crypto-religious and utopian aspects of post 
humanism in the debate on converging technologies on the nanometre scale. He considered 
post humanism as an anti-modern movement aiming to overcome the human world and 
self-image of the new time. The post humanists themselves and their critics interpreted their 
effort as fulfilling or extremely radicalising modernism. Coenen saw post humanism as a 
techno futuristic worldview, standing in the Gnostic and anti-physical tradition. It was not 
clear then if such a vision will ever be realisable in practice. Its political and philosophical 
impact must be taken seriously and analysed.
Joachim Schummer (2006) argued that the specific protestant Christian tradition 
dominating the US population has fostered exceptional excitement about nanotechnology, 
converging technologies and transhumanism. He thinks that Americans have a more 
apocalyptic orientation than people in other countries, especially in Europe. Schummer did 
not think it likely that Europeans will be as enthusiastic about the future prospects of 
nanotechnologies and converging technologies.
To conclude: from about 2003, nanotechnology has been included in a much older 
philosophical debate on human enhancement. Even though several authors have discussed 
issues related to nanotechnology, these issues are not specific to nanotechnology. This point 
will be left here for now. The overview of ethical issues in current debates on 
nanotechnology will be continued with another application domain: agro food, water and 
environment.
3.1.3.3 Agro food, water and environment
In the Netherlands, the Rathenau Institute tabled discussion on nanotechnology in agro food 
in 2004. It raised questions like: “Is the current regulation governing nano in agro food 
adequate? Globalisation of the economy may present unprecedented problems with 
enforcing national legislation. This may put the consumer in the role of involuntary guinea 
pig.” Risk assessment of nanoparticles and nano structured materials in food and public 
acceptance of nanotechnology in food should also be addressed. (van Kasteren, 2004) 
Related to this, the Health Council foresaw that sustainability of nanotechnology could give 
rise to complex to uncertain risks. (Health Council, 2006)
According to several sources, several dozens of nano-based food products were already on 
the market and several hundreds were in the pipeline in 2007. The lack of common 
definitions made it difficult to assess whether products really included synthetic 
nanomaterials.
During 2006, the policy debate on nanotechnology and food safety had emerged in the 
USA, the European Union and several member states and worldwide. More or less 
simultaneously, NGO’s and media had picked up the issues and were beginning to express 
concern about food safety issues and asking for nanolabelling especially for food products 
produced with nanotechnology. (Malsch, van Est, Walhout, 2007) During a European panel
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discussion on nanolabelling in June 2007 (EuroNanoForum 2007 conference, Düsseldorf), 
the discussion focused on how to implement a nanolabel. The question if nanolabelling was 
desirable was no longer an issue. Despite efforts by the organisers, no representative of the 
food industry participated in the panel. (Malsch, 2007b) By 2011, the lack of transparency 
regarding the use of nanomaterials in the food industry and controversies over regulation 
still dominated the public and political debate. E.g. the European Parliament and Council 
were discussing repealed food regulations where nanolabelling and risk assessments could 
be included.
3.1.3.4 Ambient intelligence
The ethical implications of engineering and physics related top down miniaturisation are 
more limited to trends in ambient intelligence and ethical aspects of information and 
communication technology. One of the issues identified here is privacy: “The invisible 
nature of nanomaterials may cause significant invasion of privacy.” (Roco & Tomellini,
2002) Also security of electronic information is identified as a cause for concern. 
(Mnyusiwalla, 2003)
Developing and applying nanosensors contributes to control and privacy issues, identity 
and authenticity, surveillance and information assurance. (Dowling, 2004)
Ubiquitous computing is another name for ambient intelligence. Klaus Kornwachs (2006) 
systematically investigated how the potential for conflicts increases with the extension of 
application possibilities of ubiquitous computing, as a case study of ethics of technology. 
Most conflict potential occurs in organisational issues and the concatenation of realms and 
living contexts that have not been brought together before.
3.1.3.5 Military nanotechnology
The technology assessment bureau of the German Federal Parliament (TAB) investigated 
the security political implications of nanotechnology, including risks of abuse and 
uncontrolled use. Nanotechnology may lead to destabilising the international power 
relations by its economic implications both in the western world and between developed 
and developing countries. There are also implications for national security. TAB was in 
favour of debating the consequences. (Paschen, 2003)
Military applications in development include protection against NBCRE weapons. Other 
applications could give rise to new issues. These included ethics of unmanned warfare and 
killer robots, ethics of soldier enhancement, and new armament and fostering the arms race. 
(van Est, 2004)
Military applications of nanotechnology included offensive as well as defensive uses. 
Several authors contributed to this debate, including the following:
- Possible enhancement of the arms race (Gsponer, 2002, Arnall 2003),
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- availability of knowledge and materials needed for weapons in the public 
domain (Joy 2000),
- increasing range of asymmetric power relations; public distrust of civil 
nanotechnology by association with military developments. (Dowling, 2004)
- Dual use nanotechnology is like dual use biotechnology, chemistry or nuclear 
energy technologies: how to foster beneficial applications while banning 
harmful uses? (Meridian, 2004)
- Some military applications of nanotechnology give rise to ambiguous risks. 
(Health Council, 2006)
Jürgen Altmann (2006) made a more systematic analysis of military nanotechnology and 
proposed preventive arms control of military nanotechnology. Altmann analysed trends in 
nanotechnology R&D which may be used for military applications. His analysis included 
defence as well as civil research, because a lot of research can be used for both. He was not 
concerned with ethical aspects of the technology itself. Altmann focused on with limiting 
proliferation and developments of weapons which are against the spirit or the letter of 
current international disarmament and arms control treaties, humanitarian law, and of the 
trends in strengthening these treaties and ensuring international peace and stability.
Altmann stated that: "Preventive arms control consists of four steps:
1) Prospective scientific analysis of the technology in question;
2) Prospective analysis of the military-operational aspects;
3) Assessment of both under the criteria of preventive arms control;
4) Devising possible limits and verification methods". (Altmann, 2006, p 124)
The criteria he used for his analysis were divided in three groups:
I) Adherence to and further development of effective arms control, disarmament and 
international law;
II) Maintain and improve stability;
III) Protect humans, environment and society.
He concluded that: "The following applications raise strong concerns:
- distributed sensors,
- new conventional weapons,
- implanted systems/body manipulation,
- armed autonomous systems,
- mini-/micro-robots with, but also without, weapon function,
- small satellites and launchers,
- new chemical and biological weapons.
It is in these areas where preventive limitations seem most urgent". (Altmann, 2006, p 151)
Ethical issues of military nanotechnology may have been mentioned by several authors. 
However, there has not been much debate on these issues.
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3.1.3.6 Conclusions application-specific issues
Nanotechnology is expected to be applied in a wide range of different products and 
systems. Most ethical concerns are not specific to the technology, but relate to the product 
or system and how it will be used in the future. When nanotechnology is applied in 
medical, food, ICT or military applications, the same currently unresolved ethical issues 
will also be relevant to products made with nanotechnology. Some participants in the 
discussion have suggested that nanotechnology may give rise to new issues or intensify 
existing issues. In the literature examined here, it is not so clear what could be really new 
issues.
3.1.4 Scientific and techno ethics related to the social networks 
involved in nanotechnology
Some ethical and societal aspects in the current debate relate to responsible scientific 
development in general. These aspects include science communication and public debate, 
but also science governance. In this section 3.1.4 an overview is given of different types of 
contributions to this debate are distinguished. These include research ethics, early societal 
impact assessment, ethics committees, ownership of research results, nanotechnology and 
the poor. Some national differences in the positions taken in these debates are also briefly 
discussed.
3.1.4.1 Research ethics
There appears to be a consensus among participants in the debate on nano-governance that 
students and senior scientists and engineers must be trained in ethics. Several proposals 
have been made how to integrate such training in the curricula or to offer it in postgraduate 
courses. The existing bioethics codes of conduct, regulations and practices are considered 
to be a basis for ethics of nanoresearch, but may have to be adapted. A concrete omission in 
the Helsinki convention of medical experiments on humans appears to be that scientists 
experimenting on themselves are apparently not covered. The neuroimplant experiment of 
Kevin Warwick is a case in point.24
24 Donald Bruce of the Church of Scotland remarked this during the roundtable on ethics of 
nanomedicine of the European Group on Ethics, 21 March 2006, see article of 23 March
2006, published on Nanoforum,
http://www.nanoforum.org/nf06~modul~showmore~folder~99999~scc~news~scid~2160~. 
html?action=longview& (last accessed 04-09-06)
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The European Commission (2005, p6 ) saw a need for greater awareness of nanoscientists 
on a number of societal issues including ethical, health, safety, environmental and social. 
The European Parliament (2006): “calls on industry to share in the joint effort and urges it 
to participate in developing nanotechnologies, taking into account their wider economic, 
societal, health, safety and environmental effects and acting in accordance with the 
principles of corporate social responsibility; ... businesses should help disseminate 
objective information about scientific discoveries in the nanosciences and nanotechnologies 
field, about their intended uses, their risks and benefits for society.”
The French Ethical Committee (COMETS, 2006) of the national centre for scientific 
research CNRS recommended to ethics in researchers’ careers and to develop clear ethical 
guides for them. An “ethical space” in research centres should be opened where natural and 
social scientists can debate and the interest for nanotech among human and social scientists 
should be encouraged. The relations between CNRS and industry should be made more 
transparent.
3.1.4.2 Including societal impact assessment in early stage 
research
From an American perspective, the aims of societal impact assessment are to identify (Roco 
and Bainbridge, 2001):
- Harms (safety at work);
- Conflicts over justice and fairness (changes in workforce needs and human 
resources; equity disputes raised by Intellectual Property Protection, relations 
between government, industry and universities);
- Issues concerning respect for persons.
The social network of organisations involved in strategic choices on nanoscience and 
technology funding and public research should be broadened. Roco and Bainbridge 
recommend:
- Integrate societal studies and dialogues from the beginning in National 
Nanotechnology Initiative, to develop a tradition of social science based 
countermeasures to protect the public and deal with nanotechnology’s potential 
negative consequences. (p 12)
- NNI should dedicate institutionalised funding for research into ethical, legal and 
social implications of nanoscience and nanotechnology from the start. The 
findings of this research should help shape nanotechnology funding and 
governance policies.
- Nanotechnology research centres should communicate with the general public 
about nanotechnology potential and the desirable priorities in research. This 
should be a two-way communication;
- Educating the nano-workforce from secondary school to professors including in 
ethical, legal and social implications (Roco and Bainbridge, 2001)
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In Europe, Roger Strand came up with some arguments in favour of incorporating research 
in societal and ethical aspects of science and technology in an early stage of development in 
nanotechnology research programmes:
- Public attitudes towards technical development have changed. The present distrust 
between the public and technological establishment is unwanted and costly;
- Progress in Philosophy of Science, Science, Technology and Society Studies and 
applied ethics including medical ethics, bioethics, research ethics etc have led to 
improved tools for studying ethical and social aspects of science and technology;
- There is growing concern about ethical, legal and social aspects among scientists;
- There are good reasons to be sceptical and concerned about new sciences and 
technologies.
- ELSA studies of nanotechnology should address the fundamental choices in 
research priorities including which nanotechnologies best address the world’s 
needs. (Strand, 2001)
The Technology Assessment Bureau of the German Federal Parliament (TAB) proposed 
strengthening interdisciplinary education and research in nanotechnology including social 
sciences and humanities. (Paschen, 2003)
Experts in a workshop on ethics of biomedical nanotechnology organised by the Rathenau 
Institute in 2004 proposed to start a debate between nanotechnology experts and social and 
human scientists. Early warning TA and science communication about it is an experiment 
in itself.
In the UK, the Royal Society recommended that the Arts and Humanities research council 
should fund research in social and ethical aspects of nanotechnology. Furthermore natural 
science and engineering students and researchers should be trained in ethics. Review 
committees involving a wide range of stakeholders should be installed to monitor and warn 
about policy issues related to nanotechnology. (Ann Dowling, 2004)
The European Commission (2004) highlighted the need to “respect ethical principles, 
integrate societal considerations into the R&D process at an early stage and encourage a 
dialogue with citizens”.
In a workshop on nanotechnology and society, Alfred Nordmann (2006b) reflected on his 
research and the work of scholars in Science and Technology Studies, Ethical, Legal and 
Social Aspects, and Technology Assessment. “Social scientists studying technology have 
been invited to study nanotechnology. As insiders to the development we can no longer 
oppose it, but give credibility to and help shape it,” Nordmann explored how researchers in 
social sciences and humanities could disentangle the networks of stakeholders which 
surround different nanotechnologies without ruining them. He was asked why such 
deconstruction of the networks one is part of is a sensible thing to do. Nordmann expressed 
the hope that by weakening the existing coalitions around nanoelectronics, nanomedicine or 
other nanotechnologies, social scientists might make room for new stakeholders in the
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networks. This could in the long run strengthen their durability and the public acceptability 
of the technologies.25
On an international level, at the NSF-EU workshop on nanotechnology and society (2002), 
several proposals were made to facilitate the uptake of nanotechnology in society:
- Better models for coupling complex systems to anticipate and avoid harmful 
consequences (“revenge of unintended consequences”);
- Distinguish fact and fiction;
- Use scientific cafe’s, consensus conferences and contacts with the media for 
dialogue between science and society.
Arie Rip and Tatsujiro Suzuki (2006) found that the inclusion of ELSI studies in 
nanotechnology R&D programmes leads to co-evolution of ethics and new technology, 
rather than ethics as given, to constrain new technology. They also saw mutual structural 
readjustments between society and technology.
The three Dutch technical universities have cooperated in a centre of excellence in ethics 
and nano and other technologies since 2007. This incorporated research on philosophical, 
ethical and theological implications of nanotechnology in nanotechnology R&D. (Breij, 
2006)
In Brazil, five research networks, two so-called Millennium Institutes and some other 
research centres have been active in nanotechnology. In 2005, the government installed a 
BrazilNano Network for commercialising nanotechnology. (Foladori, 2006) Research in 
social sciences and humanities of nanotechnology has been done by RENANOSOMA, the 
Research Network in Nanotechnology, Society and Environment. RENANOSOMA also 
stimulated public engagement and actively tried to establish international collaborations in 
annual Seminars on Nanotechnology, Society and the Environment since 2004. 
(Renanosoma website, 2007) A National Committee for Bioethics had to regulate impacts 
of scientific and technological development projects on the environment and on health. 
(Malta, 2004) By 2003, the parliament discussed a Law on Technological Innovation 
relevant to nanoscience and nanotechnology. The media were publishing articles on 
nanoscience and potential applications. There was little public awareness of 
nanotechnology in Brazil. (Ozorio de Almeida, 2003)
In Colombia, advanced materials and nanotechnology is a key area of research since 2004. 
A National Council for Nanoscience and Nanotechnology started in 2005. The research 
included ethical and social implications of nanotechnosciences. In Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Venezuela research centres and groups were active in nanotechnology, but 
there was no national programme. In Mexico, Guillermo Foladori of Universidad 
Autonoma de Zacatecas was interested in nanotechnology and society. (Foladori, 2006)
25 This is an excerpt from Ineke Malsch, “Scientists uneasily entangled in the nanoworld” 
published online at www.nanoforum.org in July 2006.
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In November 2006, in Brazil, the Latin American Network on Nanotechnology and Society 
RELANS was launched, aiming to stimulate dialogue on nanotechnologies in Latin 
America. (RELANS website)
3.1.4.3 Ethics committees and reviews
The EC (2005, p 9) would “ensure that Community funded R&D in N&N continues to be 
carried out in a responsible manner e.g. via the use of ethical reviews. Possible ethical 
issues for N7N include e.g. non-therapeutic human enhancement, invasion of privacy due 
to invisible sensors. The integration of ethical concerns, innovation research and social 
sciences into N&N R&D will help build confidence in decision making related to the 
governance of N&N.” The EC would furthermore: “Ask the European Group on Ethics in 
Science and New Technologies to carry out an ethical analysis of nanomedicine. This will 
identify the primary ethical concerns and enable future ethical reviews of proposed N&N 
R&D projects to be carried out appropriately.”
The European Parliament (2006): “supports the setting up of ethical committees which, by 
providing independent scientific advice, will help ensure that the public is properly 
informed and help create a climate of trust based on awareness of the possible risks and 
benefits associated with the use of discoveries in the field of nanotechnologies”.
3.1.4.4 Ownership of research results
Increasing dependence of research on private sector financing could limit academic 
freedom. (van Kasteren, 2004) The Canadian ETC group pleaded to avoid granting too 
broad patents on nanotechnology inventions which may stifle development. Their 
arguments were similar to the objections to “patenting life” which is already discussed 
extensively, e.g. in the European Parliament. (ETCgroup, 2004) These issues were also 
discussed during a conference on nanopatenting organised by the European Patent Office 
(2004), but mostly dismissed. Schummer (2005) was concerned that the shift from 
publications in the public domain to patenting in academia in developed countries may 
increase the costs of innovation and make new technologies less accessible to poorer 
countries. UNESCO mentioned intellectual property, secrecy and legitimacy of scientific 
results as a potential problem which may aggravate the nano-divide. (UNESCO, 2006)
3.1.4.5 Nano and the Poor
The Technology Assessment Bureau of the German Federal Parliament (TAB) discussed 
implications of nanotechnology for distributive justice and self-determination. They noted 
that these issues are not specific for nanotechnology, but also apply to biomedical and other
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technologies. The distribution of opportunities, avoiding harm and autonomy and self­
determination were the ethical principles which should apply. (Paschen, 2003)
A group of researchers at the Joint centre for Bioethics of the University of Toronto 
discussed nanoethics and focused on implications for developing countries. The authors 
saw many opportunities for applications of nanotechnology in e.g. the medical, energy and 
environmental remediation sectors. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and 
Cuba could also improve their employment by investing in nanotechnology from an early 
stage and hence competing with Western economies. These countries could be supported in 
this through a global internet based network for nanotechnology and development. 
(Mnyusiwalla et al, 2003) In a later publication, 63 experts participating in a Delphi study 
carried out by researchers from the same group ranked the ten most important applications 
of nanotechnology for achieving the eight UN Millennium Development Goals. The top 
three were:
■ Energy Storage, production and conversion;
■ Agricultural productivity enhancement;
■ Water treatment and remediation.
The experts also indicated some potential sources of funding for developing these 
nanotechnologies. (Salamanca-Buentello et al, 2005)
Joachim Schummer (2005) noted that several metals found in developing countries are 
likely to be replaced by nanomaterials produced by developed countries, including 
Tungsten (China) and Platinum (South Africa).
According to the Dutch Health Council, the technology divide between rich and poor 
should be considered as a complex risk. Apart from the experts employed by specialised 
government agencies responsible with governing the topic, also other scientific and non- 
scientific experts (e.g. professionals from developing countries) should be included in the 
debate. There were disagreements concerning the best strategy to stimulate 
nanotechnology for developing countries. There is no lack of knowledge and certainly no 
ambiguity on which norms and values to apply to the issues at hand. (Health Council, 2006) 
Niels Boeing (2006) argued for a concept of “open nanotechnology” similar to open source 
software to prevent a nano-divide and prevent adverse consequences. He applied a systems 
theoretical approach.
3.1.4.6 Other impacts of nanotechnology on society
Roco and Bainbridge (2001) already identified several possible large scale impacts of 
nanotechnology on society. They saw the need to take action in an early stage to govern 
nanotechnology introduction. The effects included workforce implications and need for 
nano-education, unintended consequences due to uptake of nanotechnology in new 
sectors/products by start-up companies, and shift in government structures.
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3.1.4.7 National differences
Emerging economies in Asia are investing substantial amounts in nanotechnology, not only 
Western countries. There are differences in public perception of science and technology and 
in attitudes towards risks between the countries. The USA tends to be a Risk-benefit 
society, whereas European countries are more conservative societies according to George 
Whitesides, in a personal communication. Outside North America, Europe and Australia, 
few countries have a tradition of studying risks and ethical, legal and social aspects of 
research.
Participants in a UK-Japan workshop (2005) made a start with setting the agenda for 
Japanese activities. They proposed regulation and stakeholder engagement in an early stage 
of nanotechnology development. Relevant stakeholders should be mapped and a reason 
identified for including each stakeholder. Japan had limited experience in public 
engagement in debates about technology. The participants wanted the country to gain 
experience in small projects to inform design of a large scale public dialogue project. Public 
dialogue should be a two way process and governments should take the views of the public 
more into account in policy making. (Royal Society-Science Council of Japan, 2005)
Research into ethical, legal and social aspects of research is incorporated in nanotechnology 
R&D projects. In the USA, this research takes up about 2% of the budget, in the EU 
framework programme for RTD and in the Dutch NanoNed programme 1%, in Japan 
0.05% and in South Korea 40,000 dollar. (Rip, 2006) The European Parliament asks the 
European Commission to intensify its collaborations with Russia and investigate 
collaboration possibilities with the USA, Japan, China and India. The international dialogue 
should be intensified in compliance with WTO rules. (European Parliament, 2006)
Case study o f non-western views on nanotechnology and society: India
Since India’s independence in 1950, technology development and scientific education have 
been set up separately. In the new millennium, the trend is towards integrating science and 
technology and interdisciplinary collaboration. (Vice Rector Professor Deepak Pental) By
2007, natural sciences and social sciences were still mainly separated. At the University of 
Delhi, social scientists and economists pleaded for broad interdisciplinary collaboration for 
societal relevant development of nanotechnology. Professors CSK Singh and Vijay Kumar 
Kaul expressed their views on this. The social scientists could introduce their knowledge on 
the needs of society to which the natural scientists and engineers could target their research 
projects. Professor Rajendra Jagdale, Director General of the Science and Technology Park, 
University of Pune suggested including SMEs as well. In general, technology transfer and 
private R&D hardly existed in India. Most companies lacked the capacity to absorb well 
trained researchers and give them qualified jobs. (EuroIndianet, 2007)___________________
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Some social scientists in India have already published about nanotechnology and society. 
Bürgi and Pradeep (2006) considered nanotechnology to be a fusion technology where 
information technologies and biotechnologies converge. Developing countries as well as 
developed countries could participate in nanotechnology development and benefit from its 
applications right from the start. They also noted that nanotechnology is broadly 
interdisciplinary, and that natural scientists are welcoming the contributions of social 
scientists for “finding solutions that contribute to the qualitative enhancement of human 
life.” They foresaw seven opportunities for nanotechnology to play a role in combating 
poverty and fostering sustainable development:
a) economic development of developing countries;
b) safe drinking water;
c) improved food security;
d) health diagnosis, monitoring and screening;
e) environmental pollution;
f) energy storage, production and conversion;
g) global partnerships.
Bürgi and Pradeep furthermore thought that the unexplored biodiversity of the South offers 
opportunities for bionanotechnology development.
Chatpalli and Patil (2006) explored ethical issues of nanotechnology and recommend 
incorporating ethics research in nano R&D; stimulating public dialogue; and education in 
technical as well as social aspects.
NIAS, the National Institute of Advanced Studies organised a NIAS-DST workshop on 
Dimensions of Nanotechnology: Science, Technology and Society, 26 June-1 July 2006. 
http://www.iisc.ernet.in/nias/nias-dst06.htm
A wide variety of research policy oriented issues have been discussed. Most discussions 
have taken place in Western countries. However, more and more initiatives are taken in 
other countries as well. Some of these non-western discussions have been initiated by the 
European Commission or EU member states.
3.1.5 Answers to research policy issues
Over the years, three types of answers have been proposed to the issues discussed in the last 
section: nanoethics, regulation and public debate. Each proposed solution is by now 
surrounded by a community of experts and stakeholders engaged in debates and projects. 
These initiatives are intended to develop new instruments and test their usefulness for 
governance of nanotechnology research in practice. The three communities remain 
discipline oriented. Pleas and experiments in stimulating ethical reflection on 
nanotechnology are typical for philosophers and human scientists. Regulation is more
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favoured by policy makers and legal experts, and public debate is more favoured by social 
scientists, NGO’s and politicians. The following sections 3.1.5.1 -  3 present an overview of 
relevant contributions to the debate on each of the three solutions.
3.1.5.1 Nanoethics answers
Alfred Nordmann (2003) argued in favour of “Technological Containment” as a third road 
between technologies of hubris and technologies of humility. The latter concepts had been 
introduced by Sheila Jasanoff for dealing with the risks posed by an uncertain technical 
future. Nordmann wants the research community to develop concrete visions about the way 
in which properties and processes are to be contextualised (control, retrieval, detection). 
Policy makers and funders should frame social visions for the development of 
nanotechnology and its convergence with other research agenda’s. Public debate should 
focus on legitimacy, labelling, ethical codes and regulatory issues.
The Brazilian nanoscientist Oscar Malta (2003) pleaded in favour of an “Ethical 
Modernity” instead of a “Technical Modernity”. “The technical modernity turns the means 
into the ends themselves. On the other hand, the ethical modernity considers in a deeper 
way human values and their relationships with the environment, incorporating the 
ecological and anthropological knowledge into the technical knowledge and recognising 
that the rationalization and consolidation of this synergism is the point of paramount 
importance to attain a sustainable development”. Malta was in favour of developing 
sustainable nanotechnology in line with Agenda 21 as agreed during the UNCED 
conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992. To reach this goal, research and training needs 
in emerging economies should be addressed. By 2003, these countries could only adapt 
innovations developed in the western world and produce them unsustainably at the expense 
of human and natural resources in their country.
Bert Gordijn (2003) proposed a six step procedure for developing a more balanced 
nanoethics view than the utopian dreams and apocalyptic nightmares which dominated the 
debate. He recommended to start by distinguishing different sub areas of nanotechnology 
by their application domain and choosing which specific field is to be ethically assessed. 
Then the objectives of the research in that field should be articulated. The question should 
be raised whether those objectives are ethically desirable, followed by an enquiry whether 
further development of the research will contribute to the realisation of those objectives. 
Next, the ethical problems connected with further development of the field must be 
clarified. Finally, the question must be answered if those ethical problems are 
surmountable. Such a systematic approach requires adequate funding of interdisciplinary 
groups for ethics research.
Jean Pierre Dupuy (2004) saw nanotechnology as an example of human tampering with 
complexity which gives rise to new uncertainty, for which the precautionary principle is not 
a sufficient answer. He pleaded for a new science of the future. This should be done by 
making more interactive scenarios.
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Emilio Mordini (2005) believed there is nothing new in the debate on nanoethics. Similar 
dreams, hopes and uncertainties related to technological development have been debated in 
the baroque period. He recommended to take the stories told about nanotechnology (e.g. 
Prey) seriously as a reflection of the concerns of the public.
Armin Grunwald (2005) took a similar position. He did not see the need for new 
nanoethics. Instead he observed a gradual shift of emphasis in questions which are already 
known but may be exacerbated due to nanotechnology. He only thought novel ethical 
aspects occurred due to the renewed attention raised for them through visions discussed in 
the public discourse. New questions could also be posed by convergence of previously 
separated lines of ethical reflection.
In the national newspaper Trouw26, Emiel Hakkenes discussed an attempt by the 
philosopher Marc de Vries to analyse nanoethics from Dooyeweerd’s perspective. This 
Dutch philosopher held that the reality is ordered in a variety of non-reducible aspects. 
When considering the ethical aspects of nanotechnology, all fifteen aspects distinguished 
by Dooyeweerd must be taken into account, including social, economic, aesthetic, moral 
and belief. Having said this, de Vries saw more questions than answers, which he would 
continue to study. Reader reactions included one hostile to any interference of ethicists, a 
plea for less theology and more concrete discussion on potential nanorisks, and several 
supporters.
During the Budapest Meeting 2005 on Bioethics, progress in research ethics was discussed. 
This focused especially on the badly defined concept of “Human Dignity” in the recent UN 
Declaration on Human Cloning. This declaration included a ban on reproductive cloning. 
“ . t h e  notion of “Human Dignity” as it is used in this declaration would never work as a 
basis for scientists to determine what society wants them to ban, and what society would 
allow or even encourage them to do.” (Van Steendam, 2006)
The UN General Assembly solemnly declared:
b) Member States are called upon to prohibit all forms of human cloning inasmuch 
as they are incompatible with human dignity and the protection of human life;
c) Member States are further called upon to adopt the measures necessary to 
prohibit the application of genetic engineering techniques that may be contrary to 
human dignity. (United Nations, 2005)
Van Steendam considered this to be a weak statement. It did not unconditionally ban 
human cloning, but only inasmuch as it is incompatible with human dignity. The 
declaration did not include a definition of “human dignity”. An attempt by Ana Maria 
Marcos and Iñigo de Miguel to propose a stronger definition of “human dignity” took the 
Kantian view of Human Dignity as the intrinsic and sacred value of life of every human 
individual”. Others criticised this as being too individualistic. (Van Steendam, 2006)
26 On 28 June 2006,
http://www.trouw.nl/deverdieping/religie filosofie/article361194.ece/Nanotechnologie Ult 
rakleine deeltjes roepen levensgrote vragen op (last accessed 23-10-06)
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The discussion on nanoethics answers to governing nanotechnology had not reached 
definite conclusions at the time this thesis was written. But it was not the only research 
domain from which governance solutions were sought. The next section includes relevant 
contributions from a legal perspective.
3.1.5.2 Nanoregulation
A group of experts participating in a TA-Swiss Delphi study on nanomedicine was the first 
to argue for regulating nanotechnology. Their proposals included:
The installation of a new institute for monitoring process for risk and public acceptance of 
nanotechnology, misuse, moral and ethical aspects, health policy and economic questions. 
A range of existing ethical committees were also deemed relevant for nanotechnologies, 
including committees on bio security, human medicine, clinical research, human genome 
research. (Baumgartner et al, 2003)
Two years later, the Strategic Research Agenda of the European Technology Platform in 
Nanomedicine gave a more prominent role to them, by entrusting the review of ethical 
aspects of research by established ethics committees, except for the exploration of new 
issues which should be done by research projects in ethical, legal and social aspects of 
research. (ETP Nanomedicine, 2005)
The TA-Swiss experts (2003) were divided and had three views on regulating 
nanotechnology:
1) The existing regulations are at least in the short term sufficient, and can be adapted 
if necessary;
2) The rights of the individual must be protected. A plurality of lifestyles must 
remain possible. The benefits must outweigh the risks, which should be 
minimised. Equity must not be diminished;
3) Regulation is not possible because nanotechnology is a non-revisable and generic 
technological development. Nanomaterials developed for another application can 
not be excluded from medical applications.
All agreed that regulations should be transparent and in accordance with the precautionary 
principle and generally accepted ethical principles. Existing regulations in Switzerland and 
the European Biomedical Convention (1997) are also applicable to medical 
nanotechnology. These include regulations regarding pharmaceuticals, reproductive 
medicine, embryo research, human genome research, transplantation, DNA-profiling, 
medical and other research on humans. (Baumgartner et al, 2003)
The Technology Assessment Bureau of the German Federal Parliament (TAB) proposed 
political decisions on nanotechnology regulations in the near future. To enable this, TAB 
considered an improved database of environmental and health impacts of nanotechnology 
and an analysis of the current legislative framework necessary. They suggested to install an
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accompanying monitoring programme for emerging nanotechnology applications and their 
consequences. (Paschen, 2003)
There is broad consensus that nanotechnology regulations should be harmonised from the 
beginning at a global level. This has been the focus of debate in several international 
forums. These debates were first tabled in a conference organised by the Meridian Institute 
(USA) in 2004, and funded by NSF. The representatives of governments and experts 
present came up with several proposals and issues for debate:
- Preparation of a global “code of conduct” for responsible development of 
nanotechnology in an international informal preparatory group. What happens if 
one or a few countries opt in for a controversial application while others opt out?
- Are existing organisations and governance tools adequate to handle societal 
aspects of nanotechnology?
- Educating the workforce and the public
- Involve non-governmental stakeholders (industry, civil society, and the broadest 
range of countries) in discussions on societal aspects of nanotechnology.
- Balance potential benefits and potential risks, develop an integrated technology 
governance.
- The present societal context for nanotechnology development is significantly 
different than for other technologies in the past, this includes globalisation. Other 
issues were enhanced expectations about science communication, dialogue and 
transparency. Concern about the technology divide and fairness in access also 
played a role.
- Key conditions for nanotechnology R&D should be identified. (Meridian Institute,
2004)
The Health Council of the Netherlands proposed to impose a broad “risk governance 
strategy” on nanotechnology for human health (2006). This included several measures:
- imposing a weak precautionary approach to uncertain risks of non-degradable 
nanoparticles
- installing a commission to monitor nanotechnology development, risks and 
societal aspects
- increasing stakeholder and public participation in governance debate and decision 
making with increasing risk categories, from simple via complex and uncertain to 
ambiguous.
The council cited the IRGC risk governance framework (IRGC, 2005).
IRGC itself also applied its risk governance framework to nanotechnology as a whole. It 
recommended two distinct strategies. The first should deal with the complex risks related to 
passive nanostructures (frame 1). The second should address the uncertain and ambiguous 
risks of active nanostructures and nanosystems (frame 2). The strategy for uncertain and 
ambiguous risks consisted of stakeholder debate and scenario studies. The potential 
conflicts IRGC foresaw are tensions created by unforeseen or insufficiently addressed 
consequences and inequitable distribution of benefits. (IRGC, 2006)
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The European Parliament (2006): “ .encourages the Commission to continue improving its 
work to respond to the increasing demand for better regulation”. ... “emphasises that all 
applications and uses of nanosciences and nanotechnologies must comply with the high 
level of protection of human health, consumers, workers and the environment prescribed by 
the EU and insist on the need for the codification of nanomaterials, which leads to the 
drawing up of standards, which would in turn boost efforts to identify any risks; calls on the 
Commission to take the necessary initiatives to this end.”
The Dutch government (2006) adopted the "Cabinet vision Nanotechnologies: from small 
to great". The vision aimed for a balanced development of nanotechnologies. The 
Netherlands aimed to develop a special research agenda. The government proposed to 
install an observation post for nanosafety at RIVM (State Institute for Public Health and 
Environment). They also pleaded for an interdepartmental discussion forum for 
nanotechnologies to improve coordination within the government. Public acceptance of 
nanotechnology was deemed essential.
The government was convinced that nanotechnology will contribute to strengthening the 
Dutch economic structure and competitiveness. The technology offered solutions for 
healthcare, food, environment, privacy and defence. Potential risks and legal and ethical 
aspects should also be addressed at the same time. The government developed this vision 
because nanotechnology is developing rapidly on a global level. The Netherlands should 
maintain its strong position in this field. This required a coordinated approach. The vision 
could also play a role in effective Dutch participation in the EU and on a global scale.
Case study o f  a non-western nanoregulation debate: Argentina27
In Argentina, the president launched the Argentinian Nanotechnology Foundation (FAN) 
by decree 380/2005 on 29 April 2005, which created much political and public debate. 
Contributers to this debate were the Congress, the Argentine Physics Association and the 
National Committee on Ethics in Science and Technology (Foladori, 2006). The main 
issues were political, including fear of foreign military funding, and economic. The FAN 
had been launched without the need for approval by the congress. The government 
announced an investment of $10 million in it, and the US company Lucent Technologies 
was granted exclusive rights to develop products arising from the research. In June 2005, 
the congress discussed a ten year nanotechnology development plan proposed by the 
technology commission headed by Mrs. Lilia Puig de Stubrin. (Sametband, 2005) Several 
congress delegates have proposed “proyectos de ley” (legislative projects) in 2005 and 
2006, as reviewed below. This indicated considerable political interest in nanotechnology 
and its implications for the Argentinian economy and society.
On 31 March 2005, Jorge Raul Giorgetti proposed creating the “Argentinian Institute of 
Nanotechnology,” before the Presidential decree which was issued a month later. On 13 
May 2005, the congress adopted a resolution asking the executive for information about the 
objectives of science policy and the creation of the FAN. On 2 June 2005, Lilia Puig de
27 An earlier version of this paragraph was published in Malsch, 2007
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Stubrin and colleagues proposed the abovementioned “ten year strategic plan for 
developing micro and nanotechnologies.” One and a half years later, Miguel Dante Dovena 
and Jorge Raul Giorgetti tabled a proposal entitled: “Nanotechnology, regime for its 
industry,” on 7 December 2006. The parliamentarians participating in the debate wanted to 
ensure that Argentinian companies and the economy and society at large could benefit from 
the investment in nanotechnology. They cited several articles by international scholars 
about applications of nanotechnology for developing countries. (Source: Argentinian 
Parliament website)
At the time of writing of this thesis, the debate among experts and policy makers on 
nanoregulations was ongoing. Different experiments were made for regulatory 
contributions to governing nanotechnology. At the same time, social scientists and policy 
makers were investigating potential contributions to nanogovernance through public debate.
3.1.5.3 Public debate
In 2004, the Rathenau Institute (NL) published an introduction into ethical, legal and social 
aspects of nanotechnology. It recommended stimulating public debate in the Netherlands. 
This should include speculations as well as common sense. Social wishes and concerns 
should figure as central themes. The debate should facilitate open interaction between 
government, scientific community, companies and social actors. There should not be one 
central nanotechnology debate, but several debates concentrated on individual application 
domains and in line with existing debates on technology and society. The organisers of the 
debate should be aware of new as well as old issues and work swiftly towards a widely 
supported public agenda. (Rinie van Est et al, 2004) The purpose of public debate had a 
different meaning for different parties. Should the focus be on public information or on 
dialogue? And what should be the responsibility of researchers in public debate about 
potential risks. (This is a recurrent theme, e.g. van Kasteren, 2004.)
In the UK, the Royal Society and Royal Academy of Engineering study on nanotechnology 
and society reached a similar conclusion, though less detailed. The organisations asked the 
UK government to initiate public dialogue on nanotechnology. The outcome of such debate 
should influence policy decisions. Two questions were deemed likely to be the focus of 
social and ethical concerns in the short term: Who controls uses of nanotechnologies and 
who benefits from uses of nanotechnology? (Dowling, 2004)
The EU funded project Nanologue developed an online “Nanometer”. This was intended to 
help policy makers and technology developers to identify possible ethical, legal and social 
aspects of the product or application they were working on. The intention was to enhance 
awareness of these issues and stimulate users to start public debate on the issues in an early 
stage of development. The meter consisted of 18 questions related to social benefits, health 
and environment, resource requirements, privacy, overall user benefits, product stewardship
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and transparency.28 An updated version of the Nanometer was developed for companies by 
2010 in the ObservatoryNano project.29
The French Ethical Committee (COMETS, 2006) of the national centre for scientific 
research CNRS recommended coordination with all stakeholders to evaluate needs and 
wishes of society for nanotechnology. The public debate should discuss benefits as well as 
risks and all nanotechnology stakes should be taken into account.
Other suggestions for stimulating debate included capacity building of civil society groups, 
including religious NGO’s, on nanotechnologies and converging technologies and their 
ethical aspects. This could be done in dedicated projects such as the EU funded NANOCAP 
(2006-2009) project for environmental groups and trade unions (Rinie van Est, Rathenau 
Institute, personal communication). Another suggestion was to stimulate public debate in 
the media. This could be done through publishing opinion articles, sending press releases, 
giving interviews clarifying the issues and calling for contributions to the debate from 
opinion leaders representing different perspectives. (Malsch, 2006)
Case study o f non-W estern initiatives for public debate: India
In 2003, a conference with school children on nanotechnology was organised in India. In 
March 2006 the University of Delhi has organised a similar conference “Nanoworld” with 
500 school children about nanotechnology, aiming to excite them about the technology. In 
March 2007, the University of Delhi has organised a nanotechnology conference for college 
students (studying for a Bachelor degree). Furthermore, IIT Delhi is responsible for the 
education contents for the 24 hour science and education television channel “Technology 
Channel” which is a main channel for distance education in India. In the future, societal 
aspects might also be discussed in outreach events for school children and college students, 
in teacher training programmes and in TV programmes. Akhlesh Lakhtakia (2006) pleads 
for introduction of Just in Time Education (JITE) to complement the conventional Just in 
Case Education (JICE) for secondary school children worldwide. JITE is especially suitable 
for learning interdisciplinary subjects like nanotechnology, where students must be able to 
find and integrate knowledge from different disciplines including natural sciences and 
engineering as well as social sciences and humanities.
3.1.6 Conclusions inventory
The current nanoethical issues can be divided in three categories. The first is related to risk 
governance. The second encompasses a variety of issues more related to the application
28 The nanometer is accessible at http ://nanometer.nanologue.net/ (last accessed 23-10-06)
29 http://www.observatorynano.eu/project/questionnaire/nanometer (last accessed 2 1 -0 2 ­
2 0 1 1 )
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domain than to nanotechnology itself. The third is related to research policy. In other 
reviews of these debates, the last category is usually not distinguished. Instead long term 
implications of technological convergence for human self-understanding or the boundary 
between natural and artificial or living and non-living is considered a separate category. 
The introduction of nanotechnology in current discussions on risk governance, applications 
of nanotechnology and convergence has not given rise to really new ethical issues. Mostly, 
nanotechnology has given rise to continuation and possibly intensivation of ongoing 
debates.
In the overview in this chapter, research policy issues were set apart because this is 
probably the key novelty in the debate on nanotechnology and its ethical and societal 
aspects. These questions are asked much earlier in the technological development than had 
been customary in the past. However, the issues discussed tend to be more related to 
politics and governance than to philosophical ethical research agendas. Because this thesis 
examines ethically sound governance of nanotechnology, it is important to examine such 
philosophical ethical issues more in depth. Therefore the focus in the next section will be 
on ethics. The governance aspects will temporarily be left aside.
3.2 Analysis o f key ethical conflicts which are not discussed 
sufficiently
The first chapters of this thesis have demonstrated the breadth and variety of 
nanotechnology and the ethical issues discussed in relation to it. In all the contributions by 
a wide range of organisations and individuals in different parts of the world, no really new 
issue has been identified that is unique to nanotechnology. Given all this diversity, a 
philosophical ethical analysis of nanotechnology can only be meaningful at a lower level of 
abstraction. It is necessary to focus on a limited number of cases where nanotechnology is 
applied in a particular sector, product or system. The overview of current discussions on 
ethical and societal issues does present decisive arguments to decide on thé issues that are 
generally considered most important. This gives some flexibility for the author to choose 
three topics to focus more in-depth ethical reflection on. One reason for the selection of the 
following three cases is that they all have an international dimension. That makes them 
potentially relevant for contributing to the central research question aiming at ethically 
sound global governance. In the light of this final goal, the cases are also broad enough to 
bring together different views and different issues that have been discussed by experts and 
stakeholders.
The issues discussed in this section 3.2 are clustered in three areas:
1) Nanotechnology and security (military nanotechnology, weapons of mass 
destruction, nanotech and civil security/freedom)
2) Impact of nanotechnology on sustainable development (environment as well as 
poverty, millennium development goals)
3) Shifting boundaries between natural and artificial entities (synthetic biology, 
artificial life, overcoming disability versus enhancement). The international
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dimension is that there appears to be disagreement on applicable values between 
different countries.
These conflicts are not specific for nanotechnology. However, the researchers and policy 
makers responsible for decision making on the priorities in nanotechnology research are 
confronted by them and need to develop their own ethical position. Also, the debate on 
these three issues was current at the time of writing the thesis because of trends external to 
nanotechnology. These trends included the development of a European foreign and security 
policy, the global effort to accomplish the UN Millennium Development Goals by 2015, 
and general progress in biomedical sciences and technology.
In any analysis of the key nanoethics conflicts, descriptive and normative concepts must be 
distinguished. Descriptive concepts are used to analyse the observed situation, the playing 
field in relation to which actors should develop an ethical position, to guide their actions in 
it. Normative concepts are used to analyse the variety of possible responses towards the 
observed situation. Examples of descriptive concepts are “Human being” or “Person”, 
which can be used as somewhat different ways of determining who or what should be 
granted the rights and responsibilities inherent in the normative concept of “Human 
Dignity”. In the following sections, descriptive and prescriptive concepts will be 
distinguished.
3.2.1 Nanotechnology and security
Trends in nanotechnology for security applications have been reviewed by several authors 
(e.g. Altmann, 2006, Nanoforum, 2007, ObservatoryNano, 2009d). A major issue was the 
interpretation of the concept of “security”. National governments tended to emphasize the 
interests of states to protect their own existence against foreign enemies (national security). 
Since the emergence of international terrorism, also homeland security is high on the 
agenda. UN bodies and NGOs are currently proposing an alternative concept of “Human 
Security” (e.g. Pax Christi, 2007). The main issue is how to strike a new balance between 
protecting the security of citizens against attacks from other people, and guaranteeing the 
freedom of individuals against unjustified limitations from the state or other organizations. 
(EU Charter Human Rights, 2000)
Since WWII, in the USA, federal government investment in defence technology 
development has traditionally been large. Therefore the high percentage of the 
nanotechnology R&D budget for defence applications does not represent a change in 
policy. What was new under the Bush administration was the change of policy concerning 
outer space, including the desire to defend national security in Space. Other new trends 
were the wider definition of strategic goods on which export restrictions apply, and stricter 
visa restrictions for foreign researchers wishing to work in the USA.
In Europe, Defence and Security were traditionally national policies. Until the end of the 
Sixth Framework programme for RTD, the European Union was not allowed to fund
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defence technology development. Since about 2005, the policy has changed. Since then the 
EU and its member states have developed a Common Security and Defence and Common 
Foreign and Security policy. In the Seventh Framework Programme (2007-2013), security 
research was a separate thematic programme. The European Commission also stimulated 
targeting other thematic programmes on the needs of the security sector (including ICT and 
nanotechnology). This change in policy has given rise to new ethical, legal and social 
issues, which can be addressed by new research in social sciences and humanities. The 
Security research programme included funding for this. The national defence policies and 
research programmes in EU member states vary considerably among themselves. There are 
potential conflicts of interests, as has become clear at the time of the war in Iraq.
In Asia, several countries including Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel and North 
Korea have invested in military and space technologies including in nuclear weapons. 
Several of these countries also had considerable nanotechnology research programmes.
Underlying the general case of security applications of nanotechnology, some ethical issues 
and descriptive and prescriptive ethical concepts can be distinguished. This list is based on 
the author’s own analysis. The issues and concepts are summarised in the following boxes. 
The lists are too large to be examined in depth, so a selection of some key descriptive and 
prescriptive concepts will have to be made. The following analysis is intended to do just 
that.
Box: list o f  ethical issues related to security applications o f nanotechnology
- What is “security” (global peace and security, national security, homeland 
security, human security)?
- What is Human Dignity from different perspectives? (Key concept European 
Charter of Human Rights, 2000)
- What is freedom?
- Striking a good balance between security and freedom (e.g. academic freedom 
versus classified research and confidentiality; free trade versus export restrictions 
on strategic goods, “big brother” technologies (nanosensors, RFID, smart dust))
- Impacts of (nano)technology development on international peace and security 
(balance of powers, arms race, increased availability of military technology / 
weapons to non-state actors (terrorists, criminals))
- Implications of (nano)technology development for Just War doctrine (e.g. 
weapons of mass destruction, “father of all bombs”, remote control war)
- National interests versus common heritage of humanity (e.g. militarization / 
weaponisation of space thanks to miniaturisation of space technologies 
(micro/nano/pico satellites, etc)
- Soldier nanotechnologies (see also natural / artificial dichotomy)
- Use of scarce resources (see also sustainable development).
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Relevant descriptive Relevant normative concepts:
concepts:
- (global, national, homeland, human) Security
- Human, Person, - Freedom
community - Human dignity
(“Gemeinschaft”) - Just War and criteria:
, people (“volk”) o Just War Criteria, Jus Ad Bellum:
- Nation, state, ■ Just Cause;
country, ■ Just Intent;
homeland, ■ Legitimate Authority;
society ■ Reasonable Prospect of Success;
(“Gesellschaft”), ■ Last resort; (can also be a criterion for Jus
government in Bello)
- International, o Jus in Bello:
global, world ■ Discrimination/non-combatant immunity;
- Peace, civil ■ Proportionality;
- War ■ (Tradition in international law.) 30
- Terrorism, crime - Common heritage
- Science, - Humanity
technology,
innovation
(nanoscience,
nanotechnology)
etc
- Military, security
sector
In the rest of this section, relevant nanoresearch and technology development for military 
and civil security applications and future scenarios are being described. In this description, 
those developments are being highlighted which the author expects to be ethically 
problematic. Several other books and reports review all nanotechnology trends relevant for 
military, civil or homeland security. (e.g. Altmann, 2006)
Nanosciences and nanotechnologies for security applications
A wide range of nano structured materials and nanoelectronics applications are being 
developed for defence and civil security applications. Many of these developments are 
defensive in nature and won’t lead to obvious ethical conflicts. E.g. smart textiles may be 
applied in the soldier’s uniform. General trends in nanotechnologies for defence or security
30
http://people.westminstercollege.edu/facultv/mmarkowski/312/iustwar.htm;
http://atheism.about.eom/od/warandmoralitv/a/iustwartheory.htm
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applications have been reviewed by several authors. Jürgen Altmann (2006, see also p 24­
26 above) has analysed current and expected future developments and applications of 
nanotechnologies for military purposes. TNO (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006, 2009) has 
made similar analyses, but from the perspective of defence technology promoters. 
Nanoforum (2007a, 2007b), ObservatoryNano (2009d) and others (e.g. Ratner & Ratner, 
2003, Hoffknecht & Teichert, 2006) have analysed developments and applications of 
nanotechnologies for civil space and security applications, including both technological 
trends and risks and ethical, legal and social aspects. Below, those nanotechnological 
developments which may contribute to new ethical conflicts are being summarised and 
placed in a roadmap distinguishing available technologies, short term developments which 
are expected to enter the market in 0-5 years since the publication of the source, medium 
term developments (5-10 years), long term developments (10-20 years) and speculative 
developments. Since several sources have been published some years ago, the short term 
developments may already have become state of the art at the time of publication of this 
thesis.
3.2.1.1 Technological trends in nanotechnologies for security
Four types of security applications exist where nanotechnology is either used already or 
expected to be incorporated in the future. These include identification and tracking and 
tracing; robotics and unmanned aerial vehicles, explosives and micro-satellites. As for 
identification and tracking and tracing, an ever-increasing array of sophisticated sensors 
and command and control systems are available for combined-arms warfare. (EDA, 2006)
Currently, RFID chips are incorporated in an increasing number of consumer goods and 
security applications, for collecting and storing data on the movements of individuals. 
Applications include public transport chip cards, biometric passports and consumer 
products sold in shops. Each chip is unique and any shopkeeper or other organisation or 
individual can read the chip when it gets within range and store the data in a database. 
Justice Departments are interested in using the collected data generated by these techniques 
for identifying criminals and terrorists and for collecting evidence in criminal 
investigations. (Rathenau Institute, 2007) Similarly, GPS chips integrated in mobile phones 
or car route planners can be used to collect data on individuals’ movements by the 
companies operating the system. Nanoelectronics constitute enabling technology used in 
both systems. “Smart dust” refers to miniaturised systems including a sensor, information 
processing device, transmitter and energy supply in a very small package. A swarm of such 
smart dust motes can be used for collective secret information gathering for many purposes 
including defence and security. By 2001, the smallest systems were around 100 mm3 in 
volume. The aim was to miniaturise them further to 1 mm3. (Pfister, 2001) Long range 
RFID-systems can help identify and localise fellow and enemy soldiers, goods and vehicles 
(Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006). Distributed sensors can be connected to pieces of 
equipment for surveillance at fixed locations and verification by 2010. (Altmann, 2005) By 
2 0 1 0 , such sensor technologies have indeed advanced and given rise to the emerging
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“internet of things” and related policy and societal and ethical issues. (e.g. EC, 2010) 
Civilian markets are primarily targeted. (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2009)
Large robotic aeroplanes (without nanotechnology) already exist for reconnaissance tasks. 
Microsystems and nanomaterials could in the near future be integrated in unmanned or 
manned aerial vehicles with larger dimensions (deemed realistic by 2011, Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 2006) Combat UAVs and precision weapons are available for combined-arms 
warfare. (EDA, 2006) Currently, ESA missions launch batches of micro-satellites (10-15kg, 
1 dm3 in size). (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006)
Metallic Nanoparticles including e.g. Aluminium can be used in explosives, to achieve a 
bigger bang. The UK company QinetiQ Nanomaterials Ltd. (QNL) has been developing 
such nanoparticles for defence as well as civil applications. E.g. in 2005, QNL first 
produced 80nm nanoparticles of Aluminium / Boron with applications in pyrotechnics for 
air bags, rocket motors etc. (QinetiQ 2005) The Russian army tested a new heavy Thermo 
baric “Father of all Bombs in September 2007. Several sources including the BBC have 
speculated that this new conventional explosive with power comparable to a nuclear 
weapon contains nanoparticles. (Harding, 2007, BBC, 2007)
Russia is investing $7.7 billion until 2015 in nanotechnology research, with foreseen 
applications in a number of areas including medicine, space research, telecommunication 
and weapons production. (Ria Novosti, 2007b) Russia will equip 20 battalions with S-400 
air defence systems using nanotechnologies for increasing striking range and height by 
2015. (Ria Novosti, 2007c)
Altmann foresaw several applications of nanotechnology in conventional weapons by 2015. 
These included distributed sub-mm size sensors scattered in high numbers on the 
battlefield, interrogated by laser beam or self-configuring radio-network. Nanoparticles 
may be applied in better propellants and explosives. Metal-less arms, small missiles and 
other conventional weapons could be improved by nanotechnology. In addition, auxiliary 
systems for nuclear weapons based on nanotechnology for safety, arming and fusing could 
be expected, (Altmann, 2005)
In the long term (2018 and later, more and more applications of nanotechnology are 
foreseen in the areas already mentioned above: robotics, unmanned aerial vehicles, 
identification and tracking and tracing, and micro satellites. Remote controlled and 
autonomous vehicles and robotics are expected in 2016-21. These can include nano­
electronics for memories and computing power, as well as nanomaterials for light weight 
and smart structural materials, and in light weight batteries. Brain-machine interfaces for 
remote control of platform systems and autonomously operating robotic systems are 
expected to become more dominant in the period 2021-2026. (Simonis & Schilthuizen,
2006) “A distributed network of sensors can operate autonomously, be self-learning and 
self-responsive and will evolve into an ambient intelligence system reacting to other 
elements on the battlefield (soldiers, equipment, environmental influences, etc.” (Simonis 
& Schilthuizen, 2006) Further miniaturisation of satellites from micro satellites to
119
nanosatellites (1-10 kg) and Pico satellites (<1 kg) and integration of these in military 
swarms of cooperating micro satellites may be applied for information and communication, 
spying as well as for destroying other satellites or ground attacks. (Time range unclear, 
Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006)
Non-conventional military applications of nanotechnology could also enter the battlefield in 
the long term. Implanted systems and body manipulation of soldiers is expected by 2020, as 
are autonomous systems, mini/micro-robots, biotechnical hybrids and small satellites/space 
launchers. (Altmann, 2005) Nanotechnology may lead to innovation in chemical and 
biological weapons in 5-15 years (e.g. by encapsulation and drug delivery techniques), but 
chemical/biological protection and neutralisation are also expected in the coming 5-10 
years. (Altmann, 2005)
Other military applications are considered possible in the very long term, but the likelihood 
that they will really be applied is low. A high power laser for hand guns is not unthinkable. 
“Nanobots and bio bots as weapon systems are perhaps to be expected in the longer term 
(20-30 years).” (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006)
Hypothetically, very small nuclear weapons based on pure fusion without fission trigger, 
e.g. ignited by antimatter might be developed using nanotechnology. (Altmann, 2005)
The trends foreseen in the literature are summarised in the next table.
Table 1: Concerns related to security applications o f nanotechnology
Concern of Current By 2012 2012-2017 2017 >
nanotechnology concern
for security
Big brother RFID, GPS, long range wireless ambient
technologies biometric RFID (Simonis distributed intelligence
passport & Schilthuizen, sensors network of self-
(Vedder et al, 2006), fixed (Altmann, leaming
2007, distributed 2005) sensors
Rathenau, sensors (Simonis &
2007), internet (Altmann, Schilthuizen,
freedom 2005) smart 2006)
(Amnesty) area covering 
monitoring of 
moving persons 
and vehicles 
(micro-sensors) 
(Don & Heus, 
2007)
Biometric 
identification 
with micro
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sensors (>3 
years) (Don & 
Heus, 2007)
Remote control 
war
Combat UAV; 
precision 
weapons 
(without nano) 
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 
2006; EDA, 
2006)
UAV incl. 
MST & 
nanomaterials 
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 
2006)
Tracking & 
tracing persons 
/ substances / 
objects with 
mini-planes 
which can 
transmit 
messages 
broadcast by 
ground based 
transmitters (>3 
years, Don & 
Heus, 2007); 
very small 
planes are 
sensitive to 
wind
remote control 
vehicles, brain- 
machine 
interface for 
remote control 
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 
2006) UAV 
may replace 
manned aircraft 
for certain tasks 
(MOD, 2006)
Weaponisation 
of Space
military
satellites for 
communication 
or earth 
observation 
(without nano) 
(European 
Commission, 
2007); micro­
satellites (civil) 
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 
2006)
CANEUS 
nano- and Pico 
satellites for 
civil and 
military In­
Space
Technology 
Validation 
(CANEUS 
website, 2007)
small satellites/ 
space launchers 
(Altmann,
2005) 
military
swarms of 
micro satellites 
for
communication 
, spying, 
destroying 
other satellites 
or ground 
attack?
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen,
2006) Virtual 
military 
satellites 
(Pimprikar, 
2 0 0 2 )
WMD
proliferation
encapsulation 
of bio/chem. 
agents
nano-improved 
auxiliary 
systems for 
nuclear
nanobio/ 
chem weapons 
(Altmann,
2005)
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weapons,
nanobio/chem
weapons
(Altmann,
2005)
Detection 
techniques for 
explosives and 
CBRN
materials (>3 
years) (Don & 
Heus, 2007)
Conventional
weapons
Nanoparticles 
in 120mm tank 
rounds
(Burgess, 2003) 
Thermo baric 
bomb (Harding, 
2007; BBC, 
2007)
explosives with
nanoparticles;
metal-less
arms, small
missiles
(Altmann,
2005)
Enhancement brain-machine 
interface for 
remote control 
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 
2006), 
implanted 
systems and 
body
manipulation of
soldiers
(Altmann,
2005)
Military robots autonomous 
vehicles, 
(mini/micro) 
robotics, 
ambient 
intelligence 
network of self­
learning 
sensors
(Simonis & 
Schilthuizen, 
2006)
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As can be foreseen at this moment, nanotechnology may contribute to several existing 
ethical concerns related to military or security applications, and could in the future create 
new concerns (see table 1). The Big Brother scenario is inspired by George Orwell’s novel 
“ 1984” (published in 1948). It highlights the risk that government measures aiming for 
security may invade the privacy of individual citizens and may be abused for repression of 
civil liberties. Currently, politicians and stakeholders are debating privacy concerns related 
to security applications of RFID and related techniques for tracking and tracing goods and 
persons. The issues are related to their uptake in applications such as biometric passports 
and chip cards for public transport. (Vedder, 2007; Rathenau, 2007, etc) These existing 
RFID chips already include nanoelectronics components. Current privacy issues may be 
exacerbated in the future through ongoing miniaturisation and integration of individual 
wireless sensor systems in cooperating (invisible) swarms. (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006, 
Altmann, 2005) By 2010, privacy and other societal issues related to RFID chips and the 
“internet of things” had entered the political agenda. (EC, 2010)
The concept “remote control war” refers to trends in precision missiles, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, cars and ships, where soldiers can target enemies on a distance and stay in a safe 
place themselves. Such missiles and vehicles already exist, without microsystems or 
nanotechnology components. They may in the future be miniaturised or rendered lighter or 
more effective thanks to nanotechnology. (Peres, 2003, Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006, 
2009, Altmann, 2005) The debate on the ethical acceptability of the development in the 
direction of a “remote control war” has slowly started. By 2006, the European Defence 
Agency considered it a possible solution to the expected lack of European soldiers due to 
the ageing population by 2025. (EDA, 2006) By 2010, several ethicists, social scientists 
and policy makers had started discussing these issues (reviewed by Homan, 2010, Malsch, 
2008b)
Weaponisation of Space is receiving more interest recently. Military satellites already exist, 
for communication and earth observation. Further miniaturisation of satellites enabled by 
microsystems and nanotechnology may enable anti-satellite swarms of space weapons 
destroying other satellites or ground attacks. (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006, Altmann,
2005) There is a suspicion that countries may be developing micro-satellites, to be 
converted for use as Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT). (UNIDIR, 2006)
The risks of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction or the dual use technologies 
needed to make them is high on the political agenda. Nanotechnology or other new 
technologies may exacerbate the risks. Nanotechnology may also be used in conventional 
weapons, making them more deadly or changing the properties. In the long term, human 
enhancement or human-machine interfaces as well as robots may be used in military or 
security applications.
“Remote Control War”, Militarising Outer Space and proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction are the three application domains of nanotechnology which may lead to 
currently insufficiently addressed ethical concerns.
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3.2.1.2 Related to relevant changes in policies or power 
balance
After the end of the Cold War and since the emergence of international terrorism, a 
“Revolution in Military Affairs” is occurring. This revolution is characterised by 
asymmetric warfare and rapid progress in civilian high technologies. These technologies 
may also be used for weapons and defence and security in general, by all parties including 
states as well as non-state actors including terrorists and criminals. Asymmetric warfare is 
used to indicate conflicts where military forces are charged with long term peace keeping 
and enforcing missions in civilian areas in failed or failing states, against adversaries 
hidden among the local population. The technological progress including in emerging areas 
of research such as nanotechnology means that the traditional distinction between the 
national military-industrial complex and civilian industry and research is progressively 
blurring. High technologies are not so much spun-out of military research into civilian 
applications, but spun-in to arms and other military technology development from civilian 
industries and research. For civilian researchers in nanotechnology and other areas, this 
implies that they are confronted with a new potential client for their results, with particular 
security demands. This could lead to new restrictions on academic freedom for the 
scientists, and export restrictions for industry. Other possible implications could be less 
funding for non-security related applications of research including healthcare, environment, 
etc. Below, some relevant changes in security policies with implications for 
nanotechnology research are analysed for countries with considerable investments in 
nanotechnology and security.
Commercial industry drives military technology
During the Cold War, the defence industry drove high-tech development. Since the 1980s, 
this trend has been reversing, and now key technologies used to make remote control and 
precision weapons and other military systems are often developed by commercial 
industries. These include the entertainment, pharmaceutical, automotive, personal 
communication and banking industries. (DoD, 2003)
Michael Brzoska (2007) has analysed defence conversion in the long decade of 
disarmament from the late 1980s until the late 1990s. During the Cold War, 20-25% of 
worldwide public R&D spending, research facilities and scientists and technicians were 
used for military purposes. In the USA, defence R&D was reduced by 30% from the late 
1980s until the late 1990s, and increased again afterwards. In Russia, defence R&D was 
reduced to 10% of Cold War levels. The border between military and civilian R&D and 
industry varied per country. In some countries like Germany, most defence R&D took place 
in dual use companies. In the USA, most activity took place in dedicated military R&D 
facilities, whereas in Russia, defence and civilian R&D sectors were strictly separated.
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In Western countries, military R&D had been more advanced than civilian R&D only in 
some areas such as composite fibre structures and metal coatings, but civilian sectors had 
been leading in most other high tech sectors including electronics, materials science and 
aerospace already in the late 1980s. This trend which had already started after World War 
II, had led to a shift from spinning out military technologies to civilian uses towards 
spinning in civilian technologies to military uses following integration of military and 
civilian R&D in the 1970s and 1980s. This trend stimulated concentration of defence R&D 
on technologies with limited civilian applications such as stealth technology. In the 1990s, 
when the end of the Cold War prompted reduction of military R&D spending, demand for 
civilian R&D happened to be low as well, limiting the uptake of military R&D resources 
for civilian uses especially in the former Warsaw Pact States, but also in other countries 
including Germany, Japan and the USA. (Brzoska, 2007)
21st century war strategies
The shift toward the military adoption of commercial technologies for weapons 
development has been accompanied by a change in military planning. Since the 1990s, the 
U.S. has been initiating revised strategies for military deployment. These strategies have 
been driven in part by rapid technological advances in information and communication 
technology. They have also been the result of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent 
decrease in defence spending in the 1990s. Precision warfare is a key element to these new 
war strategies. (Tilford, 1995) The U.S. and the NATO Response Force (NRF) introduced a 
new form of network-centric warfare (NCW) as part of these new military strategies, 
according to Kees Homan (2005). With NCW, all branches of the armed forces are 
integrated in a threefold electronic network: a network of sensors in the air, on the ground, 
at sea and in outer space; a shooter network integrating weapons systems; and an 
information network connecting these two and collecting, analysing and distributing data 
rapidly. While NCW enables faster and more precise warfare, it also makes the U.S. and 
NATO armed forces more vulnerable to attacks on the network.
W ar on Terror fought with precision
Other trends driving precision warfare are the War on Terror and NATO peace enforcing 
operations. U.S. President George W. Bush announced the War on Terror, or The Long 
War, after the September 11 attacks in the U.S in 2001. The War on Terror involves 
measures against some governments and international terrorist organizations. It is a 
perpetual armed conflict, with no clear conditions for resolution and with ongoing tensions 
that can escalate at any moment. The UN Agenda for Peace (2002) defines peace 
enforcement as a category of international military operations, between peacekeeping and 
large scale enforcement.
The U.S. and its NATO allies are using remote control and precision weapons in the War 
on Terror, peace enforcing operations and in the subsequent Long War period of 
asymmetric warfare against insurgents. These weapons are designed to make it possible for 
armed forces to control a hostile territory without sending in a large number of soldiers.
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Israeli President Shimon Peres also wants new technologies for remote control war against 
what he calls terrorists. Hezbollah, the Lebanese paramilitary organization, on the other 
hand, used precision weapons and advanced communication among troops in the 2006 war 
with Israel. Jürgen Altmann notes Hezbollah also used unmanned drones years before. The 
technological advantage is continually eroding, adding to the demand for newer and more 
precise technologies.
Mary Kaldor, director of the Centre for the Study of Global Governance at the London 
School of Economics, considered the American War on Terror to be an ‘old war’ fought 
with new technologies. Kaldor defined ‘old war’ as warfare in which two states engage in 
battle to capture territory. The American military believed that by using new technology, 
the War on Terror could be a new type of war, one that was rapid, precise and low in 
casualties. However, ‘new wars’ are not defined by technology, but are associated with 
globalization and the disintegration of states. Networks of state and non-state actors fight 
the wars, and violence is most often targeted toward civilians. The distinctions between 
combatant and non-combatant and between legitimate violence and crime are breaking 
down. ‘New wars’ violate all the conventions of ‘old wars’ and international human rights.
The intervention in Iraq may have started as a high-tech ‘old war’, but the U.S. has been 
dragged into a ‘new war’ in which private contractors fight alongside troops, the main 
victims are civilians and opposition against the US intervention by groups in the country 
grows. (Kaldor, 2005) Kees Homan noted that despite the use of precision weapons in 
Afghanistan, 750 civilians were killed in 2007. Precision weapons have so far not been 
capable of discriminating between fighters and civilians. Soldiers using remote control 
weapons are not distant enough to be invulnerable to attacks.
3.2.1.3 Military nanotechnology R&D
At the international level two organisations are stimulating nanotechnology R&D 
cooperation for military or dual use applications: NATO and CANEUS. Several countries 
also fund defence-related nanotechnology R&D. The USA is the global leader, but 
evidence in the public domain on relevant activities of other countries has also been found. 
The activities are summarised below.
NATO
The NATO Research and Technology Organisation RTO promotes and conducts defence 
research and technology development for the 26 NATO countries and 38 NATO partners. 
The Research and Technology Agency RTA coordinates the activities. Currently, research 
is going on in six areas coordinated by technical panels. The panels on Applied Vehicle 
Technologies and on Sensors and Electronics Technology are engaged in projects including 
nanotechnology. By 2006, there had been four nanotechnology research activities in the last 
decade. These included a project on nanomaterials for military vehicle structural 
applications (ended 2005), nanotechnology aerospace applications (ended 2006), emerging
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technologies for sensor front ends (ended 2007) and nanotechnology for autonomous 
vehicles (ended 2008). Later, more projects were started involving military and security 
applications of nanomaterials and nanotechnologies, but not always labelled nano. 
Examples of more recent projects include metamaterials for cloaking, Terahertz and other 
Electromagnetic Wave technologies, diverse types of distributed sensors, sensing through 
walls etc. (RTA NATO 2006, 2011)
CANEUS
CANEUS is an international public-private consortium of research organisations active in 
Microsystems and nanotechnology development for aerospace and defence applications. It 
was originally started from Canada, Europe and the USA in 1999, but now also includes 
partners in other countries in Asia, and Brazil. CANEUS started a number of pilot projects, 
including CANEUS NPS (Nano-Pico-Satellites). Nanosatellites weigh ~10 kg, and Pico 
satellites ~1 kg. CANEUS NPS aims to develop commercial small satellites for “In-Space 
Technology Validation” (ISTV) based on Microsystems and nanotechnology within 5 
years. The costs of space missions can be reduced to $2-4 million per mission, and the 
frequency of missions can be increased to one or more per six months. They estimated a 
market for ISTV of $2.3 billion by 2010, including $1.5 billion from the US military. 
(CANEUS, 2006) By 2010, five projects were ongoing, on small satellites, fly-by-wireless, 
reliability, materials and devices. (CANEUS, 2010)
The Centre for Large Space Structures and Systems (CLS3) in Canada has assessed 
developments in Microsystems and nanotechnology for space applications, including for 
defence. Experts foresaw that small satellites could be improved or enabled by 
Microsystems and nanotechnology. Such miniaturised satellites may replace existing 
satellites or enable new satellite missions. Military satellites will not only carry out existing 
tasks including command, control and communication (C3) and intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance (ISR), but also space control and force multiplier applications. Outer 
space control includes the means for defending security and freedom of spacecraft while 
denying its use to others. Force application of space is now limited to ballistic missiles, but 
space-based systems and space force missions may become important in the future. Micro 
and nanosatellites are already operational, including for military purposes. In the long term 
future, a paradigm shift is expected from large, specialised satellites to virtual satellites -  
clusters of cooperating small satellites. (Pimprikar et al, 2002)
USA
The annual investment in military nanotechnology development funded by the US federal 
government had been increasing steadily since 2000. In 2006 and 2007, the Congress 
increased the budget requested by the Pentagon. (Michael Berger, 2007) However, the 
percentage of nanotechnology funding in the NNI budget for defence and homeland 
security has been around 30% all these years. From 2009, the relative share of defence and 
security related budgets of the total NNI has declined remarkably under the Obama 
administration. In 2009, the additional recovery budget stimulated nanoresearch in non­
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security related areas. This contributed to a sharp decline of the relative share, but the 
balance has not been restored in later years.
year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
DoD 123 224 243 291 352 424
(348)
450
(354)
460
(375)
459 436.4 348.5
DHS 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 9.1 11.7 11.7
Total
NNI
464 697 863 989 1200 1351 1425 1554 1701.5
(511.3)
1781.1 1761.6
Sec.
rel.
share
27% 32% 28% 30% 29% 32% 32% 30% 28%
(21%)
25% 20%
Table 2: Comparison of budgets for nanotechnology research for Defence (DoD) and 
Homeland Security (DHS) compared to the total budget for the US National 
Nanotechnology Initiative since 2001. In 2009, $511.3 million had been dedicated to non­
security related nanoresearch from the recovery budget on top of the NNI, for 2010, the 
budget is estimated and for 2011, proposed. (NNI 2011)
The long term challenges and programme goals for the Nanotechnology research funded by 
the Department of Defence (DoD) included technical objectives and defence objectives: 
“The technical objectives are to develop understanding and control of matter at dimensions 
of approximately one to one hundred nanometres, where the physical, chemical and 
biological properties may differ in fundamental and valuable ways from those of individual 
atoms, molecules or bulk matter.” “The defence objectives are to discover and exploit 
unique phenomena at these dimensions to enable novel applications enhancing war fighter 
and battle systems capabilities.” (DoD, 2007)
The Defence Science Board worried that “The DoD and its government and industry 
partners are no longer at the leading edge of most technologies.” They explored 21st 
century critical defence capabilities and enabling technologies including nanotechnology 
and converging technologies. The critical capabilities were more or less the same as in the 
Cold War: precision; stealth; tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); 
and speed. However, the capabilities were more adapted to five strategic missions identified 
in the US 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review: “defeating terrorist networks; preventing 
acquisition and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction; defending the homeland; shaping 
nations at strategic crossroads; and conducting stability, security, transition and 
reconstruction operations.” So the new critical capabilities were: “Human terrain 
preparation, ubiquitous observation and recording, contextual exploitation, and rapidly 
tailored effects.” Nanoelectronics and ambient intelligence could contribute to the 
capability “ubiquitous observation and recording”. This is subdivided into:
- day/night all weather wide area surveillance, including sensors, space-based radar 
surveillance systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) for low and high 
altitudes in the atmosphere with enabling technologies such as hydrogen fuel-cells, 
sensors and transmitters;
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- close-in sensor and “tagging” systems, with integrated command and control and 
data exfiltration links, with sizes between <1 cm3 and ~1 dm3. Nanotechnology is 
considered a relevant area of research;
- soldiers-as-collectors within a network.
The DSB recommended developing new tools for achieving three aims including 
“delivering conventional strikes with great precision and timeliness from afar.” This can be 
achieved with the aid of several enabling technologies including: “directed energy, high- 
energy lasers, ballistic missile propulsion and guidance, scalable warheads, and hypersonic 
flight of either transport or launch vehicle.” They warn that “DoD must also keep abreast of 
the most rapidly changing and emerging technologies”, including biotechnology, 
information technology and nanotechnology. Convergence of these technologies is 
expected to “produce truly revolutionary capabilities in human performance enhancement, 
medical treatment and prophylaxis, miniaturisation, life extension, robotics and machine 
intelligence, to name a few of the more promising areas for research.” (DSB, 2007)
In the US National Security Strategy (White House, 2002) the suspicion that rogue states or 
terrorists may try to acquire technologies for making or delivering weapons of mass 
destruction plays a more important role than developing technologies for military or 
security applications. On 31 August 2006, President Bush approved the new US National 
Space policy, stating the US commitment to “exploration and use of outer space by all 
nations for peaceful purposes, and for the benefit of all humanity. Consistent with this 
principle ‘peaceful purposes’ allow U.S. defence and intelligence-related activities in 
pursuit of national interests.” Furthermore, the US considers space capabilities vital to its 
national interests, intends to protect its space activities and “deny, if necessary, adversaries 
the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests.” The policy is clearly 
unilateral: “The United States will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other 
restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. Proposed arms 
control agreements or restrictions must not impair the right of the United States to conduct 
research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for U.S. national 
interests.” Stimulating a strong U.S. Space related science, technology and industrial base 
as well as international cooperation are included in the policy. (White House, 2006)
The Obama administration changed course again. The national security strategy aimed at 
renewing American leadership in an interconnected world. American interests should be 
pursued through an international system in which all countries have rights and 
responsibilities. Homeland security should be integrated with national security. (White 
House, 2010)
EU
The European Union is developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy. This included a 
European Security and Defence Policy, to strengthen Europe’s leading role in the world. 
Another aim was to overcome the traditional fragmentation of investment in defence and 
security including in technology development.
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The European Security and Defence Policy aimed at harmonising the EU and member 
states security and defence policies to deal with different threats in our globalised world. 
These included terrorism and organised crime, failed states, regional conflicts, proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. (Solana, 2003)
The European Defence Agency (EDA) expected that European Defence will continuously 
need to adapt to two global trends: the changing role of force and the technological 
revolution, until 2025. (Military) force is and will no longer be used after politics has run 
out of options, but in parallel with it, and under close media attention, against an unequal 
adversary hiding among the civilian population. This has given rise to an increasing need 
for precision weapons and techniques for identifying and observing individuals in crowds. 
The technological revolution implies that progress in civilian technology development can 
and should be used for military applications. However, the adversary also has access to the 
same technologies, leading to proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities 
and a new arms race. EDA explicitly mentioned trends in micro-electronics, 
communication and sensing technologies, bio- and materials sciences (nanotechnology) and 
energy technologies. Europe had to overcome its own particular problems including an 
ageing population (by 2025, the average European will be 45 years old). Other problems 
are traditional fragmentation of the Defence Technological and Industrial Base and 
government funding. (EDA, 2006)
The European Commission was not given a role in defence research in the 20th century. 
This was the responsibility of the Member States. This has changed recently. In 2004-2006, 
some security research projects, worth €65 million were funded under the Preparatory 
Action for Security Research (PASR). Under the 7th Framework Programme for RTD (FP7, 
2007-2013), the European Security Research Programme should focus on the development 
of systems and products for:
- protecting EU member states territory, sovereignty, domestic population and 
critical infrastructure against trans-national treats;
- EU missions for peace-keeping, conflict prevention, strengthening international 
security in accordance with the UN Charter. (GOP, 2004)
In FP7, a total budget of €1400 Million is reserved for security research. This budget can be 
increased by joint calls involving the security programme and another programme 
including ICT and nanotechnology. The Security Theme addresses four missions, including 
security of citizens, of infrastructures and utilities, intelligent surveillance and border 
security, and restoring security and safety in case of crisis. It also includes three cross 
cutting themes, including systems integration and standardisation, security and society and 
coordinating the security research. ICT and sensor technologies comprise major priorities. 
(ESRAB, 2006, European Commission, 2006b) The EU also funds security research under 
the EU Framework Programme on ‘Security and Safeguarding Liberties’ (€745 million, 
2007-2013). The European Security Research Innovation Forum ESRIF (11 September 
2007-end 2009) has developed a Joint Security Research Agenda integrating national, 
European and private investment. (ESRIF, 2009)
In May 2007, the European Commission proposed a new Space Policy to the Council and 
European Parliament, including a paragraph on security and defence. The Commission
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proposed “The economy and security of Europe and its citizens are increasingly dependent 
on space-based capabilities which must be protected against disruption. Within the 
framework of existing EU principles and institutional competencies, Europe will 
substantially improve coordination between its defence and civilian space programmes, 
while retaining primary end-user responsibility for funding.” (European Commission,
2007) European satellites should contribute to security and defence policy by allowing 
monitoring areas of operation and identifying illegal activities and crisis management. (EC 
staff, 2007)
The Council issued a resolution, including on security and defence. They stressed the need 
for more coordination between space research and technology development for civil and 
defence applications. Military uses of European Satellites (Galileo and GMES) should 
respect the principles of civilian use. (Council, 2007) In 2008, the Council welcomed 
progress in the space policy and introduced new priority areas including space and
31security.
UK
In the UK, the Ministry of Defence invested £1-1.5 million per year in nanotechnology 
R&D, but relied for 98-99% of its technology need on civil research. The focus was on 
power sources, explosives, self-repairing materials, weapon improvement and information 
systems for reducing collateral damage (to non-combatants) as well as medical technologies 
and pharmaceuticals. (Burgess, 2003, MOD, 2001)
In the Defence Technology Strategy (MOD, 2006), the UK intended to make better use of 
civil technology development and integrate the military industry and technology 
development more with civil technology development and industry. Some emerging civil 
technologies were mentioned. MOD would keep a technology watch for progress in those 
fields, which may be useful for defence purposes. These included technologies for 
“information and decision support”, “safer operations” “people” and “generic 
technologies”. Information and decision support may benefit from a number of emerging 
technologies including semantic web technologies, pervasive computing, identity 
management and continuous tracking, and autonomous self-organised networks of sensors. 
People may benefit from knowledge about human cognitive processes, human performance 
and behaviour modification, complex systems and systems integration, brain machine 
interface, bio-nanotechnology and nanomedicine. Safer operations (for military personnel, 
no mention of civilians) include signature management (camouflage) and autonomous 
operations. Generic technologies include biomimetics, nanomaterials, advanced electronics 
and smart/interactive textiles. As for nanomaterials, MOD, academia and the DTI 
(Department of Technology and Industry) were engaged in two Interdisciplinary Research 
Centres to investigate biomaterials and electro-nanomaterials technologies. They also 
intended to look out for new technologies MOD is not aware of, such as the recent 
developments in bioactive peptides and synthetic biological engineering. For the latter, they 
stated: “The use of such tailored organisms provides both military opportunities and
31 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/space/esp/index en.htm
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threats.” (MOD, 2006, p152) In a later report on Global Strategic Trends -  Out to 2040, 
several nanotechnologies relevant to defence and civilian applications were discussed. 
(MOD, 2010)
Germany
The Federal Ministry of Defence BMVg was among the seven federal ministries which 
supported the Nano-initiative Action plan 2010. (BMBF, 2006) It is not clear what this 
meant for the technologies being developed under this action plan. Annually, the German 
federal government invested about € 1000 million in defence R&D. Basic research was not 
funded from this budget, but from the general budget for civilian research. (BMBF, 2007) 
The Federal Ministry for Education and Research launched a (Civil) Security Research 
programme in 2007, in conjunction with the European Security Research programme. The 
budget for the German programme was €123 million from 2007-2010. 
(http://www.bmbf.de/en/6293.php) In preparing for this security research programme, VDI- 
Technology Centre carried out a survey of research organisations and companies in 
Germany with research activities for civil security applications. The research landscape was 
very scattered. The survey aimed to stimulate networking and research collaborations in 
German and EU funded security research projects. According to the survey, 14 of 206 
participating organisations were working on nanotechnology as well as security. 
(Hoffknecht, 2007) In the Action Plan Nanotechnology 2015, security was among the five 
key application areas for science and technology transfer. (BMBF, 2011)
France
In France, several ministries and other government organisations are engaged in security 
policy and R&T (research and technology). The SGDN (General Secretariat for National 
Defence) reports to the Prime Minister, and is responsible for Civil CBRN R&T. An 
interdepartmental committee prepares the European ESRP and coordinates the French 
Security R&T. The White book on terrorism 2006 included also plans for R&T for CBRN, 
explosive detection, control of communication and data processing, video surveillance, 
information security and biometry. The Ministry of Defence and General Delegation for 
Armament (DGA) funded R&T, including 15% for security. It had a partnership with the 
Ministry of Interior. The ministry of industry gave subsidies and funded Eureka projects in 
competitiveness poles or clusters, including for security projects. The ministry of research 
was responsible for the French National Research Agency ANR. The latter was responsible 
for a research programme on global security, which started in 2006. The missions were in 
accordance with European Security Research priorities: citizens’ protection (against 
terrorism and crime), critical infrastructures and network protection, borders security and 
crisis management. In 2006, 14 projects were selected with €11 million government 
funding. In 2007, the four priorities were: situation awareness, crime prevention and 
surveillance of people and goods; (open and crowded) infrastructure protection; network 
protection against threats (water and food chain, embedded systems in transport); first 
responder behaviour, protection and equipment for civil or public forces in the early stages 
of crises; neutralisation and rehabilitation. (Lecourtier, 2007)
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DGA had three responsibilities: to equip the armed forces (80 programmes), to prepare for 
the future by foresight studies and investing in R&D as Europe’s largest defence research 
investor (35% of the total EU investment, over €700 million for industrial R&D contracts, 
and to stimulate export of French defence equipment.32 DGA published a regularly updated
30 year prospective plan analysing the future military system resulting from geostrategic, 
operational and technological developments. The military strategy of France makes use of 
four functions: (nuclear) deterrence, prevention, protection (of France) and projection (of 
intervention forces outside of France). Militarization of space, the development of non- 
lethal weapons, robotisation and biotechnologies are considered potential breakthrough 
technologies with remarkable impact on future conflicts. Until 2030, several technological 
trends are expected to influence defence systems, including: miniaturisation of systems 
(micro- and nanosystems and materials), Network Centric Warfare etc, integration of 
humans in arms systems (bio-nanotechnologies, implanted sensors), robotisation of 
(autonomous) systems, use of outer space, evolution of legislative restrictions (reduce 
environmental impact, stimulate non-lethal weapons). Biotechnologies and 
nanotechnologies are expected to have great impact on defence, without necessarily being 
disruptive. Future developments in military forces are based on existing programmes and 
roadmaps until 2015 and longer term foresight. DGA distinguishes two general themes: 
increased use of outer space and network centric operations; and prospective domains 
specific for the French military systems. (DGA, 2005 and update)
The Netherlands
In the Netherlands, about 245 companies had defence related activities, mostly combined 
with civil research or production. In 2002, 4% of their annual turnover of €1.72 billion was 
defence-related, including 45% from exports. The companies were most active in 
aerospace, marine shipbuilding, command, control and communication and information 
technology. Together, they employed 11,000 people including a third in R&D. The small 
home market for defence technologies and the preference for commercial-off-the-shelf 
technologies by the Dutch ministry of defence and armed forces presented risks for the 
viability of the sector. (Wils & Ziegelaar, 2004)
The Netherlands Defence R&D organisation asked TNO Science & Industry to compile a 
roadmap on nanotechnology for military applications including a survey of current 
developments in civil and military nano & Microsystems developments and impacts on 
military operations and organisation in 10-15 years. It also requested guidance on how to 
translate and adapt such nano- and Microsystems technology into a military context and a 
proposal for a Dutch nanotechnology programme. (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2006) In an 
update of their report, Simonis and Schilthuizen (2009) foresaw main applications in:
- The future war fighter or combat soldier
- Information dominance
- Weapons of Mass Destruction: CBRNE
website DGA: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/dga32
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- Weapons / countermeasures
- Platforms. (Simonis & Schilthuizen, 2009)
Nanotechnology and Microsystems were also included in the Strategic Knowledge Agenda 
of the Dutch Ministry of Defence (2008). “Advanced Materials and Nanotechnology” and 
“Microsystems and Robotics” were among five areas in which research initiatives from the 
Dutch knowledge providers took place. These were TNO, the Large Technological 
Institutes, Universities, the Netherlands Defence Academy and industry.
Nanotechnology was seen as a basic technology with long term application potential in 
security technologies, together with materials & (micro) construction, biotechnology, ICT 
and human perception & behaviour. These basic technologies were funded by the research 
council NWO, the Innovation Research programme IOP and TNO Kavot. The medium 
term developments were taken care of by (a.o.) TNO-programme security and short term 
developments were carried out in innovation projects with stakeholders. (Don, 2007)
At the request of the Minister of Justice, an advisory committee has reviewed opportunities 
and threats of technology for controlling crime. The minister intended to overcome the 
traditional lack of interest and expertise in technological developments in the police and 
justice sectors. The committee recommends focusing Dutch research on face and pattern 
recognition for applications in investigating burglary, control of weapon-possession, 
identity fraud and oversight and control of public spaces, and also watching and adopting 
relevant technology development in other countries. They considered nanotechnology to be 
potentially useful for miniaturised cameras, microphones and reconnaissance systems. 
(Commissie Criminaliteit en Technologie, 2005) A later report reviewed trends in security 
applications of converging technologies (nano, bio, info, cogno) with particular emphasis 
on impacts on the constitutional state and legal order. (Teeuw & Vedder, 2008)
Point One is the national competitiveness pole in nanoelectronics and embedded systems, a 
public-private funded initiative including TU/e, TNO, Philips and other large and small 
high tech companies. Point One’s strategic research agenda included security as one of a 
number of societal goals. This included private demand for security measures for homes 
and shops as well as military and public civil security needs. Nanoelectronics may 
contribute to sensors, computing power and affordable reliability for recognition of 
individuals, explosive and chemical warfare agents etc. (Zhang, Begeer & Hartman, 2007) 
In the 2009 update, security is combined with transport and logistics in one common 
application domain. (Roosmalen & Gelderblom, 2010)
Sweden
The Swedish Defence Research Agency FOI started a Defence nanotechnology programme 
in October 2003, and invested €11 million in seven projects, during five years. (Anderson,
2003) In an earlier phase, FOI already funded at least two projects in nanomaterials, one on 
nanocomposite materials and one on advanced radar absorbers. (Savage, 2002) By 2011, 
there is no formal nanotechnology programme anymore, but nanotechnology may be 
included in other research priorities. (FOI, 2011)
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Russia
Russia’s military industry is responsible for 70% of Russian science production. 
Nanotechnology for offensive and defensive purposes was an important part of the Russian 
national nanotechnology programme 2007-2015. The Russian government intended to 
invest up to $7 or $7.7 billion. (Ria Novosti, 2007a) The organisation responsible was the 
Russian Nanotechnology Corporation Rusnano.33 The Kurchatov Institute was the main 
organisation coordinating the Russian nanotechnology programme. It is the most important 
research centre in nuclear energy and has been responsible for developing nuclear weapons 
(since 1943) and nuclear fusion and plasma physics research from 19 5 5.34 In 2005, the 
Russian minister Gref of economic affairs installed six special economic zones to attract 
foreign investment, including for micro technologies (Zelenograd) and for nuclear and 
nanotechnologies (Tomsk). (EVD, 2007)
Asia-Pacific
In SCI (Science Citation Index) and EC (Engineering Compendex) records from the period 
2000-2003 and 2005, China was among the leaders in scientific publications in several 
fields including nanotechnology, but these publications were not cited as much as those 
from a developed country like Australia. China invested more in nanotechnology for 
defence and commercial applications than the USA, where medical, psychological and 
social applications are more important. In areas requiring a large investment in research 
infrastructure, China tended to be underrepresented. (Kostoff et al, 2006)
India’s former president Kalam expected great benefits from nano-bio-info technologies for 
military applications (Hindu, 2004). End of 2006, Nanowerk reported that India was 
moving towards military nanotechnology. The Defence Research & Development 
Organisation DRDO aimed to make the country self-sufficient in strategic nanomaterials 
including nanotubes and fullerenes, which can be applied in stealth, nanoelectronics and 
smart materials. The Agharkar Research Institute ARI for microbiology was planning 
production of nanoparticles for defence. (Berger, 2006) The DRDO newsletter reported 
about CNT production in November 2007. (DRDO, 2007)
As discussed already in chapter 2, Israel’s current President Shimon Peres considered 
nanotechnology to be the civil version of the atomic bomb and has for several years been 
interested in the future opportunities offered by nanotechnology in advanced surveillance 
techniques to identify terrorists hiding in civil neighbourhoods. In 2006, leading experts 
developed plans for futuristic nanoweapons.
33 http ://www.rusnano .com/Home.aspx
34 http://www.kiae.ru/index.html
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Iran started a national nanotechnology programme in 2005, aiming to collaborate 
internationally and to be among the top 15 nanotechnology countries in the world in ten 
years time. (Mojtaba, 2005) In 2006, the website of TAVA (Industrial Research, Training 
& Information Projects) mentioned “studying the military aspects of technology” as part of 
the second of a three step evaluation of the potential of nanotechnology. (TAVA, 2006)
The Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) participates in the Australian 
national nanotechnology research programme. They focus on nano-electronics and 
photonics. (Australian government, 2007) By 2007, the Australian Nano Business 
Federation ANBF has a strategic collaboration with the Australian Industry and Defence 
Network and other industry networks. (Innovation Australia website)
3.2.1.4 Key ethical descriptive concepts related to security 
aspects of nanotechnology
As has been shown in the above discussion of ethical conflicts related to nanotechnology 
and security, such conflicts may relate to three aspects. These are technological trends, 
general changes in defence strategies and military nanotechnology research activities in the 
USA and other countries in different parts of the world. Once again it has become clear that 
nanotechnology as an independent product or technological system does not exist. 
Nanotechnology it is always a new material or device incorporated into a more complex 
system together with other technologies, e.g. for military or security applications.
No new category of nanoweapons exists or is foreseen by authors who take the current 
trends in nanotechnology R&D as starting point. Nanotechnology may lead to innovation in 
existing categories of military technologies and weapons. These include conventional 
weapons, militarization of space, command and control or espionage, and weapons of mass 
destruction.
Security applications of nanotechnology may make several descriptive concepts in the 
current debate on defence ethics more acute:
1) Invisibility of surveillance and control technologies as well as weapons.
2) Distance between the battlefield and civilian areas may possibly be increased if 
swarms of small military satellites or space based robots enabled by 
nanotechnology are used to fight out conflicts in outer space.
3) Human enhancement may be enabled in the long term by some implanted soldier 
nanotechnologies. Nanoelectronics as well as biocompatible nanomaterials are 
essential elements in this development. (see also the section on “Shifting 
boundaries between natural and artificial entities”, below)
4) Discrimination between combatants and non-combatants may be reduced by 
some applications, e.g. by using nanoparticles to create conventional bombs with a 
bigger explosion as in the thermo baric bomb tested by Russia in 2007. This may
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be more acceptable for use than nuclear weapons, while having comparable 
impacts in the short term. On the other hand nanoelectronics and other 
technologies contribute to improvement of precision weapons enabling targeting 
of combatants and avoiding harm to non-combatants.
5) Proliferation of military technology and weapons to state as well as non-state 
actors may be facilitated due to a shift from spin-out of military technologies to 
civil applications, to spin-in of civil technologies to military applications. This is 
not caused by nanotechnologies, but an element of the societal context 
surrounding the emergence of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is one of the 
civilian technologies seen as promising for military and security applications.
Some existing descriptive concepts for military technology are also relevant to military 
nanotechnology:
a) Rem ote control by small military satellites, precision weapons and UAVs. 
Microsystems and nanotechnologies will contribute to this ongoing development.
b) Automation can partly be contributed to by nanoelectronics, but this trend also 
depends on progress in software, robotics, Microsystems etc.
c) Mass destruction power of new or improved weapons may be increased due to 
nanotechnology. This could happen if nanoelectronics and other technologies are 
incorporated in new generations of nuclear weapons, or if nanocapsules or 
nanobiotechnologies are used in new biological or chemical weapons. Also the 
boundary between conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction may 
fade. This could happen by continuing the trend that nanotechnology enables 
larger conventional explosives, or by enabling smaller nuclear weapons or more 
precise / non-lethal chemical or biological weapons. On the other hand, 
applications of nano (bio) sensors in detection of NBCRE weapons may help 
prevent use or mitigate the impact of such weapons.
3.2.1.5 Key normative ethical concepts related to security 
aspects of nanotechnology
Ethical descriptive concepts such as the ones presented in sections 3.2.1.4 are “neutral” in 
the sense that they describe aspects of the status quo or trends in the real world. On the 
other hand normative ethical concepts point to how this status quo and these trends ought to 
be changed in order to be improved from the perspective of one or more ethical traditions. 
In the case of security aspects of nanotechnology, the interpretation of concepts such as Just 
War, Security, Liberty and Human Dignity may shift.
1) The Just W ar doctrine is a framework for making ethical decisions on whether to 
go to war (Jus ad Bellum) and on good conduct during a war (Jus in Bello). 
Walzer (1977?) has complemented this with criteria for “Just Peace” during a 
post-conflict period (Jus post Bellum). The emerging use of new military
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technologies incorporating nanotechnology is governed by two Just War criteria: 
proportionality and discrimination.
2) The Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) grants 
European citizens the right to a fair balance between Liberty and Security. This 
balance is currently under pressure due to the increased concern about threats to 
security by non-state actors and “rogue” or failed states; and also due to 
applications of Microsystems, nanoelectronics and other information and 
communication technologies which enable new invisible observation, command, 
control and communication techniques. The discussion focuses on the right 
balance between these two rights Another issue, the concept of “security” is also 
under discussion (International, State, Homeland, or Human Security).
3) There is a long tradition of discussions of the concept of Human Dignity. This is 
a key concept, e.g. in the preamble of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union (2000). However, there is no consensus on the interpretation. 
Especially the question who is a human being is controversial. Where 
nanotechnology and other converging technologies are used to connect human 
bodies or minds and machines, the implications for human dignity are already the 
topic of lively debate. The general developments in remote control warfare 
including armed robots, UAVs and satellites partly enabled by nanoelectronics and 
other technologies could also have implications for human dignity (of combatants 
as well as non-combatants).
This assessment of key ethical issues related to nanosecurity ends here. Before examining 
them further, the discussion of unresolved nanoethical issues moves on to the next issue: 
sustainable nanotechnology development.
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3.2.2 Impact o f nanotechnology on sustainable development
Worldwide investment in nanotechnology amounted to about US$1.2 billion in 2000, 
increasing to US$15 billion by 2008. Currently, the world market for products with nano­
inside is estimated to amount to $254 billion, and expected to increase to $3 trillion by 
2020 (Roco, 2010). The impact on the global economy and society will probably be 
considerable. But there is little consensus or even debate on what should be the priorities in 
research, which societal or environmental problems should be solved with the help of new 
nano-enabled products. Most technology assessment specialists and ethicists tend to focus 
on potential risks of synthetic nanomaterials, different interpretations of the precautionary 
principle, and ethical implications of speculative developments such as human 
enhancement. Present-day strategic issues such as which potential benefits of 
nanotechnology should be realised, and who should reap the fruits in the future are 
discussed far less often.
In 2000, the UN General Assembly accepted the UN Millennium Development Goals, 
aiming to combat poverty through an 8-point agenda until 2015. 189 UN member states 
signed up to this declaration and solemnly promised to achieve these goals. At the midterm 
review in 2007, it became clear that there is a huge gap between what had been 
accomplished until then, and the targets set in the MDG. By 2010, the world was on track 
for achieving the goals globally, but Sub Sahara Africa was lagging behind.35 Research and 
Development are certainly not the only solution to the problems of extreme poverty and 
hunger, infant and maternal death, infectious diseases, lack of (primary) education, 
discrimination of women and sustainable development, but some of these problems can’t be 
solved without them. Several scholars have argued that Nanotechnology can contribute to 
several or all MDG (e.g. Mnyusiwalla et al, 2003, Salamanca-Buentello et al, 2005, 
Meridian Institute, Malsch, 2005).
Underlying the general case of sustainable nanotechnology development, some ethical 
issues and descriptive and prescriptive ethical concepts can be distinguished. This list is 
based on the author’s own analysis. The issues and concepts are summarised in the 
following boxes. The lists are too large to be examined in depth, so a selection of some key 
descriptive and prescriptive concepts will have to be made. The following analysis is 
intended to do just that.
Box: list o f  ethical issues related to sustainable nanotechnology development
- Conceptual framework: Justice as Fairness (Rawls), Capacities (Martha 
Nussbaum), Capabilities (Amartya Sen)
- Who should decide on the priorities in nanotechnology research?________________
35 www.endpoverty2015.org
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- What should be the priorities in nanotechnology research? What is the optimal use 
of scarce financial and natural resources?
- In which countries should the nanotechnology research be carried out? (Developed 
countries or developing countries?)
- Public research for the benefit of multinationals or humanity? What is the right 
balance between protecting intellectual property and stimulating scientific 
progress and societal benefits of research in current patent legislation? (c.f. EGE 
ethics of nanomedicine, 2007, conflict India Novartis?)
Relevant descriptive concepts: Relevant normative concepts:
- Developing country; developed - Justice, Fairness, rights
country - Capacities, Capabilities
- Poverty, wealth, property, etc - Sustainable development
- Resources; - Progress
- Environment, nature - Humanity
Sustainable development is aimed at striking a balance between the rights of wealthy and 
poor people and countries as well as present and future generations. Sustainable 
technological development should harmonise with the common good and avoid 
environmental degradation. In this section, potential implications of nanotechnology for 
socio-economic development of the world as a whole and developing countries in particular 
will be discussed. Expected environmental benefits and risks will be included.
3.2.2.1 The UN Millennium Goals
As mentioned above, nanotechnology is expected to contribute to some or all of the UN 
Millennium Goals, aiming for poverty reduction by 2015. Potential contributions of 
nanotechnology to poverty reduction include diagnostics and therapies for infectious 
diseases, water purification and desalination, sustainable energy production and saving, 
environmental monitoring and remediation, and agro food. Some of these applications of 
nanotechnology may contribute to several millennium goals, according to experts who took 
part in a Delphi study carried out by Fabio Salamanca-Buentello and colleagues of the 
University of Toronto. Other sources don’t refer explicitly to these goals, but nevertheless 
appear relevant to the aims.
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Table 3: Potential implications o f nanotechnology for sustainable development
Potential
implication of 
nanotechnology 
for sustainable 
developm ent
Current implications 2012-2017 2017-2027 Longer
UN Millennium 
Goal 1 : end 
hunger
Nanotech for agricultural 
productivity enhancement, 
food processing and 
storage; Nanowater 
treatm ent and remediation 
(Salamanca-Buentello 
2005) Agro food 
(Meridian, 2004-6)
Artificial
meat
(Heckl)
Nanofood
(Peres,
2003-6)
Decent
living
conditions 
for 10 
billion
world
population 
in 50 yrs 
(Smalley, 
1995)
UN Millennium 
Goal 2: universal 
education
W estern
nanoeducation for 
experts from 
developing countries 
(McKeown, 1997) 
Nanotechnology 
Higher Education, 
short courses 
(Nanoforum, 
EuroIndiaNet,
M alsch, 2007) 
Standards for 
nanoeducation (ICS- 
UNIDO, 2005) 
Vocational training, 
e-learning 
(EuroIndiaNet,
M alsch, 2007)
2 million trained workers 
for nanotech 
manufacturing needed by 
2015 (Roco, 2001)
6 million 
workers 
needed by 
2020 
(Roco, 
2010)
UN Millennium 
Goal 3 : gender 
equity
M ost researchers are 
male
EU W omen in nano­
project (2003-2008)
UN Millennium 
Goal 4 & 5:
Child & 
Maternal health
Nanotech for agricultural 
productivity enhancement, 
food processing and 
storage, vector and pest 
detection and control; 
N anow ater treatm ent and 
remediation;
Nanotechnology for 
disease diagnosis and 
screening, drug delivery 
systems, health
Nanowater
desalinatio
n and
purification
(Peres,
2003-6)
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monitoring;
Nanotechnology for air 
pollution and remediation 
(Salamanca-Buentello 
2005) nano for health & 
water (Meridian, 2004-6)
UN Millennium 
Goal 6: Combat 
HIV/AIDS
Nanotechnology for 
disease diagnosis and 
screening, drug delivery 
systems, health 
monitoring; Nanotech for 
vector and pest detection 
and control (Salamanca- 
Buentello 2005) nano for 
health & w ater (Meridian, 
2004-6)
Nanowater
desalinatio
n and
purification
(Peres,
2003-6)
UN Millennium 
Goal 7: 
Environmental 
sustainability
N anocatalysts for 
cleaning exhaust 
gases; Nanofiltration 
(nanoroadsme) 
Synthetic biofuel 
production;
Remediation of 
polluted soil with 
nanocatalysts
Potential benefits o f  
nanotech for environm ent 
(Arnall, 2003) 
Nanotechnology based 
energy storage, production 
and conversion; Nanotech 
for agricultural 
productivity enhancement 
; Nanow ater treatm ent and 
remediation;
Nanotechnology for air 
pollution and remediation; 
nanotechnology in 
construction (Salamanca- 
Buentello 2005) nano for 
water & energy 
(Meridian, 2004-6)
Nanowater
desalinatio
n and
purification
(Peres,
2003-6)
Sustainable
developme
nt by 2020
(NSTC,
2000)
Nanotechn
ology
based solar 
cells for 
India’s 
Energy 
independen 
ce by 2030 
(Kalam, 
2006) 
Sustainable 
energy 
supply in 
50 yrs 
(Smalley 
1995) Full 
recyclabilit 
y (Drexler, 
1986) 
Synthetic 
biology 
(Kavli, 
2007)
Environmental
risks
Down on the farm 
(ETC group 2004) 
Nanocosm etics (FOE, 
2006)
Nanofood safety 
(Malsch, Van Est, 
W alhout, 2007)
Risks nano in agro 
food (Rel-UITA, 
2006, IUF, 2007) 
Risks o f stable
Risks o f nanomaterials 
(ETC group, 2003, 
RENANOSOM A, 2007) 
next asbestos 
(M nyusiwalla, 2003) 
Risks o f changing 
nanomaterials (IRGC, 
2006) Safe handling 
(M aynard, 2006)
Risks of
nanobiotec
hnology
(COGEM ,
2004)
Risks o f 
nanomateri 
als (Health 
council 
2006)
Risks o f
Extinction 
o f  human 
race by 
2030 (Joy, 
2000) 
Synthetic 
life, bio 
security (de 
Vriend, 
2006-7, 
Kavli,
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nanomaterials (IRGC, 
2006)
systems of 
nanosystem 
s (IRGC, 
2006)
2007)
UN Millennium 
Goal 8: global 
partnership
Latin America: lack of 
private investment in 
nano R&D; gap 
between academ ia and 
industry (Malsch, 
2007, 2008)
Limited opportunities 
for developing 
countries in nano 
R&D (Mc Keown, 
1997)
International R&D 
cooperation including 
developing countries 
under FP7 (European 
Commission)
Critical o f attempts at 
developing
nanotechnology for 
poverty reduction in the 
present capitalist 
circumstances (Foladori, 
Invernissi, 2006) Socio­
economic benefits for 
A rgentina (Kirchner, 
2005) Socio-economic 
benefits for Brazil (MCT 
2003) O ff shoring; 
Reduced world m arket for 
commodities (Meridian, 
2004-6)
Socio-economic benefits 
for Argentina (Arg. 
Congress 2005, SECYT, 
2005)
W ho controls nanotech, 
public dialogue 
(RENANOSOM A, 2007)
Technical
and
economic 
developme 
n t o f  India 
(Rao, 2000­
7, Kalam, 
2006-7)
M illennium Goal 1: End Hunger
Several applications of nanotechnology for enhancing the productivity of agriculture may 
contribute to ending hunger by 2015. Similarly, food processing and storage, and water 
treatment and remediation improved with nanotechnology may be beneficial for 
undernourished people in developing countries. (Salamanca-Buentello et al, 2005) The 
authors don’t demonstrate how this will be done in practice. It could be wishful thinking 
rather than a reliable prediction of developments which will take place the coming years. In 
several countries, research projects are taking place for applications of nanotechnology in 
agro food. In the USA, 160 publicly funded projects were identified by 2006, worth $15.2 
million, mainly for food packaging and nutraceuticals. (Kuzma and Verhage, 2006) In 
Europe, the EU has been funding a number of projects where nanomaterials and sensors 
were developed for monitoring food safety or for processing food products. Several 
European countries have their own nanofood programmes including Denmark, the UK and 
the Netherlands. (Malsch, van Est, Walhout, 2007) By 2011, key European opportunities 
for nanotechnology in agrifood included antimicrobial packaging, healthy food and 
pathogen detection in food processing. (ObservatoryNano, 2011) Also in less developed 
countries including Iran and India, there has been interest in applications of nanotechnology 
in agriculture and food. (Nanoforum, 2006) In less developed countries food security, or 
improving the harvest of crops, received more interest than applications in food packaging, 
novel foods and personalised food, quality control and food processing. Major food
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corporations and other companies in Europe and the USA have been more interested in the 
latter.
Food security can be improved by making greenhouses or agricultural plastic more efficient 
in trapping heat by including a layer of nanofoam or aero gel between double glazing. 
These types of nanostructured materials are transparent to sunlight, but reflect heat 
radiation. (Luinge, 2005, Schultz et al, 2005) Crops grown in such greenhouses or under 
such plastic can be harvested sooner than other crops, leading to direct benefits for the 
farmer.
Sensors for monitoring crop and veterinary diseases may include nanostructured active 
layers.
The delivery of pesticides may become more efficient by encapsulating the pesticide in 
nanosized delivery vehicles which can be designed for delivery of the contents only in the 
presence of the relevant pest. Food Safety researchers are concerned about residues of these 
nanopesticides which may accidentally open up inside the human body.
According to Burgi and Pradeep, nanotechnology may contribute to sustainable 
development in less developed countries in seven ways, including improved food security 
and safe drinking water. Food security may be improved by atomically rather than 
genetically modifying the crops to be more nutritious. Carbon nanotubes could be used in 
packaging and food preservation in the tropics. (Burgi & Pradeep, 2006) Wolfgang Heckl 
and Frans Kamper propose artificial nanostructured Vega burgers, with the same taste and 
texture as natural meat. They consider this a potential contribution to food security.
ETC group has asked for a moratorium on all food, feed and beverage products (including 
nutritional supplements) incorporating manufactured nanoparticles until regulatory regimes 
are in place taking into account the special characteristics of these materials, and until the 
products have been shown to be safe; and on environmental release of nanopesticides. 
(ETC group, 2004) The Latin American Regional Secretariat Rel-UITA and the 
International Union of Agriculture and Food Workers IUF have adopted a resolution on 
nanotechnology especially in agro food, which called a.o. for “prohibiting the sale of food, 
beverages and fodder, and all agricultural inputs which contain nanotechnology, until it is 
shown that they are safe,” a moratorium on nanopatents in the food industry and 
agriculture, incorporating nanotechnology in food and agriculture in the Codex 
Alimentarius, and studies on impacts of nanotechnology on health and employment in 
agriculture and food industry. (Foladori & Invernissi, 2007)
M illennium Goal 2: Universal education
Nanotechnology as such won’t contribute to primary education of girls and boys in 
developing countries. The necessary measures are of a financial and social nature, e.g. 
training enough teachers, supporting poor families enabling them to send their children to 
school, etc. There are attempts at international cooperation in nanoeducation in higher 
education in universities. This could be by standardisation, stimulating exchange of best 
practices and the development and distribution of e-learning tools. The main driver is the 
USA since Roco (2001) forecasted that by 2015, worldwide 2 million trained
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nanotechnology workers would be needed in manufacturing products with nano-inside. 
McKeown (1997) advised governments of developing countries to train some experts in 
nanotechnology who could advise on which nanotechnologies to purchase in the interest of 
their country’s development. In the mean time, universities in industrialised countries have 
started nanotechnology Masters Courses or full academic curricula, and some universities 
in the South have followed suit. The current trend in industrialised countries is in 
developing vocational training for technicians who can operate nanotechnology research 
instruments and work in nanotechnology manufacturing. (Malsch, 2007, Roco, 2010)
M illennium Goal 3: Gender equity
The lack of gender equity is not just a problem in less developed countries, but also in the 
wealthiest parts of our world. It is not something technologies can help solve. Measures for 
stimulating women and other underrepresented groups to make a career in sciences and 
engineering are of course useful for achieving the goal of Gender Equity. The European 
Union has funded a project “WomenInNano”, specifically aimed at stimulating female 
researchers to make a career in nanotechnology in the period 2005-2008.36
M illennium Goal 4 and 5: Child and maternal health
Reducing child and maternal death in developing countries by half in 2015 are major aims 
of the millennium campaign. This can be achieved by improved supply of sufficient and 
healthy food and drinking water, access to adequate medical care and a clean environment. 
Salamanca-Buentello considered the same applications of nanotechnology for agricultural 
productivity enhancement, food processing and storage and water treatment and 
remediation - discussed as solutions for ending hunger - to be useful for improving child 
and maternal health. Furthermore, he saw potential benefits of nanotechnology applied to 
vector and pest control, disease diagnosis and screening, drug delivery systems and health 
monitoring, and for combating air pollution and remediation. (Salamanca-Buentello et al, 
2005) The Meridian Institute also considered nanotechnology applications in health and 
water to be useful for poor people in developing countries. (Meridian Institute, 2004, 2006) 
Measures for vector and pest control include the nanopesticides mentioned above as well as 
nanobiosensors which can detect the presence of viruses, bacteria and other disease causing 
organisms, Nanofiltration membranes and antimicrobial catalysts (e.g. of nanosilver) for 
disinfecting objects, air and water. They also mentioned medical applications of 
nanotechnology, but most development in nanomedicine is aimed at diagnosis and therapy 
for patients in developed countries, and not likely to be made available to poor people in 
developing countries. There has been relatively little investment in nanotechnology for 
infectious diseases responsible for child and maternal death in developing countries.
36 See website: http://www. womeninnano .de/
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M illennium Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, M alaria and other infectious diseases
Combating infectious diseases is highly dependent on scientific progress, because micro­
organisms causing the diseases continuously evolve and tend to become resistant to 
antibiotics, vaccines and other remedies. Nanoparticles may be used in diagnostics as well 
as therapies for tuberculosis and other lung diseases. (Dobson, 2007) E.g. nanogold 
particles in lateral flow test kits for Tuberculosis or Malaria. There is some interest in 
developing nanovaccines in the strategic research document of the European Technology 
Platform on Nanomedicine. Most interest and investment in nanomedicine is targeted to 
other diseases such as cancer, diabetes, etc. The nanotechnologies for vector and pest 
control discussed as solutions for child and maternal health are also useful for combating 
infectious diseases in general. By 2011, poverty related diseases are receiving more 
attention from nanotechnology researchers and companies in the South and North.
M illennium Goal 7: Environmental sustainability
Environmental Sustainability is the aim of many research programmes and projects in 
nanotechnology for energy and environmental applications in North as well as South. At 
the same time, there is concern about potential new environmental risks caused by the small 
size or surface characteristics of synthetic nanostructured materials. The expected lack of 
recoverability of nanoparticles after these have been spread into the environment is also 
considered problematic.
Currently, nanocatalysts and Nanofiltration are already in use for cleaning exhaust gases. 
Most photovoltaic solar panels currently on the market use a relatively thick layer of 
expensive crystalline silicon as the active material converting sunlight into electricity. 
Some existing types of solar cells use nanostructured materials (e.g. amorphous silicon, thin 
films). Nanostructured solar cells tend to be cheaper, but less energy efficient than 
crystalline solar cells. The current research is focused on increasing the efficiency, using 
cheaper and flexible carrier materials, and integrating the solar cells in building materials. 
Cheap amorphous silicon PV solar panels are already a competitive option for people in 
remote regions off the electricity grid.
By 2012, synthetic biology was expected to enable the production of synthetic bio fuels. In 
many countries, the lack of basic sanitation and clean water is daily responsible for diseases 
and deaths. Nanotechnology may contribute to several solutions. Conventional Point of Use 
water treatment technologies exist, including some which remove contaminants effectively, 
are easy to use and can be produced locally. These may still be made cheaper or more 
effective by incorporating nanomembranes or catalytic nanoparticles. (Meridian, 2006) 
Even though they believe nanotechnology could help make drinking water safe, South 
African nano-water specialists Thembela Hillie and Mbhuti Hlope consider it necessary to 
investigate potential health risks. (Hillie & Hlope, 2007) Nanotechnology may also be 
applied in desalination membranes and as catalysts for extracting Arsenic from drinking 
water in municipal water treatment plants, e.g. in Bangladesh (Mayo et al, 2007, Sarkar et 
al, 2007). Since 2006, two related projects have aimed to develop solar water disinfectant
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solutions for rural regions in South Africa, Kenya, Zimbabwe and Cambodia. The projects 
investigated the usefulness of nanoparticles as photo catalysts for faster disinfection 
without increasing the costs too much. The projects were carried out by researchers in 
Europe and Africa, and were funded by the European Commission and Irish government. 
(website Sodiswater project)
By 2011, several projects in the USA and a few in Europe have been experimenting with 
remediation of polluted soil and groundwater with the aid of nanocatalysts: nano zero 
valent iron (nZVI). (ObservatoryNano, 2011) It is still not clear whether spreading such 
free nanocatalytic materials into the soil, water or air is safe and does not introduce new 
unintended environmental hazards. (e.g. IRGC, 2006) Especially the risks that free 
synthetic nanostructured materials enter the food chain or are taken up into living 
organisms and cause new health risks within 5 years have been debated strongly. (e.g. ETC 
group, 2004, FOE, 2006, Malsch, van Est & Walhout, 2007, Rel-UITA, 2006, IUF, 2007, 
IRGC, 2006)
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD has been 
coordinating efforts to achieve harmonised definitions, stimulate risk assessment studies 
and agreement about responsible nanotechnology development and regulation. Currently, 
employees working in nanoparticles production facilities or research laboratories are 
deemed to be most at risk. Free nanoparticles are included in increasing numbers of 
consumer products. A major issue is the lack of awareness of the potential risks among 
workers and consumers handling the nanoparticles. (Maynard et al, 2006, OECD, 2007) 
This has given rise to public and stakeholder dialogues organised in several countries and at 
EU and international levels.
Most people don’t even know that invisibly small nanoparticles could be present in the air, 
water, soil, product or their body. If nanotechnology production is off-shored to developing 
countries, workers there may be most vulnerable for health impacts of nanoparticles. Will 
these production facilities be equipped with adequate protective measures, at the same 
standards as in Europe or the USA? Will the workers receive sufficient training in safe 
handling of the materials? National authorities responsible for safety of consumer products 
may not have the necessary resources to test products with nano-inside and prevent 
hazardous products from entering the market.
A number of authors expected potential energy or environmental applications of 
nanotechnology in the 2012-2017 timeframe. As more and more products with nano inside 
will be introduced on the market, especially with nanomaterials which change their 
properties during their lifetime, potential and unforeseen environmental risks are also more 
likely to occur. Toxicologists and risk assessment specialists have developed a roadmap for 
safe handling of nanotechnology which resulting tests and measures should also be 
introduced by then. (Maynard et al, 2006) NSTC (2000) expected nanotechnology to 
contribute to sustainable development by 2020, but by then IRGC (2006), and the Dutch 
Health Council (2006) and COGEM (2004) foresaw new potential environmental risks of 
systems of nanosystems, or of nanobiotechnology.
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In the very long term Indian (ex) President Kalam (2006) expected nanotechnology to 
contribute to India’s energy independence by 2030. Richard Smalley (1995) expected 
nanotechnology based sustainable energy supply in 50 years. K. Eric Drexler (1986) 
believed that his concept of bottom-up molecular nanotechnology may eventually lead to 
full recyclability of any product. A group of scientists supported by the Kavli Foundation
(2007) expected synthetic biology to contribute to saving energy and raw materials, but are 
also concerned about potential risks for bio security of synthetic life. De Vriend (2006, 
2007) shared their concerns. Bill Joy (2000) foresaw the potential extinction of the human 
race by 2030 due to competition from new artificial life forms which could be the result of 
converging nanotechnology, biotechnology and ICT.
Nanotechnology therefore promised considerable benefits for sustainable environmental 
development, but could also lead to new pollution or unsustainable use of raw materials and 
energy. The future scenarios don’t all display the same credibility.
M illennium Goal 8: global partnership for development
Stimulating international R&D collaboration between researchers in North and South, and 
public private partnerships for (technological) development are considered essential for 
reaching the millennium goals and stimulating long term global sustainable development. 
Currently, research collaboration exists, but mostly in basic sciences. More often than not, 
scientists from less developed countries have to move to North America, Europe or Japan 
to make a career in science. There are some initiatives to stop this brain drain by enabling 
scientists to work in developing countries and participate in virtual international research 
networks, by internet and other ICT.
Already in 1997, the UN Industrial Development Organisation UNIDO explored whether 
the least developed countries could participate in nanotechnology R&D. A British expert 
warned that the required investment in research infrastructure would present an 
insurmountable barrier to developing countries. He recommended these countries to 
educate and train engineers and scientists in nanotechnology. These people should be hired 
as advisors on priorities in applications and future national research programmes, in the 
best interest of the socio-economic development of the country. (McKeown, 1997) In 2006, 
Practical Action, DEMOS and University of Lancaster, UK organised focus groups in 
Zimbabwe on nanotechnology for water treatment. The participants did not consider 
nanotechnology-based water treatment an unrealistic or useless solution for rural or semi­
urban regions. They stressed the need for manufacturing the technology using local 
materials and building resource capacity within communities, to avoid dependency on 
(expensive) imports of spare parts and foreign experts. (Grimshaw et al, 2006)
Whether or not developing countries can share in the benefits of nanotechnology is 
disputed, as a discussion in (Malsch, 2008) summarised here illustrates. Some, including 
Ejembi Onah, the manager of the FONAI nanotechnology research network in Africa and 
the Caribbean are optimistic and believe that even the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
will be able to participate in the nanotechnology revolution with little or no pre-condition. 
On the other hand, sceptics like the Mexican social scientist Guillermo Foladori think
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LDCs may produce nanoparticles or nanodevices by either subordinating to a trans national 
corporation or by establishing an S&T program focused on the main social needs, 
supported by strong national policies and international cooperation. The required 
investment and minimum critical mass of researchers needed in a country depends on the 
particular sub area of nanotechnology. The investment in clean rooms and high tech 
research infrastructure for the extremely competitive area of nanoelectronics is a different 
category than in basic research labs for the soft lithographic nanotechnologies developed by 
chemists like George Whitesides. Transnational networks such as MERCOSUR (Nano 
Mercosur) in Latin America and the African Union or African Academy of Sciences in 
Africa can be suitable platforms for achieving a critical mass in research investment and 
numbers of researchers. However, participation may be too expensive for the Least 
Developed Countries. The European Union has been playing a similar role for the 
development of nanotechnology in Europe especially in and for the benefit of less 
developed member states. Researchers working in the EU’s International Cooperation 
Partner Countries including the least developed countries can participate as equal partners 
in projects funded under the Seventh European Framework Programme for Research and 
Technology Development. This may help reduce the need for investment by these 
countries’ own governments. An important bottleneck is that European researchers don’t 
know their colleagues in those countries, and hence won’t invite them as partners to their 
proposals. To overcome this bottleneck, the EU has been funding several support actions to 
improve visibility. Whether or not investing in nanotechnology is necessary for the Least 
Developed Countries is also disputed. Critical social scientists like Foladori point out that 
the main poverty problems of these countries have nothing to do with a new or different 
technology. On the other hand, optimistic engineers like Onah believe that not joining the 
nanotechnology bandwagon will have negative effects such as technological poverty and 
brain drain. In any case, investing in nanotechnology won’t bring solutions in the short 
term. (Malsch, 2008)
Economic and social implications for developing countries
In the future, multinational companies selling products with nano-inside may off-shore 
production to developing countries where labour is cheaper. And emerging economies such 
as Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are already investing considerable amounts 
of funding in domestic nanotechnology research programmes, which could lead to 
nanotechnology products competing on the world market. Nanotechnology may contribute 
to better resource efficiency, meaning that less energy or raw materials are needed for 
making a product. This is of course good for the environment. But many developing 
countries’ economies depend heavily on the export of such commodities. The debate on 
such implications is only just beginning (Meridian Institute, 2007). A discussion is 
emerging on the proper balance between protecting industrial property rights and public 
health, or the interests of pharmaceutical companies and developing countries in the current 
patent system. This may shift to the detriment of developing countries under the emergence 
of nanomedicine. The intention of patent law is to ensure that diagnosis, therapy and 
research should be available to patients undisturbed by patents. Nanomedicine blurs the 
distinctions between different categories and if very broad patents are granted, therapeutic
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availability may be limited. Patents on use or process may be more useful for balancing 
different interests than traditional product patents. (EGE, 2007)
3.2.2.2 Key ethical descriptive concepts related to sustainable 
development aspects of nanotechnology
To sum up the overview of discussions on sustainable nanotechnology development, 
nanotechnology promises to contribute to environmental sustainability and combating 
poverty. However, nanotechnology may also introduce new environmental and health risks 
and contribute to an increasing gap between rich and poor countries and individuals. The 
size itself of nanoparticles or nanostructures may lead to different properties from the same 
materials with other spatial dimensions. However, this does not give rise to totally new 
ethical descriptive concepts.
Several descriptive concepts characterising the current debate on sustainable development 
are or may become more acute due to applications of nanotechnology for developing 
countries or the environment:
1) Resource efficiency may be improved due to miniaturisation down to 
nanoelectronics as well as introduction of some nanostructured materials (light and 
strong, insulating, etc). This can be considered beneficial for environmental 
sustainability, but can inadvertently contribute to smaller commodities markets, 
thereby damaging the economies of developing countries.
2) The concept of Intellectual property may have to be redefined due to the 
development of new systems and products with nano-inside, such as nanomedicine 
or nanosystems consisting of many components patented by different inventors. 
The balance between protecting the rights of the owner and society at large may 
shift due to the emergence of nanotechnology.
3) The concept of Chemical substance may have to be redefined because it has been 
demonstrated that differences in particle or structure size cause differences in 
observable properties of the materials or substances. This can give rise to new 
uncertain risks for health and the environment.
3.2.2.3 Key normative ethical concepts related to sustainable 
development aspects of nanotechnology
Ethical descriptive concepts as presented in section 3.2.2.2 are “neutral” in the sense that 
they describe aspects of the status quo or trends in the real world. Normative ethical 
concepts presented here point to how this status quo and these trends ought to be changed. 
The aim should be to improve them from the perspective of one or more ethical traditions. 
In the case of sustainable development aspects of nanotechnology, the interpretation of the 
following normative ethical concepts is currently being debated:
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1) The Precautionary principle is adhered to by all stakeholders, but the 
interpretations vary widely. Some NGO’s call for moratoriums on the market 
introduction of some or all products with synthetic nanomaterials inside, whereas 
others consider the current legislation governing market introduction of new 
products good enough to deal with potential risks of these materials. The current 
debate on governance of nanotechnology aims to balance different views and 
interest in the absence of reliable scientific evidence to establish the risks and 
benefits of such nanomaterials.
2) The debate about the concept of distributive justice is getting renewed interest, 
partly due to the movement aiming for accomplishing the UN Millennium goals, 
but also because the emergence of new technologies including nanotechnology is 
expected to lead to a shift in the current balance of interest, potentially to the 
detriment of less developed countries or poorer people in general. This shift 
manifests itself both in the discussion about resource efficiency and commodities; 
and in the discussion about intellectual property and nanomedicine / 
pharmaceutical industry.
This assessment of key ethical issues related to sustainable nanotechnology development 
ends here. Before examining them further, the discussion of unresolved nanoethical issues 
moves on to the next issue: nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial.
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3.2.3 Shifting boundaries between natural and artificial entities
Where different technologies such as nanotechnology; biotechnology; information and 
communication technologies; and cognitive sciences converge on the nanoscale, the natural 
and artificial world meet and the boundary between them erodes. This gives rise to new 
ethical dilemmas and anthropological questions. In the last few years a debate has been 
started on ethics of synthetic biology. This is often presented as an attempt to make 
artificial life, bringing together nanotechnology, biotechnology and ICT. The transhumanist 
association has been lobbying for the development of converging technologies for human 
enhancement for several years. In the USA NSF has organised a series of conferences on 
Converging technologies for improving humans (Roco & Bainbridge, 2003). In Europe, 
converging technologies are considered as a more general trend in integration of different 
scientific disciplines, technologies and markets, and they are stimulated as part of the 
European Knowledge Society (Nordmann, 2004). There seem to be national differences 
between EU member states, e.g. in the UK there is more interest in enhancement and anti­
ageing than in Germany.
An overview of the current debates has already been give in section 3.1.2 especially in the 
parts dedicated to nanomedicine and human enhancement. This will not be repeated here. 
Underlying the general case of nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between natural 
and artificial, some ethical issues and descriptive and prescriptive ethical concepts can be 
distinguished. This list is based on the author’s own analysis. The issues and concepts are 
summarised in the following boxes. The lists are too large to be examined in depth, so a 
selection of some key descriptive and prescriptive concepts will have to be made. The 
following analysis is intended to do just that.
Box: list o f ethical issues related to nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between 
natural and artificial
- Playing God
- Bio safety risks (and relevance of current risk assessment methods for GGOs, c.f. 
COGEM 2006)
- Bio security risks, bio warfare and bioterrorism
- Conflict humans / post- or transhumans, will human race become extinct?
- Interpretation of anthropological concepts: Human being / person, Human dignity
- What is life?
Relevant descriptive concepts:
- Human, person
- Biology, nature, animal, plant, 
organism, creature
Relevant normative concepts:
- Enhancement, improvement
- Bio safety, bio security
- Humanity, post humanity,
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- Species, race transhumanity
- Ageing, disease, disability - Human dignity, Human rights
- Life, living, dead, lifeless, - Sustainable development
artificial - Freedom
- Evolution, creation, intelligent
design
3.2.3.1 Nanotechnology on the boundary between natural and 
artificial
The boundary between the natural and artificial world appears to be shifting in five 
(overlapping) current fields of research where nanotechnology plays a role. Until recently, 
the term nanobiotechnology (and also sometimes bionanotechnology) was used for research 
where nanotechnology and life sciences came together. Currently, three other terms are 
more popular: nanomedicine, converging technologies and synthetic biology). The first 
area, closest to industrial uptake and incorporation in real products is called nanomedicine. 
This comprises diagnostics, drug delivery / therapy and regenerative medicine (ETP 
Nanomedicine, 2006). Nanomedicine is a rather broad term, and the main issues related to 
the boundary between natural and artificial are associated to applications of nanomedicine 
inside the body.
The second area is called Converging technologies, where nano, bio, information 
technologies and cognitive or neurosciences are integrated at a length scale of nanometres. 
Converging technologies are currently mainly a set of long term scenarios with different 
aims and perspectives in different parts of the world. Notably the USA and Europe have 
different approaches.
The third area is called synthetic biology. In this case, the developments foreseen are 
aiming at the very long term (50 years), and the current developments are mainly building 
upon progress in biotechnology. Nanotechnology and ICT tend to be included in tools for 
doing the research, and some long term scenarios for nanotechnology (Drexler, Feynman) 
inspire future visions about the development of the field. Below, future visions for the 
development of these fields are categorised on their time scale (current, short term, medium 
term, long term and very long term).
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Table 4: Potential implications o f nanotechnology for the boundary between natural 
and artificial
Potential
implication of 
nanotechnology 
for natural- 
artificial 
boundary
2012-2017 2017-2027 Longer
N ano­
biotechnology / 
Bio­
nanotechnology
medical and 
pharmaceutical 
applications, research 
policy (W evers & 
W echsler, 2002); nano 
(bio) technologies for 
human health, agriculture 
(especially controlled 
release o f animal feed, 
vegetal nutrition and 
pesticides), and industrial 
biotechnologies. 
(Presidente da republica, 
2007)
improve biology with
supram olecular chemistry 
(Lehn, 1995)
fuzzy boundary 
biotic/abiotic world, 
repair body functions 
(Reinhoudt, 1999) 
bioethics issues (eroding 
views on w hat constitutes 
life), artificial ‘molecular 
m otors’ D rexler’s 
m olecular assemblers as a 
long term option (STT, 
1998); applications o f  
biomaterials in 
nanotechnology, 
biosensors,
biophotovoltaics, bio 
m olecular motors, ICT, 
bottom -up self 
organisation, research 
policy (W evers & 
W echsler, 2002); 
available and future likely 
applications of 
nanobiotechnology, 
discussing theoretical 
possible but unlikely and 
science fiction, focus on 
risks of 
nanobiotechnology for 
health and environment, 
research policy (COGEM , 
2004); “Green Goo” that 
could lead to new  
unforeseen biohazards. 
(ETC group, 2003)
nanoethics, human 
identity, enhancement 
(TAB, 2003); intelligent 
bioscience (Kalam, 
2006); Artificial meat 
(Heckl, Kampers); After 
20-40 yrs: m olecular self 
assembly or bottom-up 
nanotechnology for 
manufacturing simple 
materials and devices 
(NRC, 2006)
Nanom edicine nanomedicine (life 
extension) (Roco & 
Tomellini, 2002); 
roadmap life science
sensitivity o f genetic 
information, gap between 
diagnosis and therapy, 
human dignity and value
nanobots inside the body 
(Drexler, 1986) human 
identity, erosion of 
fundamental values, no
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research: new  pathways 
to discovery (incl. 
Nanom edicine), etc.
implants, sensors (NIH,
2003); diagnostics,
targeted delivery,
regenerative medicine, 
cardiovascular diseases, 
cancer, mucoskeletal, 
inflammatory diseases, 
neurodegenerative 
diseases, diabetes (ETP 
Nanom edicine, 2006); 
nanomedicine, detection, 
diagnosis, therapy and 
prevention o f diseases 
(RIVM, 2005); potential 
risks o f nanoparticles in 
medical applications 
(RIVM , 2005); respect for 
private life in the case o f 
early diagnostics (genetic 
privacy), human
enhancement, 
multiplication o f personal 
data stored in databases, 
cost o f and access to 
medical care, and military 
applications. (Lorrain & 
Raoul, 2004);
nanomedicine standards 
are needed. M ajor ethical 
challenges are posed by 
benefit sharing and data 
protection. (Potocnik, 
2007b);
Nanom edicine ethical 
questions incl. sensitivity 
o f  genetic information, 
gap between diagnosis 
and therapy, health care 
resources and tensions 
between holistic and 
functional medicine. In­
depth ethical analysis is 
needed including on 
human dignity (non- 
instrumentalisation, 
privacy, non­
discrimination, informed
conflicts, safety o f 
nanomedicine (Rathenau,
2004); nanomedicine, 
early diagnostics, gap 
diagnostics-therapy, right 
not to know (van Est, 
M alsch, Rip, 2004); 
simple, complex,
uncertain and ambiguous 
risks o f nanomedicine, 
enhancem ent and
nanoparticles in the 
environm ent and human 
body (Health Council NL, 
2006);
eugenics or neurochips, 
early diagnostics, human 
selection, widen gap 
diagnostics-therapy 
(Baumgartner, 2003); 
therapeutics, drug
delivery, toxicology, 
clinical applications, 
regulation, public
dialogue (ESF, 2005); 
fusion of human and 
m achine, transformation 
of humans, mapping 
brains for software 
intelligence, need for 
biomedical ethics of 
nanomedicine (Gordijn, 
2005-6)
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consent, equity, 
precautionary principle) 
and value conflicts. (ETP 
Nanom edicine, 2005)
Converging
technologies
challenges for health 
technology assessment, 
enhancement, shifting 
definitions o f disability 
and human health, include 
disabled people in 
decision making 
(W olbring, 2005); 
different m odels of 
disability, fresh 
perspective on ethics and 
theology, distributive 
justice (W CC, 2005); 
political control, 
enhancement, responsible 
science (W ACC, 2005); 
heaven, hell and prevail 
scenarios, political 
control, how  to govern 
technological 
development, societal 
consequences, values o f 
converging technologies, 
public debate (STOA, 
2006); cyborgs, human 
enhancem ent o f senses, 
memory and brain 
capacity, direct 
communication human- 
m achine, brain-brain. 
Society should deal with 
ethics (W arwick, 2002-7); 
European vision on 
converging technologies 
is viable alternative to 
Am erican, opens decision 
m aking to civil society, 
enabling new  social 
contract (Saage, 2006); 
post humanism as anti­
modern movement, 
Gnostic techno futuristic 
vision (Coenen, 2006); 
compares protestant 
Christian tradition behind 
US enthusiasm for
Extinction o f human race 
by 2030 (Joy, 2000)? 
drive for enhancement is 
inherent in human pursuit 
o f happiness, but should 
not be pursued (Pres 
Council bioethics, 2003); 
opposes enhancement, 
designer babies, eugenics 
(Fukuyama, 2002) human 
intelligence as a computer 
program m e (Minsky, 
1985) post biological / 
supernatural life forms 
will replace humans 
(M oravec, 1985); what 
can tame humans? 
antropotechnology 
enables planning human 
properties (Sloterdijk, 
1999); opposes new 
eugenics (Habermas, 
2001)
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enhancem ent with 
European tradition 
(Schummer, 2006) 
brain-m achine interface 
for remote control 
(Sim onis & Schilthuizen, 
2006), implanted systems 
and body m anipulation o f 
soldiers (Altmann, 2005)
Synthetic biology Experiments
incorporating changed 
DNA bases in DNA and 
letting them be 
transcribed inside living 
cells. The adapted bases 
are built up o f a natural 
base (A, C, G, T) and a 
benzene ring or metal ion. 
(Stanford, xx)
risks, ethics o f synthetic 
biology, understanding 
what makes a biological 
cell live, demonstrate 
intelligent design 
(Dekker, 2005)
grey goo hypothesis 
(Drexler, 1986) Synthetic 
life, bio security (de 
Vriend, 2006-7, Kavli, 
2007)
The current debate on ethical issues related to these areas of research has been reviewed 
above in section 3.1.3, “Ethical issues related to particular application domains which are 
also relevant to nanotechnology,” and won’t be repeated here. There is much discussion 
about future scenarios which are expected to be implemented in the longer term and hence 
have a highly speculative character. There is far less discussion about ethical implications 
of current research projects. If such proposals are evaluated by ethics boards, these focus 
mostly on the ethical aspects of the proposed research itself (testing on humans or animals, 
use of privacy sensitive data, etc), and not on the potential implications for society of the 
new technologies and products under development.
3.2.3.2 Key ethical descriptive concepts related to 
implications of nanotechnology for the boundary between 
natural and artificial
There are no new ethical descriptive concepts typical for nanotechnology implications for 
the boundary between natural and artificial. All concepts and ethical implications have been 
discussed for a long term, mainly based on future visions and speculations. There are no 
totally new medical or biological applications of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is 
gradually incorporated in existing medical devices or pharmaceuticals, as biocompatible 
layer or electrode material which is more suitable for connecting nerves to electronic parts.
The existing descriptive concepts related to the implications of nanotechnology for the 
boundary between natural and artificial which may be made more acute due to the 
emergence of nanotechnology include:
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1) The concepts of bio safety and bio security may acquire a new meaning due to 
developments in bionanotechnology and nanobiotechnology. Nanoinstruments 
applied to (synthetic) biology may enable the development of new dangerous as 
well as harmless pathogens, and if DNA and other natural cellular elements are 
adapted through nanochemical means, this may contribute to life forms which are 
very different from their natural predecessors. On the other hand, nanobiosensors 
and other nanoinstruments may also contribute to better control of biological 
materials and earlier warnings of the presence of pathogens, enabling successful 
treatment.
2) The concept of novel food may also have to be reinterpreted due to applications of 
nanotechnology in agriculture and food. If food engineers manage to control the 
fibre size of vegetarian meat replacement products, these may eventually taste the 
same as meat. In the shorter term, already existing nano-encapsulation vesicles are 
expected to enable disconnecting the taste of food from the ingredients.
3) The concept of Cyborg or cybernetic organism is becoming more and more a fact 
of life, as neural implants and other devices and systems which connect the 
nervous system to computers or telecommunication networks are applied in 
disabled and in the future also non-disabled people.
4) The concept of Human enhancement has been discussed for a long time. This 
may be enabled in the long term by some implanted nanotechnologies, but it is not 
clear when this may happen or who would do this. Nanoelectronics as well as 
biocompatible nanomaterials are essential elements in this development.
5) The concept of life extension is in fact also not just a future dream, but the 
average lifespan of humans has been increasing for decades due to better food, 
housing and healthcare. Nanomedicine and replacement medicine (replacing sick 
or damaged organs and tissues with artificial organs and tissues) may be next steps 
in this development.
3.2.3.3 Key normative ethical concepts related to implications 
of nanotechnology for the boundary between natural and 
artificial
Ethical descriptive concepts presented in 3.2.3.2 are “neutral” in the sense that they 
describe aspects of the status quo or trends in the real world. Normative ethical concepts on 
the other hand point to how this status quo and these trends ought to be changed in order to 
be improved from the perspective of one or more ethical traditions. In the case of 
implications of nanotechnology for the boundary between natural and artificial, the 
interpretation of the following normative ethical concepts is currently being debated:
1) As for security applications Human Dignity is at stake where nanotechnology 
contributes to making the boundary between natural and artificial fuzzy.
2) As for sustainable development, the interpretation of the Precautionary principle 
is contested for applications of bionanotechnology with bio safety and bio security
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implications. In this case, governments (in particular the US government) are 
pleading for the strictest interpretation of this principle. (For nanoparticles and 
nanofood, this role is fulfilled by NGOs).
3.2.4 Discussion: selection o f key ethical issues and w hat’s next?
In section 3.2 above, current and expected future trends in nanotechnology for security and 
for sustainable development, and potential implications for shifting boundaries between 
natural and artificial, have been analysed. A step back has been taken from the myriad of 
current debates, which are more related to ethical and societal aspects of particular 
application domains where nanotechnology is or may be used (e.g. military 
nanotechnology, nanotechnology for civil security, nanotechnology and the environment, 
nanotechnology for the poor, nanomedicine, nanofood, etc).
In the first focus area: ‘nanotechnology for security’; current and future developments of 
technologies with nano-inside as well as the policy and societal context have been brought 
together. A number of descriptive ethical concepts is relevant to these co-evolving 
developments, of which the tendency to proliferation due to the shift from spinning out 
defence technologies to civil applications towards spinning in civilian high technologies 
including nanotechnologies to military and civil security applications. This means relevant 
technologies are also available to non-state actors, and has already led to restrictions of 
academic and trade freedom.
In the second focus area, nanotechnology and sustainable development, there are no real 
new ethical descriptive concepts which are not being discussed by others. Integrating 
discussions about nano for the poor with environmental applications and implications does 
not lead to new insights.
The third focus area is nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial. The current debate on ethical aspects of shifting this boundary still focuses on a 
considerable longer time scale than the debates in the other areas. It may be interesting to 
try to focus on the short to medium time scale. However it is not likely that the key 
descriptive ethical concepts will be different from the well known concepts which have 
been discussed for a long time. It is therefore difficult to imagine that the present research 
will lead to useful contributions to the debate.
In general, it is not possible to find a common denominator in the wide variety in types of 
materials, relevant scientific disciplines, and markets and end products or systems. The 
only thing all these have in common is the determining characteristic of a nanotechnology 
based product, that the sheer size of the artificially made nanoparticles or structures 
between ~1 and ~100  nm causes novel observable properties; different from the same 
materials not structured on a nanometre scale. The current risk debate focuses mainly on 
attempts to govern the potential negative impacts of such new properties for health and the 
environment in the absence of sufficient science based evidence. Nanostructures applied in
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a wide range of products also tends to blur the distinction between different categories of 
technologies or products (e.g. the distinction between pharmaceuticals and medical devices 
may become irrelevant if a pharmaceutical is incorporated in an implant thanks to a 
nanocoating or in the case of theranostics; nanotechnology can enable conventional 
explosives with a bigger blast as well as potentially new weapons of mass destruction with 
reduced casualties; bionanotechnologies may blur the distinction between natural and 
artificial entities).
In the following three chapters, the three cases nanotechnology and security, sustainable 
nanotechnology development, and nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between 
natural and artificial are analysed from the perspective of philosophical ethical theories. No 
really new ethical issues related to those cases or to nanotechnology in general have been 
identified. Still, examining the issues closer from the perspective of ethical traditions may 
well bring new insights to the current debates. The first case of nanotechnology and 
security is analysed from the perspective of Just War Theory.
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Chapter 4: Nanotechnology and security
Section 3.2.1 above resulted in a number of ethical issues concerning security applications 
of nanotechnology, including implications of nanotechnology for the Just War doctrine, 
dual use and balancing freedom and security. In this chapter, these issues will be examined 
more in depth. The classical Just War theory37 is taken as starting point, as a comprehensive 
normative framework for assessing whether the decision to go to war or conduct during the 
war can be justified as unfortunate violent steps on the way to Just Peace. An attempt is 
made to apply and adapt the Just War theory to military and dual use (nano) technology 
development. Leading philosophical authors in this field are Michael Walzer, the 20th 
century authority on the Just War theory, and Paul Virilio, a political and cultural theorist 
who has written extensively about 20th century warfare and dynamics in military 
technology development and its surrounding military-industrial complex. This chapter 
makes good use of central concepts in their work.
4.1 Conflicts between use o f military (nano) technology and the 
Just War doctrine
In this section the Just War doctrine is first introduced as an ethical framework for 
evaluating trends in warfare and military technologies. This doctrine has been developed in 
a long historical process dating back to classical times. Subsequently, interactions of the 
Just War doctrine with trends in Weapons of Mass Destruction and in precision warfare are 
discussed. Literature on these topics tends to be limited to applying a limited set of Just 
War criteria to the use or sometimes also development of military technologies. These are 
mainly discrimination / non-combatant immunity and military proportionality, intended for 
evaluating conduct of military troops during a war (Jus in Bello). From the analysis below, 
a destabilising effect of precision warfare on the Just War doctrine becomes apparent. Do 
the applied Jus in Bello criteria sanction the development of new weapons?
37 In this chapter, the terms Just War theory, doctrine and tradition are used as synonymous. 
All three terms can be found in relevant literature with slightly different meanings. The 
distinctions are not relevant to the case of military and dual use (nano)technology 
development, as they refer to philosophical writings, church teaching, and efforts by 
members of peace movements. Contributions from all three domains are useful to the case 
at hand.
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4.1.1 The Just W ar doctrine
In general, three ethical traditions of War and Peace can be distinguished, so-called 
Realism, Just War and Pacifism, according to Orend (2005). In the so-called Realistic 
tradition, moral concepts are not relevant to state behaviour or international affairs, but only 
govern actions by individuals. “All’s fair in love and war,” characterises the realistic 
tradition. Sovereign States have unlimited rights to engage in armed conflict as one 
instrument of politics next to others such as diplomacy and bilateral or international 
cooperation.
According to the Pacifistic tradition on the other hand, no moral grounds can justify going 
to war. War is an intrinsic evil and should be avoided at all costs. In stead, non-violent 
actions may be undertaken to defend against an aggressor, such as strikes or acts of civil 
disobedience.
In contrast to the other two traditions which seem to consider morals and warfare to be 
mutually exclusive, the Just War tradition introduces moral considerations to evaluations of 
decision making and actions in or related to warfare. Whereas the Just War tradition strives 
eventually for a Just Peace, for Sovereign States the choice to engage in war may 
sometimes be the lesser evil of the available options. For these unfortunate cases, the Just 
War doctrine gives two sets of criteria, for evaluating whether decisions for going to war 
can be justified, and for the right conduct during a war. The intentions are to raise the 
threshold for going to war by stimulating reconsideration before taking the decision, and to 
limit human suffering during a war as much as possible. (c.f. Orend, 2005)
According to Wils (2007), in philosophy, the Just War theory is one particular form of the 
theory of double effect, or the notion that actions can have simultaneously good as well as 
bad consequences. The theory of double effect investigates under which circumstances 
good or bad consequences of actions can be tolerated. This chapter will concentrate on the 
Just War doctrine and leave the general theory of double effect until later.
In practice, the Just War doctrine is used to evaluate whether going to war can be justified 
(Jus ad Bellum, dealing with the ends of defensive warfare) and whether a war is conducted 
respecting humanitarian law (Jus in Bello, dealing with the means applied in warfare). The 
concept is used both by decision makers in defence policy and by religious leaders making 
moral statements. Becker (2007) remarked that the Just War doctrine has gradually been 
developed throughout history. The development dates back to Classical Greek times. 
Aristotle and Plato (4 th century BC) asserted that the main human goals are only attainable 
during peace, but considered that war may sometimes be necessary. Gilbert (1990) noted 
that Aristotle distinguished two types of Just Wars. The first were wars between free 
regimes, composed of human beings, which could only be justified if waged for the sake of 
achieving peace. The other type were wars between free and barbarous populations in order 
to enslave the barbarous population, who were considered less than human. The 
contribution to present-day Just War theory is of course limited to the first type of Just War. 
Mattox (2006) considered Plato’s main contributions to Just War theory to be giving the
162
state exclusive right to wage war, and making a distinction between combatants and non­
combatants. In Roman times Cicero (1st century BC) emphasised that any Just War must 
clearly serve peace in the end. He formulated some criteria for decisions on going to war 
(Jus ad Bellum) and for the right conduct during a war (Jus in Bello). These criteria include 
Just Cause (in a broader sense than today). Before going to war, the offended state should 
first send a demand for satisfaction to the aggressor and declare the war publicly. The jus in 
bello criteria include discrimination of soldiers who lay down their arms and good faith 
(keeping one’s promises to the enemy).
Through the ages others have contributed to the elaboration of the Just War theory. 
Augustine (5th century AD), Thomas Aquinas (13th century), de Vitoria and Suarez (16th 
century) added sets of criteria for both Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, which are still in 
use. Hugo Grotius (17th century) emphasised the principle of Sovereignty of the State as the 
sole actor who was entitled to make decisions on going to war. (Becker, 2007)
Orend (2005) observed that during the 20th and 21st century, the Just War doctrine has been 
extended in three ways: the broadening of the concept Just Cause, the introduction of a 
third phase in the Just War doctrine, and the role of the United Nations in matters of world 
peace and security. However, other experts consider these elements to have been part of 
Just War doctrine much longer. In the broad interpretation of the criterion Just Cause, states 
may not only go to war against an aggressor, but the United Nations Security Council may 
also authorize pre-emptive strike in the light of imminent serious threat of aggression. This 
constitutes an extension of the Just War doctrine outside the realm of defensive wars. The 
extension is controversial and it is not easy to determine when pre-emptive strikes would be 
justified.
Walzer (1977) introduced a third phase in the Just War doctrine, Jus Post Bellum (or Jus in 
Pace). Under this heading, he defined some moral criteria for evaluating peace agreements 
and the activities undertaken to end a war. Even in cases where a government’s decision to 
go to war as well as the conduct of its military troops during the war could be justified, the 
regime imposed on the population of the defeated country could still conflict with basic 
human rights. The Jus Post Bellum criteria were meant to give guidelines for good 
governance during this post-war period.
After the Second World War, the United Nations have gradually been given a more 
important role in ensuring world peace and security. The international community is called 
upon to take over the “Responsibility to Protect” populations in fragile states in order to 
ensure their human security (distinct from state security). This responsibility may imply 
military humanitarian interventions by countries’ troops under the flag of the United 
Nations.
The criteria for Jus ad Bellum (before a war) include both deontological (rule-based ethics) 
and consequentialist criteria. Deontological criteria impose rules on proper behaviour 
irrespective of the eventual effects caused by the actions. Consequentialist criteria are used 
to evaluate actions by examining the real or intended consequences. In the case of Jus ad 
Bellum, the consequentialist criteria are used to evaluate intended consequences, as they are 
part of a framework for decision making before an actual war breaks out.
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Deontological criteria are:
- Just Cause
- Just Intent
- Legitimate Authority.
Consequentialist criteria are:
- Reasonable Prospect of Success
- Political Proportionality
- Last Resort.
All six criteria must be fulfilled; otherwise a war can not be called a Just War. Not all six 
criteria have the same weight, though. Especially the concept Reasonable Prospect of 
Success is contested. Orend (2005) gives the following definition: “A state may not resort 
to war if it can foresee that doing so will have no measurable impact on the situation. [...] 
International law does not include this requirement as it is seen as biased against small, 
weaker states.” States which possess high tech weapons and military systems may believe 
this gives them a better prospect of success. Later on in this chapter, the relevance of each 
of these criteria for military technology will be analysed more in depth.
The Just War theory is not limited to evaluating decisions for going to war, but also for 
examining conduct during a war. The relevant criteria for Jus in Bello (during a war) are:
- Discrimination / non-combatant immunity
- Military proportionality
International humanitarian law (IHL) is a very detailed concretisation of the two general 
criteria. This makes Jus in Bello legally firm.
Discrimination / non-combatant immunity means that armed force should be directed to 
those engaged in combat. Killing or injuring civilians and soldiers who are not fighting 
should be avoided. However, some non-intentional “collateral damage”, or non-combatant 
casualties is accepted. When new weapons or military technologies enter the battlefield, 
this changes the ability of the fighting parties to discriminate between combatants and non­
combatants. E.g. the availability of heavier explosives may contribute to more collateral 
damage, whereas more precisely guided missiles may improve the ability to discriminate.
Military proportionality means that military forces may only use force in proportion to the 
ends they seek. New weapons or military technology may be more or less proportionate 
than existing technology. Precision weapons are expected to contribute to better military 
proportionality. By definition, Weapons of Mass Destruction can’t be used in a 
proportionate way.
In this section, the Just War doctrine has briefly been introduced. The next section will 
focus on interactions of the Just War doctrine with trends in Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMD). How this topic has been discussed in philosophical literature is examined to
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identify relevant arguments for ethical assessment of nanotechnologies that can contribute 
to new WMD.
4.1.2 Ethical concerns caused by W eapons o f M ass Destruction
Three main types of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) exist already, nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons. These WMD are subject to international conventions which either 
outlaw their use, possession and further development (B & C weapons) or restrict 
proliferation (Nuclear weapons). Considering innovation and new development related to 
WMD, a number of worrying trends in (nanotechnology for) WMD can be distinguished, as 
explained in section 3.2.1 (summarised in table 5).
In the short term there is a risk of proliferation of dual use technologies and knowledge as 
well as existing stockpiles of WMD to hostile states and non-state actors. The international 
community is trying to prevent this by implementing and controlling the existing Biological 
and Toxin Weapons Convention, Chemical Weapons Convention and (Nuclear) Non 
Proliferation Treaty. For biotechnology and life sciences, the scientific and business 
community has been prompted to develop, discuss and comply with voluntary codes of 
conduct for bio security.
In the longer term, the boundary between weapons of mass destruction and conventional 
weapons may blur, because some states are developing smaller nuclear weapons or heavier 
conventional bombs. Such developments may gradually increase the likelihood that 
weapons will be used which make large numbers of victims or render the environment 
uninhabitable for a long time.
Table 5: Trends in (nanotechnology for) WMD
WMD Present 2012-2017 >2017
Nuclear weapons Existing stockpiles 
strategic & tactical 
nuclear weapons (not 
nano)
Nanotechnology 
improved auxiliary 
systems (Altmann 
2006)
Micro fusion weapons 
possibly > 20  years 
(Altmann 2006)
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Chemical & biological 
weapons
Existing stockpiles of 
chemical and 
biological warfare 
agents (not nano); 
Nanodrug delivery 
systems (currently not 
suitable for battlefield 
use)
Detection techniques 
for NBCRE (Altmann 
2006)
Nano bio/chem 
weapons (Altmann 
2006)
Large conventional 
weapons
FOAB 7 tonnes, 44 ton 
TNT equivalent 
(Russia, 2007)
Nano-particles in 
explosives (e.g. 
Qinetiq)
The current Just War theory has been applied to WMD in general, distinguishing two cases: 
the use of WMD in conflicts and deterrence by possession of nuclear weapons. During a 
war or armed conflict, the Just War criteria for Jus in Bello oppose the use of WMD 
including those enabled by nanotechnology for three reasons. Firstly, WMD can not be 
used in a way that respects the discrimination / non-combatant immunity criterion. 
Secondly, the first actor who uses WMD can never do this in a proportionate way. Thirdly, 
international law outlaws the hostile use, development and possession of biological and 
chemical WMD (CWC and BTWC conventions) and proliferation of nuclear WMD (NPT 
treaty). Aside from formally recognised WMD, powerful conventional bombs used at 
battlefields where civilians are present may also conflict with criterion prescribing 
immunity of non-combatants.
Just War theory has not only been applied to use of weapons of mass destruction in armed 
conflict, but also to their deterrent effect before the outbreak of such a conflict. Michael 
Walzer (1977 p 283) has justified nuclear deterrence under the Just War doctrine:
“Nuclear war is and will remain morally unacceptable, and there is no case for its 
rehabilitation. [...] Because it [nuclear war] is a bad way, we must seek out ways to prevent 
it, and because deterrence is a bad way [to prevent nuclear war], we must seek out others. 
[ . ]  deterrence itself, for all its criminality, falls or may fall under the standard of necessity. 
[ . ]  So, the readiness to murder [ . ]  should be balanced by the readiness not to murder, not 
to threaten murder, as soon as alternative ways to peace can be found.”
The Catholic Church has also justified nuclear deterrence under the Just War doctrine. In 
the words of Pope John Paul II (1982) during the Cold War:
“In the current conditions, ‘deterrence’ based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, 
but as a step on the way toward progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally 
acceptable.” (Pope John Paul II, 1982)
During the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the American bishops have criticised the 
US government policy to invest $12 billion in the ‘Stockpile Stewardship Program’ with its 
intention to continue developing, testing and relying on nuclear deterrence until 2065,
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because this is not an interim policy and does not imply ‘progressive disarmament’. 
(Schennink, 1999)
Theologian Oliver O’Donovan (2003) applied the Jus in Bello criteria discrimination and 
proportionality to determine whether certain categories of weapons including nuclear and 
biological weapons could be considered immoral. He claims that discrimination is 
fundamentally about the intention of an attack, not about the technological properties of the 
means.
“Indiscriminate intention can affect weapons at a variety of stages: in design there may be 
indiscriminate intent, either in the mode of operation itself or in the choice of certain 
feature to develop; in deployment there may be indiscriminate intent in the choice of one 
weapon over another, or in the failure to accept the discipline that discriminate use of a 
weapon requires [...] a fifth application of the label ‘indiscriminate’ [...] is to any weapon 
of mass destruction [ . ]  justified [ . ]  simply on the grounds of scale alone.”
Donovan does not know intrinsically disproportionate weapons as individual pieces. 
However he considers a large enough stockpile of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles 
that enables the country possessing these weapons to destroy 200 cities simultaneously a 
disproportionate stockpile. The reason is its unavoidable impact on human existence. He 
also considers weapons disproportionate if their consequences are radically unpredictable, 
such as large atomic bombs, especially if both conflicting parties have nuclear weapons and 
mutual retaliation can’t be excluded. “Some weapons are inherently disproportionate to any 
conceivable political goal; others are probably disproportionate to any likely political goal.” 
Some types of weapons like biological weapons are considered cruel and should be banned 
because they constitute an affront to human dignity. He also argues that “the search for new 
and ever more effective weapons technologies encourages cruelty of mind.” (O’Donovan, 
2003)
To conclude this section developing new weapons of mass destruction with or without 
nanotechnology is not justified under the Jus in Bello criteria. In fact, O’Donovan applies 
Jus ad Bellum criteria “Just Intent” and “Political Proportionality” as well as Jus in Bello 
criteria. So his argument also implies that these Jus ad Bellum criteria make R&D for new 
weapons of mass destruction immoral. There is no need to look for other moral criteria for 
condemning development of new WMD.
4.1.3 Ethical concerns raised by technologies developed for 
Network Centric W arfare
Nanotechnology is not only considered useful for applications in WMD but also in 
conventional weapons and military systems, as summarised in table 1 in section 3.2.1. Even 
prior to the incorporation of nanotechnology, there is an ongoing discussion on ethical 
concerns from the perspective of Just War Theory raised by so-called Network Centric 
Warfare in general and precision and remote control warfare in particular. In this section, 
literature in which Jus in Bello criteria are applied to precision and remote control
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technologies which can be used in Network Centric Warfare is reviewed to examine their 
usefulness for evaluating military and dual use nanotechnogy. In this current debate it is 
possible to distinguish ethical reflection on the use of these technologies during a war and 
on the changing relation between political decision making governed by Jus ad Bellum and 
military decision making governed by Jus in Bello.
4.1.3.1 Use of precision technologies in war38
Jus in Bello criteria govern decisions to use precision weapons and systems during armed 
conflict. According to Schmitt (2005) attacks with precision weapons may have positive as 
well as negative implications for three principles of International Humanitarian Law / Jus in 
Bello criteria: Indiscriminate attack, Proportionality and Perfidy and protected status.
Based on these criteria, there are some arguments in favour of preferring the use of 
precision weapons to conventional warfare. Such weapons may enable better discrimination 
between combatants and non-combatants, having a better chance to hit the target with a 
smaller explosive charge. Also, more targets can be attacked at the same time. This means 
that open war can be fought quicker. It is expected that precision weapons may lead to less 
collateral damage and incidental injury. Because precision weapons promise to enable 
better discrimination, the party using them has a stronger obligation to avoid civilian 
casualties. In practice, precision weapons contribute to more proportionate attacks.
However, the same criteria may also be used to criticise the use of precision weapons. 
Precision warfare may infringe upon non-combatant immunity. For example, the employing 
force may use precision weapons to attack targets which would not be aimed at previously, 
because the risk would have been too high to hit civilians. More civilian casualties might 
result in reality than would have been the case without such weapons. Also, if one 
technologically superior party uses precision weapons which the other side does not 
possess, the enemy under attack may use a human shield to protect military objects, 
reducing the effectiveness of the precision weapons and again leading to more civilian 
casualties. This asymmetry is already tempting the low tech army to violate humanitarian 
law by wearing civilian clothes or hiding among civilians. (Schmitt, 2005) The use of 
precision weapons is a mixed blessing from a Jus in Bello perspective. It may contribute to 
more humane warfare, but also to increasing numbers of civilian casualties.
38 Sections 1.1.3.1 until 1.1.4 are based on excerpts from: Malsch, Ineke, “Remote Control: 
Precision Warfare is not Bloodless,” in The Broker 8 , 2008, www .thebrokeronline.eu
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4.1.3.2 Political decision making on precision and remote 
control warfare
The availability of precision and remote control warfare technologies leads not only to 
effects during the period of open war. Already in the pre-war period, technological trends 
give rise to a promise of a virtual, bloodless war, as in a computer game. This notion of 
bloodless war leads to different behaviour of countries. In classical political theory, 
democratic states are supposed to be more peaceful than authoritarian states. Ignatieff
(2000) warned:
“New weaponry may force us to reassess an essential assumption about democracies: that 
they go to war less frequently than authoritarian regimes, and that they rarely, if ever, go to 
war against fellow democracies. Democracies may well remain peace loving only so long 
as the risks of war remain real to their citizens. If war becomes virtual -  and without risk -  
democratic electorates may be more willing to fight, especially if the cause is justified in 
the language of human rights and even democracy itself.” (Ignatieff, 2000)
Müller et al (...) considered democracy as a source of the race toward more precise weapons 
and increased safety for soldiers.
Others observed that the availability of precision weapons may actually encourage war. 
Jeffrey Record, professor at the U.S. Air Force’s Air War College in Alabama, thought that 
the expectation that precision weapons ensure ‘bloodless war’, at least for the intervening 
power, may prompt U.S. defence decision makers to use force sooner, whereas in the past 
diplomatic or other non-military means would have been attempted. (Record, 2002)
In the coming decades, European governments may no longer exhaust other options before 
resorting to military force. Instead, the European Defence Agency (EDA, 2006) expects 
them to use military and non-military means in parallel, and under close media attention, 
against an unequal adversary hiding among the civilian population. According to EDA, 
European governments will increasingly deploy precision weapons and techniques for 
identifying and observing individuals in crowds.
The reviewed ethical reflections on precision and remote control warfare give rise to mixed 
conclusions. The availability of precision weapons may have ambiguous effects on the right 
conduct during a war. Precision and remote control weapons may also contribute to 
destabilising the Just War doctrine. This may occur if Jus in Bello criteria are used in 
decision making on going to war in stead of the traditional Jus ad Bellum criteria including 
the criterion Last Resort. In the next section, this gradual blurring of the boundary between 
the two chapters in the Just War doctrine is examined more in depth taking a critical 
discussion of effects based warfare in which technological networks play a role as starting 
point.
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4.1.4 Blurring the boundaries between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello
Paul Cornish (2007) warned that effects based war destabilises the Just War doctrine, and 
was concerned that this makes it more difficult to attribute responsibility to individual 
actors. According to the US Joint Forces Command: “Effects based operations (EBO) is a 
process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome, or effect, on the enemy through the 
synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military 
capabilities at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Effects-based thinking focuses 
upon the linkage of actions to effects to objectives.” (Macgregor, 2003) Cornish argued that 
effects based warfare seeks to lock military activity during a war in a political framework. 
It becomes more difficult to attribute responsibility for decisions, actions and consequences 
to individual commanders and combatants. This leads to crowding out of the Jus in Bello 
chapter, because combatants are progressively reduced to instruments in the hands of 
military strategists and may be less able to take responsibility for their actions. Both Jus ad 
Bellum (judging the ends of warfare) and Jus in Bello (judging the means used in warfare) 
should be evaluated independently. This is in line with the bicameral Just War tradition. 
The solution could either be to empower soldiers to implement Jus in Bello criteria or to 
develop a new unicameral Just War variant in which authority and responsibility are 
understood and can be attributed. (Cornish, 2007)39
The problem highlighted by Cornish is not so much remote control or precision warfare, 
but instrumentalising soldiers as one tool interchangeably with other technical or human 
resources. The increasing availability of precision and remote control weapons systems has 
contributed to another way in which the boundary between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello 
is blurred. The Jus in Bello criteria “discrimination / non-combatant immunity” and 
“(military) proportionality” may now already be applied in the pre-war period, for deciding 
on going to war. The Jus ad Bellum criterion “Last Resort” may be ignored in these 
decisions. Remote control and precision weapons already help to create an illusion of 
virtual bloodless war and lower the threshold for use of military force under Jus in Bello 
criteria, because precision warfare is expected to be more proportionate and to discriminate 
between combatants and non-combatants. However, the decision to go to war can only be 
justified if all six criteria of Jus ad Bellum are fulfilled, including “Last Resort”. This 
means that all other options including diplomacy or non-military measures should have 
been tried. Even if precision and remote control warfare are being used, the reality of war is 
bloody, making victims among own soldiers and civilians. In democratic states, the sight of 
body bags returning home could lead to new demand for more precise weapons, remote 
control or autonomous military robots.
39 Cornish seems to observe a similar dynamics as Paul Virilio (in Speed and Politics, Pure 
War etc): that the missiles used for delivering bombs have increased their speed so much 
that the military command hierarchy is reduced to a single person (in case of nuclear 
weapons in the USA), thereby instrumentalising soldiers as well as military commanders. 
Virilio’s work will be discussed later in this chapter.
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4.1.5 Jus in Bello criteria for stimulating weapons development?
In this thesis, the focus is not on the conduct of war or the use of different types of 
weapons, but on the application of nanotechnology in military and dual use technologies 
developed before the war. Some interpretations of the Just War doctrine may stimulate an 
arms race in precision and remote control weapons, because it is expected that these 
weapons will enable better discrimination and military proportionality. This goes against 
the intention of the Just War doctrine as an unfortunate step on the way to a Just Peace.
A prime example of an arms development proponent who uses Just War criteria to make his 
case is Richard T. De George (2007). The Jus in Bello criterion “non-combatant immunity” 
should have implications for the development of smart bombs already during peacetime. 
The “Principle of Morally Obligatory Smart Weapons Development” and the “Principle of 
Weapons Development Assistance to Others,” are proposed. These principles imply that 
states should take measures both to prevent harming civilians of their potential future 
enemy and to contribute to protecting their own civilian population to attacks by 
adversaries. The argumentation is clearly flawed. Firstly, the intention of the Just War 
doctrine is turned on its head. The Just War doctrine is meant to avoid war as much as 
possible. War can only be justified as an unfortunate means to the end of more Just Peace, 
as a last resort. Peace can not be considered a means to the end of achieving a more Just 
future War. As Cornish (2007) has argued the criteria for Jus ad Bellum and for Jus in Bello 
are two independent systems for deciding on going to war and for the right conduct during 
a war.
Secondly, De George argues that arms development in Peacetime is morally obligatory 
under the Just War doctrine. However, public resources are always limited, and the choice 
to invest in new weapons means the same money can not be invested in other public goods 
such as healthcare, education, etc. Furthermore, the final aim of the Just War doctrine is to 
achieve Just Peace, which is also aimed at by other strategies including disarmament. De 
George does not compare his strategy of smart weapon development with an alternative 
strategy of disarmament as to the likelihood of armed conflicts. Multilateral disarmament 
and investment in peaceful cooperation between potential adversaries are more likely 
strategies for avoiding casualties of war.
Another counter-argument is given by Oliver O’Donovan (2003), who considers the search 
for new and more effective weapons technologies to stimulate cruelty of mind, and - citing 
Mark Twain in Connecticut Yankee -  warns that “the intense pursuit of military technology 
[ . ]  must [ . ]  make the military enterprise less noble, breeding a race of inventors who do 
not have to contemplate at close quarters the harm that their inventions do. [...] Weapons 
technology has terrorised the twentieth century by running ahead of moral, political and 
legal control [...] the practical question is always how to bring it under control. [...] 
Prohibitions are unhelpful, unless accompanied by a serious attempt to apply moral 
reasoning to the task of weapons design.” (O’Donovan, 2003)
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Pacifists might reject the idea that there could ever be anything like ‘moral weapons 
design’, since almost all weapons are meant to kill people. However, the Just War tradition 
does not exclude war as a deplorable but necessary means to the end of achieving Just 
Peace, and therefore might consider a concept like moral weapons design.
In the current debate about arms control treaties for types of weapons which are considered 
cruel (including land mines and cluster ammunition) O’Donovan distinguished two 
approaches. The first approach is to ban whole categories of weapons or specific technical 
components causing disproportionate suffering, the second is to prescribe weapons design 
criteria. The criterion “disproportionate suffering” is again a Jus in Bello criterion applied 
before the war, while arms control and disarmament treaties are made. It is unlikely that 
new generations of precision and remote control weapons would be the subject of a ban, as 
they are intended to be more discriminate and proportionate than existing weapons (again 
Jus in Bello criteria). However, moral design criteria could be useful in stimulating 
reflection on the harm the weapons which are under development today would eventually 
be likely to cause. Then, such criteria could be a way to reduce cruelty of mind among 
those engaged in new military or dual use technology development. Cruelty of mind is not 
explicitly included in the Just War doctrine, but can be considered to infringe upon the Jus 
ad Bellum criterion “Just Intent”, as it is a concept that implies certain intentions which 
conflict with basic human rights and justice. Below, an attempt will be made to formulate 
criteria for moral weapons design based on Jus ad Bellum criteria. It should be noted that 
Jus ad Bellum criteria are addressed to political decision making on going to war, who may 
be others than those engaged in decisions on new arms development.
4.2 Comparison with other work on moral design criteria 
relevant for military and dual use nanotechnology
Before attempting to apply Jus ad Bellum criteria to arms development, a preliminary 
question should be answered: Who should apply moral weapons design criteria? Obviously, 
the design criteria should be relevant to the context in which they are used as well as to the 
powers and responsibilities of the user. Four types of users are distinguished on different 
levels. The responsibilities of three of them are already addressed by other authors who 
have proposed moral design criteria.
- The international community could use such criteria in their discussions on 
international arms control treaties. Jürgen Altmann’s (2005, 2006, 2008) research on 
preventive arms control of military nanotechnology addressed mainly to those engaged 
in international arms control.
- National governments and parliaments could use them to decide on avoiding 
investments in undesirable weapons development or on legislation governing the 
market for military goods.
- Companies and research organisations engaged in dual use or military R&D could use 
them to determine moral specifications for the weapons and technologies they are 
contributing to. Jeroen van den Hoven’s (2006, 2008, 2008a) work on moral design of
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ICT, mainly addressed to civilian companies / research organisations and individual 
engineers.
- Individuals could use them for their own personal decisions to contribute to certain 
projects or not, or to “blow the whistle”. Joachim Schummer’s (2001) article on Ethics 
of Chemical Synthesis is mainly addressed to (individual) researchers.
The Jus ad Bellum criteria are most relevant to decision makers on national and 
international level, apparently filling a niche in the overall framework of moral design of 
military technologies. These criteria are primarily intended as instruments for those with 
the authority for deciding on going to war. The contributions to moral design criteria from 
the abovementioned three authors will be briefly discussed below.
In his standard work on Military Nanotechnology and Preventive Arms Control, Jürgen 
Altmann (2005, 2006) has made a thorough review of trends in military and dual use 
nanotechnology. Subsequently, these technologies are analysed with a view to their 
positive, negative or neutral implications for a predetermined set of preventive arms control 
criteria, including international arms control treaties and humanitarian law; international 
stability; and general implications for humans, the environment and society. In a later 
article (Altmann, 2008) and in chapter 5 of (Altmann, 2006), the history, embedding and 
shaping of these preventive arms control criteria is explained. They have been incorporated 
in international arms control treaties since 1945. The concept “preventive arms control” has 
been developed in a project by the German Parliamentary Technology Assessment 
organisation TAB since 1994 and a later project organised by FONAS. The criteria are 
partly based on (international) law and partly on governance criteria aimed at avoiding wars 
including accidental and unintended wars (stability, arms control, protecting humans, the 
environment and society). Philosophical ethical theories are not applied in this preventive 
arms control framework.
The analysis in the present chapter builds upon Altmann’s work, and is complementary in 
the sense that the ethical Just War theory is applied to more or less the same technological 
trends. In this thesis, a selection is made of nanotechnology for military and security 
applications which may have worrying implications for peace and human rights in the 
future. As discussed in section 4.3, there is overlap between the criteria Legitimate 
Authority and International Law. Furthermore, the criteria Political Proportionality and 
Arms Race are complementary; In addition, both frameworks include other criteria which 
are specific for that approach.
Altmann’s recommendations are addressed to the international community where new arms 
control initiatives are to be discussed and implemented in new treaties or transparency and 
confidence building measures. The analysis of Just War criteria in this chapter is primarily 
addressed to national governments and parliaments. The criteria may be useful as 
instruments in their decision making on military R&D and acquisition. But the international 
community can also use them in discussions on new or reviewed arms control treaties and 
transparency and confidence building measures.
Schummer (2001) discussed the ethics of chemical synthesis, which produces new 
substances with potential negative as well as positive consequences for society.
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Consequentialist ethical theories including utilitarianism should be applied on three fields 
of synthetic chemistry: chemical synthesis as an end in itself, chemical weapons research 
and chemical solutions for improving living conditions. Individual researchers as well as 
the synthetic chemistry community are held responsible for all possible harm from new 
substances. Every synthesis of a new substance with the intention to harm or kill people is 
condemned, because it is the crucial causal condition of all harm caused by potential future 
use. Synthesis of new substances for the benefit of humanity should balance expected gains 
and losses and contribute to equal distribution of goods and harm to everyone. To conclude, 
freedom of research should be conditional on the moral norms and values of one or another 
major ethical theory, which can be chosen by the individual researcher. The article is 
written from a relativistic standpoint concerning these theories.
The scope of the article is limited to the case of synthetic chemistry, a dual use technology 
which may contribute to chemical weapons of mass destruction. However, the 
argumentation has more general implications for all researchers who contribute to creation 
of material objects that did not exist before, including nanoscientists. The starting point is 
philosophical ethical theory, but the article is mainly limited to utilitarianism, presented as 
a common denominator of different formal ethical theories.
The approach in the present chapter also has a formal ethical starting point, but is broader in 
its analysis of a range of military applications of different nanosciences and technologies, 
not just synthetic chemistry. The Just War theory is on the one hand more focused to 
decision making on war and peace, as a special case of the theory of double effect. On the 
other hand it includes not only consequentialist but also deontological ethical concepts. 
Going back to the list of potential users of moral design criteria, it appears that Schummer’s 
plea for responsible research is targeted to individuals who could use the suggestions for 
their own personal decisions to contribute to certain projects or not or to “blow the 
whistle”. The Just War criteria in this chapter are more addressed to national governments 
and the international community.
Van den Hoven (2006, 2008, 2008a) has published extensively about moral issues in 
engineering design and R&D for civilian ICT including balancing privacy and security. 
Complex dilemmas and controversies on balancing these human rights are chopped up into 
manageable technical design questions. This way, engineers can incorporate norms and 
values into the design of databases and data collecting technologies. This is mainly related 
to trends in ‘Big Brother’ technologies included in table 1 on Ethical concerns of 
nanotechnology for security in chapter 3.
A similar approach could be taken for applying moral design criteria based on Just War 
criteria into the design of military applications of nanotechnology. In this chapter, the 
analysis is focused on strategic investment decisions and legislative initiatives at national 
and international level. Van den Hoven’s work is more relevant to companies and research 
organisations.
Altmann, Schummer and van den Hoven have made valuable contributions to the 
development of moral design criteria for military, dual use and civil security technologies.
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These contributions are addressed to different types of actors involved in technology 
development: the international community, researchers, and companies and engineers. 
Whereas Altmann’s approach starts from a legal and arms control position, Schummer and 
van den Hoven apply philosophical ethical theories and concepts. In the next section, an 
attempt is made to integrate assessment of the morality of military and dual use (nano) 
technology in the Just War tradition by applying Jus ad Bellum criteria. The advantage is 
that the Just War theory is an accepted comprehensive framework for thinking about moral 
aspects of warfare, which has been developed and tested in a long historical process.
4.3 Which properties o f military and dual use nanotechnologies 
conflict with Jus ad Bellum criteria?
As observed above, weapons are being designed in preparation for armed conflict, when the 
war itself has not broken out. The Just War doctrine consists of two parts, Jus ad Bellum to 
evaluate decisions for going to war, before the war; and Jus in Bello criteria for assessing 
the conduct of military troops during a war. If it can be demonstrated that the existing Just 
War criteria should apply to political pre-war decisions on weapons R&D and design, it 
makes more sense that these should be Jus ad Bellum criteria. As mentioned above, the Jus 
ad Bellum criteria are Just Cause, Just Intent, Legitimate Authority, Reasonable Prospect of 
Success, Political Proportionality, and Last Resort. The following assessment will highlight 
which military applications of nanotechnology may conflict with one or more Jus ad 
Bellum criteria.
4.3.1 Just Cause
Traditionally, the cause of a war was only considered just if it was waged by a sovereign 
state in self-defence or to protect one’s allies against a physical aggression. It currently 
includes preventing an imminent attack if waiting until the attack really took place would 
arguably be worse than preventing it; and assisting others against oppressive regimes or 
external aggression (interventionism). (Walzer, 1977, Moseley, 2009)
Given current technologies, a weapon which only works or can be operated if the cause is 
just is hard to imagine. In the hypothetical case that weapon stockpiles would be handed 
over to the United Nations for safekeeping and only be released subject to a UN Security 
Council resolution to a party which has applied for using the weapons for a cause 
considered just by this council, this still would not mean the weapons could be applied only 
for an objectively just cause. The criterion just cause is thus not suitable for morally 
evaluating design of individual weapons or military systems. Reflecting on the motivation 
for investing in new military technology development is possible. From a Just Cause 
perspective, weapons should be suitable for defending one’s national security or protecting 
citizens of other states. This is not specific for nanotechnology but relevant to the 
characteristics of weapons and systems while in actual use.
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4.3.2 Just Intent
According to Moseley, “Just Intent” in the classical sense means that the reason for going 
to war should be to achieve justice including protecting its own existence, not to further 
self-interest or aggrandizement. (Moseley, 2009) Ethical questions of intention are 
important in cases like the decision to go to war where possible negative consequences of 
an action may be justified by a good intention. (Lesch, 2007)
This article does not elaborate on classical Just War theory, but attempts to apply Jus ad 
Bellum criteria to political decisions on military and dual use nanotechnology development. 
That requires a more down to earth interpretation of the criteria.
The criterion “Just Intent” is a positive ethical concept, which is not suitable as foundation 
for imposing limits on technology developments. A related more limited negative ethical 
concept is “Malevolent Intent”. This means:
1. “Having, showing or arising from intense often vicious ill will, spite or hatred;
2. Productive of harm or evil.”40
Malevolent intent could imply cruelty of mind. As quoted above, Mark Twain and 
O’Donovan accuse military technology developers of cruelty of mind. In the case of 
technology development, whether the intention is just or malevolent can be observed by 
examining the intended use of the technology. O’Donovan has done this for nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction (see section 4.1.2).
Two types of technologies in which nanotechnology may be used to enable or improve 
them arguably demonstrate Malevolent Intent because both are very likely to be productive 
of harm or evil when used. The first type of technologies instrumentalises the soldier and 
hence infringe upon human dignity (in the Kantian sense). The harm is done to the soldier 
whose human rights are violated, especially if he or she is ordered to incorporate the 
technology in his or her body without informed consent. These technologies include 
military nano-enabled Brain-Machine Interfaces, implants and soldier body 
manipulations.41
The second type can not be used in a way that discriminates between combatants and non­
combatants (by definition or in practice). The harm will practically unavoidably be done to 
the non-combatants in the area where the weapon will be used42. This includes using 
nanotechnology to make better Weapons of Mass Destruction and more powerful 
conventional bombs. Not because of particular nanotechnological characteristics, but 
because of the properties of the weapons for which the technology is developed.
Technologies that enable remote control warfare, where the safety of the operating war 
fighter is a major design criterion, have some aspects that are problematic in the light of the 
Just Intent-criterion. The design is clearly intended to overcome one problem in warfare: 
that one’s own war fighter who is physically present on the battlefield risks death or injury.
40 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, 12 June 2009: http ://www.merriam- 
webster.com/dictionary/malevolent
41 The integration between the technological device and the human body or neural system 
requires working on a nanometre scale.
42 Unless there are no civilians on the battlefield.
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This is in itself not a bad intention. The political and military authorities responsible for 
sending the soldiers to war have an obligation to ensure their safety and security as much as 
possible. But what about the safety of the enemy war fighter or the civilian in the firing 
line?
What would be the responsibility of those engaged in developing the remote control 
warfare technologies? (This may include nanosensors networks and nano-enabled 
unmanned military systems.) 43 Let’s examine the case of unmanned armed military 
systems. These systems are intended to identify the enemy and then attack him with no risk 
to the operator of the system. The operator changes from a soldier in direct physical danger 
confronted by enemy soldiers on the battlefield to an engineer operating a technological 
system with a computer, as if he was playing a computer game. Risk free for him, but 
potentially deadly for the people in the firing line. The soldier can avoid the direct 
confrontation with the victims he makes, lowering the threshold for using deadly violence. 
With what intention are such unmanned armed military systems developed? One could say 
that the intentions of the politicians deciding on investing in armed unmanned systems, and 
of the companies and engineers developing the technologies and manufacturing the systems 
are malevolent or cruel because these systems potentially encourage the use of deadly force 
for a longer period at lower costs to the employing force.
However, unmanned armed systems are assemblies of parts which may just as well be used 
for less problematic purposes. E.g. the unmanned systems can also be used for surveillance 
and communication. Furthermore, missiles or other weapons for arming the unmanned 
systems make use of conventional weapons used also by soldiers who are physically 
present on the battlefield. And nanotechnology applied in such military systems is primarily 
developed for civil applications and has an intrinsic dual use character. So where is the 
threshold beyond which the technologies used in armed unmanned systems become 
exceptionally cruel or malevolent? The best one can say is that these and other types of 
remote control systems are developed for ambiguous intentions. But of course that is the 
case with all dual use or military technologies.
Just intent o f the soldier operating remote control weapons
The term ‘remote control’ seems to imply that the controlling soldier is able to decide 
consciously when he operates the weapon and what it does to the person under attack. 
Intentional killing or injuring a civilian with such a weapon is forbidden. The soldier would 
have to prove that any harm done to civilians with remote control weapons was an accident 
which could not reasonably be avoided. But more fundamentally, the question should be 
raised if deliberately killing or seriously injuring an enemy war fighter with remote control 
weapons should be allowed if the operating soldier or people or infrastructure he was trying 
to protect were not directly at risk of being attacked by the enemy war fighter. Shouldn’t 
this be considered to be murder? One could argue that the enemy war fighter should at least 
be offered the chance to surrender and be granted the rights of a prisoner of war. This is a
43 Unmanned Military Systems include unarmed systems used for observation, 
communication, demining etc as well as armed systems which can be used to identify as 
well as shoot the enemy.
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scenario of actual use of the technology in war, where Jus in Bello criteria should be 
applied, and the person held responsible is the war fighter.
Another type of military systems where Nanotechnology could in the future also be used is 
armed military satellites. Making use of nanotechnology and other information and 
communication technologies, such small armed satellites could one day operate in swarms44 
to attack other satellites. In one scenario, weapons would be placed in space that could aim 
for targets on the ground or disrupt civil communications and the functioning of society as 
a whole.45 Since such armed military satellites are again complex systems consisting of 
many parts which are developed for a wide range of applications, the development of these 
parts does not constitute malevolent intent.
Nanotechnology may in the future enable or improve autonomous robots some of which 
could be intended for killing or injuring people without conscious human intervention.46 In 
general, autonomous armed robots could be developed to limit the danger for human 
soldiers, which is of course a Just Intent. Examples include demining robots or unmanned 
observation and communication satellites or planes.
Armed autonomous robots can be considered to constitute an attempt at delegating the 
responsibility for killing a person to a machine, or at least making it difficult to identify the 
person responsible for the death. Such an intention would be cruel or malevolent.
However, the case of autonomous armed robots is to some extent similar to accidents with 
high technological systems such as plane crashes, where the responsibility may in reality be 
attributed to a number of individual or collective human actors including the designer of the 
plane, the company which manufactured it, the pilot flying it etc. Perhaps a better 
comparison is with large conventional bombs dropped from aeroplanes where the pilot also 
does not consciously decide to kill each individual victim but can still be held accountable 
for it. Similarly, those involved in designing and manufacturing the autonomous armed
44 Such a swarm of small mobile satellites would behave similarly to a swarm of insects,
where the intelligence of the total swarm is more than the sum of the parts.
45 Currently, no weapons are placed in space, but there are trends which may contribute to 
such “weaponisation of outer space”. C.f. Malsch, 2009 (forthcoming). In theory, one could 
imagine robot wars or wars in outer space where no human beings would be in the firing 
line. This would be like an expensive game of chess, and probably as useless as a means to 
peaceful conflict resolutions. One could imagine military satellites armed with lasers which 
only have the power to attack other satellites. But still it is hard to conceive a design only 
enabling such lasers to attack military satellites and not civilian satellites and manned space 
stations, shuttles and rockets. In any case, weaponisation of outer space conflicts with the 
spirit if not the letter of the Outer Space Treaty. (c.f. Altmann, 2006)
46 Some philosophers have proposed “Robot Ethics,” which might be incorporated in the 
design of robots, including “Never Harm a Human Being.” Given the current state of 
technology, it is not possible to implement such design criteria. Robots are simply not 
intelligent enough to avoid harming any human beings. Future scenarios of postbiological 
intelligence are still not more than very questionable science fiction. (c.f. Sharkey, 2008)
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robot and those responsible for sending it to the battlefield can be held responsible for any 
harm done by the thing. So, autonomous armed robots may be intended for delegating 
responsibility for killing human beings to machines. But if the authority responsible for 
developing autonomous armed robots openly declared that he would assume responsibility 
for any harm done by the robot, this development could not be condemned solely on the 
basis that it was apparently done with a Malevolent Intent.
To conclude, application of nanotechnology in weapons of mass destruction and for 
instrumentalising the soldier conflict with the Just Intent criterion. Other applications of 
nanotechnology including in armed autonomous robots, armed military satellites and 
remote control weapons may be developed for Just as well as Unjust intentions, so this 
criterion alone does not give sufficient arguments to stop their development.
4.3.3 Legitimate Authority
Traditionally, the sovereign state is granted the legitimate authority to decide on going to 
war. This authority also covers decisions on developing new military technologies and 
weapons.47 However, the United Nations have been given a more important role in deciding 
when engaging in war can be justified since the mid-20th century. Even though deciding on 
legitimate military R&D is still the privilege of national governments, there is an extensive 
body of international law governing types of military and dual use technologies and 
weapons. New military technology development currently has to respect existing arms 
control treaties and conventions, at least in the States which have signed and ratified them. 
In the States Parties to arms control treaties, the legitimacy of the authority of the 
government has to be evaluated in the legal context prescribed by these treaties. These 
States may of course withdraw from the treaties. Thereby they would increase the freedom 
of their government to operate and still have the legitimate authority to decide on military 
and dual use technology development. This should then only be in accordance with their 
own national legislation, also taking into account other criteria of the Just War theory. But 
keep in mind that the ultimate goal of the Just War Theory is to further a Just Peace in the 
end. In matters of war and peace confidence of states that other states will refrain from 
hostile acts including preparation for warfare is a key factor in their own decisions on 
preparation for warfare. So the existence of an international legal arms control regime 
imposing restrictions on what authorities can legitimately decide regarding military and 
dual use technology development is a valuable contribution to the spirit of the Just War 
tradition.
47 Actual work on R&D and manufacturing can be licenced to private companies.
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For military nanotechnology, Jürgen Altmann (2005, 2006, 2008) analysed which
technologies would conflict with international arms control and humanitarian law48. He
identified the following problematic developments:
- Metal-less arms present dangers for civilian society
- Small missiles, armed autonomous systems, and armed mini/micro-robots could 
undermine the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) because they 
are more difficult to detect with existing verification techniques. This means countries 
could violate the treaty with less chance to be caught, or states party to the treaty could 
withdraw from it because they lacked confidence that others would respect it. It might 
also lead to the development of new verification techniques.
- Armed mini/micro-robots could furthermore undermine the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Convention, because they could function as mines in practice without fitting the 
definition of a mine according to the convention. This could lead to increased numbers 
of civilian casualties unless the APMC is extended to outlaw relevant armed mini and 
micro-robots.
- Using small or autonomous satellites to attack other satellites is against the spirit if not 
the letter of the Outer Space Treaty. This and other trends towards weaponisation of 
outer space have already led to a discussion on a new treaty or voluntary measures to 
prevent it. (Malsch, 2009)
- Vastly extended computer modelling used for modelling nuclear weapons and very 
small nuclear weapons would undermine the spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
which is aimed at nuclear disarmament. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may not 
be sufficient to prevent development of new nuclear weapons using computer 
modelling. Politicians and the peace movement are already pleading for banning 
nuclear weapons altogether for other reasons. Preventing the development of new 
nuclear weapons could be another argument to further their case.
- New chemical or biological weapons are forbidden by the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). 
Whereas the CWC has a verification regime, a corresponding regime for the BTWC is 
still under negotiation. These conventions cover new technological developments and 
are subject to regular reviews. Some trends in nanotechnology may make it more 
difficult in the future to verify whether countries respect the treaty, and can undermine 
the convention.
- Implanted systems and soldier body manipulation could increase aggressiveness and 
entice soldiers to break humanitarian law on non-combatant immunity and violate the 
proportionality criterion. During the war, the soldier is responsible for his actions on 
the battlefield and should respect this Jus in Bello criterion. As argued above, 
instrumentalisation of the soldier and making him do something against his will 
violates his human dignity. Persons or organisations involved in developing and 
implanting the systems could furthermore be held responsible for the crimes committed
48 Altmann also evaluates military nanotechnology with a view to other criteria including 
their utility for weapons of mass destruction, maintaining and improving (military) 
stability, and protecting humans, environment and society. (Altmann, 2006)
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by such an enhanced soldier. There is a more general discussion on ethical aspects of 
human enhancement of which soldier enhancement is a special case.
- Armed autonomous systems and mini/micro robots would be forbidden by 
humanitarian law as long as they are not smart enough to discriminate between 
combatants and non-combatants.
- Very small nuclear weapons could create unnecessary suffering and conflict with non­
combatant immunity.
Currently, some developments of military or dual use nanotechnology are forbidden by 
existing international conventions, such as applications in new chemical and biological 
weapons. Other developments may undermine existing treaties by disabling verification 
methods or by making use of legal loopholes to enable new weapons conflicting with the 
spirit of arms control or humanitarian law. These trends are likely to constitute reasons for 
improvement of these treaties and verification methods. Should the political will and 
mutual trust to take such measures be lacking49, these technological trends could contribute 
to the abandoning of treaties and the return to state sovereignty as the sole basis for 
determining legitimate authority for weapons and military systems development. In 
addition, some technological developments could make it easier for terrorists and other 
non-state actors to lay their hands on high tech weapons including precision weapons or 
even weapons of mass destruction. Such non-state actors are not considered legitimate 
authorities in the classical Just War theory and are not signatories to international 
humanitarian law and arms control treaties. Just War theory is however addressed to the 
states with military-industrial infrastructure needed to develop the technology in the first 
place. It is their responsibility to prevent proliferation to actors not bound by the Just War 
doctrine or International Humanitarian Law.
The ultimate goal of the Just War doctrine, to achieve a more Just Peace in the world, is 
easier to reach with effective international arms control and humanitarian law than without 
it. The reason is that these international agreements give guidelines for the relations 
between countries which are considered fair and trustworthy by the participating states and 
international public opinion and hence reduce the risk of violent conflicts. They also 
prescribe methods for increasing transparency and confidence building measures.
To conclude, Jürgen Altmann has identified a number of developments in military and dual 
use nanotechnology which could give rise to more restrictive interpretations of the criterion 
“Legitimate Authority” in a way that would reduce the effectiveness of the Just War 
doctrine as a means to achieve global peace.
4.3.4 Reasonable Prospect o f Success
The criterion “Reasonable Prospect of Success” is clearly relative to the actual conflict the 
technologies are expected to be used in. High Tech military technologies for network 
centric, precision or remote control warfare are intended for use in conflicts against a High
49 As was the case during the Bush administration in the USA.
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Tech adversary. By itself, the criterion “Reasonable Prospect of Success” may encourage 
R&D for new military technologies and an arms race, because a technological advantage is 
considered rightly or wrongly to give a better chance to win an armed conflict. Perhaps it 
would be better to remove the criterion “reasonable prospect of success” from the list of Jus 
ad Bellum criteria. This criterion by itself can be interpreted in a way that undermines the 
spirit of the Just War theory: to prevent war and foster Just Peace. This criterion is debated 
on other grounds as well, e.g. by Orend (2005).
In current asymmetric warfare conditions the prospect of success due to technological 
superiority is questionable. In particular, the effect of nano-enabled unmanned systems and 
small satellites on the prospect of success in asymmetric wars is ambiguous.
4.3.5 Political Proportionality
The criterion Political Proportionality is used to evaluate whether the political costs of 
going to war are excessive relative to the benefits. It is complementary to the Jus in Bello 
criterion Military Proportionality. Resorting to the use of military force should be a 
proportional response to an actual (or imminent) attack, and the ends pursued with military 
force should be proportional to the damage suffered. (Moseley, 2009)
Political proportionality could also be used to evaluate decisions to develop new military 
technologies, or to apply new civilian technologies in military systems. In most cases, there 
is no actual or imminent attack to serve as benchmark for evaluating the proportionality of 
the investment of resources in new military technology development. Determining 
proportionality should take into account socio-economic costs for the country itself and 
risks for the own society, humankind and the environment as well as expected military and 
strategic benefits, which should be evaluated by governments and parliaments deciding on 
the budget for military R&D in comparison with other priorities in government policies. 
The evaluation of proportionality always takes place in an international context, which may 
impose restrictions on the national decisions to develop new military and dual use 
technologies.
In this chapter it is assumed that the current arms control treaties and international 
humanitarian law are in place and that breaking these treaties will be costly for the country 
in question, because the international community will not normally accept it and is likely to 
retaliate. In the case of development of new Biological or Chemical Weapons using 
nanotechnology, the main costs are the risks for the own society, humankind and the 
environment in case of accidental or intentional release of the biological and chemical 
weapons. The total expected costs are disproportionate compared to any expected military 
or strategic benefits.
Innovation in nuclear weapons is problematic in the light of the current global movement to 
abolish nuclear weapons, but it is unclear whether this movement will be successful. 
Whereas the use of nuclear weapons is disproportionate to any conceivable political goal, 
the possession and maintenance of existing nuclear weapons and its deterrent effects are 
considered a necessary evil as a temporary step towards abolishing them. The costs of the 
development of new smaller types of nuclear weapons including risks for the own society,
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humankind and the environment remain higher than the potential benefits. (c.f. O ’Donovan, 
2003)
Whether investment in nano-enabled autonomous robots and military nano-enabled brain- 
machine interfaces, implants and soldier body manipulations will turn out to be 
proportionate is unclear given the current undecided debates on the ethics of human 
enhancement and of robotics.
For comparison: Altm ann’s assessment o f nanotechnologies with arms race potential
Investments in new types of military technologies or building up large stockpiles of 
existing weapons could contribute to an international arms race in which the costs for the 
societies investing in the technologies and weapons are disproportionate to any foreseeable 
military goal. Investment in nano-enabled military technologies that arguably contribute to 
an arms race would thus conflict with the criterion political proportionality. Altmann (2005, 
2006, 2008) has argued that several military nanotechnologies contribute to an arms race50:
- Generic technologies including electronics, photonics, magnetics; computers & 
communication; software / artificial intelligence; materials; energy sources & energy 
storage; propulsion; vehicles; propellants & explosives; and camouflage;
- Battlefield distributed sensors;
- Armour & protection;
- New conventional weapons including metal-less arms, small guidance, armour piercing 
and small missiles;
- Implanted systems and soldier body manipulation;
- Autonomous systems and mini-micro robots;
- Small satellites / space launchers;
- Computer modelling for new nuclear weapons and very small nuclear weapons;
- New chemical & biological weapons.
The definition of an arms race remains rather vague. In a broad sense, it could encompass 
all new dual use or military technology development in a competitive environment. Such a 
broad definition is not useful for addressing the ethical dilemma’s related to balancing the 
security of one’s home country with the security of other countries, and those related to 
balancing security and freedom. Moderate investment in generic technologies, dual use or 
defensive technologies including sensors, armour and protection, robots and small satellites 
and space launchers can not arguably be considered politically disproportionate. The 
international community can however impose limits on application of these technologies in 
either:
- Systems that are revolutionarily new51,
- Weapons of mass destruction or other illegitimate weapons, or______________________
50 He also evaluates military nanotechnologies on their impact on two other criteria under 
the heading “maintain and improve stability” : destabilization of international security and 
proliferation of (nuclear) weapons technologies to other countries as well as existing 
nuclear weapons states acquiring new ones. These criteria are not related to political 
proportionality and hence are not included here.
51 With implications for the global balance of powers
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- The size of the stockpiles possessed by individual countries.
All these could contribute to a disproportionate arms race. Such a more restricted definition 
would reduce Altmann’s list to nanotechnologies applied in WMD, military implants and 
soldier body manipulations, autonomous military robots and armed unmanned systems and 
satellites. Altmann’s arms race criterion is thus more restrictive than the criterion of 
political proportionality.
4.3.6 Last Resort
The criterion Last Resort prescribes that all other solutions must have been tried out before 
resorting to war. Warfare must always remain an exceptional solution to a conflict, because 
it implies the deliberate use of deadly force which transgresses the boundaries imposed by 
peacetime law. Also, once started, war gets its own violent dynamics which is not easily 
stopped, and negative after-effects remain for several generations. (Moseley, 2009)
Several military technologies in which nanotechnology can be applied may lower the 
threshold for going to war, because they give the impression that “bloodless war” is 
possible, with few or no victims among one’s own soldiers or the civilian population. In 
this sense, such precision or remote control technologies can contribute to legitimising 
warfare as a solution to conflicts on a par with other solutions. (Malsch, 2008) Relevant 
applications of nanotechnology include: Nano-enabled Unmanned Vehicles/ Robots, 
Military nano-enabled small satellites, Nano-enabled small space launchers, Nano-enabled 
autonomous robots and Military Nano-enabled Brain-Machine Interface / implants / soldier 
body manipulations.
The potential that these technological trends have for legitimising warfare call for 
emphasizing the criterion Last Resort in political decision making on going to war. But the 
criterion Last Resort is not suitable for evaluating decisions on development of new 
military and dual use technologies, because those decisions are not taken in an emergency 
situation and the implications for people’s lives are less severe and mostly indirect.
4.4 Conclusions: Usefulness o f Jus ad Bellum concept for  
evaluating military nanotechnology development
As illustrated by table 6 below, R&D on WMD (nuclear auxiliary systems, smaller nuclear 
weapons, chemical and biological weapons) should be rejected because this research clearly 
conflicts with one or more criteria. Two of them clearly can’t be developed with a just 
intention in mind (nuclear auxiliary systems and BC weapons), and two breach current 
international arms control treaties (smaller nuclear and BC weapons). Nano-enabled nuclear 
auxiliary systems conflict with the spirit if not the letter of the NPT treaty and are
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disproportionate to political goals and problematic in the light of the movement to abolish 
nuclear weapons. Whether smaller nuclear weapons conflict with just intent is not quite 
clear, since theoretically these could have a destructive power comparable to existing 
conventional explosives. Likewise, it is probable, but not completely clear that developing 
larger conventional bombs could only serve an unjust intention. Applying nanotechnology 
in new biological, chemical or nuclear micro fusion weapons is politically disproportionate 
and nano-enabled nuclear auxiliary systems are problematic in the light of the current 
movement to abolish nuclear weapons. Taken as a whole, the Jus ad Bellum framework 
gives arguments against developing these applications of nanotechnology in WMD. In 
addition, the Jus in Bello framework also gives arguments against this development, as has 
been discussed by other authors.
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Table 6: Conflicts o f military nanotechnology with Jus ad Bellum Criteria
Jus ad Bellum  
C riteria /
Type o f  
m ilitary nano
Just
Cause
Just Intent Legitim ate
Authority
R easonable  
Prospect o f  
Success
Political
Proportionality
Last
R esort
Nanodrug  
delivery for
BC W  /Nano  
BCW
Conflict 
Encourage 
cruelty of 
mind
(O’Donovan,
2003)
Conflict
(CWC,
...........
Developing new 
BCW  would not 
be tolerated by 
the International 
Community, risks 
for own society, 
humankind and 
environment
Nano-enabled
Nuclear
A uxiliary
Systems
Conflict 
Encourage 
cruelty of 
mind
(O’Donovan,
2003)
Problematic in the 
light of current 
attempts to 
abolish nuclear 
weapons
Nano-enabled  
Nuclear M icro  
fusion  
W eapons
Conflict? 
Encourage 
cruelty of 
mind
(O’Donovan,
2003)
Conflict
(NPT)
Problematic in the 
light of current 
attempts to 
abolish nuclear 
weapons, 
disproportionate 
to political goals 
(O’Donovan, 
2003)
Nano-enabled
large
conventional
weapons
Encourage 
cruelty of 
mind
(O’Donovan,
2003)
M ilitary N ano­
enabled Brain- 
M achine  
Interface / 
im plants / 
soldier body 
m anipulations
Conflict? 
(Human 
Rights?, non­
combatant 
immunity)
Acceptance is 
unclear in the 
light of current 
debates on human 
enhancement
Conflict?
Nano-enabled
autonom ous
robots
Conflict? Armed 
systems 
conflict with 
humanitarian 
law, could 
undermine 
CFE / Anti­
Personnel 
Mine
Convention
Acceptance is 
unclear in the 
light of current 
debates on 
robotics
Conflict?
Nano-enabled
Unm anned
Vehicles/
Robots
Ambiguous Armed 
systems 
conflict with 
humanitarian 
law, could
Ambiguous Conflict?
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undermine 
CFE / Anti­
Personnel 
Mine
Convention
M ilitary nano­
enabled small 
satellites
Ambiguous Conflict? 
(Outer Space 
Treaty)
Ambiguous Conflict?
Nano-enabled  
sm all space 
launchers
Conflict? 
(Outer Space 
Treaty)
Conflict?
Nano-enabled
RFID
Ambiguous Conflict?
Nanosensors 
for tracking & 
tracing
Ambiguous
Nano-enabled
distributed
sensor
networks
Ambiguous
Nano-enabled  
detection o f
NBCRE
Ambiguous Favour Favour Contributes to 
demand for 
human security
Favour
The Jus ad Bellum framework also gives arguments against two somewhat futuristic 
potential applications of nanotechnology: in autonomous military robots and in military 
implants and soldier-body manipulation. The latter can not be developed for a just 
intention, as it will violate the human dignity of the soldier. For autonomous robots, it is 
highly questionable whether these could be developed for a just intention. Both conflict 
with the spirit if not the letter of international treaties. In both cases, acceptance of the own 
society is unclear given the current debates on ethics of robotics and ethics of human 
enhancement. Both may contribute to a lowering of the threshold for going to war, because 
the consequences (for one’s own forces) may appear comparable to the consequences of 
alternative solutions to the conflict.
Where nanotechnology is applied for improving existing military systems - including 
unmanned systems, small satellites and space launchers - they contribute in a probably 
politically disproportional way to the arms race and may contribute to a lowering of the 
threshold for going to war. These applications also conflict with the spirit if not the letter of 
international treaties. Some (but not all) applications of unmanned systems and small 
satellites are developed for a malevolent intention, or may have limited prospect of success 
in asymmetric warfare conditions.
Ambient intelligence applications of nanotechnology in sensors or RFID chips are least 
controversial from a Jus ad Bellum perspective. RFID chips may conflict with the criterion 
legitimate authority as their implications for privacy and individual freedom are 
controversial. All of them can be developed for good as well as bad intentions. The 
development of RFID, nanosensors for tracking & tracing and distributed nanosensor 
networks could potentially be politically disproportional as they may negatively affect the
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balance between security and freedom of the civilian population under surveillance. Nano­
enabled detection of NBCRE substances is least problematic from a Jus ad Bellum 
perspective.
The analysis in this section also raises the question whether “Reasonable Prospect of 
Success” should be kept as Jus ad Bellum criterion, because it may be interpreted as 
encouragement of an arms race. This goes against the spirit of the Just War theory, aiming 
to achieve Just Peace. Orend (2005) also reports that “International law does not include 
this requirement as it is seen as biased against small, weaker states.”
The discussion of the usefulness of Jus ad Bellum criteria for decision making on 
development of military (nano) technology has implications for national governments and 
parliaments, but also for the international community. National governments and 
parliaments having the authority to decide on military R&D and acquisition of military 
technologies and weapons could use these criteria to decide on avoiding investments in 
undesirable military nanotechnology development or on legislation governing the market 
for military goods. Currently, apart from the United States, most countries appear to be 
investing more in dual use nanotechnologies than in purely military nanotechnologies, at 
least according to non-classified sources. However, more and more countries are explicitly 
including defence applications in their national research priorities for nanotechnology (see 
section 3.2.1). The overview of conflicts between military applications of nanotechnology 
and the Jus ad Bellum criteria in this chapter could be used to target political debate on 
funding priorities as well as the national position in arms control negotiations.
The international community could use these Jus ad Bellum criteria to identify issues to be 
put on the agenda of regular reviews of arms control and human rights treaties currently in 
force. In addition to the analysis and recommendations made by Jürgen Altmann (2005, 
2006, 2008, see also discussion in section 4.2.1), assessment of military nanotechnologies 
with a view to the criteria “Just Intent” and “Last Resort” give arguments for imposing 
limits on some applications with offensive as well as defensive uses.
4.5 Paul Virilio on anthropological implications o f military 
technology development
Paul Virilio (1997, 2007; 1980, 2009; 1983, 2008) has written extensively about political 
and anthropological implications of contemporary military technology development and 
high tech warfare. He discussed dynamics of the military-industrial complex and central 
theories and concepts of war and peace. His ideas on the Just War theory give rise to 
amendment of this theory which will be worked out in section 4.6. Other central concepts 
Virilio proposed which are also relevant to nanotechnology development include:
- Dromocracy;
- Speed;
- Metabolic vehicles;
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- Automation of deterrence;
- Disappearance.
In this section, Virilio’s thoughts on these concepts are brought together in a summary 
fashion. It should be noted that Virilio’s style is essayistic and that he often introduces ideas 
without in depth argumentation why his intuitions should be true. This essayistic style is 
reflected in the summary below.
4.5.1 M ilitary-industrial complex
In Pure War (1983, 2008), Virilio and Lotringer reflected on the emergence of the military 
industrial complex since WWI, the first truly technical war in Europe, which created the 
need for a wartime economy. This perverted the notion of “civilian” because of total 
involvement of the economy in war, already in peacetime. (2008, p 24-25) Virilio 
distinguishes three phases of military knowledge:
- Tactics (art of hunt)
- Strategy (appears along with politics and the polis)
- War economy (since around 1870) (2008, p 30)
Since the invention of the ultimate weapon (the atomic bomb) logistics takes over. 
According to Jomini, the Pentagon defined logistics in 1940-45: “Logistics is the procedure 
following which a nation’s potential is transferred to its armed forces, in times of peace as 
in times of war.”
All people are already civilian soldiers without knowing it. People don’t recognise the 
militarised part of their identity, of their consciousness. The military class includes all those 
who reason within this technological logic. “Technocrats” are the military class, who 
consider rationality only in terms of efficiency. (2008, p 34) Pure war is operating in the 
sciences. It’s everything that is already perverting the field of knowledge from one end to 
the other; everything that is aligning the different branches of knowledge is a perspective of 
the end. (2008, p 36) The military is the inquisitor of all thought within science itself, it 
infiltrates social sciences.
Strategy or logistics has become the whole of war. In an age of deterrence, the production 
of arms is already war. (2008, p 103) War is no longer in its execution, but in its 
preparation. This infinite preparation entails the non-development of society in the sense of 
civilian consumption. (2008, p 104) The US welfare state of the 1960s is replaced by the 
state-as-destiny, or the state of inevitability (nuclear, technological). (2008, p 109)
“The doctrine of production has replaced the doctrine of use on the battlefield. The 
computer already has the last word.” (2008, p 179)
Postscript 1997: Infowar (Virilio and Lotringer, 2008). The thoughts in Pure War are still 
valid because they were about the development of science as techno science: experimental
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science became one with technology.52 During the period of deterrence, performance 
replaced philosophical reflection. Science has become a race to the death. The military 
industrial and scientific complexes continue to function on their own momentum. (2008, p 
185-191)
In “the aesthetics of disappearance” (1980, 2009), Virilio argued that science kills the 
conscience because it is a collective work. (2009, p 55) The paradox of the Western war 
machine and weapons research is: “If it’s working, it is already obsolete.” (2009, p 104) 
The technician becomes the victim of the movement he’s produced. (2009, p 106)
4.5.2 Just W ar and Pacifism, Death, Religion and Politics
In Pure War, Virilio and Lotringer (2008 update) discussed the Just War theory. 
“Somewhere there is still an enemy against which a just battle can be fought -  and thanks 
to which we can consider ourselves on the side of the just.” Lotringer thinks.
Virilio does not agree because of the reappearance of Holy Wars and the availability of the 
ultimate (nuclear) weapon. Holy war goes beyond political war, because the perpetrators 
don’t believe in death. Virilio opposed the ideology of a ‘Just War.’ “In the name of a belief 
that death does not exist, that there is an afterlife, we must not only forbid Holy Wars -  
wars of complete release -  we must also refute the justness, the justice of war. The theology 
of the “Just War” must be abolished by the Pope at a time [in 1983] when the Holy War is 
starting up again in Lebanon, when it’s spreading between Iran and Iraq; because the Holy 
War, given existing technology, is a complete release.” (2008, p 63) Before nuclear power, 
the ‘just war’ had meaning in politics. Technological war is complete release. We’re there 
as soon as we accept the idea of a holy or just war without nuclear power. Today the only 
recourse against the state is non-violence. (2008, p 64)
We can’t escape the question of Death. We must face it intellectually and physically, and 
get inside Pure War. That is political and civil virtue. (2008, p 120) Pacifism is religiously 
founded on belief in God, not in the ultimate weapon. But Church and State should be 
separated. The peace movement should try to revive the question of Death. The gravest 
danger is concealment of Death. (2008, p 133) According to Bergson, death is the accident 
par excellence. We must study the accident, not just the substance. (2008, p 134)
Politics no longer exists. It was an interpretation of death which differed from the military 
interpretation. If politics detaches itself from death, we fall victim to the military 
interpretation. (2008, p 138) We must recognise death as an organiser. “God has come back 
into history through the door of terror.” (2008, p 140)
The notion of Holy War reveals the religious nature of deterrence, which takes place at the 
level of belief. (2008, p 145) A valid peace movement would lean on faith but reinstitute
52 Virilio is not the only one discussing dynamics and implications of technoscience. Since 
around the 1980s, general trends in technoscience have been discussed systematically in the 
field of Social Studies of Science and Technology (STS).
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political intelligence, through a new knowledge of technology. Real deterrence lies in the 
neutral character of scientific and technological development. Pacifists today oppose the 
tendency toward war, the war for preparation for war, the scientific and technological 
preparation. (2008, p 148) The apocalypse is here, hidden in the development itself of arms, 
in the non-development of society. We would have to reinvent life from a civilization of 
death. (2008, p 149)
4.5.3 Dromocracy
Virilio (1977, 2007) introduced the concept “dromocracy” in his book “Speed and Politics”. 
He derived it from the term “dromomaniacs”, which means deserters (introduced by the 
French ancienne regime) or compulsive walkers in psychiatry. Virilio introduced a new 
dromocratic idea: the notion of displacement without destination in time and space. With 
this concept he described the trend introduced by the UK fleet in being which defeated 
Hitler, drawing victory from their inaccessibility to combat. “The fleet in being is logistics 
taken to its absolute point, as the art of movement of unseen bodies.” This fleet created a 
global zone of insecurity, thereby annihilating the enemy’s will to power. (2007, p 62)
The industrial revolution was really a dromocratic revolution, governed by the rule of speed 
(dromocracy) rather than democracy. In this dromocracy, there is no strategy, only 
dromology: knowledge of speed. Speed as the nature of dromological progress runs 
progress in society. (2007, p 69) Dromocratic type progress will reduce human diversity in 
the world, to two types of populations: hopeful versus despairing. Hopeful populations have 
access to high tech and infinity. Despairing populations are limited to the finite world 
without high tech. (2007, p 70)
Dromological progress and human and social progress coincided, but did not converge. 
This progress can be summarised as follows. In a society without technological vehicles, 
women were the metabolic vehicles. This phase was followed by indiscriminate boarding 
of soulless bodies as metabolic vehicles. Then started the empire of speed and technological 
vehicles, in which metabolic vehicles are competing with and then defeated by the earthly 
technological vehicle. This leads to the end of the dictatorship of the proletariat and history 
in the war of time. (2007, p 115)
Dromology comes from “dromos” = race. Dromology is the logic of the race, the entry into 
the world of speed-equivalent and wealth-equivalent. (2008, p 55) We no longer have time 
for reflection; that is dromocracy; we are in the hands of computerised instruments. (2008, 
p 67)
191
4.5.4 Speed
Virilio (1977, 2007) discussed the concept “speed” in his book “Speed and Politics”. 
Reduction of distances has become a strategic reality with incalculable economic and 
political consequences. It corresponds to negation of space. The non-place of speed has led 
to instantaneousness of action at a distance. (2007, p 149) To disarm would thus mean to 
decelerate. Any treaty that does not limit the speed of this race (the speed of means of 
communicating destruction) will not limit strategic arms. (2007, p 153) Speed is war, the 
last war. (2007, p 155)
The war machine is essentially the speed of delivery. (2008, p 35) We must politicize 
speed, both metabolic and technological speed. (2008, p 43) Speed comes before wealth. 
The primacy of speed is equivalent to the primacy of the military. (2008, p 57) We no 
longer have time for reflection: that is the power of speed. (2008, p 67)
What should be done: Research into the economy of speed, understanding of speed? “Try 
to comprehend the effect of speed on the time of societies and on the space-time of 
societies.” Speed dissolves the city, displaces it in time. (2008, p 73)
In “The aesthetics of disappearance,” (1980, 2009) Virilio reflects on his argument in 
“Speed and Politics” (1977, 2007). The modulation and manipulation of vectorial speeds 
were the surest elements of mass cohesion in Europe and America in diverse military and 
revolutionary conflicts. The goal sought by power was a sort of recapitulation of the world 
obtained by the ubiquity, the suddenness of military presence, a pure phenomenon of speed. 
In advancing too fast, everything happens as if their own arsenal became the internal enemy 
of each of the protagonists. (2009, p 53)
4.5.5 M etabolic vehicles
In “Speed and Politics”, dromological progress imposes the idea of two types of bodies and 
souls: weak, dependent on the environment; and powerful, with souls out of reach through 
deterritorialisation. The Clausewitzian definition of war: “an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will”, suggests the creation of the “presence in the world of bodies without 
will”. (2007, p 97)
The soul does not pre-exist or survive the disappearance of its body-vehicle or machine, but 
as a potential /scientific reason can act on foreign bodies on a distance. Such bodies are 
metabolic vehicles. (2007, p 108) The body without soul is a body assisted by technical 
prostheses. (2007, p 128)
In Pure War (2008 update) Virilio distinguished military intelligence and military men, 
who are dominated by the war machine. “My opposition to war is an opposition to the 
essence of war in technology, in society, in the philosophy of technology, etc.” Soldiers and 
civilians are disappearing in the technology and automation of the war machine. (2008, p 
33) Technology is our nature since around a century. (2008, p 36)
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Movement is only a handicap. A man in a piloted car is motor handicapped (I run for you); 
a man in front of a TV is seeing handicapped (I see for you). (2008, p 88)
4.5.6 Automation o f deterrence
According to Virilio in “Speed and Politics”, deterrence has become the main military 
strategy [during the Cold war], in which the weapon replaces the protection of armour. The 
possibility of offence ensures defence, but this requires a constant refining of engine power. 
(2007, p 152) The response time to a missile attack goes down to 1 minute, which 
necessitates automation of response. (2007, p 155) The principle of deterrence: in the past, 
the aim of use of weapons has been to deter the enemy, to force him to interrupt his 
movement. Deterrence seems to have passed from the fire / explosive stage to the 
movement of vectors. (2007, p 161)
According to Sun Tzu, weapons are tools of ill omen. The ominous character is split in 
three:
- Threat of performance at moment of invention / production;
- Threat of use against enemy;
- Effect of use, fatal for persons, destructive for goods.
The threat of performance at the moment of invention / production is less commonly 
recognised, but the level at which the question of deterrence takes hold. We can’t deter an 
enemy from inventing new weapons, or from perfecting their performance. The threat of 
use of nuclear arms prohibits terror of actual use, but for this threat to remain and allow a 
strategy of deterrence we are forced to develop the threatening system that characterises the 
first component: the ill omen of the appearance of new performances for the means of 
communicating destruction. The new weapons deter us from interrupting the arms race 
characterised by the performance of missiles. (2007, p 162)
The balance of terror is a mere illusion in the industrial stage of war. Automation becomes 
the principle enemy of both parties by depriving them of their freedom of movement. 
Where will it lead? To automation of deterrence:
- smaller numbers of submarines (numerical)
- smaller sizes of explosives (volumetric)
- retreat to own territory (geographic)
- smaller command structure (limited to head of state) (political)
- Towards speed of light (spatio-temporal). (2007, p 163)
The total peace of deterrence is total war pursued by other means. War today (1983) is 
either nuclear war or nothing. Deterrence creates acts of war without war, state terrorism. 
(2008, p 39) We have reached generalised deterrence, it is cultural suicide. (2008, p 67) 
Deterrence is the development of an arms capacity that assures total peace. (2008, p 104) 
“War is automatized and along with it the power of decision. They no longer need men, 
soldiers or workers, only means of absolute extermination.” (2008, p 113)
Deterrence is a fatal coupling between the US and USSR. “The arms race unifies them.” 
“Arms control treaties are agreements in perfecting the war-machine.” (p 130)
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Absolute unity of the world is what deterrence aims towards. Deterrence has begun to 
realise this Pure State. (2008, p 177) “Pure War no longer needs men; that’s why it’s pure.” 
(2008, p 180)
Deterrence aimed at civilian population
In Pure War (2008 update), Virilio and Lotringer write: After the end of the Cold War, 
deterrence has changed in nature and is now aimed at the civilian population. This Impure 
War or asymmetric warfare is an enormous threat to democracy in every single country. We 
have moved from geopolitics to metro politics and the battlefield is now the city, in an 
international civil war (the fusion of hyper-terrorist civil war and international war). Impure 
war is characterised by uncertainty, indeterminacy about the adversary.
4.5.7 Disappearance
In “the aesthetics of disappearance” (1980, 2009), Virilio discussed the changing 
relationships between humans, technology and the world.
Man constructs his technological double and entrusts the keeping of his knowledge to a 
reflection, a cinematic illusion. What is given is the information, but not the sensation, 
which leads to apatheia. (2009, p 56) He foresees that the progress of electronics may bring 
active prostheses of intelligence. Human prostheses have passed to systems of active 
assistance in the sensorial domain in particular. Even outside the body, cinema creates an 
illusion imposed on the physiology of our organs of visual perception (Alfred Fessard). A 
synergy of eye and motor is realised in the camera. The fascist Marinetti thought up the 
anthropocentric superman, the coming identification of man and motor. This leads to the 
disappearance of bodies in the cumbersome prostheses that technology then produced. To 
identify with the motor is to identify with the vector. (2009, p 76)
The basic causes of the generalised evolution of technology: miniaturisation is not only to 
furnish replacement parts of the organism by placing them on the scale of the human body, 
but also to create inside the person a Para sensory competition, a duplication of being in the 
world. (2009, p 77)
The original sin was a rite of passage from one world to the other, which provoked 
metamorphosis of vision and immediate dissimulation (prudent camouflage of bodies). 
(2009, p 86)
The disappearance of the body’s characteristics in the uniformity of civil or military dress 
goes along with the disappearance of the body in the unidirectionality of speed. (2009, p 
100)
Woman has disappeared in the fatality of the technical objects since the beginning of the 
20th century. Men fell in love with cars. “The liberation of women liberates the seductions 
of technique.” The rapport is established between a unisex and a technological vector. 
(2009, p 101-2)
Technology, in making the rites of passage a continuous phenomenon would make of the 
derangement of the senses a permanent state, conscious life becoming an oscillating trip
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whose only absolute poles would be birth and death. All this would mean the end of 
religions and philosophies. Science would have effectively fabricated a new society whose 
members would all have become sleepers. (2009, p 103)
The technician becomes the victim of the movement he’s produced. If all is movement, all 
is at the same time accident. All this becomes a different mode of being. The motor 
proceeds from the soul. The tree of the motor is the tree of knowledge (science), corruption 
of sight is corruption of life. (2009, p 106-113)
In Pure War (1983, 2008) Virilio distinguished three levels of (military) disappearance:
- Disappearance of place and individual;
- Disappearance as repression;
- Disappearance at the level of opposition to science as a war-machine itself. (2008, p 
147)
4.6 The Right to Arm
Has the Just War theory become obsolete because of nuclear weapons and other Weapons 
of Mass Destruction, or due to trends in automation of deterrence as Paul Virilio suggests? 
Should we all become pacifists? Or would it be more fruitful to develop a new chapter in 
the Just War theory, giving criteria for the “Right to Arm”? In this section, an attempt will 
be made to develop criteria for moral military and dual use technology development, given 
dynamics in the Military Industrial Complex, speed and automation of deterrence, and 
changing relations between humans and technology sketched by Paul Virilio.
The first step is to identify the actors addressed by the criteria for determining what can and 
can not be considered morally sound military technology development. As indicated in 
section 1.2 , relevant decisions can be taken at four levels, of the international community, 
national governments, research organisations and industrial companies, and individual 
researchers. According to Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, in general, decision making on 
research and technology development takes place in a triple helix of government, research 
community and industry (Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 1996 etc) In the case of military 
technology development, Virilio argued that the “Military Industrial Complex” has taken 
care of this since the Second World War (Virilio & Lotringer, 1983, 2008). The concept 
was first coined by US President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1961), who reflected on the 
achievements of his Presidency. He warned against the “recurring temptation to feel that 
some spectacular and costly action could become the miraculous solution to all current 
difficulties. A huge increase in newer elements of our defence . th e s e  and many other 
possibilities, each possibly promising in itself, may be suggested as the only way to the 
road we wish to travel.” “But each proposal must be weighed in the light of a broader 
consideration: the need to maintain balance in and among national p ro g ra m s.” Since 
WWII, the USA had been compelled to newly create a permanent armaments industry and 
in conjunction with it, a sizeable defence sector. “In the councils of government, we must 
guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence ... by the military-industrial
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complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. 
. . .” (Eisenhower, 1961)
As discussed in section 3.2.1, the lead in high technology development has shifted from the 
defence sector to the civilian R&D sector since the 1980s. (c.f. Brzozka, 2007) This seems 
to imply that the Military-Industry Complex is now less powerful in determining the 
direction of military technology development, but it also means that the responsibility for 
the development of new military and dual use technologies is shared by a broader range of 
actors including in civilian research and industry. Therefore criteria for the Right to Arms 
should be useful for actors operating at all four levels, and not just be restricted to those 
explicitly engaged in the military-industrial complex.
In this section, relevant criteria additional to the already existing Jus ad Bellum and Jus in 
Bello criteria will be tested in a case study of novel nanotechnologies which may in the 
future enable weapons or military technologies, which do not yet exist: military implants 
and soldier body manipulations. This is to avoid confusion between weapons development 
and actual use in armed conflicts. Subsequently, the criteria could be applied for other 
military and dual use technology development as well.
4.6.1 The “Right to Arm ” criteria
The analysis in this chapter suggests the following set of criteria for the “Right to Arm” 
which should be used by all actors engaged in military technology development. Each actor 
should use the criteria in a different interpretation, to evaluate different parts of the shared 
responsibility:
- Just Intent
- Legitimate (Human) Authority
- Socio-economical Proportionality
- Balance Liberty-Security
- Human Dignity
R&D for military and dual use purposes should respect these five criteria, including three 
which are derived from Jus ad Bellum criteria: Just Intent and Legitimate (Human) 
Authority and (Socio-economic) Proportionality. Just Intent refers to the intentions with 
which technologies are developed, similar to the discussion of moral development of 
synthetic chemistry by Joachim Schummer, and the discussion of moral design criteria by 
Oliver O’Donovan. Legitimate (Human) Authority has different meanings. It refers to the 
authority to decide on which new military or dual use technologies will be developed, 
complementary to the Jus ad Bellum criterion Legitimate Authority. In another 
interpretation it implies a demand for safeguards that the technology in development as 
well as in use should be under human control. This is important for counteracting the 
tendency for automated deterrence sketched by Paul Virilio.
For decision makers on the defence budget at national level, the third criterion Socio- 
economical Proportionality should be interpreted in a macroeconomic way. This should 
encourage them to compare the investment in new military technologies to those in other
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areas important for their national society and humanity as a whole. This Socio-economical 
Proportionality is complementary to Political and Military Proportionality in the Jus ad 
Bellum and Jus in Bello chapters of the Just War theory. Socio-economical proportionality 
can also be interpreted in a micro-economical way. In this interpretation it is useful for 
evaluating investment decisions in individual technologies by research organisations and 
industrial companies.
The fourth criterion is a positive formulation of what needs to be done to counteract the 
tendency for instrumentalisation of humans as “metabolic vehicles” inherent in the 
dynamics described by Paul Virilio: balancing the fundamental human rights to Liberty and 
Security. It is also a concern in the work on moral design criteria by Jeroen van den Hoven 
and others, and has been identified in section 3.2.1 as a key ethical issue raised by 
nanotechnology developed for security applications.
The fifth criterion, Human Dignity, has been identified also in section 3.2.1. It can be 
considered a response to the tendency for instrumentalisation and to some extent also to the 
question of Death posed by Paul Virilio. The central role Virilio gives to consideration of 
the concept of death by politics or religious authorities is hard to operationalise in a set of 
criteria for evaluating military and dual use technology development. Who ‘deserves’ to die 
is an overarching question. This has to be answered separately from the question about the 
means which can legitimately be developed for killing. However, the concept of Human 
Dignity implies that killing any human being should be restricted to an unfortunate 
consequence of human action aimed at protecting innocent human life.53 At any time the 
responsibility for the decision to kill should be attributable to an identifiable individual or 
group of humans. This responsibility can never be delegated to a non-human system.
4.6.2 Testing the criteria in the case o f soldier enhancement
As discussed above in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3, nanotechnology is expected to contribute to 
human enhancement in general. Several authors (Altmann, Simonis & Schilthuizen, Virilio, 
etc) foresee military applications of nanotechnology in improving the soldier’s body or 
integrating the brain or nervous system of the soldier intimately into military technological 
systems.
4.6.2.1 Just Intent
In section 4.3.2 it was argued that technologies which degrade the soldier to a mere 
instrument of war conflict with Just Intent because the human right of the soldier to 
informed consent may be violated. In case of armies made up of volunteers, there may be
53 But is it still possible to distinguish innocent from non-innocent people if the whole 
peacetime economy can be considered to be geared towards the preparation of war, as 
Virilio argues?
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circumstances where the criterion of informed consent can be adhered to .54 Even then, it is 
questionable whether the intended creation of “super-soldiers” with more than human 
capabilities to fight ordinary human beings can ever constitute a “Just Intent”. This could 
endanger the mere existence of the human race as we know it (c.f. Bill Joy, 2000). The 
current debate on human enhancement and the question on what it means to be human 
illustrates that there is no consensus on whether this would be a bad thing. However, it is 
questionable how large the movement of people is in favour of the extinction of Homo 
Sapiens, aside from philosophical and theological principles which would condemn it as an 
evil in itself.
A more fundamental argument why soldier enhancement conflicts with Just Intent is the 
following. War as we know it is a form of conflict between human beings, and Just War by 
definition can not be more than an unfortunate step on the way towards Just Peace among 
human beings. The development of a new race of physically or mentally enhanced soldiers 
for the express purpose of armed conflict with human beings or even with other enhanced 
soldiers makes War an end in itself instead of a means which can be used by people or their 
representatives to achieve their human goals. This can never be a Just intention.
4.6.2.2 Legitimate (Human) Authority
In section 4.3.3 legitimate authority for deciding on military technology development was 
limited to national authorities acting in accordance with international law and sanctioned by 
the international community. In the light of Paul Virilio’s concerns about automation of 
deterrence and the dynamics in techno science, any legitimate authority for deciding on 
military and dual use technology development should at any time be human. This authority 
should furthermore be accountable to other human beings. In the case of nanotechnology 
development, this human authority is a collective responsibility distributed over a diverse 
group of actors. This group includes not only national governments but also researchers and 
industrialists in defence as well as civilian sectors. There is a current debate in nanoethics 
and studies in Ethical, Legal and Social aspects of nanotechnology on public engagement in 
decision making on science and technology in general (c.f. Malsch & Hvidtfeldt-Nielsen, 
2009). Given the dual use nature of nanotechnologies and human enhancement 
technologies, public dialogue should not be limited to civilian applications but explicitly 
include military uses.55
54 Although one may question whether informed consent can at all be possible in cases like 
enhancement where the result of the application of technology may be unpredictable and 
irreversible. There is a lively debate on such issues in the field of biomedical ethics.
55 Jürgen Altmann reaches the same conclusion through assessment of trends in 
nanotechnology for military and dual use purposes with his preventive arms control 
approach. (Altmann, 2005, 2006, 2008)
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4.6.2.3 Socio-economic Proportionality
In section 4.3.5 the Jus ad Bellum concept of Political Proportionality was extended to 
decisions on military technology development. One aspect of this is Socio-Economic 
Proportionality, which should be evaluated by governments and parliaments deciding on 
the budget for military R&D in comparison with other priorities in government policies. 
The criterion is not very suitable for evaluating investment decisions on particular 
technologies including human enhancement technologies. It could only help as a reminder 
that any investment in R&D costs public money and that it is therefore prudent to think 
about what benefits to society can realistically be expected from it. Joachim Schummer
(2001) assessed blue skies, military and societal benefits oriented synthetic chemistry 
research. This can be considered to give arguments for applying the criterion Socio­
Economic Proportionality not only on military R&D but also on dual use R&D such as 
general nanotechnology for human enhancement purposes. Does the foreseen benefit from 
this particular technology justify the investment in the light of other promising technologies 
which might also be developed with the same resources? As Arie Rip (2009) argued other, 
more useful things can be done with the same resources required for investing in the 
development of human enhancement technologies for any particular purpose (e.g. 
improving human learning processes).
4.6.2.4 Balance Liberty-Security
Humans have a fundamental right to both freedom and security. Governments (at least in 
the European Union) have the obligation to protect those rights of their citizens in a 
balanced way, according to the European Charter for Human Rights (EU, 2000). Military 
and dual use R&D should be evaluated on its expected impact on the balance between 
liberty and security. This criterion implies that the goal of any technology development 
should be to serve any individual human being in his or her legitimate social relations. 
Human enhancement consisting of direct coupling between the human brain or nervous 
system and the internet raise issues of privacy and control of the enhanced individual. 
These issues may destabilise the balance between liberty and security. However, such 
effects might be avoided by moral design criteria similar to the ones proposed by Jeroen 
van den Hoven for ICT.
4.6.2.5 Human Dignity
Any human being has an intrinsic dignity, guaranteed by human rights declarations such as 
the European Charter for Human Rights (EU, 2000). However, the concept “human 
dignity” is ill defined and not unproblematic, lacking consensus on what it means to be 
human. In the Kantian interpretation, human dignity implies that any human person should 
at any time be considered an end in him or herself, and never as a means to achieve another
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goal. This implies that humans can’t legitimately be enhanced in an irreversible way for the 
sole purpose of becoming better war fighters. Human dignity and other criteria for 
evaluating human enhancement will be discussed more at length in chapter 6.56
4.6.3 Conclusion: validity o f “Right to Arm ” approach
The concept of a “Right to Arm” as such could be a fruitful complement to the existing 
bicameral Just War tradition, which enables a structured moral assessment of new 
technology development for military or dual use purposes, relatively independent of 
political decisions to engage in armed conflict or military decisions on the use of military 
technologies during a war. The concept can be interpreted in a flexible way for use by 
different kinds of actors which share responsibility for these technology developments.
The selection of the individual criteria is to some extent arbitrary. The first three are 
derived from existing Just War criteria which have been shown to also be relevant to 
military technology development in section 4.3. Their application on soldier enhancement 
enables the identification of specific moral issues due to soldier enhancement, but also of 
the relationship with more general considerations in the nanoethics debate. The fourth 
criterion, “Balance Liberty and Security”, is not so much suitable for identifying moral 
issues. It serves more as a basis for deriving moral design criteria for ensuring that the 
technologies which will eventually be adopted do not unnecessarily restrict civil rights. The 
fifth criterion is the most problematic, because there is currently no common definition of 
the concept of human dignity. It is a broad, fundamental concept underlying the other four 
criteria. However, it is hard to operationalise by itself as a basis for convincing arguments 
in discussions on decision making on military and dual use technology development.
4.7 Conclusions Nanotechnology and security
56 As argued by Roberto Mordachi in the recent STOA report on Human Enhancement
(Coenen et al, 2009, p 147), human enhancement technologies should be governed by a
reasoned restrictive approach. He proposes a set of five dimensions of the “human
condition” :
- “A recognisable human body;
- Naturally unrestricted desire: there is no limit to what we can desire, only to what we 
can achieve;
- A complex theoretical and practical rationality, which distinguishes us from most 
animals;
- Freedom of will, although this is disputed at the practical level; in political and ethical 
issues we start from the premise that we are free and we cherish that freedom;
- Equal dignity”.
The debate on governance of human enhancement in general is only just starting.
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In this chapter, implications of security applications of nanotechnology for the Just War 
doctrine, dual use and balancing freedom and security have been analysed, with a main 
focus on the usefulness of the Just War doctrine as an ethical framework for moral 
assessment of military and dual use nanotechnology development. The chapter started with 
identifying conflicts between the use of military technologies which actually or potentially 
include nanotechnologies and the Just War doctrine as it is currently applied, mainly 
restricted to Jus in Bello criteria. This review led to the hypothesis that the Jus ad Bellum 
criteria for evaluating decisions for going to war could be more useful to assess military 
and dual use (nano) technology development because the decisions for developing 
technologies were taken in preparation for potential future warfare. Before testing this 
hypothesis, other relevant work on moral design criteria relevant for military and dual use 
nanotechnology was reviewed, to determine what could be the added value of this new 
approach. The Jus ad Bellum criteria were shown to be addressed to other actors or use 
ethical rather than legal considerations. Subsequently, a systematic evaluation was made of 
properties of military and dual use nanotechnologies which conflict with Jus ad Bellum 
criteria, and implications were derived for national governments and parliaments as well as 
the international community. Some of the Jus ad Bellum criteria (Just Intent, Legitimate 
Authority and Political Proportionality) proved more useful for evaluating military 
technology development than others, but the Jus ad Bellum system for evaluating political 
decisions for going to war did not arguably prove to have clear advantages compared to 
other assessments. An inventory of relevant thoughts on trends in military technology and 
the Just War doctrine by Paul Virilio led to the notion that the current bi-cameral Just War 
tradition might need to be expanded in order to cope with dynamics in the military­
industrial complex and the end-colonisation of the civilian economy for preparation for war 
during peacetime as sketched by him. A proposed third57 chapter of the Just War doctrine 
was tested for the case of nanotechnology enabled soldier enhancement. The new chapter in 
the Just War theory can now be applied and further developed for assessment of moral 
military and dual use technology development.
57 Fourth in case the Jus in Pace or Jus post Bellum concept of Walzer is included.
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Chapter 5: The capability approach to 
nanotechnology for sustainable 
development
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the capability approach as proposed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen 
is used for analyzing the government strategies for nanotechnology development in a 
number of Latin American countries including Brazil, Mexico and Argentina. The intention 
is to contribute to deeper insights on sustainable development of nanotechnology beyond 
the often cited Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of the United Nations (UN General 
Assembly, 2000).
In the current debate on nanotechnology for sustainable development, the UN MDG play a 
key role in selecting relevant nanotechnologies and applications that may contribute to 
halving poverty in the world by 2015. Such applications include nanofood, sustainable 
energy, water purification and desalination, environmental technologies, and nanomedicine. 
(e.g. Mnyusiwalla et al. 2003, Salamanca-Buentello et al. 2005, Meridian Institute, Malsch, 
2005) This discussion of nanotechnology for the poor is complemented by a broader debate 
on strategic implications of nanotechnology and its applications for the socio-economic 
development of less developed countries. In this debate on the nano-divide58, issues like 
these have been discussed by Meridian Institute, ETC group, Foladori & Invernissi:
- Implications of nanotechnology for resource efficiency and the world market for 
commodities
- Intellectual property rights of nanotechnology based inventions
- The balance between who reaps the benefits and who carries the risks
The current debate on nanotechnology for development has been summarised by Malsch.
(2008)
In the area of political philosophy, Amartya Sen (1985, 1993, 1999 and 2009) and Martha 
Nussbaum (1993, 2000) have developed the capability approach as a conceptual framework 
for evaluating how governments contribute to human well-being. The capability approach 
is based on John Rawls’ Theory of Justice (1971). In this chapter, the conceptual 
framework will be introduced by discussing relevant elements of Rawls’ theory and the 
contributions and adaptations made by Sen and Nussbaum. Nussbaum (2000) specifies the 
capability approach in ten capabilities: life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, 
imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and 
control over one’s environment.
58 The nano-divide is a technology gap between countries or individuals with access to 
nanotechnology and those without it.
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The capability approach has been applied in political philosophy and economics. Paul 
Anand and colleagues have developed indicators to measure capabilities in order to assess 
the socio-economic policy of countries. (Anand et al, 2008) The capability approach is also 
applied in the Human Development Index, used by the UN Development Programme 
(UNDP) for ranking countries on their “achievement in attaining a long and healthy life, 
access to knowledge; and a decent standard of living.” (UNDP, 2010)
In the present chapter, the capability approach will be applied to evaluate nano science, 
technology and innovation (ST&I) policies in or in cooperation with developing countries 
and emerging economies. Are current national nanotechnology programmes expected to 
contribute to better distributive justice as proposed by Martha Nussbaum? This adaptation 
of the capability approach is expected to enable a longer time horizon and a more 
encompassing assessment of the potential long term implications of nanotechnology for 
sustainable development.
5.2 Theory o f justice and capability approach
5.2.1 The theory o f justice according to John Rawls
In 1971, the American philosopher John Rawls (1921-2002) first published his 
comprehensive theory of justice. The revision published in 1999 incorporates a response to 
comments and criticism. Rawls theory of justice is grounded in the utilitarian ethical 
tradition, which he criticises from the perspective of social contract thinking. Utilitarian 
ethics can be characterised by the aim: “the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people.” Rawls is concerned with the question how a fair distribution of common goods 
among individuals can be argued in a theory of social distributive justice. Social contract 
thinkers like Locke, Rousseau and Kant propose that the institutions of a just state should 
be based on a theoretical social contract among the citizens of that state. Society is 
interpreted as a form of cooperation to mutual advantage of the citizens. To build up his 
theory of justice, Rawls assumes an original position in which all individual citizens 
involved in the contract have no information on their social position, whether they are rich 
or poor, which talents and resources are available to them, or in which age they live. This 
information is hidden from them by a “veil of ignorance”. In this original position, it is 
assumed that the contracting parties will adopt two principles of justice:
1) Principle of Equal Liberty: Each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others.
2) Difference Principle: Social and economical inequalities are to be arranged so that:
a. They are to be of the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of 
society, consistent with the just savings principle
b. Offices and positions must be open to all under conditions of fair equality 
of opportunity. (Rawls, 1971, 2009, p 321)
First rule of priority (priority of liberty): The principles of justice are to be ranked in a
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lexical order; hence the fundamental liberties can only be restricted for the sake of liberty. 
Rawls distinguishes two cases:
1) A reduced liberty should strengthen the total system of liberties shared by all
2) A less than equal liberty must be acceptable for those with a reduced freedom.
Second rule of priority (priority of justice over efficiency and welfare): The second 
principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and of maximising the 
sum of advantages; and the principle of equal opportunities is prior to the difference 
principle. There are two cases:
a) An inequality of opportunities must improve the opportunities of the persons with 
less opportunities
b) An excessive savings quote must in general reduce the burden of the ones bearing 
these costs. (Rawls, 2009, p 321)
It is assumed that all contracting parties have physical needs and psychological faculties 
within the normal range, excluding issues of healthcare and intellectual abilities. (Rawls, 
2009, p 133) Rawls does not postulate independent criteria for choosing a concept of 
justice, but considers it necessary that the contracting individuals choose the optimal 
concept of justice in the original position in which they are covered by the veil of 
ignorance. The theory of justice as fairness also presupposes that the contracting parties are 
in circumstances of justice, where there are limited resources to be distributed and conflicts 
of interest between the contracting parties. (Rawls, 2009, p 162-163)
A number of boundary conditions for the concept of right are distinguished. A concept of 
right is a collection of principles general in form and universal in application, which must 
be recognised publicly as the highest authority for ranking the conflicting claims of moral 
persons. Principles of justice are determined on the basis of their special role and the object 
they are applicable to. (Rawls, 2009, p 167)
5.2.2 The idea of justice according to Amartya Sen
Amartya Sen is an Indian economist and winner of the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1998, 
who builds upon Rawls’ theory of justice in a critical way. His main criticism is that Rawls’ 
theory prescribes an ideal just society, and is not suitable for ranking different imperfect 
systems on their relative justice. Sen’s idea of justice aims to do just that. He stresses the 
role of public reasoning in different cultural traditions (western as well as non-western), in 
determining how a particular society can become less unjust. Whereas Rawls proposes to 
let the people who will live in a particular society close a social contract under the veil of 
ignorance, Sen favours an impartial observer who can judge fairness of a society from a 
position of positional objectivity. This is necessary to overcome parochialism and address 
questions of global justice. (Sen, 2009)
In Sen’s concept, divergent views on what is the more just solution in a particular case are 
allowed. Contrary to conventional economic theory, rationality is not limited to furthering 
one’s own personal interests. People who want to promote the common good or the 
interests of other people can also be considered to maximise these interests in an 
economically rational way. The materials of justice are not public goods, as Rawls states,
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but capabilities of individual persons that should be developed in a just societal 
arrangement.
Sen’s Idea of Justice is a comparative system for ranking different actual societies on being 
more or less just according to different preferences. These preferences can not all be ranked 
in one single closed ordering with one single optimum. Instead it is possible to use the 
system for comparing two particular societies on their comparative justness in accordance 
with a particular set of preferences. The identification of redressable injustice is central to 
Sen’s theory of injustice, starting from an intuitive sense of justice. In addition, there is a 
need for a formal theory of justice to enable reasoning about our intuition and critically 
examining the intuition and what we can do to overcome the perceived injustice. What kind 
of reasoning is appropriate for ethical and political concepts like (in) justice? An impartial 
observer is allowed to comment on the justness of a particular society, rather than limiting 
this to the people who will live in that society. There is a clear role for rationality and 
reasonableness. (Sen, 2009)
Grounds for judgements of justice could be freedoms, capabilities, resources, happiness or 
wellbeing. Sense’ idea of justice assumes a connection between justice and democracy. It is 
not enough to establish just institutions, but we must examine how these institutions and 
people’s behaviour influence other people’s lives. The focus should be on the lives people 
are able to lead and on their freedoms. Democracy is defined as government by discussion. 
It also encompasses the capacity to enrich reasoned engagement through enhancing 
informational ability and the feasibility of interactions. It is not just about institutions, but 
also about enabling people to be heard. At the global level, democracy can be seen as the 
possibility and reach of public reasoning. Advancing global democracy and justice is an 
understandable ambition and can inspire concrete actions. (Sen, 2009)
Sen’s concept of justice is placed in the tradition of western enlightenment, but similar 
ideas can be found in non-western traditions. One example is the Indian concept of 
institutional and behavioural justice “niti” versus the concept of justness of the actual lives 
people lead “nyaya”. There are two enlightenment traditions. Firstly, social contract 
thinking concentrates on the institutions of justice. Secondly, the comparative tradition 
compares different ways of life, influenced by institutions and actual behaviour of others, 
social interactions etc. Social choice theory developed by Condorcet and Arrows belongs to 
the comparative tradition. Both traditions rely to a great extent on (practical) reason. Sen 
believes that good public reasoning for more justice should help overcome bad parochial 
reasoning. He maintains that there is not one single best way, because different positions 
can be equally reasonably defended.
In earlier writings, Amartya Sen has developed the capability approach, together with 
Martha Nussbaum. He builds on this in formulating his “Idea of Justice”. Nussbaum’s 
conceptualisation of the capability approach is more elaborate than Sen’s. Therefore only 
Nussbaum’s formulation and discussion of the implications of the capability approach for 
global justice will be presented below.
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5.2.3 Philosophical basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capability
approach
In “Frontiers of Justice” (2000), the American philosopher Martha Nussbaum builds upon 
theories of justice in the tradition of social contract thinking, mainly Rawls’ theory. She 
explicitly discusses the concepts proposed by other philosophers than Rawls that she uses 
in her own capability approach. In this section, the contributions of these other philosophers 
will be sketched in order to enable better understanding of Nussbaum’s theory outlined 
below.
In general, social contract theories assume an original natural position in which all humans 
are free, equal and independent. These individuals will only agree to limits to their freedom 
in a mutual social contract intended to achieve the benefits of communal life including 
comfort, safety and peace and protection of their property rights. (Locke, Second Treatise 
of Government, quoted in Nussbaum, 2000, p 23) David Hume introduces the idea of 
‘circumstances of justice’, developed further by Rawls. Incidentally, Hume is not a social 
contract thinker, but this idea is more fitting to Rawls’ theory of justice than similar 
concepts from social contract thinkers. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 25)
In Nussbaum’s capability approach she focuses on those who have not been involved in 
designing the social contract, including women, disabled, people in poor countries and non­
human animals59. In this regard, she disagrees with Rawls, according to whom people can 
only have access to justice if they are in the right circumstances of justice (free, equal and 
independent). Rawls considers mutual benefit as the aim of societal cooperation and 
assumes that contracting parties are driven by their own interests. Nussbaum on the other 
hand points out that other relevant theories assume different motivations for cooperating, 
including those of Grotius, Hobbes and Locke. In the seventeenth century Hugo Grotius 
developed a vision on the interdependence of nations. He argues that moral norms impose 
restrictions to the actions of all nations and individuals in the international society. Human 
rights of individuals may justify intervention in the internal affairs of other states. 
Determination of ownership of goods requires detailed examination because this depends 
on needfulness of the poor in one state and surplus in another state. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 31)
Nussbaum wants to revive the natural law approach of the foundations of international 
affairs of Hugo Grotius. This natural law approach also offers a framework for considering 
internal affairs. In “De jure belli ac pacis” Grotius (1625) founds the principles of 
international relations on human dignity and sociability in the tradition of the Greek and 
Roman STOA (Seneca and Cicero). Even though Grotius connects these aspects with a 
particular metaphysical theory of human nature, his approach can also form the basis of a 
political concept of the person that can be accepted by people with another vision on 
metaphysics and religion. Human dignity and sociability form the basis for certain specific
59 Nussbaum considers human beings to be rational animals, a concept borrowed from 
Aristotle.
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rights and are necessary conditions for a humane life. Grotius focuses on the space between 
states, where there is no sovereign. This space is still morally ordered and some very 
specific principles shape human interactions in it. These principles inspired his 
interpretation of the “Ius ad Bellum” and the “Ius in Bello” : starting a war is only justified 
in response to an unjustified act of aggression. Preventive war is prohibited as it is a way to 
use humans as instruments for the interest of others. During the war, strict rules have to be 
obeyed: no excessive or cruel punishment, no killing of civilians, minimal damage to 
property and prompt restitution of property and sovereignty in ending a war. Interestingly, 
Grotius’ theory starts with an outcome: the fundamental rights of people that must be 
respected in the name of justice. If these rights are respected, a society is minimally 
justified. This theory is based on an intuitive notion of human dignity, and explicitly not on 
mutual benefits. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 44-45)
Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651) holds that there are natural moral laws that call for 
‘justice, equality, fairness, charity and doing to others as we want others to do to us’. These 
natural moral laws can’t form the basis of a stable political order because they are ‘in 
contradiction with our natural passions that lead us towards partisanship, pride, revenge, 
etc’. Natural sociability can be observed among ants but not among humans. The natural 
state is a state of war. All humans are equal in capabilities and means in this natural state. 
In this state, our passions stimulate us to make peace so as to live securely to some extent. 
This social contract does not lead to justice. Hobbes does not have a clear vision on justice. 
In some places it can only be enforced, whereas elsewhere natural principles of justice exist 
but are ineffective, given our natural passions. The social contract generates the 
fundamental principles for a political society, as a mutual agreement to hand over political 
rights. Hobbes includes the contracting parties as well as those on whose behalf the contract 
is made, but excludes animals. Hobbes considers a state form with a sovereign who has 
been handed over all powers as the only attractive form of contract, enforcing security by 
imposing fear of punishment. Anywhere outside the realm of such sovereigns is 
characterised by a state of war (e.g. in international relations). (Nussbaum, 2000, p 46-48)
John Locke’s theory of the social contract contains several ideas used in Nussbaum’s 
capability approach. In the natural state, people are free, equal and independent. They are 
free in the sense that nobody rules over another person and that each has the right to govern 
oneself. They are equal in the sense that nobody has the right to rule over another person 
and that any jurisdiction is mutual. They are independent in the sense that all people have 
the right to further their own interests, without hierarchical relations. People have similar 
physical and mental capabilities that are connected to moral rights. Equal capabilities are 
sufficient grounds for a general status of each person to be considered a goal in oneself, 
rather than as a means to another end. Such equal capabilities also are a necessary 
precondition, because animals, lacking the same capabilities, can be used as means to an 
end according to Locke. Nussbaum does not include this in her theory. Locke distinguishes 
binding moral obligations in his natural state including the obligation to maintain oneself 
and others, not to take another’s life, to abstain from damaging another’s freedom, health or 
property. The principle of moral equality leads to the obligation to charity and good will. A 
social contract is not a precondition for moral reciprocity. Humans also have a natural
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dignity because they are created by God. They are entitled to a dignified life, but are also 
needful and not able to realise such a life on our own. They have a natural tendency to look 
for community and fraternity with others in political communities. Locke combines 
elements of a natural law theory that are similar to Grotius’ ideas. But Locke has also 
formulated the founding idea for the social contract. Even though the natural state is not 
necessarily a state of war, nothing outside a political society can prevent this natural state 
from falling into a state of war. Mutual benefit is the main goal for which the contracting 
parties agree to accept the authority of laws and institutions. Nussbaum builds upon the 
natural law elements in Locke’s work and criticises the social contract ideas. (Nussbaum, 
2000, p 48-51)
David Hume (1739-1740, 1751 and 1777) describes the circumstances under which justice 
is possible and necessary, inspiring Rawls. Hume bases his vision on justice on convention 
rather than contract thinking. Mutual benefit is again the key to the emergence and 
continuation of justice. According to Hume, justice is only possible in cases of a limited but 
not extreme lack of resources, where people are simultaneously selfish and competitive, 
and charitable to some extent, yet capable to impose limits to their behaviour. He considers 
this to be the human situation in reality. Egoism is not all-powerful, but kindness is 
unbalanced and partisan, mostly in favour of one’s own family and less favourable to more 
remote relations. Justice is a convention which usefulness depends on the physical and 
psychological circumstances, including a global equality of capabilities between people. 
Hume excludes animals, people with severe mental or physical disabilities and women 
from justice, because they do not have more or less the same capabilities as healthy men in 
the society in which he lived. Humane treatment of these outsiders would not be based on 
justice but on charity and hence would be unreliable. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 51-55)
In his essay “Über den Gemeinspruch Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht 
für die Praxis” (1793) and in “Metaphysik der Sitten” (1797), Kant makes a combination of 
moral philosophy and social contract thinking. Nussbaum is interested in the tension 
inherent in his work, because Kant’s moral philosophical notion that people must always be 
treated as goal in oneself and never as a means to an end is a core element of Rawls’ theory 
of justice. Kant’s theory of the social contract is essentially the same as Locke’s. The 
natural state is characterised by natural, egalitarian freedom. The social contract is closed 
when people opt for a state of distributive legal justice. The contract is needed because 
justified claims are uncertain in the natural state. It is not only beneficial but also morally 
right for all persons to join the contract. In Kant’s view, the free, equal and independent 
contracting parties are the same citizens whose lives are governed by the contract. He 
distinguishes active and passive, dependent citizens. Only active citizens are included in the 
contract and have political rights. Passive citizens are subordinate to the state, but still have 
certain pre-political human rights including freedom and equality. By requiring that 
contracting parties should be approximately equal, Kant creates two classes of citizens. 
Some passive citizens may become active citizens, but this does not apply to women and 
disabled. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 55-57)
Nussbaum insists on developing a broader concept of justice than assumed by the social
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contract thinkers, but does not explain why she thinks “justice” is more applicable to 
questions of dealing with the disabled, poor people in developing countries and non-human 
animals than concepts like “charity”. Her capability approach is a political theory about 
basic rights, not an all encompassing moral theory, not even a complete political theory 
(Nussbaum, 2000, p 139). She assumes that the capabilities or basic rights are already 
enclosed in the notion of human dignity and humane life. Her theory converges with ethical 
contract thinking, but does not assume mutual benefit as driver for cooperation. Instead, 
benefits and goals of cooperation are morally and socially inspired, and justice and 
participation are aims with an intrinsic value. People are connected by altruistic bonds as 
well as by mutual benefit. Whereas contract thinking is a procedural theory, the capability 
approach is aimed at results.
Nussbaum applies a political concept of the person as proposed by Aristotle: The human 
being is a political animal, and strives for a social form of the good, sharing complex goals 
with others on many levels. Her concept of dignity is Aristotelian (rationality and animal 
nature are a whole), not Kantian (humanity is opposed to animal nature; rationality is 
opposed to needs shared by humans and animals). Nussbaum requires a theory of “the 
good” to determine preconditions for ethical contract thinking. Capabilities are an extension 
of the concepts of income and poverty as measures of wellbeing. People have different 
individual needs. This fact necessitates a plurality of measures for wellbeing. Contrary to 
Amartya Sen, Nussbaum does not consider it possible to measure all capabilities in 
monetary terms, but her theory requires ten independent threshold values to determine 
wellbeing. A diversified form of care is a fundamental aspect of the concept of justice for 
all capabilities. It depends on the capability whether it is necessary to stimulate the human 
capability or the human functioning. Enforcing behaviour should be avoided, but 
information on beneficial behaviour is welcome. Children should have more obligations 
than adults (e.g. in following education).
The species norm Nussbaum uses to determine who is a human being is evaluative and 
ethical, but contrary to her assumption, is not uncontroversial. The capability approach is a 
critical liberal theory, imposing limits to freedom in the interest of society.
Nussbaum compares her capability approach with other theories of international justice: 
two types of social contract thinking (the two phase contract of Rawls, and the global 
contract of Beitz and Pogge), as well as economic utilitarian development models. Her 
theory aims for human development in agreement with Grotius’ natural right, taking human 
rights as basis for international justice. Rawls two phase contract theory takes the state as a 
virtual person and contract party. The internal affairs of a state are independent of foreign 
relations and unchanging. International law only covers war and peace. This assumption is 
not in agreement with present-day reality where multinational companies and international 
NGO’s are of importance. The current inequality between states and redistribution of 
wealth also doesn’t fit Rawls’ assumption.
Nussbaum does not agree with Rawls idea of a veil of ignorance at the time of designing 
the contract, because the parties need to know in which age they live and what the 
(technical) circumstances are in order to be able to determine what will be a fair agreement 
in those circumstances.
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5.2.4 Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach
The capability approach concentrates on what people are capable of. It is expected to give 
more robust guidelines for jurisdiction and government policies than other theories of 
justice. Whereas Sen applies the capability approach to comparative measurement of the 
quality of life, Nussbaum uses it to give a philosophical foundation to a vision on essential 
human rights that ought to be respected and implemented by governments of all nations, as 
an essential minimum of what respect for human dignity requires. This notion leads to a list 
of ten essential human capabilities, which are all implicitly present in the idea of a life in 
accordance with human dignity. These capabilities are the source of political principles for 
a liberal pluralist society. The capabilities should be pursued for each individual who is 
treated as a goal in himself and not as a means to an end. The capability approach assumes 
a threshold level for each human capability, below which normal human functioning is not 
possible. Government policies should aim to lift citizens above this threshold level. 
(Nussbaum, 2000, p 71-72)
The basic intuitive notion which forms the starting point of Nussbaum’s capability 
approach is a concept of human dignity and a dignified human life and functioning. The 
central notion is the capabilities someone has to undertake activities rather than resources 
available to him, because different individuals have different needs for resources to 
undertake the same activities. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 74-75)
The essential human capabilities are according to Nussbaum (2000, p 76-77):
- “Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.
- Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to 
be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.
- Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure 
against violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.
- Senses, Imagination and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think 
and reason -  and to do these things in a “truly human’ way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, 
literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use 
imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing works 
and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical and so forth. Being 
able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression 
with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. 
Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid non-beneficial pain.
- Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; 
to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to 
love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having 
one’s emotional development blighted by fear and anxiety. [...]
- Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. [ . ]
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- Affiliation.
i. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern 
for other humans, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be 
able to imagine the situation of another. [...]
ii. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to 
be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This 
entails provisions of non-discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, national origin and species.
- Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, 
plants, and the world of nature.
- Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
- Control over one’s environment.
i. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that 
govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of 
free speech and association.
ii. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and 
having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to 
seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human, 
exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of 
mutual recognition with other workers.”
The capability approach is a type of universal human rights approach, which respects 
pluralism in six forms:
1) The list is open-ended.
2) The items must be specified in an abstract and generalisable way, to allow for 
national differences in implementation.
3) The list is a freestanding ‘partial moral conception’, only used for political goals 
and without metaphysical foundation.
4) The right political target is the human capability rather than the corresponding 
functioning.
5) Pluralism protecting freedoms like freedom of opinion, assembling and of 
conscience are central items on the list.
6) Problems of justification and of implementation should be separated. State 
sovereignty should in principle be respected. (Nussbaum, 2000, p78-79)
The international capability approach
In her international capability approach, Nussbaum assumes that people possess an ethical 
reason and sociability. Cicero, the Roman Stoics and Grotius have also assumed this before 
her. Humans are beings with a common good, striving to live together in a way that is 
ordered by the measure of their moral intelligence (human dignity, sociability and human 
needs). There is discussion on what should have priority: rights (capabilities) or 
responsibilities. Also, there is no agreement on what counts as the basis for being entitled to 
certain rights: rationality, intelligence or the fact that there is life. Are the rights pre­
212
political or an artefact of laws and institutions? The capability approach takes the existence 
as a human being as basis for rights, and assumes pre-political rights. It also pleads for a 
proactive government role, not only withholding itself from intrusion on the rights of 
citizens, but also actively promoting freedom. Nussbaum is against a world state, because 
of the risk of a dictatorship without outside countervailing force. She favours national 
autonomy with foreign intervention. The responsibility for maintaining a threshold level for 
all capabilities should be assigned to institutions which can enforce cooperation from 
individuals (taxes, legislation). Above this threshold, individuals may follow their own 
conscience or group norms. Essential human rights must be incorporated in the national 
constitution of each country.
On an international level, a variety of actors shares in the responsibility:
1) Government organisations with responsibility for international solidarity;
2) Multinationals;
3) Global economic policy and organisations;
4) International organisations (UN, ILO, International Court, etc);
5) NGO’s.
Adapting Nussbaum’s approach to sustainable (nano) technology development requires 
addressing a somewhat different set of actors. In addition to government organisations with 
responsibility for international solidarity, government organisations with responsibility for 
Science, Technology and Innovation policy have to be involved. The same goes for 
departments of international organisations including UNIDO, UNESCO, but also regional 
intergovernmental bodies such as the European Commission DG Research. In addition to 
multinationals and (development) NGO’s, universities and research centres as well as 
international academic organisations have to be called upon.
The international capabilities approach distinguishes ten principles for a just global 
structure:
1) A plurality of actors should be held responsible.
2) National sovereignty should be respected within boundary conditions of human 
capabilities.
3) Rich countries should give a substantial part of their BNP to poor countries.
4) Multinationals should stimulate human capabilities in the regions they are active 
in.
5) The main structures of the global economy should be fair for poor and developing 
countries.
6) All should strive for a limited, decentralised but powerful global open space.
7) All institutions and (most) individuals should pay attention to problems of the 
deprived in each country and region.
8) The global community should emphasise care for sick, elderly, children and 
people with disabilities.
9) The family is valuable but not private.
10) Everyone must support education to emancipate the deprived and to make them 
self-supporting. (Nussbaum, 2000)
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5.3 Applying the capability approach to sustainable
nanotechnology development
As discussed above, Nussbaum recommends ten principles for a just global structure. In 
this chapter, this approach is applied to sustainable nanotechnology development, but not 
all ten of Nussbaum’s principles are relevant to this. The international capabilities approach 
should be adapted to science, technology and innovation (ST&I) policy. This leaves us with 
the following set of principles:
1) Public engagement: A plurality of actors should be held responsible for decisions 
on science, technology and innovation policy in each country, including not only 
the traditional triple helix of natural science, industry and government, but also 
representatives of other stakeholders such as members of the parliament, NGO’s 
and social and human scientists. Where foreign aid is given to developing 
countries, government and international organisations responsible for science, 
technology and innovation should cooperate with those responsible for 
development aid policies.
2) National sovereignty should be respected within boundary conditions of human 
capabilities. Thus, foreign actors should cooperate with the national government 
on science, technology and innovation policies, and not undermine national 
policies, as long as such cooperation does not undermine the human capabilities of 
the population in the country in question.
3) Foreign investment: Rich countries should invest a substantial part of their BNP 
in stimulating the development of a knowledge economy in poor countries.
4) Private investment: Multinationals should invest in the national knowledge 
economy in the regions they are active in.
5) Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy: The main structures of the 
global knowledge economy (including intellectual property rights, mobility of 
knowledge workers and trade agreements) should be fair for poor and developing 
countries.
6) Access to higher education and research jobs: The global community, national 
governments and all research institutions and individual researchers should enable 
access to higher education and research jobs for the deprived.
7) Target research to poverty and health related problems: The global 
community, national governments and all research institutions and individual 
researchers should target a substantial part of their research to poverty and health 
related problems.
8) Environmental sustainability: Apart from social development, environmental 
aspects should also be included in international cooperation in science, technology 
and innovation.
These principles 6 and 7 (access to higher education and research jobs and target research 
to poverty and health related problems) include Nussbaum’s principles 7, 8 and 10 
(problems of deprived and care for vulnerable, education). Principle 8 is based on
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Nussbaum’s capabilities “other species” and “control over one’s environment”. 
Nussbaum’s principles 6 and 9 about global governance and the family are not relevant to 
ST&I policy.
5.3.1 Relationship of criteria with current debate on nanoethics
Public engagement
Public engagement in decision making on nanoscience and technology is currently a hot 
topic, at least in Europe. This is not only apparent in the recent public dialogues on 
nanotechnology policies in countries like the UK, Belgium, The Netherlands and France 
and at the level of the European Union, but also in projects stimulating discussions between 
natural scientists and the general public about the priorities in research. (e.g. Bonazzi, 2010, 
ObservatoryNano, 2011a)
National sovereignty
Primarily, each national government is of course responsible for its own national policy on 
ST&I. However, in international research cooperation involving research groups and 
companies from different countries, differences in national legislation and policies can 
constitute a challenge which may jeopardise the outcome of the project. Respecting the 
sovereignty of the national government is thus not only an ethical norm, but also a 
pragmatic necessity, helping partners in international projects to prevent wasting valuable 
resources. It also attributes responsibility to this national government for the quality of its 
ST&I policy. There are two aspects to the boundary condition. It can be interpreted as a 
warning against cooperation in ST&I with the governments of countries which do not 
respect basic human rights of their citizens, or as an incentive to look for cooperation with 
non-governmental actors such as academics or private companies. General Business Ethics’ 
concepts such as Responsible Care include elaboration of possible ways for ethical 
behaviour in such countries. The benefits for the population of a country as a whole from 
such non-governmental foreign investment in ST&I in such countries could contribute to 
the development of an open minded academic elite in the long term. However, such non- 
structural research cooperation is unlikely to add up to substantial socio-economic benefits 
for the country as a whole. For the latter, a clear innovation policy of the own government 
is an essential prerequisite.
Foreign and private investment
A major bottleneck in many developing countries is the lack of financial resources available 
for investment in ST&I. Following a global justice approach, rich countries and 
multinational companies share in the responsibility for investing in the capabilities of poor 
countries to develop their own knowledge economy. Most economic value is added in 
knowledge intensive sectors of the economy. One of the foreseen implications of 
nanotechnology is that natural resources including fossil fuels and raw materials can be
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used more efficiently. (Meridian Institute, 2007) Therefore, it is even more urgent for 
countries mainly depending on exports of such commodities to develop their own 
knowledge economy.
Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy
The main structures of the global knowledge economy including intellectual property 
rights, mobility of knowledge workers and trade agreements should be fair for poor and 
developing countries. The current global dialogue on responsible nanotechnology 
development organised by the American National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
European Commission (Cordis, 2008) and in OECD circles (OECD 2010a, 2010b) could be 
a good platform for discussing relevant measures, provided the discussions are not limited 
to Environment, Health and Safety risks and technological standards. However, most 
decisions on the structures of the global economy are outside the scope of such 
international dialogue on nanotechnology.
Access to higher education and research jobs
The global community, national governments and all research institutions and individual 
researchers should give opportunities for the deprived to get access to higher education and 
research jobs. Industrial uptake of nanotechnology is expected to lead to a need for skilled 
labour force of 2 million workers worldwide by 2015. (Roco, 2002) People in developing 
countries, but also deprived people from poor families, women and minorities need special 
support measures to be able to compete on this highly skilled labour market and to be able 
to contribute to the socio-economic development of their country.
Target research to poverty and health related problems
The global community, national governments and all research institutions and individual 
researchers should target a substantial part of their research to poverty and health related 
problems. It is not clear how much money is actually being invested in nanoresearch 
towards those aims.
Environmental sustainability
Apart from social development, environmental sustainability should also be a condition for 
international cooperation in ST&I. This principle is not explicitly included in Nussbaum’s 
principles for an international capabilities approach. Nevertheless, it is an important 
prerequisite for sustainable nanotechnology development. Environment, Health and Safety 
risks, and potential environmental benefits of nanotechnology are key issues in the current 
international debate on nanotechnology. Nussbaum’s approach includes two relevant 
capabilities: ‘other species’ and ‘control over one’s environment’.
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5.3.2 Why can these criteria contribute to fairness in
nanotechnology development?
The capability approach is a result oriented political theory on basic rights. Policies 
stimulating international cooperation in (nano) ST&I are not integrated with policies for 
stimulating international solidarity. This limits the chances that nanotechnology may 
contribute to sustainable development. Nussbaum’s principles for a just global structure are 
intended to evaluate and direct policies of international organisations, governments, 
companies and NGO’s for building capacities for development in developing countries. The 
role of ST&I policies is not explicitly included in her approach. However, the present set of 
principles for sustainable (nano)technology development can be considered an adaptation 
of Nussbaum’s principles to a specific case, just like she has done for people in developing 
countries, disabled, women and non-human animals (Nussbaum, 2000).
The principles for sustainable (nano) technology development can be used to analyse 
factors influencing the chances that poor people in developing countries may benefit from 
nanotechnology development. The scheme is thus more an evaluative framework for 
assessing policies than a normative framework determining morally sound policy aims. The 
motivation why people in developing countries should benefit from nanotechnology is 
given to some extent in Rawls’ Theory of Justice and Sen’s Idea of Justice.
Examining each of the abovementioned principles for sustainable nanotechnology one by 
one, it becomes clear that they highlight different aspects of the international innovation 
system that may stimulate or hamper equal opportunities to benefit from nanotechnology.
Public engagement
The question who should be engaged in setting priorities in nanotechnology development 
features on the international political agenda. Views on the matter range from the 
traditional triple helix of science, industry and policy making to direct democracy involving 
all citizens. Nussbaum states “a plurality of actors should be held responsible” without 
specifying which kinds of actors or what they should be held responsible for. This criterion 
can be used to analyse which actors are engaged in some form in the debate or decision 
making on priorities in nanotechnology in international cooperation and individual 
countries, what role each group plays and what the connections between the different actors 
are. This allows for factual comparison rather than moral evaluation of good or bad 
practices.
Sen’s concept of democracy as deliberative governance implies that more rather than less 
relevant stakeholders and even impartial observers should be heard to enable more just 
decision making.
National sovereignty
In international cooperation in (nano) ST&I, respect for national sovereignty implies that 
foreign investors or cooperation partners refrain from undermining national policies. Again
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this appears to be more a pragmatic guideline to avoid wasting resources than a moral rule. 
As the case studies of nanotechnology in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico below will 
demonstrate, without a deliberate policy of the national government, the chances that 
investment in nanotechnology research in or for the country will eventually benefit the 
national socio-economic development can be considered low.
Foreign and private investment
The demand that governments of rich countries and multinational companies invest in 
building up a knowledge economy in developing countries can be considered a genuinely 
moral rule. More than vague declarations of good intentions, it implies transferring hard 
cash and other resources from serving a country or company’s self-interests to supporting 
the development of countries which lack the resources to develop themselves. From the 
case studies of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico it appears that the European Commission and 
national governments of other countries are making available resources for nanoscience and 
nanotechnology in those countries. On the other hand, investment by industry in R&D in 
Latin America is lagging behind private investments in North America, Europe and 
Oceania. So apart from being a moral rule, the criterion demanding foreign investment in a 
knowledge economy in less developed countries can also be used to identify factors which 
need improvement.
Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy
The call for fair structures of the global knowledge economy is again a moral rule, which 
may suffer from the fact that the term “fair structures” is not well defined. As for 
international cooperation in nanotechnology, the relevant structures of the global 
knowledge economy are mainly outside the scope of those responsible for such nano­
cooperation. E.g. the TRIPS agreement on intellectual property rights in the World Trade 
Association and bilateral free trade agreements between countries are greater determinants 
of who will benefit from investment in nanoscience in Latin America than any foreign 
investment in the nanoresearch in the countries. So again, this criterion helps to identify 
relevant dynamics rather than giving guidelines for nanoresearch activities and policies.
Access to higher education and research jobs
A substantial part of the benefits nanotechnology is expected to bring is in high tech 
employment and economic benefits for the companies selling products made with 
nanotechnology. On the down side, nanotechnology is expected to reduce the demand for 
commodities and may make unschooled labour superfluous. A precondition to participating 
in the economic benefits nanotechnology is expected to bring is therefore access to higher 
education, especially in nanotechnology, and at least in the near future to research jobs. In 
addition to allowing students and researchers from less developed countries to study or 
work in research in western countries, investment in high quality (interdisciplinary) 
education and research infrastructure in less developed countries is mandatory. As the case 
studies on nanotechnology in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico show, the actual situation needs
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improvement both for all students and researchers from those countries and for deprived 
groups inside the countries. This criterion is again a moral rule.
Target research to poverty and health related problems
Apart from the question who gets access to jobs and economic benefits thanks to 
nanotechnology, the choice for which applications will eventually be enabled or improved 
thanks to nanotechnology can also be evaluated from a perspective of fairness. Nussbaum’s 
capability approach prescribes a clearly moral choice for targeting the limited resources for 
research to problems that benefit the weakest groups in society: the poor and sick. 
Assessing the priorities in nanotechnology research in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, it 
appears that relevant research is indeed supported, but maybe not getting a major part of the 
resources. This criterion can thus be considered to be a moral rule stimulating changes in 
funding priorities.
Environmental sustainability
In line with the philosophical concept of human beings as rational animals, a fair 
development of nanotechnology should prevent endangering other species as well as human 
beings. Risk governance of engineered nanomaterials should therefore be aimed at reducing 
environmental as well as health risks. The debate on how to accomplish such nano risk 
governance is ongoing, but it appears that there is currently more attention for health risks 
than for environmental risks (SAFENANO study, 2009). In most developing countries and 
emerging economies, risk assessment research and debate on regulation of engineered 
nanomaterials is lagging behind compared to Western countries. On the other hand, there is 
some discussion on potential environmental benefits of applications of nanotechnology for 
sustainable energy, remediation, environmental monitoring and resource efficiency. 
Whether the actual investment in nanotechnology for stimulating environmental 
sustainability is enough and well targeted is a matter for debate. These developments may 
contribute to the capability “control over one’s environment”.
5.4 Applying the capability approach to nanotechnology 
policies in Latin America
The present chapter makes use of conceptual analysis of national nanotechnology policies 
in several Latin American countries including Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Information 
on these policies has been compiled mainly in the EU funded projects Nanoforum, 
NanoforumEULA and ICPC-NanoNet from literature, internet, interviews and participation 
in events. The countries take different positions in the UN Human Development Index 
(HDI) (ranking between 46th and 70th out of 179 countries), but none of them is among the 
50 Least Developed Countries.
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Argentina Mexico Brazil
HDI-2006 (179 countries) 0.860 (46th) 0.842 (51st) 0.807 (70th)
HDI-2006, Life expectancy at birth 
(years)
75 (49th ) 75.8 (42nd ) 72 (80th )
HDI-2006, Adult literacy rates (% 
ages 15+)
97.6% (28th ) 91.7 (59th ) 89.6 (70th )
HDI-2006, Combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary gross 
enrolment ratio (%)
88.6 (35th ) 80.2 (54th ) 87.2 (39th )
HDI-2006, GDP per capita (PPP 
US$)
11,985 (60th ) 12,176 (59th ) 8,949 (77th )
Table 7: Scores and positions of Latin American countries in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) (UNDP, 2006)
5.4.1 International cooperation involving Latin American 
countries
International cooperation in nanotechnology research is stimulated in a number of 
cooperation agreements between Latin American countries (e.g. MERCOSUR, Common 
Market of the South), and with other continents (e.g. European Union-Latin American 
framework agreements). The research question for this section is whether these 
international cooperation activities contribute to the principles for a just global structure for 
ST&I.
Public engagement
Decisions on international cooperation in nanotechnology in MERCOSUR and between the 
European Union and Latin America are taken on a political level. MERCOSUR is an 
economic cooperation agreement between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, to 
which Chile and Venezuela are candidate members. The MERCOSUR Action Plan of 
Buenos Aires (2006) aims to advance scientific research and development including 
nanotechnology, through establishing a web of centres of excellence. (Chiancone & 
Garrido, 2008) The current ST&I Programme for MERCOSUR 2008-2012 includes 
“Nanotechnology and New Materials” as one of five priority areas. The European Union is 
cooperating in Science and Technology not only with MERCOSUR but also with the 
Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and six Central-American 
countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama), as well 
as with the Latin America and Caribbean region as a whole (EU-LAC) and in bilateral 
cooperation with each individual country. In these EU-Latin American regional cooperation 
agreements, nanotechnology is not explicitly prioritised. (Malsch, 2009)
Social scientists from different Latin American countries have organised themselves in the
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ReLANS Latin American network for Nanotechnology and Society. They tend to criticise 
the lack of integration of nanotechnology research policy in national development policies 
from the perspective of people who are not involved in decision making (e.g. Foladori & 
Invernizzi, 2007) International NGO’s - including ETC group, Meridian Institute, Friends 
of the Earth and the International Union of Agricultural Workers - have published 
statements on nanotechnology, mainly focusing on risks, but also on factors affecting the 
socio-economic development of developing countries (e.g. commodities markets, 
intellectual property). It appears that on international level, a plurality of actors is engaged 
in the debate on nanotechnology for developing countries, but it is not so clear which actors 
actually influence decision making on investing in nanoresearch in Latin America.
Respect national sovereignty
Since interregional and bilateral cooperation agreements are decided upon by governments, 
national sovereignty should in principle be respected, as long as the less developed 
countries are not forced to agree to unfair conditions because they have no viable 
alternative.
In the case when research groups from Latin American countries participate in EU funded 
nanoresearch projects, contractual obligations of the EU - including those on intellectual 
property - may conflict with the laws or interests of Latin American countries. A minor 
investment of European funding in high quality research in a Latin American university 
could lead to European ownership of the results of a much bigger and longer term prior 
investment of public funding in the Latin American country. Such transfer of intellectual 
property from South to North would contradict the principles of global justice. It is 
important to be aware of such potential conflicting interests before agreeing on R&D 
contracts.
Foreign and private investment in stimulating a knowledge economy in poor countries
The European Union has opened up the Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development to participants from International Cooperation Partner 
Countries including Latin American countries. This is a bottom-up, researcher-driven 
process for North-South investment by rich countries in a knowledge economy in poor 
countries, without a predetermined budget. In addition, the EU and individual countries 
including Mexico have made cooperation agreements stipulating budgets for 
nanotechnology research cooperation where each of the partners invests 50%.
In general, private investment in R&D in Latin America is considerably below the global 
average. This is around 65% of the total investment in R&D in North America, around 55% 
in Europe, around 50% in Oceania and around 40% in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
(RICYT, Estado de la Ciencia, 2008)
According to UNESCO (2009) the importance of foreign government investment and 
private industry investment in different Latin American countries varied considerably in 
2007. Total foreign investment was highest in Panama (almost 60%), Guatemala (about 
40%), El Salvador (over 20%), Paraguay and Bolivia (around 15%), and less than 10% in 
other countries. All business investment ranged between 40 and 50% in Mexico, Chile and
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Brazil, around 30% in Argentina, Peru, Uruguay and Costa Rica, and between 20 and 30% 
in Trinidad & Tobago, Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador. In other Latin American countries 
business investment was insignificant. (UNESCO, 2009) Nanotechnology research in Latin 
America suffers from the same lack of private investment, according to researchers.
Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy
The structures of the global knowledge economy influence the chances that nanotechnology 
development will contribute to socio-economic development of Latin America. However, 
these structures fall outside the scope of international cooperation agreements on 
nanotechnology. E.g. since 1994, international and bilateral agreements on intellectual 
property rights are more and more in favour of multinational companies from highly 
developed economies (Pacon, 2009). Latin American organisations have so far applied for 
very few nanopatents. Under these circumstances, the results of Latin American public 
investment in nanoscience and technology could well end up benefiting companies from 
industrialised countries.
Access to higher education and research jobs
Cooperation agreements between the European Union and Latin America include access for 
Latin American students to higher education and research jobs in Europe. However, if this 
is not complemented by return grants and investment in higher education and research 
infrastructure in Latin America the resulting brain drain will hamper the development of a 
knowledge society in Latin America. This is especially bad, because Latin American 
countries are not characterised by universal access to higher education.
The percentage of all researchers in the world who work in Latin America and the 
Caribbean has increased from 2.9% to 3.6% between 2002 and 2007, placing this whole 
region between Germany and France. In 2007, there were 460 researchers per million 
inhabitants in Latin America and the Caribbean (625 in Brazil and 464 in Mexico). For 
comparison, there were 4262 researchers per million inhabitants in Oceania, 2515 in 
Europe, 2013 in the Americas, 742 in Asia and 169 in Africa. In Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 46% of researchers were women, which is much better than the world average 
of 29%. (UNESCO, 2009)
Taking a closer look at nanotechnology, the development of nanotechnology curricula in 
higher education in Latin America is still in a very early stage and investment in world 
class research infrastructure for doing nanotechnology research is a major problem in R&D 
in most Latin American countries.
Target research to poverty and health related problems
There are projects aiming to develop nanotechnology for poverty and health related 
problems including agrifood, water purification and desalination, sustainable energy, 
nanomedicine for infectious diseases. But the percentage invested in such ‘nano for the 
poor’ appears to be modest compared to investments aimed at enhancing the 
competitiveness of leading economies including the USA, Europe and Japan.
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In international discussions on responsible nanotechnology development coordinated by the 
OECD, risk governance of nanomaterials is a big issue and several European countries have 
announced considerable investments in nanorisk research (10 or 15% of future national 
public funding for nanotechnology). However, in Latin American nanoresearch, it is hardly 
addressed at all. The European Commission is stimulating debate on responsible 
nanotechnology research not only inside the European Union but also in international 
cooperation including with Latin American countries. No figures on the budgets for 
applications of nanotechnology in sustainable energy and resource saving are available.
Summary international cooperation
Applying the capability approach to international cooperation in nanotechnology helps to 
clarify which factors are important for improving the chances that investment in 
nanotechnology R&D will contribute to sustainable nanotechnology. Many different actors 
are engaged in the public debate on nanotechnology on a global level, but the decision 
making process could be more transparent. In order to strengthen national sovereignty of 
less developed countries, awareness should be raised on potential conflicts of interest 
before signing R&D contracts. Foreign government and private investment in 
nanotechnology varies considerably between Latin American countries. The structure of the 
global knowledge economy influences the chances of success of international cooperation 
in nanotechnology. However, these structures are mostly out of reach of the actors engaged 
in such nano-cooperation. Access to higher education and research jobs is important for 
getting a share in the expected socio-economic benefits of nanotechnology. However, such 
access is limited for Latin Americans in general and the deprived population in that 
continent in particular. Women appear to have more than the global average access to 
research jobs in Latin America, but this may be distorted if it turns out that more male 
researchers migrate to Western countries. No data on migration of knowledge workers has 
been found. Poverty, health and environmental sustainability are the subject of some 
research in nanotechnology, but it is not clear how big a percentage of the total this is.
In the following, nanotechnology policies in the three Latin American countries which are 
most active in nanoscience and technology are analysed to identify bottlenecks for 
sustainable nanotechnology development in those countries and what role international 
cooperation could play.
Environmental sustainability
5.4.2 Argentina
The Argentinean government has developed prospective ‘Bases for a Strategic Medium 
Term Plan in ST&I’ (2005) in a stakeholder dialogue involving hundreds of experts and 
stakeholders. The main aim of this exercise was to develop a strategy for sustainable 
development. Its feasibility depends on the generated willingness to rethink the country,
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based on equality, responsible use of natural resources, technological development and 
strengthening education on all levels. This scenario is the preferred middle road between a 
pendulum scenario characterised by large swings in the economy and society without real 
development and a scenario of compulsive opening as tried in the 1990s. Nanotechnology 
is included as one of the technological areas with emphasis. Nanotechnology research in 
Argentina is still in an early stage of development. Therefore, the main priorities in policy 
are to develop basic research capacities for nanotechnology in networks inside Argentina as 
well as in MERCOSUR and in international cooperation.
Applications of nanotechnology include:
■ Molecular Electronics (logic and energy storage);
■ Advanced and intelligent materials (e.g. screens and displays);
■ Sensors and biosensors (esp. for food quality, environment, medicine, 
bioterrorism):
■ Diagnostics and medical therapy;
■ Cosmetics.
The experts and stakeholders proposed several measures for improving the innovation 
system for nanotechnology, including strengthening and articulating networks and creating 
and revising interface mechanisms with the productive sector. (SECyT, 2005) 
Nanotechnology is among the thematic priority areas for scientific and technological 
development in the Bicentennial Strategic Plan 2006-2010, one of the plans following from 
the Bases-scenario exercise. Nanotechnology is expected to contribute to five out of nine 
problem-opportunity areas:
■ Competitiveness of Industry and Modernization of its Production Methods;
■ Competitiveness and Sustainable Diversification of Agricultural Production;
■ Knowledge and Sustainable Use of Natural Renewable Resources and Protection 
of the Environment;
■ Energy Infrastructure. Rational Use of Energy;
■ Prevention and Attention for Health.
Only under ‘Competitiveness of Industry and Modernization of its Production Methods’ is 
the contribution expected from nanotechnology explicitly specified: ‘Nanotechnology; 
Development and Application of Micro and Nanodevices.’ (SECyT, 2006)
Responsible nanotechnology development is an explicit aim of the Argentinean 
government. The minister for ST&I, Dr Lino Baranao, is addressing these issues 
personally. The National Committee on Ethics of Science and Technology (CECTE, 2008) 
is developing a code of conduct for responsible nanotechnology research, inspired by the 
European Commission code of conduct (EC, 2008), and organised an international 
conference on this in 2008.
According to patent analysis by CAICyT (2008), Argentinean nanotechnology appears to 
be biased towards nanomedicine and nanobiotechnology (9 out of 11 patents).
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Public engagement
Public engagement with decision making on nanotechnology in Argentina appears to be 
relatively extensive compared to what is known about other Latin American countries. In 
June and July 2005, the government organised the abovementioned public consultation on 
prospective bases for a strategic medium term plan in ST&I, to which citizens were also 
invited to participate. In 2005, a presidential decree installing the Argentinean Foundation 
for Nanotechnology FAN with an investment of US$10 million and investment of US 
defence funding bodies in nanotechnology research in Argentina gave rise to heated debate 
in the congress, the Argentinean Physics Association, the Committee for Ethics in Science 
and Technology (CECTE) and in the media.
Whether this apparent openness actually gives different stakeholders influence on decision 
making on nanoresearch is contested by some nanoscientists in personal communication. 
There are complaints about corruption on public investments in research. In the 
International Property Rights Index 2009, Argentina scores 4.3 out of 10, and ranks 80th out 
of 115 countries in the world and 12th out of 20 Latin American countries. This index 
consists of criteria measuring the legal and political environment (including corruption and 
political stability), physical and intellectual property rights and gender equality.60 
According to Transparency International (2009), Argentineans considered their country’s 
public and private institutions to be more corrupt than the global average (scoring 4 out of 5 
compared to 3.6 out of 5 on average). Political parties (4.4), public officials / civil servants 
(4.3), the judiciary and parliament / legislature (both 4.2) were considered more corrupt 
than business / private sector (3.7) and the media (3.3). (TI, 2009)
Respect national sovereignty
The Argentinean government is playing an active role in nanotechnology policy making, 
but a major bottleneck is the lack of funding, especially for research infrastructure and 
instrumentation. This makes nanoscientists dependent on international cooperation, which 
may undermine national sovereignty. A case in point is the heated debate on US military 
investment in nanoscience and other research in Argentina in 2005 (c.f. Foladori, 2006). 
The EU policy allowing non-European scientists to participate in EU funded projects under 
the Framework Programme for RTD could also have an unintended undermining effect of 
Argentinean ST&I policy. The development of an Argentinean code of conduct for 
responsible nanoresearch may counteract such undermining effects. The current 
government led by President Christina Kirchner has made investment in nanotechnology a 
priority, installed a separate Ministry for Science and Technology MINCYT led by the 
biologist Lino Baranao, and planned to increase the percentage of the GDP for R&D from 
0.66% in 2007 to 1% in 2010. (Dalton, 2008)
60 See website: http://www.intemationalpropertvrightsindex.org/
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Foreign and private investment in stimulating a knowledge economy in poor countries
The World Bank is investing US$150 million in research infrastructure in Argentina in 
several strategic areas including in nanotechnology. Furthermore, Argentina has research 
cooperation agreement with the European Union as well as individual countries including 
the USA, Germany and Brazil where nanotechnology is explicitly mentioned. (Malsch, 
2009)
Investment by multinational companies in research in Argentina, including in 
nanotechnology is low. In 2006, Argentina invested 0.49% of the GDP in R&D, including 
29.4% from companies. Especially the private investment is considerably low compared to 
North America (~65%), Europe (~55%), Oceania (~50%) and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (~40%). (RICYT, Estado de la Ciencia, 2008)
In general, foreign direct investment in Argentina has decreased considerably after the 
financial crisis of 2001. Confidence in the Argentinean government and banking sector 
among foreign investors has only been increasing gradually since then. The lack of 
investment is not due to a lack of valuable human and natural resources in Argentina.
Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy
As in other Latin American countries, patenting research results is not a very common 
practice in Argentina. The Argentinean economy is still mainly dependent on export of 
commodities including agricultural products and raw materials Almost two thirds of 
exports are agricultural or food products. (EVD, 2009) One aim of the national 
nanotechnology activities is to increase the value added to exports, but it is unclear how 
international structures influence the success in achieving this goal.
Access to higher education and research jobs
Globally, Argentina ranks 35th on the Human Development Index ‘Combined primary, 
secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio,’ with 88 .6%, so in general the population has 
access to education. In nanotechnology, the current nanotechnology networks offer 
employment to hundreds of nanoscientists and in the Interdisciplinary Centre for 
Nanoscience and Nanotechnology CINN, 60 PhD students will be trained. This is sufficient 
to fill the research jobs in nanotechnology in academia, but not to fulfil potential demand 
for trained staff in industry. (Malsch, Nanotechnology in Argentina, 2008) The main 
bottleneck appears to be a lack of funding. There is no information on access to higher 
education and research jobs for deprived groups in Argentina.
Target research to poverty and health related problems
Nanotechnology development in Argentina focuses on applications in healthcare. 
Diagnostics & medical therapy, and (bio) sensors for food quality, environment, medicine 
and bio security are among the foreseen application areas of nanotechnology.
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Nanotechnology is expected to contribute to sustainable agrifood production, and 
prevention and attention for health. Most Argentinean nanotechnology patents are in 
nanomedicine and nanobiotechnology. It is not so clear how much of it will benefit the 
poor.
Environmental sustainability
In Argentina, nanotechnology is expected to contribute to knowledge and sustainable use of 
natural renewable resources and protection of the environment, but the actual investment in 
such applications appears to be modest. It is not clear whether the Argentinean government 
will be able to protect the environment and consumers against potential risks of products 
made with nanomaterials. Also, the budget for risk assessment of nanomaterials is unknown 
and it is unclear whether and how much rich countries will contribute to protecting less 
developed countries from potential risks of nanomaterials.
Conclusion for Argentina
In this section, nanotechnology policy in Argentina has been analysed to identify 
bottlenecks for sustainable nanotechnology development and what role international 
cooperation could play. Whereas public participation in the debate on nanotechnology since 
2005 has been abundant in comparison to other countries, there are concerns that corruption 
in the public sector may reduce the level to which investment in nanotechnology will 
benefit the whole population. The Argentinean government is taking a leading role in 
nanotechnology development and international cooperation, which will increase the 
chances that national sovereignty will be respected. Foreign government and private 
investment in R&D in Argentina is currently lower than the average in Latin America. It is 
unclear how structures of the global knowledge economy influence the chances that 
Argentina may reap the benefits of nanotechnology investment in the country. Educating 
students is part of the national activities in nanotechnology, but the numbers are relatively 
low due to a lack of funding. Whereas health and environmental applications are among the 
priorities for nanotechnology research, it is not clear how much poor people and the 
environment will benefit.
5.4.3 Brazil
Nanotechnology is included in the Action Plan for Science, Technology and Innovation 
(PACTI 2007-2010), action line III: Research, Development and Innovation in strategic 
areas. It is one of two future carrying areas together with biotechnology. A wide range of 
economic sectors relevant to the country are expected to benefit from applications of 
nanotechnology. The action plan includes strategy development, investment in R&D, 
higher education and research infrastructure for nanotechnology and innovation support and 
technology transfer from academia to industry. Concrete, measurable milestones are 
included that enable evaluation of the policy. The total budget for nanotechnology in 
PACTI is R$69.99 (~€23) million in 4 years, from MCT/FNDCT (National Fund for
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Scientific and Technological Development) and MCT/other actions PPA.
Public engagement
The network on Nanotechnology, Society and Environment RENANOSOMA aims to 
stimulate public dialogue on implications of nanotechnology for society and the 
environment. This network is the initiative of social scientists and not included in the 
national nanotechnology programme. Brazilians involved in nanoscience and in 
RENANOSOMA give evidence of limited cooperation between the social scientists 
cooperating in this network with Brazilian nanoscientists and technologists. The public or 
stakeholder debate on nanotechnology and society in Brazil appears to be rather polarised. 
(Martins, 2007)
Respect national sovereignty
The Brazilian government plays a clear leading role in planning and managing 
nanotechnology research in the country. International cooperation including North-South as 
well as South-South collaborations is an integral part of this policy. The government looks 
after Brazil’s national interests in these international agreements. In direct contacts with 
nanoscientists, they appear to be interested only in international cooperation with active 
support from the ministry of science and technology MCT. The complicated Brazilian 
legislation imposes barriers for international cooperation in ST&I.
Foreign and private investment in stimulating a knowledge economy
Brazil is an emerging economy. Nanotechnology is included in international cooperation 
agreements in science and technology with the EU, Germany and Argentina. The EU is 
investing €30.5 million in scholarships and capacity building in higher education in Brazil 
and Brazilian scientists can participate in projects funded by the EU Framework 
Programme for RTD including in nanotechnology. It appears that international cooperation 
helps build a knowledge economy in Brazil.
In 2006, Brazil invested 1.02% of GDP in R&D, the highest in Latin America. Companies 
were responsible for 47.9% of investment in R&D, more than the average in Latin America. 
This is a result of the Brazilian government policy obliging companies to invest a 
percentage of their profits into sectorial funds for Research and Development. (RICYT, 
Estado de la Ciencia, 2008) There are no separate statistics for investment in 
nanotechnology in Brazil.
Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy
Patenting results of nanotechnology research is still not very common in Brazil. Brazilian 
organisations only hold 89 nanopatents registered in the period 2000-2007. This is very low 
compared to western countries. In the current structures of the global knowledge economy, 
this lack of patenting is a disadvantage.
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Access to higher education and research jobs
In the HDI-2006, Brazil’s combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio 
is 87.2%, ranking 39th in the world. In nanotechnology, the Brazilian government aimed to 
train 100 nanoscientists in the period 2007-2010, under the PACTI action plan for ST&I. In 
the ten nanotechnology research networks funded under the same scheme, 1000 
nanoscientists are employed. It is not clear if deprived groups have access to nanoeducation 
or research jobs, but the federal government actively promotes networking in 
nanotechnology research including in less developed regions of the country. (Malsch, 2009) 
In general, one of Brazil’s weaknesses is that access to the higher education system is low 
for deprived groups. There is currently a shortage of skilled technical manpower. The main 
challenge is therefore generating manpower by e.g. repatriating Brazilian scientists from 
abroad and offering basic education in order to overcome inequality. (Bound, 2008, p 44)
Target research to poverty and health related problems
Food production is among the application areas of nanotechnology in PACTI (2007-10). A 
National Institute for Science and Technology is funded in nanobiopharmacy and other 
research targets medical applications including infectious diseases. It is unclear how much 
of these innovations will benefit poor people in Brazil. Renanosoma is very sceptical that 
nanotechnology development in Brazil will benefit the poor in any way. (Martins, 2007)
Environmental sustainability
Sustainable energy and environmental monitoring are among the application areas 
developed by PETROBRAS, INPA etc. Nanosensor technologies are being developed for 
environmental monitoring.
Conclusions Brazil
In this section, nanotechnology policy in Brazil has been analysed to identify bottlenecks 
for sustainable nanotechnology development and what role international cooperation could 
play. The government, especially the ministry of science and technology, is playing a 
leading role in nanotechnology policy and research in the country. One of their priorities is 
to build up a research capacity for nanotechnology in less developed regions, to stimulate 
employment and socio-economic development. It remains to be seen how successful this 
strategy will be. Social scientists are also actively discussing nanotechnology, taking 
mainly a critical position. There appears to be a gap between proponents and opponents and 
little communication between them. The government is successful in enforcing respect for 
its national sovereignty, but the complicated Brazilian legal system imposes barriers to 
successful international cooperation. Brazilian organisations are still not very active in 
patenting nanotechnology inventions, which is a disadvantage in the current structures of 
the global knowledge economy. Education and employment in nanotechnology is 
stimulated, but the capacity is limited. In general, deprived groups have limited access to
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higher education. Whether poverty, health and environment are priorities of 
nanotechnology funding is contested by Renanosoma.
5.4.4 Mexico
Mexico is a Latin American middle income country with 110 million inhabitants and a per 
capita income of US$10,000. It is member of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
NAFTA since 1994 and of the OECD. It has Free Trade Agreements with the EU, Japan 
and several other countries. Nanotechnology is mentioned as a strategic technology in one 
of ten lines for improving competitiveness (2008-2012) by the Secretariat for Economy. 
The general aim of the policy is to contribute to more and better employment, enterprises 
and entrepreneurs. Application areas for nanotechnology are mining, (sustainable) energy, 
housing, added value to natural resources (metals, minerals and agrifood). (Malsch, 2008)
Public engagement
The federal government has not published its national strategy for nanotechnology 
development, even though it has been announced already in 2007. Activities in nanoscience 
and nanotechnology in the country seem to be more the result of a bottom-up process. 
Natural scientists are beginning to cooperate in nanotechnology networks and they appear 
to be in favour of a more centralised strategy for nanotechnology development. Social 
scientists cooperating in ReLANS (see section 5.4.1) lobby for a national nanotechnology 
policy. It is not clear to what extent natural and social scientists are talking to each other.
Respect national sovereignty
Since the Mexican federal government has not published a strategy for nanotechnology 
development so far, there are no mechanisms to control the influences international 
cooperation in nanoscience and nanotechnology might have on national policy.
Foreign and private investment in stimulating a knowledge economy
Mexico is collaborating in nanotechnology research with the European Union as well as 
individual countries in Europe, North and South America and Asia. Mexican researchers 
can participate in the EU Framework Programme for RTD, and Mexico and the EU have 
agreed to invest both about 5 million euro in common projects in nanotechnology for 
construction. The main bottleneck hampering socio-economic benefits from foreign public 
investment is the lack of a clear government policy fostering innovation and the Mexican 
culture where networking and cooperation is still underdeveloped.
In 2006, Mexico invested 0.46% of GDP in R&D, ranking fourth in Latin America behind 
Brazil, Chile and Argentina. Companies were responsible for 41.5% of this. (RICYT, 
Estado de la Ciencia, 2008) Few public research organisations participate in academia- 
industry cooperation in nanotechnology.
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Fair structures o f the global knowledge economy
In the period 2000-2007, Mexican organisations and individual patent holders registered 
only 28 nanotechnology patents. (RICYT, Estado de la Ciencia, 2008) This is very low 
compared to western countries. In the current structures of the global knowledge economy, 
this lack of patenting is a disadvantage.
Access to higher education and research jobs
The Mexican higher education system is still mainly discipline oriented, and 
interdisciplinary education including in nanoscience is only just emerging. According to 
HDI-2006, Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio is 80.2%, 
ranking 54th worldwide. There is great variety in quality of higher education in Mexico with 
great differences between public and private universities. There is no data on access to 
higher education and research jobs in nanotechnology for deprived groups in Mexico.
Target research to poverty and health related problems and environmental 
sustainability
The housing sector is interested in applications of nanotechnology. In the diagnostic report 
on nanotechnology in Mexico and other advisory reports, applications including water 
purification, cheap housing etc are mentioned, but no data is available on how much effort 
is really deployed to achieve those aims. (Nanoforumeula, 2007)
Conclusions Mexico
In this section, nanotechnology policy in Mexico has been analysed to identify bottlenecks 
for sustainable nanotechnology development and what role international cooperation could 
play. There is a lively debate on nanotechnology policy in Mexico, in which federal, 
regional and local governments, natural and social scientists participate. However, this 
debate has not yet been translated in an official government strategy. The government does 
not enforce respect for its national sovereignty in international cooperation in 
nanotechnology which limits the chances that foreign investments benefit the socio­
economic development of the country. Patenting nanoinventions by research organisations 
in Mexico is not done on a large scale. This is problematic because the structures of the 
global knowledge economy benefit organisations possessing IPR. Nanotechnology 
education does not appear to be a national priority. There is reference to poverty, health and 
environmental sustainability in the discussion about nanotechnology, but there is no 
separate funding budget set aside for achieving these priorities. To conclude, the lack of a 
national nanotechnology policy in Mexico is the main bottleneck hampering sustainable 
nanotechnology development in the country.
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5.5 Conclusions
To conclude, the theory of justice and its practical application in the form of the capabilities 
approach makes it possible to develop a framework for assessing which factors influence 
the chances that national policies and international cooperation in nanotechnology will 
contribute to sustainable nanotechnology development. It is not only suitable for making 
the dynamics of the activities of actors inside nanotechnology research and policy making 
visible, but also to identify relevant external bottlenecks which should be addressed to 
improve the chances of success of such nanotechnology policies. Comparing Argentina, 
Brazil and Mexico, the main bottlenecks in Argentina appear to be a lack of financial 
resources and a lack of trust in especially public institutions. Strengths of Argentina include 
good human and natural resources and well-established national and international networks. 
The main bottlenecks in Brazil appear to be a lack of access to higher education among 
deprived parts of the population and the complicatedness of the national legislation. 
Strengths of Brazil include the strong federal government policy on nanotechnology 
development, strong networking inside the country and internationally, and very rich 
natural resources. The main weaknesses in Mexico include the lack of a formal federal 
government policy and the lack of networking among research groups inside Mexico as 
well as academic-industrial cooperation. Strengths of Mexico include the availability of 
high quality research infrastructure and world class researchers and a wealth of natural 
resources. All three countries are weak in patenting nanotechnology inventions and hence 
are disadvantaged in the current structure of the international knowledge society.
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Chapter 6: Nanotechnology and shifting 
boundaries between natural and artificial.
In this chapter, the development of nanotechnology with potential implications for the 
shifting boundary between the natural and artificial world is taken as a starting point, 
together with the public or stakeholder discussions about this development. From the 
perspective of this technological development, questions arise to which the ongoing debate 
in philosophy and ethics may give answers in the form of valuable insights. Conversely, the 
discussion of these issues in the present chapter may hopefully contribute to progress in the 
philosophical-ethical debate on technology and anthropology.
As discussed in section 3.2.3 the relevant debate regarding nanotechnology and the shifting 
boundary between natural and artificial entities is held under different titles, involving 
distinct and partially overlapping groups of actors and stakeholders. These titles are 
nanobiotechnology / bionanotechnology, nanomedicine, converging technologies / human 
enhancement, and synthetic biology. Of these titles, human enhancement and synthetic 
biology are the broadest, involving a more diverse range of actors and stakeholders than the 
more nanotechnology related terms. Human Enhancement and Synthetic Biology are labels 
for distinct discourses, with different implied ethical and societal issues. Whereas Human 
Enhancement focuses on societal and technical trends with the potential to change the 
human body, mind or identity; Synthetic Biology focuses on mainly technical trends with 
the potential to change living organisms in general. Since Human Enhancement is the most 
encompassing, this will be the focus of this chapter.
To start with, an analysis of the concepts of “human” in the current debate on Human 
Enhancement is presented which will result in some questions for philosophical 
anthropology literature. Which relevant interpretations of each concept can be found in 
literature? Do all concepts recognise the existence of a boundary between natural and 
artificial in their interpretation of what it means to be human? For those concepts that do 
recognise the existence of such a boundary, are there different judgements of how much 
shifting of the boundary between natural and artificial enabled by nanotechnology would be 
acceptable? Are there overlaps or contradictions between the concepts? What meanings are 
given to the related concept of “Human Dignity”? This concept has two sides: Human 
Rights and Responsibility. Do theories of Human Rights and Responsibility have 
something to say about which impacts of nanotechnology on the shifting boundary between 
natural and artificial will still be acceptable and which go too far? But first, let’s review the 
current debate on Human Enhancement.
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6.1 Human Enhancement
Since approximately 2001, a discussion has been held on Human Enhancement issues as 
potential implication of several technological developments. These include nanotechnology 
and nanomedicine, converging technologies (nano, bio, info and cogno), brain research and 
ICT implants in the human body. Participants in the policy and stakeholder debate on 
Human Enhancement include a range of different actors. Experts have participated in expert 
conferences on Converging Technologies organised by the National Science Foundation 
(USA) and the European Commission, in the European Group on Ethics and in an advisory 
committee to the UNESCO Commission for Ethics in Science and Technology. Specialist 
NGO’s have issued opinions on converging technologies and on human enhancement, 
including ETC group, the World Council of Churches and the Transhumanist Association. 
Parliamentary technology assessment institutes have published reports and organised 
debates with politicians and stakeholders on these issues, including STOA (EU), ITAS 
(Germany) and the Rathenau Institute (Netherlands). The European Commission has 
mentioned enhancement in its code of conduct on responsible nanotechnology research 
(EC, 2008). Journalists and essayists have discussed the issues in the media. And the debate 
is expected to pick up steam and become even more prominent in the coming years.
In a recent report, STOA, TAB and Rathenau Institute (2009) distinguished four types of 
enhancement, including mood, cognitive, bodily and life expectancy enhancement. 
According to van Est et al (2008), the current problems are not so much technology 
development or a lack of regulation. What is problematic is that new social movements are 
experimenting with new applications of (medical) technology. These movements and their 
activities, however, have not been investigated systematically as yet. Their essay illustrates 
the return of the debate to human enhancement issues as a societal and philosophical 
phenomenon. In one interpretation, the debate on the implications of nanotechnology and 
other emerging technologies is part of the centuries-old philosophical debate on human 
desires to improve the individual or the human race as a whole. The striking difference is 
that the discussion on nano and other emerging technologies and human enhancement has 
taken real technological developments as starting point rather than dreams and 
philosophical concepts. It appears that the technological development is less rapid and 
revolutionary than expected, which may explain why the philosophical and stakeholder 
debate has moved away from the technology development again. In this chapter, I will not 
follow this trend, but limit myself to human enhancement enabled by nanotechnology. It is 
the technological development which brings forth really new practical tools enabling 
human enhancement, not the discussion about future scenarios, or new uses of old 
technology. Whether the technology will be developed into a functioning device that 
becomes an integral part of the human body depends not only on technology development 
but also on human governance including funding priorities and legislation.
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6.1.1 Human Enhancement Technologies
The Human Enhancement Technologies discussed in the stakeholder debate range from 
cups of coffee to future scenarios of post humans. In some of these technologies and 
medical trends, nanomaterials or nanodevices are used. In the future, nanotechnology may 
be used more broadly in such products. Preventive medicine is not commonly considered a 
form of human enhancement, but it does contribute to medicalisation of formerly healthy 
people, which means it has comparable effects on society to human enhancement (e.g. 
increasing the costs of healthcare, shifting focus from healing the sick to treating healthy 
people). Nanotechnology can contribute to this in several ways, including in biosensors in 
body area networks and as lab on a chip for testing blood samples for personalised 
medicine and food, and in functional food.
Implants and prosthetics may in the future also be used for enhancement. Currently, 
implants and prosthetics are only used for medical applications. Pacemakers have been on 
the market since the 1950s. Nanotechnology may be applied to improve them in 
biocompatible or drug-eluting coatings and in smaller electrodes or improved batteries. 
Cochlear implants also exist, and may be improved with nanotechnology. Retina implants 
depend on nanostructured electrodes for connecting a chip to the optical nerve. These chips 
have been in the clinical test phase for some years, but they will not enter the market 
anytime soon. They enable vision in a broader spectrum than just the visible light. Patients 
see also in Infrared. This is considered an enhancement of which the pros and cons are 
currently being debated. However, this Infrared vision can’t be switched off; closing one’s 
eyes does not shut out the Infrared light. As a result, the patient can’t sleep anymore. (Ellis- 
Behnke, 2010) So in the reality of today Infrared vision is no more than an undesirable side 
effect of a medical device intended for assisting disabled people.
Neuro-implants include deep brain stimulation for Parkinson and depression. Some of these 
implants are already in use. Limb-prosthetics integrated into the nervous system are also 
being developed including a “nanohand” in an EU funded project.
Brain-machine interfaces are applied in experiments in apes and humans, mainly for 
medical applications. In the long term, enhancement applications are foreseen.
Prof. Kevin Warwick was the first to experiment with an implanted RFID chip in 1998. The 
company Verichip has been selling RFID implants in the USA since 2004. According to 
Wikipedia 80 hospitals and 232 medical doctors are using it to implant medical records in 
patients. Baja Beach Club Rotterdam and Barcelona have implanted a purse on a chip in 
VIP customers in 2004. Most of these chips are not integrated in the nervous system. Long 
term scenarios for military nanotechnology include brain-machine interfaces for remote 
control of vehicles, implanted systems and soldier-body manipulations. (Altmann, 2006, 
Schilthuizen & Simonis, 2006, 2009) Kevin Warwick has communicated via a chip in his 
nervous system with his wife or a computer network and controlled doors, computers and 
robot arms on location and remotely via internet. More recently, some of his students have 
implanted a magnetic sensor in their fingertip as part of a system that enables them to “see” 
through a wall via extrasensory perception. Warwick dreams of a future as a cyborg 
including memory enhancement, sensory enhancement (IR/X-ray vision and direct sensing) 
and brain-to-brain communication. (Warwick, 2007)
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According to Aubrey de Grey (SENS project, Cambridge University, UK) the first human 
who will live 1000 years is already 60 years old. De Grey aims for Strategies for 
Engineered Negligible Senescence (SENS), promoting regenerative medicine solutions for 
the diseases and disabilities of ageing. His final aim is to overcome ageing by rejuvenating 
body cells. (SENS Foundation website: www.sens.org) Transhumanists want to improve 
humans and some of them think we can live forever. Transhumanists have considerable 
influence on the national nanotechnology initiative in the USA. (www.transhumanist.org ) 
Especially in the USA, some people have their bodies or heads frozen in cryogenic 
suspension, hoping for a cure for their diseases and restoration of bodily functions thanks to 
nanobots. (www.foresight.com)
6.1.2 Philosophical debate
The philosophical debate on human enhancement is centuries old. This debate remains 
limited to speculative ethics, and is mainly concerned with issues that are currently not 
technically feasible. The discussion is still mainly dominated by future visions. The current 
stakeholder debate attempts to focus on hypothetical experiments by societal groups with 
alternative applications of existing medical technologies. Another issue is the effect of 
activities that cross the border between human and more than human. (e.g. van Est, 2008) It 
remains unclear who is exactly involved in such activities, what they do and how large the 
groups are. Governance issues are insufficiently being discussed, such as the question “Is 
Human Enhancement the most efficient use of resources for R&D for e.g. improving 
learning abilities?” (Arie Rip, 2009) Such governance issues are also the focus of this 
chapter. That is the reason for concentrating on nanotechnology enabled human 
enhancement currently in development. What consumers and patients do with existing 
medical technologies for non-medical goals or on long term future scenarios is not covered 
in this thesis.
Nanotechnology is not the only technology which contributes to a shifting boundary 
between natural and artificial. Cyborgs exist already, if one includes pacemakers, cochlear 
implants and deep brain stimulators to assist the disabled. But still there is an intuition that 
limits should be imposed on such boundary crossing or fusion between what is alive and 
what is not. Another question, more adequate to the current situation could be: When will 
the borderline between therapy and enhancement be crossed due to nanotechnology? But it 
remains to be clarified why this distinction would be important.61 Rather than joining the
61 Another key concept in the discussion is “human health”. Again, there is no consensus 
on what this means. Gregor Wolbring has examined the different concepts of health which 
play a role in the current debate on enhancement. These range from simply “the absence of 
illness” via “a state of full physical, psychological and social well-being” according to the 
World Health Organisation, to improving capacities over biological species boundaries. 
(Wolbring, 2005)
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debate on what is health or disability or on when a medical intervention in the body stops 
being aimed at healing but starts stressing human bodily functions beyond their natural 
range, I will examine what it means to be human. Whether someone is healthy or ill, able or 
disabled, he or she is a human being. Unfortunately, there is not one single answer to this 
question. Several distinct views are playing a role in the current debate on nanotechnology 
enabled human enhancement. According to some, human beings are image and / or likeness 
of God. Both Cosmo centric and anthropocentric religious visions can be distinguished. 
Others focus on humans as Persons. Kant has given an authoritative interpretation to this 
concept, implying a disconnection between human reason and animal body. (C.f. Paschen 
(TAB), 2003). Yet others see humans as rational animals, including Aristotle and 
Nussbaum. And finally, people like Marvin Minsky and transhumanists consider humans as 
biological machines.
Recently, several (groups of) authors on nanotechnology and human enhancement have 
moved away from the discussion on what it means to be human and human dignity, towards 
broader concepts including human flourishing (e.g. Sandler, 2008) and human 
sustainability (van Est et al, 2008). The introduction of such broader and ill-defined 
concepts is not expected to add value to the current debate. Therefore this chapter will 
focus on an analysis of the anthropological concepts which can be identified in the current 
debate.
6.2 The different concepts o f “human” in the current debate
Four concepts of “human” can be identified in the current debate: Imago Dei, Person, 
Rational Animal and Biological Machine. All four concepts are attempts at saying 
something about what it means to be human. The moral implications of the different 
concepts vary from restrictive to liberal.
Most often in the current debate, “Imago Dei” is interpreted in a Cosmo centric way. It is 
seen as the ground for prohibiting human beings to “Play God”. People with techno phobic 
conservative or orthodox religious views are opposed to “Playing God”. On the other hand, 
technophile anti-religious writers discuss it as an outdated view contrasting with their own
Related to this, there appears to be disagreement on the concept of disability. In a 
discussion paper published by the World Council of Churches, five models of disability are 
being distinguished:
- The medical model of “disability / impairment”
- The medical model / social determinants / social well-being combination model of 
“disability / impairment”
- The medical model / transhumanist / enhancement determinants / social well-being 
combination model of “disability / impairment”
- The pure transhumanist model of “disability / impairment”
- The social model of disability. (Lee & Robra, 2005)
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standpoint. Interestingly, some authors in the transhumanist movement like James Hughes62 
explore other, more anthropocentric religious views which would be in favour of human 
enhancement, to mobilise support for their project to enhance humans beyond species- 
specific boundaries. This is a case of special pleading, because their end goal, to enhance 
humans, is kept outside the scope of the debate. They let only the motivation why such 
enhancement is to be considered a good thing be approached from different angles.
In a recent analysis of the debate on synthetic biology, Henk van den Belt (2009) found that 
“Playing God” was more used as an argument by secular stakeholders like the ETC Group 
and by journalists than by theologians. Synthetic biology pioneer Craig Venter has installed 
an Ethics of Genomics board consisting of bio ethicists and theologians who saw no 
objections to his plan to construct a minimal genome. Liberal theologians including Ted 
Peters (Professor of Systematic Theology, Berkeley, California) (e.g. Peters, 2007) and the 
Ethics of Genomics Board deny the religious character of the ‘Playing God’ argument. 
According to Peters, the God in ‘Playing God’ is rather ‘Deified Nature’. Dutch theologian 
Frits de Lange distinguishes between the Protestant restoration model of redemption 
returning to the situation before the Fall and the liberal model of redemption as the 
completion or perfection of Creation. De Lange considers the liberal model to lead to 
almost unrestrained optimism regarding genetic technologies. Van den Belt notes that the 
current debate on the meaning of life is held from an anthropocentric perspective and that 
transgressing the boundary of the human being is the main issue at stake also in synthetic 
biology. (Belt, 2009)
It remains to be seen whether the ETC group members and journalists quoted are really 
secular or non-religious rather than lay religious people. Not all believers are theologians or 
bio ethicists and not all who are professional theologians or bio ethicists are believers. And 
it has not been demonstrated that assuming the liberal model of redemption really comes 
down to an ‘anything goes’ mentality regarding human enhancement as de Lange seems to 
think. That will be assessed later in this chapter.
Technology assessment specialists and policy makers, who want to explore argumentations 
pro and contra granting human rights to enhanced humans or trans- or post human 
intelligence find the concept of “Person” interesting. They expect that current scientific and 
technological development may one day bring forth such beings. Interfering with the 
human body gives rise to most questions for human self-understanding and identity. It is 
inherently human to change nature and oneself. Neuroimplants which influence individual 
thoughts and other artificial changes of the human person are considered problematic. It 
might be useful to distinguish between (biological) human being and (Kantian) person, who 
can never be seen as a means but only as an end in himself, and has the right to develop 
himself. It may then be possible to give human / machine mixed beings the right to be 
treated as persons. (Paschen, 2003)63 Transhumanist James Hughes also adheres to a 
concept of the person as the bearer of rights. He bases this on the possession of capacities
62 See podcast interview: http://www.greenflame.org/2005/06/08/changesurfer-radio-and- 
the-created-co-creator/
63 see also section 3.1.3 in part I above
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for thought and feeling. In his view, not all human bodies are bearers of rights. (Hughes, 
2004)
Recently, another concept of humans as rational animals has been discussed by some 
authors exploring philosophical, ethical and societal aspects of nanobiotechnology and 
human enhancement. Jotterand (2008) took the concept of humans as rational animals as 
starting point. He thought that developments in neuroprosthetics and other new 
technologies for therapy, enhancement and in the long term even transformation of humans 
will lead to creation of a new kind of humans. “Humans will no longer be rational animals 
but potentially rational animal-machines or super-rational animal machines. The traditional 
conception of human beings as biological and rational entities will be transcended by a new 
dialectic between technological devices and the biological human body. (Jotterand, 2008, p 
18) He raised three issues for debate on technology, the body/brain and ethics: the moral 
acceptability of the brain-computer interface, the enhancement of human capacities and the 
alteration of human nature. These issues are related to the concept of “human flourishing”. 
The solution is not philosophical but political, but lacks a moral framework to base 
decisions on. Ethical reflection should be integrated better at the core of scientific 
development itself and not limited to ethical assessment of the problems already in 
existence. (Jotterand, 2008)
Sandler (2008) proposed a framework for assessing human enhancements based on human 
flourishing rather than human nature.
The concept of “Biological Machine” is mainly postulated without argumentation. It is used 
to motivate uninhibited exploration and development of trans-, post- and non-human 
intelligence. It is also apparent in the aims and scopes of many research programmes and 
projects in nanomedicine and nanobiotechnology. One example is the concept of the “cell 
factory” where a living biological cell is used to produce materials such as nanoparticles. In 
the practice of such research programmes, policy makers and scientists don’t usually reflect 
on the philosophical implications of the concepts they use. Some thinkers in the 
transhumanist movement are more conscious of such ideological aspects. On of them is 
Max More (2009). He explains that Transhumanism considers the biological human body 
“a marvellous yet flawed piece of engineering”. This body should be improved making use 
of science and technology. Earlier, Max More (1990) had defined Transhumanism as “a 
class of philosophies that seek to guide us towards a post human condition. Transhumanism 
shares many elements of humanism, including: respect for reason and science, commitment 
to progress, and valuing of human (or transhuman) existence in this life rather than in some 
supernatural afterlife. Transhumanism differs from humanism in recognising and 
anticipating the radical alterations in the nature and possibilities of our lives resulting from 
various sciences and technologies such as neuroscience and neuropharmacology, life 
extension, nanotechnology, artificial ultra intelligence, and space habitation, combined with 
a rational philosophy and value system.” Transhumanist ideology builds upon 
enlightenment philosophers including René Descartes and especially Francis Bacon 
(Novum Organum, 1620). Bacon pleaded for the improvement or extension of human 
physical and mental capacities by scientific and technical means.
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Not only transhumanists see humans as biological machines. A leading critic, Bill Joy 
(2000) adopted a similar vision on what it means to be human in his essay on “Why Nature 
Doesn’t Need Us”. He was convinced that continuing miniaturisation in the semiconductor 
industry will lead to thinking machines by 2030  unless action is taken to govern 
technological development.
The way each of these four concepts is currently used does not help to understand their 
origin and what nanotechnology means for the shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial. To clarify this, each will be analysed more in depth in the following sections.
6.2.1 Image and /  or likeness o f God
In this chapter a definition of Imago Dei is chosen related to the relationship between 
humans and technology. This approach is inspired by Hans van Munster (2004). Two 
extreme interpretations of the concept can be distinguished. The first interpretation will be 
called “humankind as image of God”, which is part of predominantly Cosmo centric 
religious views where God created the world and humans in his image and considered it to 
be good.64 The other interpretation is “humankind as likeness of God”. In this more 
anthropocentric interpretation, the world as it is now is not perfect, and humankind has 
been given the talents and authority to improve nature and oneself to become more like
God.65
6.2.1.1 Cosmo centric religious views
Cosmo centric worldviews take an unchanging, ordered world as a starting point. This 
worldview can be philosophical or theological. The theological Cosmo centric worldview 
assumes that God created a good world in which humans must fulfil their predetermined 
roles as image of God. Men and women, animals, plants and things each have well-defined 
places and roles to play which can not be changed at the own initiative of humans. Humans 
are not allowed to “Play God”. The objective boundaries of creatures are clearly visible.
According to Hans van Munster (2004), the Cosmo centric worldview presupposes the 
existence of a cosmos or a well-ordered universe. Furthermore, each human being has a 
primary knowledge enabling him to participate consciously in the ordering dynamics. 
(Munster, 2004, p 39) Ethical thinking is developing within the assumption of a well- 
ordered universe, externally given goal-orientation and roads to the future which have been
64 Frits De Lange refers to this as the restoration model of redemption in protestant 
anthropology.
65 This corresponds to the liberal model of redemption according to De Lange. (c.f. Belt, 
2009)
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planned from the past. (Munster, 2004, p 45) Cosmo centric theological worldviews can be 
found in Christian as well as other religions.
According to Max Wildiers (1989), in ancient Greece, the worldview was Cosmo centric. 
In Timaeus Plato considered the microcosm of a human being, governed by an imperfect 
human soul to mirror the macrocosm of the universe governed by the perfect world soul. 
Aristotle added intermediary spheres between the imperfect and the perfect. He explained 
the perfect motions of the universe mathematically and postulated an immovable mover or 
primary cause at the beginning of the moving universe. Christianity shifted the worldview 
to anthropocentric and Theo centric. The internal human being, the soul and God were at 
the core of the worldview of Christian thinkers. Augustine (354-430 AD) introduced the 
concept of “order” to establish a Christian cosmology, which was not the most important 
aspect of his worldview. According to him, being a good Christian does not presuppose 
knowledge of astronomy. Cosmo centric elements remained important in Medieval 
Christian philosophy, especially in scholasticism. Humankind should build up his culture in 
harmony with the cosmic order. Thomas Aquinas taught metaphysics of universal finality 
in which the Will of the Creator is at work everywhere. He assumed the existence of 
perfect, immobile heavenly and imperfect mobile earthly spheres. God leads the angels in 
movement of the planets at the service of humankind, the purpose of creation. The angels 
cause the origin and perishing of all material bodies, but not of their natural characteristics 
like heat, cold, dampness and dryness. The parents are mere instruments of the planets in 
conceiving a child. Human thought and will are independent from celestial bodies because 
the lower material world can’t influence the higher, spiritual world. This cosmology 
remained dominant until the Copernican revolution of the worldview. In subsequent 
modernity the worldview became increasingly anthropocentric, assuming human autonomy. 
Philosophers like Toulmin (1982) emphasized the limits of human autonomy and returned 
to cosmology. (Wildiers, 1989)
6.2.1.2 Anthropocentric religious views
The theological anthropocentric worldview assumes that God has given individual humans 
talents which they should use to establish order in the imperfect and chaotic world, in order 
to achieve a likeness of God and eventually live for ever in the Kingdom of God. 
Humankind is meant to grow and develop. People are not perfect as they are today. 
(Munster, 2004) Human beings are endowed with ratio and free will and can recreate 
themselves up to certain limits. They are not subject to the order of creation like other 
beings.
The anthropocentric worldview takes human dignity as starting point. Human rights impose 
norms on human actions. This worldview stems from the enlightenment tradition. It 
presupposes that all people are equal and no-one is allowed to limit the talents given to 
another human being; and that each human being is primarily free. (Munster, 2004, p 40) 
The issue of human dignity could be reformulated in terms of the Biblical concepts 
“Chaos” and “Logos”. Chaos is the starting point of our own existence here and now as 
well as in Genesis. The Logos, the ordered spirit, brings order into this chaos. Imperfection
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is not negative, like a corruption of the perfect Cosmos, but a positive step bringing order 
into Chaos. Imperfection is already an achievement. Humankind is a self-conscious, 
creative, self-governing being, ordering the world and moving through the world. (Munster, 
2004, p 46-47) Human dignity is inherently about relations between individual human 
beings and between humans and their environment. In the anthropocentric view, the 
individual and society as a whole are accountable for their deeds.
The shaping and testing of the conscience is based on general, transparent experiences that 
form the starting point for responsible thinking and acting. These experiences must be 
grasped and communicated in a concrete situation, after which one has to act. In this action, 
values and interests can conflict. (Munster, 2004, p 133) Tradition should enter the process 
of judgement as a guideline that can help people overcome difficulties. (Munster, 2004, p 
136)
Human autonomy implies acceptance and overcoming of one’s own limitations and bodily 
nature. Acceptance of mortality is part of that. (Munster, 2004, p 234-235)
The responsibility for God’s creation is exclusively attributed to humans, not to other 
creatures. Humans and other creatures are explicitly not equal or mutually exchangeable, 
but are in a hierarchical relationship to each other with humans on top. Intelligent robots 
created by humans would never replace humans as Imago Dei. It would always remain the 
responsibility of humans to govern these and other technologies for the good of humankind 
and in the spirit of God’s purpose with the world. This responsibility implies that scientists 
and technologists should avoid creating anything new that can’t be kept under human 
control. Like animals, robots can’t be granted human rights because they are not human. 
So, the liberal interpretation of Imago Dei is still a solid foundation for limits to radical 
human enhancement if this would imply the creation of a different new species. This 
chapter will not go into the issues of genetic enhancement crossing the species-boundary, 
since nanotechnology is not a key factor in this development. As mentioned before, 
nanotechnology can be a key enabler of enhancements of the body or brain of a living 
individual human being and of new forms of communication between people.
The boundary between human and more than human where nanotechnology may play a role 
is a trickier question. E.g. how to morally evaluate implanting people with Infrared vision 
or with artificial legs enabling them to jump ten metres high? Such enhancements do not 
influence the human genetic code. Assuming the anthropocentric interpretation of Imago 
Dei, humans are supposed to increase their likeness of God. In a Trinitarian Christianity, 
Jesus Christ the Son is the role model who will bring us to God the Father if we go forward 
in his Spirit. This progress is of a moral kind and implies that a physically and mentally 
disabled human being who uses his limited natural talents to lead a good life in accordance 
with Jesus’ teachings is better than a physically and mentally enhanced super-athlete whose 
brain is connected to the internet if he uses his skills to commit crimes and harm his fellow 
human beings or creation. Many Catholic Saints were in fact sickly or disabled people 
whose lives are nevertheless considered exemplary for others pursuing a good life. So this 
interpretation of Imago Dei can not be used to oblige disabled people to accept therapeutic 
enhancements to bring their body or mind up to a standard set by other people. On the other 
hand, it can also not be used as a categorical argument against any human enhancement
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with technical means whatsoever. Physical enhancement is irrelevant to the Christian 
intention of moral enhancement.
Later in this chapter, the grounds will be discussed that can be used to normatively evaluate 
applications of nanotechnology that contribute to a shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial in the human body. But first, this overview of the different concepts which play a 
role in this debate is continued with the next concept: “Person”.
6.2.2 Person
According to Sturma (2006), the concept of “Person” is distinct from “Human” and from 
“Rational Animal”. The concept has been developed in a historical process, from the STOA 
in Classical times via the Christian metaphysics, early modernity knowledge theory, 
philosophy of mind and moral philosophy from Locke to Strawson, to applied ethics. In 
early modernity after the middle ages, the concept of Person was newly grounded in 
knowledge theory, philosophy of mind and ethics. This new approach is apparent in John 
Locke’s “Essay concerning Human Understanding”, distinguishing “person” from “soul” 
and “human”. Locke defines the Person as an intelligent being, whose intelligence and self­
consciousness enable him to plan his life deliberately and to be able to take care of his 
future. This definition is the basis of Locke’s “Memory Theory”, according to which the 
identity of a person is limited by his consciousness. Leibniz, Butler, Reid and Hume are 
among Locke’s main critics. (Sturma, 2006)
Locke states: “Person is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does 
only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, 
essential to it: ... For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which 
makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a Rational 
Being”. (Locke in Nidditch, 1975, 335) “Personal Identity consists, not in the Identity of 
substance, but ... in the Identity of consciousness.” (Locke in Nidditch, 1975, 342) 
According to Locke, self-interest and responsibility are practical roots of the personal 
identity with a view to God’s justice. Someone has the human right to become a person, but 
can loose this right if he acts contrary to God’s law.
After Locke, Immanuel Kant made major contributions to the concept of “Person” in early 
modernity in the form of his knowledge theory and moral philosophy. Kant’s philosophical 
concept of “Person” connects the spatially and temporally positioned empirical subject with 
the theory of the identity of the self-consciousness (in Kant’s Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, 
Paralogismus chapter B). (Sturma, 2006) Kant considered the soul to be the central object 
of rational psychology. As object of internal perception, the substance of the soul is 
singular, immaterial and incorruptible. He called the identity of this intellectual substance 
Personality. Kant criticised rational psychology as a science for assuming that the concept 
of soul could be based on the transcendental subject of self-perception: “I think”. Without 
the consciousness that one is thinking, thinking is not possible. This thought has a synthetic
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function; it is not an objective thing or recognition. “I” is an empty image and can’t be 
object of internal observation. Self-reflection does not show that which determines the 
Person, but only the determinable self. “I” is connected to the plurality of images and is 
force of the unity of transcendental self-perception. Only the empirical becomes an object, 
not the transcendental “I” . “Da nun diese Identität der Person, aus der Identität des Ich, in 
dem Bewusstsein aller Zeit, darin ich mich erkenne, keineswegs folgt; so hat auch ... die 
Substanzialität der Seele darauf nicht gegründet werden können“. (KrV A 365, cited in 
Ritter & Gründer, 1989) To conclude, the concept of Person does not work in theoretical 
reason.
In practical reason, the Person becomes the driver as well as the object of freedom. Kant’s 
concept of the Person expresses belonging of the human being, not just to nature and the 
perceivable world, but also to the intelligible world. Kant called the aspect of belonging to 
the intelligible world “Personality.” Personality is the ability of the Person to determine 
itself. (KpV 155, cited in Ritter & Gründer, 1989)
Autonomy is what the Person achieves in the moral law. Kant also called it 
“Selbstzwecklichkeit” (being one’s own goal). People can have subjective and objective 
goals. Subjective goals are caused by longing for something. Furthering subjective goals is 
a hypothetical imperative. Furthering objective goals is a categorical imperative. This is 
only possible when there is something “dessen Dasein an sich selbst einen absoluten Werth 
hat” (whose existence has an absolute value in itself) as an objective goal or “goal-in- 
itself”. This is the Person. According to Kant, nature itself already designates the Person as 
goal-in-itself. Being a Person is not a product of the freedom of the Person, as Locke had 
proposed. The Person’s existence is a goal in itself. Only a goal-in-itself (the Person) can be 
the foundation of an objective principle of the Will. The purpose of the categorical 
imperative moves from the generality of the law that humans should make themselves a 
Maxim (formal moral principle) to the duty of the unconditional observation of the dignity 
of the Person: “Handle so, daß du die Menschheit sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person 
eines jeden andern jederseit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloß als Mittel brauchst”. (Act 
anytime in such a way, that you treat humankind in your own person as well as in any other 
person simultaneously as a goal in itself, never merely as a means to an end.) (Grundl. Zur 
Met. der Sitten, cited in Ritter & Gründer, 1989) This formulation of the categorical 
imperative is an attempt at determining the intentional implications or content of human 
dignity. (Wils, 2006)
Kant makes a sharp distinction between what has a price and what has dignity. “Im Reich 
der Zwecke hat alles entweder einen Preis oder eine Würde. Was einen Preis hat, an dessen 
Stelle kann auch etwas anderes als Äquivalent gesetzt werden; was dagegen über allen Preis 
erhaben ist, mithin kein Äquivalent verstattet, das hat eine Würde.” In the kingdom of goals 
everything has either a price or a dignity. In the place of what has a price, something else 
can be put as well as equivalent; what is valued over any price and equivalent to nothing 
else has a dignity. (Kant 1965, p 58, cited in Wils, 2006) The application domain 
(extension) of the dignity is the moral capability of humankind, which is shared with other 
intelligence. “Also ist die Sittlichkeit und die Menschheit, sofern sie derselben fähig ist, 
dasjenige, was allein Würde hat”. Therefore the morality and humankind, as far as it is
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capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity. (Kant 1965, cited in Wils, 2006) The 
autonomy which enables humans to impose laws on themselves is the foundation for the 
human dignity. “Die Gesetzgebung selbst aber, die allen Wert bestimmt, muß ebendarum 
eine Würde sein, d.i. unbedingten, unvergleichbaren Wert haben, für welchen das Wort 
Achtung allein den geziemenden Ausdruck der Schätzung abgibt, die ein vernünftiges 
Wesen über sich anzustellen hat. Autonomie ist also der Grund der Würde der 
menschlichen und jeder vernünftigen Natur.” The legislation itself, which determines all 
value, must be a dignity, i.e. have unconditional, incomparable value, for which the word 
respect denotes the evaluation that a reasonable being should make of itself. Autonomy is 
therefore the foundation of the dignity of the human and any intelligent nature. (Kant 1965, 
p 59 cited in Wils, 2006)
Kant laid the foundations of philosophical anthropology in his “Anthropologie in 
Pragmatischer Hinsicht,” in 1798. (Kant, 1922) He defines anthropology as that which a 
human being does, or can and ought to do. Humanity is unison of the Good Life with 
Virtues.
Here again, as in the critique of practical reason, Kant considers the human being a Person, 
because he can have the “I” in his representations. This raises him infinitely above all other 
living beings on earth. He is also one and the same person throughout his lifetime because 
of the unity of consciousness. He is “through rank and dignity an entirely different being 
from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes.” (Kant, 2006,
p15)
The anthropological characteristics are divided in the character of the person, the gender, 
the people (Volk), the race and the species. The character of any species can only be known 
by comparison with another species. Humankind is the only earthly intelligent being, and 
non-earthly beings are unknown to us, which limits the feasibility to characterise 
Humankind. Nevertheless, some typical aspects can be identified. Humankind has a 
character that creates itself by improving itself towards its own goals. The Human species 
has a threefold character, distinct from other species on earth:
- Technical, dealing with typical physiological properties of humans. This aspect 
deals with what distinguishes humans from animals including reason and the hand, 
as well as questions about nature versus nurture as determinants of human 
properties. The aim is to maintain the species by reproduction. This takes bodily as 
well as social preconditions for being able to have children and care for the family;
- Pragm atic, dealing with the techno-civilisation preconditions under which the 
reasonable animal can avoid violating himself. Humans distinguish themselves 
from animals in that an animal reaches its whole destiny individually, but humans 
only as a species as a whole, in the course of generations. Progress in what is 
known about the world is hampered because brilliant thinkers die shortly after 
reaching the forefront of knowledge, and are replaced by young people who must 
take years to achieve the same level of understanding;
- M oral, dealing with the ability to become a free-acting person. Is humankind by 
nature good or evil, or equally perceptible to good and bad influences? Kant 
argues that a human person has good as well as bad traits, but the human species 
as a whole is morally improving itself. A person may be good by nature, to begin
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with, but must be raised by adults who have good as well as bad characteristics 
and influence the young.
The human species is characterised by the necessity to belong to some kind of a civil 
society, like the hive of bees. The civil society is preferably organised by a combination of 
three principles: freedom, law and force. This gives a framework to enable humans to find a 
balance between the tendency to sociability and the tendency to conflict. Kant foresees a 
trend towards cosmopolitism, where we will all become citizens of the world. The species 
project should lead to a historic philosophical project. (Kant, 1922, 2006, pp 235-238)
Kant does not exclude the potential existence of non-human intelligent beings. However, he 
also does not say that if such non-human intelligence should exist, it would have to be 
considered a “Person” and bearer of human rights and human dignity. In his Anthropology, 
he appears to leave the discussion on what distinguishes human beings as the only known 
earthly intelligence from potential other intelligence open until such intelligence has 
manifested itself and any similarities and differences can be empirically investigated. In his 
discussion on the technical characteristic of the human species, he explicitly refers to the 
need to maintain the species through reproduction influenced by bodily as well as social 
factors. So it appears that Kant would be opposed to anything that might contribute to the 
extinction of the human race.
According to Sturma (2006), in current philosophy, the concept of the Person means a 
Being having skills and properties like self-consciousness, ability of epistemic 
differentiation, emotive expression, communication, education, time consciousness, 
situation dependent language, as well as emotional and social bonds. In philosophical 
anthropology, a distinction is made between the natural concept human and the cultural 
concept person. A person can also take the form of non-human intelligence including 
animals as well as artificial intelligence. There is an ongoing debate between proponents of 
the Convergence thesis, arguing that the concepts human and person are basically two sides 
of the same coin; and the speciesism-critical distancing thesis [Erweiterungsthese] arguing 
that the status and rights of person should be attributed not only to humans but also to 
animals (animal ethics) or to artificial intelligence. The distinction between human and 
person also plays a role in the discussion on human rights. E.g. persons as bearers of the 
right to participate in culture and society are opposed to humans as bearers of the right to 
life and physical well-being. In applied ethics, the concept of person as an autonomous 
being is interpreted by some animal rights proponents to include non-human animals and 
simultaneously to exclude some human beings who are not autonomous including embryos 
and comatose patients (e.g. Peter Singer). (Sturma, 2006) The latter interpretation would 
not be supported by Kant, because he emphasized that a human being is the same person 
throughout his lifetime. So he can’t become or stop being a person while he is alive.
In the current debate on nanotechnology and human enhancement, the concept of “Person” 
is introduced in an attempt to include not only humans, but also trans- or post human 
intelligence as bearers of rights. This interpretation follows the “Erweiterungsthese” as 
discussed by Sturma. The choice for this interpretation of the concept of person implies an
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a priori favourable attitude to enhancing humans, and an unwillingness to consider 
arguments against it. On the other hand, the convergence thesis reserves the status of person 
to humans. Like the concept of Imago Dei, this second interpretation of the person-concept 
rejects replacing humans by post-humans, but it is not clear whether and which types of 
human enhancement would be allowed. According to Kant, a living human being whose 
body or mind is enhanced with technical means will remain a person also after this 
enhancement, because he considers anyone to be the same person throughout his lifetime.
6.2.3 Rational animal
Does the often used concept of “rational animal” reveal another approach to the issues in 
the human enhancement debate? The concept of human beings as rational animals was first 
introduced by Aristotle in his Metaphysics. All living beings have a body as well as a soul 
which enables the animate being to move. The human soul consists of three parts: the 
nutritive soul common to all living beings, plants, animals and humans; the sensitive soul 
common to animals and humans and the rational soul typical for human beings. The 
nutritive soul initiates and guides the basic functions including the absorption of food, 
growth and reproduction. The sensitive soul enables perception of the environment and 
moving around. The rational soul enables representation and thought. (Aristotle)
Martha Nussbaum revisited Aristotle’s concept in a critique of Kant’s concept of Person. 
Whereas Kant considers the humanity of human beings to be in opposition to their animal 
nature, Nussbaum takes Aristotle’s concept of humans as political animals and Marx’s idea 
that a human being is a creature that ‘needs a totality of human life activities’ as starting 
points. The rational is considered to be an aspect of the animal nature and certainly not the 
only thing that matters in a truly human way of functioning. In the development of the 
political conception of the person, the basis for the political basic principles of the 
capability approach, it is recognised that humans are needful and time-bound animal 
beings, starting as babies and mostly ending up in another form of dependency. Rationality 
and sociability are inherently time-bound and enclose growth, ripeness and deterioration. 
The full human sociability encompasses symmetrical relations as well as more or less 
extremely asymmetrical relations. Non-symmetric relations can still imply reciprocity and 
truly human functioning. A human being does not have to be productive to be respected by 
other humans. The dignity of human needfulness is sufficient ground to claim the right to 
support. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 142-143)
Nussbaum holds a liberal political view with a particular concept of human dignity: “At the 
heart of this tradition is a twofold intuition of human beings: namely, that all, just by being 
human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society, and 
that the primary source of this worth is a power of moral choice within them, a power that 
consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one’s own evaluation of ends”. 
(Nussbaum 1999, p 57)
Aristotelians taught that all of nature forms a continuous whole and that all living beings 
don’t just deserve respect but also awe and admiration. Nussbaum thinks about animals as 
beings that have a ‘good’ and hence the right to strive for it. Animals are actors and
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subjects, to who something is owed, beings which are ends in themselves. The capability 
approach treats animals as acting beings that strive for a form of self realisation. 
(Nussbaum, 2000, 287)
The fundamental moral intuition of the capability approach is about the dignity of a life 
form that possesses capabilities as well as deep needs. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 294) The 
capability approach considers, like Aristotle, that there is something beautiful and awe­
inspiring in all the complex life forms in nature. Aristotle argues that all animals are related 
because they are all made of organic materials. Humans are not special. (Nussbaum, 2000, 
p 295-296)
The capability approach can be extended to the domain of relationships between humans 
and animals. The general aim of the theory mapping the political principles that shape the 
relation between animal and human is that no sentient animal should be robbed of the 
opportunity to lead a flourishing life, a life in the kind of dignity that is relevant to its 
species. All animals with a certain level of sentience should get certain positive 
opportunities to flourish. This theory implies direct obligations based on justice towards 
animals, not indirectly based on our obligations to other human beings. As in the case of 
humans, the capability approach is aimed at capabilities, not at functioning. Animals as 
well as humans should not be obliged to act according to an externally imposed conception 
of the good life. (Nussbaum, 2000, p 298-299)
Contrary to the concept of person, the concept of rational animal emphasises the organic, 
bodily nature of humans and animals alike as the basis for rights. In the discussion on 
nanotechnology and human enhancement, this might contribute to strengthening the 
boundary between the natural human body and mind and artificial post human beings. 
Human and animal dignity is specified in relation to species-characteristics, as Nussbaum 
explained. The dignity of a human being is therefore not the same as the dignity of a non­
human animal. On the other hand, the rational animal concept does away with the 
exclusiveness granted to human beings, which may open the door to granting other species- 
specific rights to different forms of enhanced humans up to and inclusive of a level where 
they are no longer human but belong to a newly created post-human species. Before 
exploring this further, another relevant concept seeing humankind as biological machines is 
introduced.
6.2.4 Biological machine
The concept of humans as biological machine can be considered to have been introduced by 
Descartes in the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason (1637). 
Descartes considers non-human animals to be complex organic machines, whose actions 
can be explained without assuming a thinking mind. Most of human behaviour can also be 
explained mechanistically, by assuming designed automata that mimic human actions. 
However, it would always be possible to distinguish a real human from a machine or 
animal. Even though a machine or animal could perform any individual activity better than 
any human being, a human being would be recognisable because he would be capable of a 
broader range of activities than anything lacking a soul. The feature distinguishing humans
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from non-humans thus appears to be the possession of a soul. No non-human intelligence 
would be able to use language as flexibly as a human being. (Descartes, 1637, 
http ://philo sophypages.com/hy/4b. htm)
In the 18th century, Denis Diderot (1769) developed some ideas which are central to 
contemporary transhumanist ideology, according to James Hughes (2006). Diderot 
considers sensitiveness to be an inherent property of matter and does not make a sharp 
distinction between animate and inanimate matter, because stone can be taken up in plants 
and enter the food chain to become part of animals and humans as well. Therefore 
inanimate sensitiveness can become animate sensitiveness. A new human being comes into 
existence through eating and other purely mechanical operations. A being can think if it can 
feel; possesses the organisation that gives rise to memory; connects the impressions it 
receives; forms its life’s story and so acquires consciousness of its identity. The human 
being is an instrument with the faculty of sensation or feeling: at the same time both the 
musician and the instrument. He also has the animal faculty of memory. If a harpsichord 
were organised like a human being it would also live like a human being. The difference 
between the animal and the human is merely one of organisation. Sensation, life, memory, 
consciousness, passion and thought are the result of organisation of inert matter, heat and 
motion. Diderot rejected the alternative assumption of a hidden, invisible element of 
sensation that distinguishes living from non-living matter. Even the emergence of language 
was reduced to material causes. (Diderot, 1769)
Hans Moravec (1988, p 2) explained that genetic evolution has been the driving force in 
development of animals and humans since the first animals were able to learn behaviour 
from their parents 100 million years ago. Since 10 million years, some primates have been 
able to use tools, and since 1 million years to use fire and complex languages. Since the 
first human sapiens appeared 100,000  years ago, cultural evolution has gradually taken over 
from genetic evolution, speeding up ever more in the last 10,000 years. This cultural 
evolution includes subsequently an agricultural revolution, large scale bureaucratic 
governments, written languages, and the rise of leisure classes with time for intellectual 
activity. The industrial revolution and emergence of calculating machines has brought us 
close to a time when almost all human functions will have an artificial counterpart. 
Moravec believed that “the embodiment of this convergence of cultural developments will 
be the intelligent robot; a machine that can think and act as a human, however inhuman it 
may be in physical or mental detail.” He believed that humans will be superseded by such 
post-biological and post-human intelligence. (Moravec, 1988)
Marvin Minsky (1985) developed a theory of human intelligence as a computer 
programme, based on studies of child psychology and his own attempts at building robots 
with artificial intelligence. He argued that the mind is like a society, developing from the 
interactions of smaller and more basic processes. He intended to demonstrate how 
intelligence can emerge from non-intelligence. Minsky took as a starting point that 
machines can in the future learn to think. “ . w e  are still far from being able to create 
machines that do all the things people do. But this only means that we need better theories 
about how thinking works. This book will show how the tiny machines that we’ll call
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‘agents of the mind’ could be the long sought ‘particles’ that those theories need.” (Minsky, 
1985, p 19)
“This book assumed that any brain, machine, or other thing that has a mind must be 
composed of smaller things that cannot think at all.” Minsky based his theory of mind on 
hundreds of assumptions, arguing that psychology is too complicated to make fewer 
assumptions. The brain in his view is a “brain-machine that manufactures thoughts”, and “a 
billion-part machine”, making the difference between a human brain and a computer or 
other machines just a matter of scale. The question whether or not minds are machines was 
not addressed in the book. (Minsky, 1985, p 322-323) Even though Minsky’s concept looks 
similar to Descartes’ automata, he did not explicitly refer to the Cartesian concept.
Like interpretations of the concept of person following the “Erweiterungsthese”, the 
concept of biological machine denies the existence of a borderline between human and 
machine or natural and artificial. In addition, it misses the strong ethical undertone inherent 
in the concept of person, who is the bearer of inalienable rights. Whereas the concept of 
person maintains human beings as the core category of those considered worthy of the title 
person, the concept of biological machine seems to imply that homo sapiens is merely a 
step in the evolution towards other species, not entitled to any special rights or protection.
6.2.5 Discussion
To sum up, four concepts of “human” in the current debate on Human Enhancement have 
been identified and their origin and relevant characteristics explored. These concepts were 
Imago Dei, Person, Rational Animal and Biological Machine. In the case of Imago Dei and 
Person, two distinct interpretations of the concept play a role in the enhancement debate. 
These are a more Cosmo centric and a more anthropocentric interpretation of the concept of 
Imago Dei and a convergence and distancing thesis regarding the relation between human 
and person.
In their moral implications, the concepts form a partially overlapping continuum ranging 
from the more Cosmo centric interpretation of Imago Dei which necessitates rejection of 
any artificial change to the human body or mind contrary to God’s natural law, to the 
biological machine concept which implies welcoming any change which can be considered 
to be an improvement including the replacement of the human race by a post-human 
intelligence. Between those poles, there is considerable overlap between the 
anthropocentric interpretation of Imago Dei, the Person and the Rational Animal concept, 
because all three grant human beings a particular human dignity.
Only “Imago Dei” grants exclusive status to humans distinct from all other life forms or 
intelligences. Only humans are created as image and likeness of God. This is valid for the 
more anthropocentric interpretation as well as the more Cosmo centric interpretation. The 
anthropocentric interpretation would not a priori forbid humans to improve themselves by 
artificial means. The “Person” concept emphasizes the intelligible, reasonable dimension of 
what it means to be human. According to the convergence thesis, the person and the human
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being are the same. According to the distancing thesis, a person is any reasonable being and 
a human being is only a person if he is reasonable. The “Rational Animal” concept 
emphasises the similarity of humans and animals, and attributes both a species specific 
dignity.
Three concepts make a distinction between natural and artificial in their interpretation of 
what it means to be human: Imago Dei, Person and Rational Animal. In the Imago Dei 
concept, there is a difference between what is created by God and what is created by 
humans. In the Kantian Person concept, the natural human body and mind are to be 
developed in the social context of a human civilisation (Kant, 1922). Natural and artificial 
are distinguished but connected. In Nussbaum’s interpretation of the Rational Animal, the 
natural origin of humans is emphasized. The artificial is not thematized, but appears to be 
considered instrumental to enabling humans and animals to develop their natural species 
specific capabilities. The “Biological Machine” concept emphasizes the material dimension 
of what it means to be human and does not make any distinction between natural and 
artificial.
Do the different concepts imply different judgements of how much shifting of the boundary 
between natural and artificial enabled by nanotechnology would be acceptable? The 
“Biological Machine” concept and the “Person” concept in the interpretation of the 
“Erweiterungsthese” open the door to granting rights to artificial intelligence. If the issue 
would be to judge conscious or involuntary actions contributing to the extinction of the 
human race, the concept of “Imago Dei” and the convergence thesis interpretation of the 
Person concept would give the strongest grounds for opposing this, because they give a 
special status to human beings as bearer of rights and dignity. The Erweiterungsthese 
interpretation of the Person concept and the Rational Animal concept would give weaker 
grounds for conserving the human race, not over and above but next to other beings. The 
concept of “Biological Machine” would give no grounds at all for protecting the human 
race as it is today. But in this chapter, the issue is to morally evaluate gradual shifting of 
boundaries between the natural and artificial due to technical improvements of the human 
body or mind on a nanometre scale. Such moral evaluation can’t be based on any 
anthropological concept as such.
6.3 Human Dignity
In the anthropocentric interpretation of Imago Dei, the Person concept and the Rational 
Animal concept Human Dignity is a core concept. These views stem from the 
enlightenment tradition. Human Dignity does constitute a foundation for imposing limits to 
human enhancement. Let’s examine what human dignity implies in these traditions.
From the perspective of the anthropocentric interpretation of Imago Dei, human dignity is 
reserved to humans and has a strong relational dimension, including relations between 
people, but also between humans and God and between humans and the environment. 
These relations are characterised by freedom to act as co-creators in bringing order in the
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present chaotic world. Furthermore, responsibility for others and accountability for one’s 
actions, as well as recognition of one’s own vulnerability are characteristic. Human rights 
are interpreted in a restrictive way, imposing limits to human actions. It is sometimes called 
the “Dignitarian Ethical interpretation of Human Rights”. (e.g. Brownsword, 2009) The 
concept of Imago Dei does not mean that the limits of the human species can be redefined 
at will, by an autonomous human decision, as if God does not exist. Several authors have 
made relevant proposals for a Christian interpretation of human dignity.
Dorien Pessers (2007) argued that human dignity could be interpreted in relation to 
biomedical technology to give rise to “gift ethics” rather than “ownership ethics”. If the 
human body is considered to be a gift one has received in the past this imposes moral 
restrictions to the purposes the body or parts of it can be used for. She referred to social 
rules for “giving because something has been given to me” (Do quia mihi datum est). 
(Pessers, 2007)
The Bioethics Reflection Group of the Commission of European Bishops Conferences 
emphasized the limits of human enhancement technologies, which can’t overcome the main 
problems of human life: suffering, lack of trust and love. A humane life requires 
acceptation of the limits of the human condition. Reflection on what is desirable for the 
future of humankind and on the values that should guide R&D of new technologies is 
required. Human enhancement technologies should be evaluated with the following criteria:
a) A harmonious development of the person;
b) Global solidarity including international justice;
c) Justice in each individual country;
d) The precautionary principle;
e) Informed consent and repercussions on future generations;
f) A case by case evaluation (COMECE, 2009)
In both cases, no a priori limits are imposed on human enhancement, but a general 
framework for evaluating individual technologies is proposed in accordance with a 
particular (Catholic / Christian) religious tradition.
The Person concept gives rise to a slightly different interpretation of human dignity. 
According to Kant, autonomy is the basis for human dignity that also imposes limits, in the 
form of the categorical imperative forbidding mere instrumentalisation of oneself or other 
persons. Each person’s responsibility is to humankind without reference to God. Kant also 
emphasized the relational character of the human species in technical, pragmatic and moral 
aspects, and the need for a civil society balancing freedom, law and force. Persons are the 
bearer of civil rights, whereas humans are the bearer of the right to life and physical well 
being. Again, it is not possible to impose a priori limits on human enhancement, but it is 
possible to base a general framework for evaluating individual technologies on elements of 
the Kantian Person concept including the categorical imperative and relational character.
The concept of Rational Animal in Martha Nussbaum’s capability theory grounds species 
specific dignity of humans as well as animals in the bodily nature and needfulness. Her 
vision is based on an anthropological interpretation of human nature, not on human dignity 
per se. Human dignity is not the same as the dignity of another animal, because it is 
determined by species specific capabilities. Human dignity is reformulated in basic rights to
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develop capabilities characteristic for each species. This should be stimulated and enabled 
by governments. The ten human capabilities distinguished by Nussbaum could be used to 
evaluate individual human enhancement technologies.
The anthropocentric interpretation of Imago Dei, the convergence thesis regarding the 
Person and the Rational Animal concept in Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation appear most 
suitable as foundations for limits to human enhancement. Needless to say, the Biological 
Machine concept is not related to human dignity or human rights whatsoever. Those who 
consider human beings to be no more than biological machines can’t see any reason to 
protect human beings. In their view, human beings have no special status, dignity or rights.
6.4 Human Rights
In this chapter the influence of nanotechnology on shifting boundaries between natural and 
artificial is the subject of examination. So far a moral evaluation has been made of different 
views on what it means to be human playing a role in the current debate on applications of 
nanotechnology for Human Enhancement. In three of the four distinguished views Human 
Dignity plays a role. Still, Human Dignity is not a solid foundation for limits to nano­
enabled Human Enhancement. Below, two hypotheses will be examined. Hypothesis 1 
assumes that Human Rights or Fundamental Rights (subjective Natural Rights) could give 
more solid grounds for such limits. The following questions will be discussed to test this 
hypothesis: How are Human Dignity, Human Rights and Fundamental Rights related? 
Which of the many currently recognised Human Rights are relevant to nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement and what do they imply? Hypothesis 2 assumes that the concept of 
Responsibility forms a good basis for limits to nano-enabled Human Enhancement. First, 
hypothesis 1 will be examined.
6.4.1. Historical development and interpretations o f Human 
Dignity, Fundamental Rights and Human Rights
In this overview, use will be made of Ishay (2004), Rosenbaum (1981), Kersting (1989), 
Wils (in press) and ICRC. From ancient historic times until the Enlightenment the Natural 
Law tradition prescribing rules for Human behaviour as well as Natural Rights granted to 
human beings was predominant. Natural Rights thinking can be identified in Classical 
Greek and Roman philosophy but also in very similar forms in the world’s major religious 
traditions. Natural Law in the Greek and Roman STOA and Christianity consisted of 
normative laws related to human nature as we know it through reason. During the 18th 
century Enlightenment, Locke contributed to subjectivising Natural Law into Fundamental 
Rights. In his view, humankind became bearer of fundamental rights, born by individuals 
confronted by government interference. The emergence of Modern States led to division of 
Natural Law in three parts: positive legislation, morals and basic rights. These basic rights 
were subsequently called Human Rights, originally defensive, protecting individuals from
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State interference. The term was probably first introduced by Thomas Paine in his English 
translation of the French “Declaration des Droits de l’Homme.” This western concept of 
Human Rights has become influential worldwide because of historic developments 
including the Enlightenment, Industrial Revolution, rise of the western economy, 
bourgeoisie, modern science, colonization, religious reformation and wars. Human Rights 
are pre-positive because they are independent of positive legal formulation, and constitute 
the foundation of any positive legal system.
How did a new theory of the State and of the relation between the individual and the State 
emerge during the early Enlightenment? Before, religion had been the basis for Natural 
Rights of people in their respective place in society, rights were God-given. From then on 
reason alone legitimised the individual right to life. Kant expressed this by calling the 
Enlightenment the “Age of Reason”. For the first time, European States emancipated 
themselves from universal papal authority and hence needed a new legitimisation of State 
souvereignty independent from religion. These circumstances of emancipation explain why 
most 17th and 18th century philosophers and rulers rejected the installation of any new 
universal authority to solve conflicts between States. The new sovereign states were 
legitimised by referring to a social contract between individual citizens and the state. In 
“The Leviathan” Thomas Hobbes stressed every individual’s natural rights. In the 
hypothetical natural original state, no government existed and hence no authority to resolve 
conflicts between individuals. These individual natural liberties could only be handed over 
to the state in a social contract in order to protect one’s life. He was the first to base State 
sovereignty on natural rights, but did not consider limits to State sovereignty. Locke (1690) 
stressed that the sovereignty of the State was limited by Human Rights of its Citizens. 
These emerging individual Human Rights were formulated in relation to the State which 
was obliged to protect them based on a social contract among citizens and on pre-existing 
Natural Rights.
The first generation of Human Rights formulated during the Enlightenment were mainly 
rights to life, property and security. Two key documents from this period are the American 
Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (1789). 
The American Bill of Rights clearly intends to protect citizens against the state. Rights 
relevant to nano-enabled human enhancement are security of person, life, liberty and 
property.66 In the French Declaration, articles 1, 2 and 4 include statements with general 
relevance to nano-enabled human enhancement and the societal context in which 
nanotechnology is currently being developed. Article 1 deals with freedom and equality: 
“Social distinctions may be based only on general usefulness.” Article 2 stipulates the aim 
of political association: to further the natural and inalienable rights of man: liberty, 
property, security and resistance to oppression. Article 4 gives limits to liberty: the power 
to do whatever is not injurious to others. Limits to this liberty may be determined only by 
law. (Ishay, 2004 p 82-83) The first generation right to private property contributed to the 
unrestricted formation of a free market economy. In the 19th century the industrial 
revolution gave rise to a poor urban working class and inspired an international socialist
66 http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill of rights transcript.html
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movement fighting for a second generation social, economic and cultural Human Rights. 
They also fought for universalising political and civil rights, rather than reserving them to 
wealthy men with the power and resources to claim them. Some authors (Cassin, Ishay 
2004) consider cultural rights and the right to self-determination of peoples to be the third 
generation Human Rights. These rights also emerged in the 19th century. Others include 
social, economic and cultural rights in one category of second generation rights.
In parallel to developments in Human Rights, the late 19th and 20th century also witnessed 
the emergence and codification of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) limited to armed 
conflicts. Institutionalisation started after the Battle of Solferino of 1859 which inspired 
Henri Dunant and others to set up the International Committee of the Red Cross and led to 
the Geneva (1864) and The Hague (1899) conventions as first instances of International 
Humanitarian Law. Some of the IHL conventions explicitly aim to protect humans against 
the effect of human made technologies. The first of these was the 1925 Geneva Protocol on 
the Prohibition in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological 
methods of warfare.
On an international level, Human Rights were first supported by supranational institutions 
in the 20th century after WWI. The League of Nations was founded to guarantee 
international security. The International Labour Organisation was given the task to set 
standards for economic and social rights. It was made up of representatives of governments, 
employers and employees and continues until today. After WWII the allied states leaders 
agreed to replace the weak League of Nations with the United Nations and gave this 
institution more authority to resolve conflicts between states and to promote international 
social justice. Smaller States and NGOs successfully lobbied for a strong UN authority in 
Human Rights matters. The UN can be considered to be the embodiment of a Kantian 
supranational authority.
Some authors distinguish a third generation of ecological rights or responsibilities for the 
living, laid down in more recent international documents such as the Rio Declaration of 
1992. This declaration places human beings at the centre of concern for sustainable 
development and is based on article 11 of the ICESCR (1966) guaranteeing rights to 
humane living conditions. These responsibilities will be discussed in the next section.
6.4.1.1 Relation Human Dignity, Fundamental Rights and 
Human Rights
Different interpretations of Human Dignity and how they relate to Human Rights have been 
discussed in section 6.3. There is a connection, but the exact relation between Human 
Dignity and Human Rights is open to interpretation. In one interpretation, Human Dignity 
is a moral concept and Human Rights the corresponding legal concept. E.g. in his 
“Metaphysics of Morals” Kant (1785) condemned rulers for treating individuals as means 
rather than ends. Kersting (1989) considers Kant’s categorical imperative discussed in
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section 6 .2.2 as the operation rule of the universality of morals, and the original contract as 
the operation rule of the universality of law and rights. Human Dignity implies Human 
Rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948). René Cassin, co­
author of this UDHR considered article 1 and 2 to express human dignity and articles 3-28 
to express different generations of Human Rights. Article 1 states: “All human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience 
and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.” Article 2 grants all rights 
and freedoms of the declaration to everyone and forbids discrimination. Likewise, on a 
national level the German constitution states that Human Dignity is incorruptible and that it 
implies basic civic rights.
A Fundamental Right is “a basic or foundational right, derived from Natural Law; . . .” 
(Webster, 2010) Fundamental Rights are subjective Natural Rights, existing prior to the 
formulation of legal documents and independent of the presence of a state that is capable of 
protecting them. Luhmann (2005) analysed the relationship between pre-positive Natural 
and Human Rights and positive law. Since the Enlightenment, a new basis guaranteeing 
Rights of Humans had to be found, disconnected from religious grounds. The social 
contract between individuals legitimising the sovereignty of modern states gave rise to a 
deconstruction of Natural Rights resulting in Human Rights based on a liberal worldview. 
Legal protection of Human Rights became an obligation of the State, but the Human Rights 
themselves remained outside the scope of the social contract because they were an inherent 
part of what it means to be human. Afterwards, during the 18th and 19th century 1st 
generation civil and 2nd generation socio-economic rights were increasingly formalised in 
legal documents, they became “positive” or posited, created by legislators or State 
authorities. Pre-positive Fundamental Rights and Human Rights are founded outside, pre­
existing to the legal order. Human Rights are codifications of Fundamental Rights resulting 
from subjectivisation of Natural Rights. Human Rights aim for increasing freedom and 
equality, without instruments to balance freedom and restrictions and equality and 
inequality of different individuals in particular cases. Such a balance requires positive legal 
rules, which impose restrictions on the civil and socio-economic rights of an individual. 
Unlike pre-modern societies, modern societies are subdivided in independent subsystems 
including the moral, legal, religious and political subsystems. Human Rights are aspects of 
the pre-political moral human nature and are simultaneously conceived as principles that 
must be embedded in the legal subsystem. The resulting ambiguity is worsened if the moral 
subsystem must be translated in positive laws.
Human Rights as laid down in current international declarations and treaties are part of the 
moral subsystem. Declarations are general statements of intentions and Treaties should still 
be implemented in national legislation. Neither of them is part of positive law. Where 
positive laws are formulated, Human Rights can be used as external standard to find out if 
laws can pass the test of moral criticism. Human Rights can only fulfil this role of external 
standard for national legislation if they remain pre-positive. When the body of international 
Human Rights becomes too extensive, this may give rise to two problems. Firstly, the 
international Human Rights documents may themselves become posited, because of 
increasingly detailed formulations. However, this is only a problem if State sovereignty is
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considered a valuable thing in itself rather than a means for protecting Human Rights. One 
could also consider increasing globalisation of positive enforceable legal protection of the 
Human Rights of all people in the world independent from their particular nationality a 
worthwhile goal. This first problem should be reformulated thus: there is a need for an 
independent unchanging minimum content of Human Rights externally to positive legal 
documents laying down the rules for protecting rights at national as well as supranational 
level. Secondly, the Human Rights may wear out because they are multiplied and called 
upon more frequently. Ideally, Human Rights should be relevant in case of suspicion that a 
particular law has violated a particular Human Right of a particular individual in the past.
Human Rights and technology
In practice, international Human Rights declarations and treaties are not only intended to 
protect individual human beings against a powerful state, but increasingly also to protect 
them against human-made technologies that endanger the mere existence of human and 
other life on earth as we know it. The earliest instances of such documents are the 1925 
Geneva Protocol outlawing the use of chemical and biological substances as weapons in 
war, and later International Humanitarian Law treaties. More recently, major environmental 
disasters in the second half of the 20 th century caused by technologies have inspired the 
formulation of third generation ecological rights and responsibilities for the living. Radical 
developments in genetic technologies since the 1980s have also inspired more recent 
documents on Human Rights and Biotechnology. Some expect that Human Rights will also 
become very relevant to some applications of nanotechnology especially nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement. E.g. the European Group on Ethics (EGE, 2010) has in the last five 
years developed its ethical framework for assessing new and emerging technologies 
progressively incorporating Human Rights principles and documents. In a particular case of 
nano-enabled human enhancement, one may ask whether something is created which 
conflicts with a particular Human Right. There are three problems with this: Firstly, Human 
Rights are intended to protect individuals, not the common good. Secondly, Human Rights 
are only invoked after the fact, not forward looking. Thirdly, Human Rights are internally 
ambiguous and contradicting each other. In the next section these ambiguities in Human 
Rights are examined further. The other two problems will be addressed in section 6.5 on 
responsibilities.
6.4.1.2 Ambiguities in Human Rights
All through their historical development until today, human rights have been contested by 
different societal groups as became clear in section 6.4.1. Wils (in press) examined more 
closely the inherent philosophical ambiguities in the concept of Human Rights and related 
concepts. In the literature, Human Rights are sometimes presented as liberties, sometimes 
as civil rights and sometimes as fundamental rights. These are overlapping but not 
synonymous concepts. Opinions also differ on the exact relations between human dignity, 
fundamental rights and human rights. Some emphasize that human right presuppose the 
existence of a state that can guarantee them. Others think they are based on what it means
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to be human. Some consider human rights to be political in nature and others highlight their 
moral foundation. These ambiguities make Human Rights more useful in philosophical 
discussions of how people should be treated in the far future, because they invite 
consideration of a broader range of relevant issues than if they were just a list of 
unambiguous criteria. The ambiguities restrict the usefulness of Human Rights as basis for 
imposing unequivocal limits to current developments in nanotechnologies which may 
contribute to human enhancement.
Like Wils, Brownsword (2009) was concerned with ambiguities in contemporary Human 
Rights, focusing on more concrete short term issues. He identified three conflicting ethical 
traditions in recent UN documents on human rights and technology: utilitarianism, a liberal 
interpretation of human rights and a dignitarian ethical interpretation of human rights. The 
utilitarian interpretation strives for the greatest good for the greatest number of people and 
leads to cost-benefit assessments on a collective level to determine whose rights should be 
respected in case of ethical dilemma’s for human rights caused by new technologies. The 
interests of the individual are subordinated to the common good. The liberal interpretation 
emphasizes the freedoms of individual reasonable persons to self-determination protected 
from state intervention. The state is responsible for guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of 
the individual. The dignitarian ethical interpretation emphasizes restrictions on the 
freedoms of individuals, groups and the state protecting human rights of weak human 
beings (such as unborn embryos). Brownsword favoured a liberal interpretation of human 
rights in relation to technology. (Brownsword, 2009) I would prefer another, dignitarian 
ethical interpretation.
It is not possible to solve the ambiguities in Human Rights documents by choosing one or 
the other interpretation, if only because others will choose another interpretation. In 
addition, because there are currently so many human rights some of them neutralise each 
other. This limits the value of all Human Rights documents as basis for protecting any 
rights whatsoever. The broad and inconsistent range of Human Rights gives so much room 
for interpretation that it appears to be a matter of individual preferences which rights are 
given priority. This was demonstrated by Brownsword in his analysis of UN documents on 
Human Rights and technology discussed above. In the interpretation of Luhmann discussed 
above, the gradual reinterpretation of pre-positive Human Rights to increasingly positive 
civil and socio-economic rights has led to this devaluation and contestation of the 
individual rights. On the other hand, positive Human Rights documents are not simply left 
open to anyone’s free interpretation. Human Rights courts are given the task to interpret the 
conventions in any particular case. Thereby they continuously contribute to jurisdiction 
defining the authoritative, consistent interpretation in a particular spatial and temporal 
context. The inherent ambiguities in the theoretical concepts of Human and Fundamental 
Rights and Human Dignity are irresolvable in Luhmann’s theory. This is because they 
escape the categories dividing modern societies into spheres and need to be accommodated 
to become effective. Another reason why they are ambiguous is because there are different 
underlying ethical or political theories in the formulation of human rights documents 
(including utilitarianism, liberalism and dignitarian ethics).
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In an attempt to overcome the observed contestation and devaluation of individual positive 
rights while rescuing the idea of universal pre-positive Human Rights, Walzer, Hart and 
Wils pleaded for concentration on a minimal content of universal human rights. (Wils, in 
press) Walzer (1987, 1993, 1994) proposed a minimal and universal moral code which can 
be found in particular local circumstances throughout the world’s history. This code 
consists of universal rules against violence committed against any human being (murder, 
deception, betrayal and gross cruelty) and particularistic rules against oppression of the 
poor in one’s own society. Hart (1994) explained that natural law is inherently teleological, 
aimed at the survival of the human race and individual human beings. It consists of “rules 
of conduct which any social organisation must contain if it is to be viable.” (Hart, 1994, p 
193) He pleaded for a minimum content of natural law based on five elementary truths 
concerning human beings, their natural environment and aims: human vulnerability 
(vulnerable humans are protected by commandments like “thou shalt not kill”); 
approximate equality; limited altruism; limited resources; and limited understanding and 
strength of will. (Hart, 1994) These five elementary truths make up some kind of 
anthropological basis which is empirically evident. They are five elements of the condition 
humaine. The minimum content of Human Rights should be concentrated on these very 
elementary aspects. The next section returns to the case of nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement and explores the usefulness of this idea of concentration on a minimum 
content of human rights for imposing limits on it.
6.4.2 Human Rights and nano-enabled Human Enhancement
Concentration on a minimum content makes the Human Rights principles very abstract and 
less applicable and enforceable in concrete cases such as the question what forms of human 
enhancement enabled by nanotechnology would be acceptable and what not. It remains to 
be seen how and when such minimum content could be useful in such cases. It might be 
useful in this respect to distinguish long term radical Human Enhancement visions and 
shorter term incremental Human Enhancement practices. The distinction between radical 
and incremental enhancements is based on Bruce (2007), according to whom radical 
enhancements envision a change of state regarding existing human capacities and 
conditions or regarding the very purpose of technology, uses (nano)biotechnologies within 
the body or brain, introduce permanent and irreversible changes and are employed to 
transform human capabilities and as such go beyond therapeutic contexts. Incremental 
enhancements represent a change of degree in the enhancement of human capacities or in 
technological innovations, involve technologies which are external to the body and which 
add to it, can be either reversible or irreversible, and generally assume the distinction 
between therapeutic and enhancement interventions. (Bruce, 2007) Making this distinction 
suggests an argument against radical enhancement and in favour of allowing (at least some) 
incremental enhancement. However, the possibility of radical enhancement is currently 
mainly a rather futuristic dream which may inspire scientists but is not likely to enter the 
market any time soon. Incremental enhancements are not only likely to be introduced in the 
foreseeable future, but may also turn out to be necessary steps enabling more radical forms 
of enhancement in the longer term. Therefore the present examination of Human Rights in
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relation to nano-enabled Human Enhancement is focused mainly on incremental 
enhancements. This is preceded by a more general discussion of radical enhancement 
visions.
Hypothetically, in the case of radical enhancement visions, a minimum content of Human 
Rights based on the condition humaine might be useful to discuss implications and 
dilemmas of long term developments without reaching any concrete judgement. In the case 
of incremental enhancement practices, the current extensive and enforceable positive 
legislation is assumed to be more useful. Both hypotheses will be tested below.
6.4.2.1 Radical enhancement visions
Is a minimum content of Human Rights useful for discussing dilemmas caused by radical 
enhancement enabled by nanotechnology in the far future? The interesting thing about the 
more radical nano-enabled human enhancement visions is that they put into question three 
of the five elementary truths concerning human beings, their environment and aims as 
formulated by Hart (1994): human vulnerability, approximate equality and limited 
resources.
Human vulnerability
Individual human vulnerability is expected to be reduced or even overcome by replacing 
cells, tissues and organs by artificial ones that are expected to be better than the natural 
original. The aim of overcoming human vulnerability by technological means gives rise to 
three ethical problems. Firstly, is the aim itself acceptable? Hart simply considers human 
vulnerability a fact of life as we know it today, but considers human rights to be neutral 
regarding attempts at overcoming vulnerability by technical means.67 Assuming thus that 
the aim is acceptable from a human rights perspective, a second ethical dilemma arises: If 
only the vulnerability of some people were to be reduced, their non-enhanced fellow human 
beings could become more vulnerable in their hands. The universal Human Right to life 
would still exist and be valid to enhanced and non-enhanced humans alike as long as all 
were regarded humans. There is no theoretical problem, but it may become more difficult to 
guarantee this right in practice for some groups.68
Thirdly, the way to achieve a reduction of human vulnerability of people in the future by 
implanting artificial body parts may put currently vulnerable human lives at stake or cause 
human suffering. Two distinct cases in which nanotechnologies for radical human 
enhancement are developed should be distinguished: where the technologies are exclusively 
suitable for radical human enhancement and where the technologies have both therapeutic
67 Some groups in society e.g. those with a cosmocentric worldview considering humans as 
Image of God may be opposed to this aim on moral or religious grounds, just like some 
groups are opposed to vaccination or blood transfusion.
68 The resulting increasing inequality is discussed below.
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and (incremental) enhancement characteristics.69 Deliberately risking human lives and 
bodily or mental integrity is problematic if the artificial body parts are developed 
exclusively for purposes of radical enhancement of the bodies of healthy people. According 
to the ethical theory of double effect (Wils, 2007) it is not acceptable to cause a bad effect 
in order to reach a beneficial goal. However, a determining factor in deciding acceptability 
of implanting artificial body parts is the question, who decides, or the issue of free and 
informed consent of the test subject. People take risks with their own lives and health all 
the time and such behaviour is in accordance with the human right to freedom. However, 
several authors have discussed the proper interpretation of “free and informed consent”. Is 
this at all possible in the case of new technologies which may have unforeseen 
consequences? To conclude, experiments with the sole intention to develop radical nano­
enabled human enhancement can’t be completely forbidden on the grounds of conflict with 
a minimum content of human rights aiming to protect vulnerable humans. But during the 
experiments and thereafter, the individual keeps his right to life and bodily and mental 
integrity, which serves as basis for guidelines how such experiments should be conducted.
Increasing inequality
In a world where only some people had access to such radical human enhancement 
technologies, the inequality in abilities between individual human beings would increase 
dramatically. Widening the gap between people with the longest and shortest life 
expectancy, highest and lowest levels of education and property is already happening under 
the influence of general technology development. It is not a priori obvious that radical 
human enhancement enabled by nanotechnology will have qualitatively different effects 
compared to other technologies.
The Human Right to equality implies that this trend towards increasing inequality is 
morally wrong. But it is not so clear how or even if this moral problem should be 
addressed. Limiting the discussion to conflicts of radical enhancement with the Human 
Right to equality is problematic because it presupposes the existence of a standard human 
being to whom all others should become equal. It is not clear how this standard should be 
defined. Some would prefer the average human being as he or she is today, others might 
prefer an ideal trans- or post human being incorporating all available human enhancement 
technologies. Furthermore, enforcement of equality would conflict with fundamental 
liberties. E.g. Leach Scully and Rehmann-Sutter warned that a sharp distinction between 
good therapy and bad enhancement could have unintended discriminatory social side 
effects, because it relies on a normalization of the human body with negative implications 
for those with disabilities or with better-than-average capabilities. (Leach Scully & 
Rehmann-Sutter, 2001)
It appears that even a minimum content of Human Rights is inadequate as foundation for 
limits to human enhancement because of remaining internal contradictions. Still, such a 
minimum content is adequate to clarify underlying moral theories of proponents and
69 See section 6.4.2.2.
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opponents of enhancement. Limits to Human Enhancements require specific and 
enforceable positive laws formulating civil and socio-economic rights. These rights give 
guidance on how to balance rights and appoint responsible national authorities (the Trias 
Politica in a modern western State).
In theory, the human right to equality could be furthered in three alternative ways:
■ Impose limitations on human enhancement, not allowing them if they increase 
inequality between enhanced and non-enhanced individuals
■ Make enhancement obligatory for all
■ Allow enhancement for some while forbidding discrimination of enhanced and 
non-enhanced people and /or prescribe legal compensation for the weaker 
individuals.
Positive socio-economic rights favour the last option.
Some more futuristic scenarios of molecular nanotechnology foresee universal recyclability 
of all materials and products, but simultaneously warn that such technologies might get out 
of control and turn the world into grey or green goo (Drexler, 1986). They are uncertain 
whether to expect overcoming the limitation of resources or rapidly using up and spoiling 
all resources. If molecular nanotechnology could overcome limitations of resources, the 
need for a fair distribution of the resources would disappear. However, this particular 
scenario of molecular nanotechnology is not the aim of current mainstream nanoscience 
and technology research. It is more a future vision used as an argument to convince 
investment in such ideas. Overcoming the limitations of available resources is therefore not 
a likely consequence of present-day nanotechnology development.
Other characteristics of present-day circumstances influencing the choices made in nano­
enabled human enhancement technology development are our common human limited 
altruism and limited understanding and strength of will. These characteristics call for 
balancing the three human rights and duties freedom, equality and solidarity (brother- and 
sisterhood). In one respect, the characteristics call for optimism: humankind is capable of 
altruism, understanding and willpower. On the other hand, they emphasize limitations and 
the need for supporting these beneficial tendencies by legal and organisational means, and 
through deliberation and education in human relations and networking. Whether or not 
radically enhanced humans would still be capable of altruism, understanding and 
willpower, or how to strengthen these characteristics legally or organisationally in a world 
where radical human enhancement would be possible may be an interesting topic for 
philosophical debate, but goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
6.4.2.2 Incremental enhancements
This chapter is focused on more incremental enhancements enabled by nanotechnology 
which are available now or expected in the near future. For the time being, the human 
condition remains as described by Hart (1994): people remain vulnerable, approximately 
equal, and have to cope with limited resources, altruism, understanding and strength of will.
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In the present world, it is a fact that the natural resources of the world are limited and that 
we are depleting them rapidly. Nano-enabled enhancement technologies can only be 
developed at the expense of limited resources. In the Netherlands, for example, most of the 
investment in nanotechnology comes from the national income from sales of natural gas 
found here. According to article 1, point 2 of the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (1966) as well as the International Covenant of Civil and 
Political Rights: “All people may, for their own ends freely dispose of their natural wealth 
and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic 
cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international l a w . ” Is 
enhancement of the body of mind of healthy individuals the best way to use the resources? 
This is a political question to which there is not one best answer from a universal human 
rights perspective, but it might be answerable from the perspective of Hans Jonas’ 
responsibility theory or third generation ecological rights. (discussed below in section 6.5)
Approximate equality is a descriptive concept, indicating one aspect of what it means to 
belong to the human species. The positive human right to equality is a prescriptive concept 
aiming to increase equality between individuals by legal means. It can be assumed that 
nano-enabled human enhancement will come about in an incremental way in different 
concrete contexts including assisting the disabled, sports and military circles. Then, the 
current legislative framework governing technology development in those domains gives 
enforceable detailed guidance for which applications should be allowed and which not. 
Where there are no suitable current regulations, new regulations should be developed 
benchmarked to their compatibility with human rights principles including equality. Unlike 
human germ-line biotechnology, nano-enabled human enhancement is mostly reversible: a 
retina implant enabling infrared vision can in principle be explanted again, thereby undoing 
the enhancement of vision over the species-typical boundary. In some cases nano-enabled 
human enhancements may not be reversible because the device can’t be explanted safely 
from the body of an individual. Even then, there are no consequences for the human species 
as a whole, because the offspring will not inherit the enhancement.
Overcoming human vulnerability in the long term may be an aim of proponents of nano­
enabled human enhancement. However, in the mean time, universal human rights to life 
and bodily and mental integrity aim to protect vulnerable humans. This includes those 
involved in experiments needed to achieve this long term aim, but also those otherwise 
affected by the development. The same rights protect future non-enhanced humans who 
will also be vulnerable. These rights give the firmest grounds for determining which nano­
enabled human enhancement technologies should be permitted for which applications and 
which should be forbidden. The pre-positive rights to life and integrity have been translated 
into a positive extensive body of biomedical law and ethics guidelines. These govern 
market access of medical technologies as well as medical experiments involving human 
subjects. These laws may be different in each country and allow room for interpretation, but 
in the short term they represent the best available framework for decision making. Even if 
an implant is designed to combine medical as well as enhancement characteristics in the 
case of incremental human enhancement practices, the presence of the enhancement parts 
could lead to more risks for the human test subjects in which case such testing should not
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be allowed. E.g. medical experiments on humans with retina implants enabling normal as 
well as infrared vision should be rejected because the infrared vision is not needed to 
restore normal human sight and may give rise to more suffering than an implant not 
enabling such radical enhancement. In fact medical experiments have resulted in such 
additional suffering because test patients could not sleep with the implant due to the fact 
that the infrared vision could not be switched off even when they closed their eyes.
6.4.2.3 Conclusion minimum content Human Rights
How and when is concentration on a minimum content of Human Rights useful for 
imposing limits on nano-enabled Human Enhancement? The proposed distinction between 
long term radical enhancement visions and incremental enhancement practices appears not 
to be watertight. This is because both radical and incremental enhancement experiments can 
be done in the short to medium term as steps on the way to future radical enhancement. 
Nevertheless, discussion of radical enhancement visions from the perspective of a 
minimum content of human rights based on five elements of the condition humane has 
highlighted ethical dilemmas without prescribing what should be done about them. Also, 
more elaborate and enforceable positive civil and socio-economic rights appear to be more 
suitable for imposing limits on incremental human enhancement.
6.4.3 Applying principles from human rights declarations on 
nano-enabled Human Enhancement
In the present casuistic exploration of the usefulness of individual human rights as basis for 
imposing restrictions on human enhancement, the main emphasis is on liberties of every 
individual in an international context, but social and ecological rights are also relevant. In 
order to approach universal validity, the starting point will be the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights UDHR (UN, 1948) and International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) include several values relevant to applications 
of nanotechnology with implications for the shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial. The documents stress the duties everyone has to the community and explicitly 
prohibit any abuse of these fundamental rights infringing on the rights of others. 70 In this
70 In addition, the “Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union” (EU, 2000) 
includes several other relevant values: right to integrity of the person, freedom of the arts 
and sciences, environmental and consumer protection.
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) includes the 
relevant ethical principles human dignity, consent, autonomy and responsibility, privacy,
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section, implications of the right to physical and mental integrity (a special case of the right 
to life, liberty and security of person), the prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment, 
the right to equality and non-discrimination and the rights to privacy and scientific research 
for the legitimacy of nano-enabled Human Enhancement are discussed.
Case 1: Physical and mental integrity
Nanotechnology based human enhancement technologies involving the insertion of an 
artificial device or material into the human body or integration of the human brain or 
nervous system with a technical system, (either within the body or wirelessly) have 
implications for an individual’s right to physical and mental integrity. The Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 13 December 2006) guarantees this right for 
persons with disabilities on an equal basis with others (article 17). Such intrusions are not 
allowed without the free and informed consent of the person, as specified by law (at least in 
Europe). There is a current debate among philosophers especially on brain implants. One of 
the key issues in debate is whether someone who has received a brain implant is still the 
same person he was before the operation. Kant would say he was, but then again, in his 
days brain implants did not exist and recent experiments have shown remarkable changes in 
personality of implanted patients. On the other hand, as the technology progresses, doctors 
will be better able to control the functioning of the brain implant, avoiding unwanted side 
effects such as personality changes. One issue is whether the experiments needed to reach 
this level of control are in accordance with current biomedical ethics rules. According to the 
ethical theory of double effect (Wils, 2007) it is not acceptable to cause a bad effect in 
order to reach a beneficial goal. So if it is necessary to use human test subjects to improve 
the brain implants, these persons should benefit themselves from the treatment. At least in 
the EU, this is guaranteed by medical ethics regulations.
Case 2: Inhuman or degrading treatment
The declaration prohibits slavery, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of anyone 
according to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). Article 7 
guarantees freedom from ... cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment ...: “ . n o  one shall be 
subjected without his or her free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.” This is 
relevant to nanotechnology based human enhancement technologies that can be used to 
control a person’s movements or thoughts by someone or something else. The declaration 
unequivocally rejects such uses of nanoenabled enhancement technologies on moral 
grounds. It can also be taken as a basis for moral design rules for implants or remote control 
devices which influence the human nervous system. It should not be possible to operate 
them by anyone other than the person himself. In a conference on Human Enhancement 
organised by the Dutch government departments of Justice and Home Affairs and the 
Rathenau Institute (20 May 2010), the use of fMRI and transcranial magnetic stimulation 
technologies to stimulate changes in behaviour of criminal psychiatric patients at the
equity and justice, solidarity and benefit sharing. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php- 
URL ID=31058&URL DO=DO TOPIC&URL SECTI0N=201 .html
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disposition of the government (TBS-ers) was discussed. Some rejected it because of 
conflicts with the Human Rights of the patients. Others wondered what to do if such a 
patient asked for such treatment hoping for a chance to be released. The Human Rights 
principles appear to be more useful to structure debate on ethical dilemma’s than as an 
unqualified basis for judgement on limits.
Case 3: Equality and non-discrimination
Equality and non-discrimination may be at stake if nanotechnology based human 
enhancement technologies are used to set apart and limit the rights of a group of people 
sharing a particular characteristic. It is not enough to simply give all enhanced and non­
enhanced people equal rights because their abilities may differ so much that they are not 
able to benefit equally from the rights. In that case positive discrimination is needed to 
allow the weakest party to participate or to protect this weakest party, similar to the current 
provisions in the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN, 13 December 
2006). This convention demands equality and non-discrimination (article 5):
“ 1. States Parties recognise that all persons are equal before and under the law and are 
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law.
2. States Parties shall prohibit all discrimination on the basis of disability and guarantee to 
persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination on all 
grounds.
3. In order to promote equality and eliminate discrimination, States Parties shall take all 
appropriate steps to ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided.
4. Specific measures which are necessary to accelerate or achieve de facto equality of 
persons with disabilities shall not be considered discrimination under the terms of the 
present Convention.”
Article 2 specifies some definitions including:
“‘Discrimination on the basis of disability’ means any distinction, exclusion or restriction 
on the basis of disability which has the purpose or effect of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal basis with others, of all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field. It 
includes all forms of discrimination including denial of reasonable accommodation; 
‘Reasonable accommodation’ means necessary and appropriate modification and 
adjustment not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular 
case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with 
others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms; . ”
There is a discussion in philosophical literature about the hypothetical situation that some 
jobs could require human enhancement. However, the ILO Occupational Safety and Health 
Convention (1981) requires employers to adapt working conditions to the physical and 
mental abilities of the worker and not the other way around: “ .A rtic le  5 The [national] 
policy [on occupational safety, occupational health and the working environment] [ . ]  shall 
take account of the following main spheres of action in so far as they affect occupational 
safety and health and the working environment:
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... (b) relationships between the material elements of work and the persons who carry out 
or supervise the work, and adaptation of machinery, equipment, working time, organisation 
of work and work processes to the physical and mental capacities of the workers; . . .”
As more and more Human Enhancement Technologies become available concepts of 
“disability” and “health” may change. (Wolbring, 2005, Lee and Robra, 2005) People 
currently considered healthy or able-bodied may one day be considered ill or disabled. 
From a legal, positive Human Rights perspective that is no problem, it is always possible to 
agree on a new treaty against discrimination of non-enhanced humans, like the current 
conventions against discrimination of women and of children or for discrimination between 
combatants and non-combatants on the battlefield.
Case 4: Privacy
In the EU project PRESCIENT, a new concept of the human right to privacy is being 
developed in relation to a number of new technologies including technologies for human 
enhancement. (Friedewald, 2010) This illustrates the trend towards increasingly positive 
formulations of civil rights the formulation of which is partly dependent upon progress in 
science and technology as discussed by Luhmann. The advantage is that more specific 
targeted rules allow for more relevant judgement and law enforcement in a particular 
jurisdiction, in this case the EU. Disadvantages are that the evolved concept is dependent 
on the technology it is intended to help judge, and that it is increasingly distanced from 
universal Fundamental Rights. Schummer (2007) warned about ethical issues of the 
American NBIC project including the erosion of human rights of the soldier under the 
influence of technological developments.
Case 5: Scientific research
Article 15 of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) 
states:
“ 1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone:
. (b) To enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications;
(c) To benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific . production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full 
realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, the development 
and the diffusion of science .
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research .
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived from the 
encouragement and development of international contacts and co-operation in the scientific 
. fields.”
The right to academic freedom imposes restrictions on the influence governments, users 
and other stakeholders can exert on the outcomes of the research. The benefits of science 
and technology should be accessible to all.
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Conflicting rights
The different rights lead to conflicting requirements and considerations when applied to 
individual nano-enabled Human Enhancement Technologies. For long term radical 
enhancement visions, such conflicts are useful because they enable examination of 
fundamental ethical dilemmas without an urgent need to take decisions. For short to 
medium term incremental enhancement practices, specific uncontested positive civil and 
socio-economic rights are needed and the designated authorities to enforce respect for the 
rights. These positive rights are formulated differently in different countries or world 
regions.
As an example, the European Commission has established ethics review boards and a 
European Group on Ethics (EGE), to determine a good balance of the rights in EU funded 
projects. With regard to human enhancement technologies, the EGE published opinion 
number 20 on ICT implants in the human body, which is relevant to nanotechnology-based 
electronic devices incorporated into the human body. In opinion 20, article 6.4 on non­
medical implants, the EGE warns “that non-medical applications of ICT implants are a 
potential threat to human dignity and democratic society.” The principles of informed 
consent and proportionality must apply. ICT implants for surveillance purposes threaten 
human dignity. “The EGE insists that such surveillance applications of ICT implants may 
only be permitted if the legislator considers that there is an urgent and justified necessity in 
a democratic society ... and there are no less intrusive methods.” Surveillance applications 
must be specified in legislation and monitored by an independent court. (European Group 
on Ethics, 2005)
In its opinion on ethics of nanomedicine (EGE, 2007), the European Group on Ethics 
stresses the need for respecting fundamental rights rooted in Human Dignity and laid down 
in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its five protocols and the Oviedo Convention and its protocols. These rights are 
interpretations of core European values including integrity, autonomy, privacy, equity, 
fairness, pluralism and solidarity.
Allhof et al (2009) considered current ethical issues in Human Enhancement from a 
perspective that includes pairings of freedom and autonomy; fairness and equity; societal 
disruptions; human dignity and the good life; rights and obligations; policy and law. 
Balancing rights has already given rise to ethical deliberations on nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement.
6.4.4 Concluding remarks on Human Rights
In the present section 6.4, the hypothesis was examined that Human Rights or Fundamental 
Rights (subjective Natural Rights) could give more solid grounds for limits to nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement. This hypothesis was only partially confirmed because Human Rights 
are inherently ambiguous and there are considerable differences in interpretation. One 
important distinction must be made between a moral pre-positive concept of universal
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Fundamental Rights or Human Rights and a legal positive concept of civil or socio­
economic rights. The pre-positive rights are independent of human subjective preferences. 
The positive rights incorporate explicitly appointed authorities balancing powers in the 
Trias Politica. These include legislature responsible for (re)formulating the civil and socio­
economic rights documents, judiciary responsible for interpreting the rights in particular 
cases and executive State governments responsible for implementing and enforcing the 
court decisions.
The advantage of the moral Fundamental and Human Rights concepts is that they represent 
an unchanging (minimum) set of principles, independent of societal changes including 
technological progress. This implies two useful roles for such a minimum content of pre­
positive rights. Firstly, they represent an uncompromised scale for evaluating moral 
dilemmas in long term future visions. Secondly, they form an external set of principles to 
which more detailed and positive civil and socio-economic rights should be benchmarked. 
This two-tier structure combines the universality and stability of a minimum content of 
Human Rights with the relevance and flexibility of civil and socio-economic legal rights. 
There are also three disadvantages. Firstly, such a minimum contents lacks the relevance 
and detailed guidance for basing judgements or choices in concrete cases of nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement. Secondly, the pre-positive Fundamental and Human Rights lack an 
authority responsible for making judgements in concrete cases and for enforcing the rules. 
Thirdly, pre-positive rights aim to protect individuals rather than the common good.
On the other hand, the current legal framework of civil and socio-economic rights treaties 
incorporates an explicitly appointed authoritative Trias Politica. This has the advantage of 
making these treaties more suitable for judging incremental Human Enhancement 
technology developments in the short to medium term, and for enforcing the judgement. 
There are five disadvantages. Firstly, the positive rights are not independent of 
technological progress. Secondly, there is no philosophically incontestable basis for 
identifying authorities responsible for formulating and interpreting positive rights. Thirdly, 
like pre-positive rights, positive laws and treaties aim to protect Human Rights of 
individuals rather than the common good. Fourthly, positive laws are always backward 
looking: only a violation which has taken place in the past can be punished under a pre­
existing law. And finally, there is no global consensus on the formulation and interpretation 
of the rights.
The more fundamental problem is the first: that these positive civil and socio-economic 
rights concepts are dependent on particular technological changes of the human condition, 
as illustrated in the case of privacy discussed above. So will the rights of someone living in 
a society with human enhancement technologies be qualitatively different from someone 
living in a society without these technologies? This can only be solved by stressing the 
unbreakable bond between positive civil and socio-economic rights and pre-positive 
Human Rights. Concrete civil and socio-economic rights texts must always be evaluated on 
their compatibility to a minimum content of Human Rights principles as suggested by Hart, 
Walzer and Wils. E.g. the right to privacy as formulated and specified in different civil and 
socio-economic rights documents can be considered a particular case of the more basic and
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abstract moral principle of freedom. This principle of freedom could be used as an external 
standard to assess the moral value of any particular, adapted concept of privacy in relation 
to nanotechnology enabled Human Enhancement.
The second and third problems are special cases of the philosophical and legal / political 
problem of responsibility, which will be addressed in section 6.5. The second problem is 
that there is no incontestable ethical or philosophical basis for determining who should 
have the authority to formulate positive civil and socio-economic rights and to make 
judgements on the right interpretation, whereas the third problem is the focus on individual 
rights. The fourth problem is that there is no global consensus on the interpretation of 
Human Rights in particular cases, that there are considerable national differences in what is 
deemed acceptable or not. Those global governance issues will be addressed in the final 
chapter below.
To conclude, Human Rights or Fundamental Rights can give more solid grounds for limits 
to nano-enabled Human Enhancement than Human Dignity, but not unambiguously. There 
are different roles for pre-positive respectively positive rights. Remaining issues include 
global differences in interpretation, and philosophical grounds for designation of 
responsibilities and for imposing limits on long term radical enhancements. These issues 
can not be solved by Human Rights concepts and theories alone. Therefore the second 
hypothesis proposed in section 6.3 will be examined in the next section 6.5: that the 
concept of Responsibility forms a good basis for limits to nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement.
6.5 Responsibility
In section 6.4 hypothesis 1 has been tested, assuming that Human Rights or Fundamental 
Rights (subjective Natural Rights) could give more solid grounds for such limits. This 
hypothesis has only partially been corroborated. In this section, hypothesis 2 will be tested, 
assuming that the concept of Responsibility forms a good basis for limits to nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement. Because hypothesis 1 has not been totally rejected, this second 
hypothesis will be reformulated: In addition to Human Rights, theories of responsibility can 
give clearer guidance what forms of human enhancement enabled by nanotechnology 
would still be acceptable and what not. To examine this hypothesis, the concept of 
Responsibility and its relations with Human Dignity, Human Rights and Fundamental 
Rights should first be clarified. Secondly, the implications of responsibility for which nano­
enabled Human Enhancement is morally acceptable should be assessed.
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6.5.1 How are Responsibility, Human Dignity and Human Rights 
related?
As discussed in section 6.3 several interpretations of the concept of Human Dignity imply a 
relationship with Responsibility. In an anthropocentric interpretation of the concept of 
Imago Dei, each individual is responsible for his fellow human beings and creation. In the 
Kantian Person concept, the categorical imperative calls upon each person to take 
responsibility for the dignity of other humans and the survival of humankind. In the rational 
animal concept, Human Dignity is dependent on human needfulness, just like animal 
dignity is based on animal needfulness. Responsibility for ensuring respect for Human 
Dignity and guaranteeing Human Rights is handed over to governments in modern liberal 
social contract thinking.
As discussed in section 6.4.4, responsibilities are incorporated in positive Human Rights 
documents and explicitly granted to authorities balanced in the Trias Politica, but not only. 
The UN General Assembly proclaimed the “... Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every 
individual and every organ of society . shall strive . to promote respect for these rights 
and freedoms and ... to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance . . .” 
(UN, 1948)
The responsibility for implementation of human rights is explicitly attributed to all 
individuals, social groups, peoples and nations, not exclusively to states. The International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) considered “the obligation of states 
under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance 
of, human rights and freedoms.” In addition, it realised that “the individual ... is under a 
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the 
present convention.” (UN, 1966)
6.5.2 What is Responsibility?
The concept of Responsibility is being discussed on two relevant levels: among 
philosophers and among politicians and civil society. The theoretical debates on 
interpretations and moral implications of the term Responsibility discussed here are limited 
to the last three decades and take the new interpretation of the term proposed by the 
philosopher Hans Jonas (1979) as starting point. This is because of the explicit connection 
to scientific and technological progress he made. The practical debates among politicians 
and civil society are mainly limited to global debates in the framework of the United 
Nations and other international forums in the last two decades.
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6.5.2.1 Ethical and philosophical interpretations of 
Responsibility
In this section, use is made of Jonas (1979, 1987), Malsch & Hvidtfelt-Nielsen (2009), 
Schomberg (2007), Grauman (2006), Rip (2008), Risser (2009) and Williams (2009).
The philosophical concept of Responsibility is subdivided in several more concrete partial 
concepts. Firstly, moral responsibility is distinguished from legal responsibility. Legal 
responsibility is also known as accountability under the law, functioning under the 
responsibility of the Trias Politica in modern states. For the purposes of this section, moral 
responsibility is chosen rather than legal responsibility.
Legal responsibility
What makes legal responsibility less suitable in this case? Firstly, in the case of future 
oriented developments in science and technology, harm has not been done yet. Legal 
responsibility is in general a backward looking concept. An individual is usually not 
punishable under the law for harm he or she has not done yet. Secondly, technological 
developments and their future impacts on the global ecosystem, society and individual 
human beings are uncertain, which makes them difficult to regulate. So the laws needed to 
determine who is responsible / punishable for which potential future effect of technology 
may not exist yet. Finally, in the case of scientific and technological developments, social 
contract theory breaks down for two reasons: distributed knowledge and globalisation.71 In 
the social contract which constitutes modern states, free individuals hand over the authority 
(and hence the legal responsibility) for enforcing their security and other human rights to 
sovereign states. In the case of scientific and technological developments, governments lack 
the knowledge about current developments and potential future implications needed for 
being able to enforce their authority. This knowledge is distributed over several distinct 
public and private actors (mainly the research community and industry). Single individual 
citizens likewise lack the oversight to understand potential future consequences of 
contemporary scientific and technological development. Unlike states, they don’t have the 
authority (and even less the power) to influence these developments on their own. Because 
of this, the social contract model between atomistic citizens and powerful states is not an 
adequate description of the societal context in which scientific and technological progress 
takes place. Communitarian theories of society are more suitable to understand the 
distributed powers of different groups in society. Such an alternative descriptive theory can 
form a better basis for prescriptive theories of collective responsibility (e.g. subsidiarity, 
group sovereignty).
M oral responsibility
Moral responsibility is weaker than legal responsibility because it is not enforceable by a 
state. On the other hand it is more encompassing than legal responsibility. Moral
71 Globalisation will be discussed in the final chapter.
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responsibility can be either attributed to individuals or to collectives, and can be both 
backward and forward looking. For scientific and technological development, forward 
looking collective responsibility is needed. Since the second half of the 20th century, 
scientific and technological progress has been conceived more and more as an ethically and 
politically problematic development. Jonas (1979, 1987) analysed the dynamics in 
technological progress and stressed the fact that this development was human made at a 
collective rather than individual level. Technology development was not considered to be 
an autonomous process beyond human control. The technological progress had for the first 
time in history become so powerful that it was able to cause uncertain future impacts on 
humankind and the global ecosystem. Whereas such uncertain impacts could turn out to be 
benefits as well as threats, Jonas called for assuming and acting upon pessimistic future 
scenarios of technology development endangering the survival of humankind and seriously 
damaging the global ecosystem. He took the position that people should not be allowed to 
kill themselves or others, and certainly not put the survival of the human race at stake. 
Other philosophers and stakeholders have criticised this pessimistic choice and proposed 
more balanced future visions.
This described powerful scientific and technological development with uncertain 
implications for humankind and the global ecosystem called for a prescriptive new, forward 
looking concept of collective responsibility, not only for the present, but also for future 
generations. In classical ethical theory, an individual can only be held morally responsible 
for direct foreseen consequences of his or her actions. In addition to this, first and second 
generation positive law protecting Human Rights also attribute responsibilities to sovereign 
state governments in a Trias Politica including legislative, executive and judiciary powers. 
In this legal framework, legal persons (individuals as well as corporate actors) can be held 
accountable for harm done by them in the past and punished for it. The new concept of 
collective responsibility goes beyond that and attributes moral responsibilities to other 
stakeholders in scientific and technological developments. But who should be given 
responsibility for which part of the scientific and technological development for which 
reasons, and what would this responsibility imply?
A liberal solution could be to give all individual citizens of all states equal responsibility 
for scientific and technological development. If the social contract theory breaks down, the 
sovereignty of the state dissolves into individual sovereignty, which might take different 
forms. One form such individual sovereignty could take is direct democracy. Another form 
is anarchy, interpreted as the right of the strongest.
The problem with direct democracy is that not all individuals have equal knowledge and 
power to influence developments. Simply giving everyone an equal share in the 
responsibility would not be feasible because it would take too much time for most people to 
understand the problems at stake, and it would also not be fair because most people would 
not be in a position to make a difference.
Other solutions have been proposed for distributing collective responsibility among 
collective actors. One solution could be to attribute specific parts of the collective 
responsibility to formal organisations or legal entities, e.g. companies, universities, 
government agencies, research centres, etc. Internally, moral role responsibility could be
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attributed to personnel of those organisations in addition to their legal and contractual 
obligations. Such organisational responsibilities can be formalised in Corporate Social 
Responsibility documents.
Another solution could be to attribute partial responsibilities to not hierarchically organised 
networks or movements in society (e.g. scientists, engineers, entrepreneurs, civil society, 
consumers or workers). These movements are partly organised in associations, unions etc, 
and partly just something individuals identify themselves with. Formal associations can 
adopt codes of conduct describing the responsibility of their members to contribute to the 
aims of the association, with or without sanctions. E.g. medical doctors are obliged to take 
the oath of Hippocrates, whereas other professional societies ask their members to 
subscribe to voluntary codes without sanctions.
More complex solutions attribute collective co-responsibility to a variety of actors, 
including individuals, states, public and private legal entities, associations and movements. 
Such solutions could fit to some extent in the descriptive concept of subsidiarity: “ ... (in 
the Roman Catholic Church) a principle of social doctrine that all social bodies exist for the 
sake of the individual so that what individuals are able to do, society should not take over, 
and what small societies can do, larger societies should not take over . (in political 
systems) the principle of devolving decisions to the lowest practical level.” (free dictionary, 
2010) Another relevant descriptive concept originating from a Protestant tradition is group 
sovereignty. This idea implies that State sovereignty is limited to specific domains, giving 
sub-groups in society (e.g. churches or ethnic groups) sovereignty over certain other 
matters. The state could be sovereign over the territory whereas the church could be 
sovereign over the souls of their adherents. Applying this concept of group sovereignty to 
technological development, this would leave room for self-organisation of responsibility or 
accountability (e.g. Medical Penal Authority, Medisch Tucht College).
Such collective co-responsibility should be organised. However, because the effects of 
technological progress are uncertain, this division of labour may result in “organised 
irresponsibility” (Arie Rip, 2008). If every group restricts its own share in the responsibility 
to the tasks assigned to them, nobody is responsible for the common good or for the 
accumulative or non-linear effects of the collective effort into technological development. 
Currently, experts and policy makers are looking at deliberative ethics and methodologies 
(stakeholder dialogue) for solutions to this problem.
6.5.2.2 Legal / political formulations of Responsibility
Consecutive international declarations concerned with implications of science and 
technology for the environment, society or the human body since 1972 have taken an 
anthropocentric approach, placing human beings at the centre of concern for sustainable 
development. This implies two things: the ecosystem should be able to support human life 
also in the future, and impacts on society as a whole should be balanced to protect 
particularly vulnerable people and allow for equal access to the benefits of present and 
future generations. Technologies in or affecting the human body should not endanger the 
individual concerned or future generations.
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Whereas most responsibility was still granted to States, the international community, 
groups and individuals were also given explicit responsibilities. The UN Conference on the 
Human Environment (1972) considered potential benefits as well as harms of scientific and 
technological developments to the human environment and set environmental goals. “ ... 
To achieve this environmental goal will demand the acceptance of responsibility by citizens 
and communities and by enterprises and institutions at every level, all sharing equitably in 
common e f fo r ts .” Most responsibility was allocated to local and national governments, 
but international cooperation was also deemed necessary. Governments and peoples were 
called upon “to exert common efforts for the preservation and improvement of the human 
environment, for the benefit of all the people and for their posterity.” States were granted 
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources but also the responsibility to avoid 
damage to other countries and areas beyond national jurisdiction.
Twenty years later, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) extended 
the scope of this 1972 declaration to include development of present and future generations 
of humans, aiming to establish a new and equitable global partnership among States, key 
sectors of societies and people. Human beings were explicitly placed at the centre of 
concerns for sustainable development. Whereas most responsibilities for legislation, 
international cooperation and policy measures including awareness raising and precaution 
were attributed to States, other groups were also mentioned. All concerned citizens 
including women, youth and indigenous people and local communities should participate in 
decision making on environmental issues and cooperate with States.
UNESCO (1997) adopted the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human 
Rights, granting most responsibilities for creating the right conditions for the exercise of 
related scientific activity to States, but not exclusively. In general, researchers have 
responsibilities “including meticulousness, caution, intellectual honesty and integrity in 
carrying out their research as well as in the presentation and utilization of their findings.” 
Public and private science policy makers and society and all its members were also deemed 
to have particular responsibilities for research on the human genome. States should raise 
awareness of these responsibilities and facilitate open international discussion on the 
subject.
The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (2005) broadened the 
scope of their 1997 declaration to “ .e th ic a l issues related to medicine, life sciences and 
associated technologies as applied to human beings, taking into account their social, legal 
and environmental d im ensions.” “ .considering  the desirability of developing new 
approaches to social responsibility to ensure that progress in science and technology 
contributes to justice, equity and to the interest of h u m a n ity .” Whereas the declaration is 
addressed to States who are given most responsibilities, “ . i t  also provides guidance to 
decisions or practices of individuals, groups, communities, institutions and corporations, 
public and private.” Decision making should be characterised by professionalism, honesty, 
integrity and transparency, and regular dialogue and public debate should engage persons,
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professionals and society as a whole. States should install bioethics committees with 
particular expert responsibilities.
To sum up, also on a political level, the responsibility for the impacts of scientific and 
technological development of sovereign States has been broadened to include the 
international community, societal groups and individual citizens. Over the last four 
decades, this division of labour has become more and more explicit, giving States primary 
responsibilities for regulation but also to implementing precautionary measures and 
organising and facilitating public debates. Secondly, distinct stakeholder groups, 
organisations and professionals are called upon to do their work in an ethically sound way. 
Thirdly, strategic decisions should be made in stakeholder and public dialogue.
6.5.3 Applying Responsibility to development of nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement
As discussed above (6.4.2.2) in the current human condition, it is necessary to make 
choices regarding the use of limited resources available for scientific and technological 
development. The international political debate on responsible scientific and technological 
development could form a foundation for limits to nano-enabled Human Enhancement, 
especially in the most recent formulation of UNESCO (2005), implying that progress in 
science and technology should contribute to justice, equity and the interest of humanity. 
This is broader than respecting individual Human Rights. One could also apply the concept 
of Responsibility to theoretical future scenarios where nano-enabled radical Human 
Enhancement Technologies are available on a large scale on the market. The possible 
implications of such radical enhancement visions have already been discussed in 6.4.2.1 
and by many authors in nanoethics literature. Applying the concept of Responsibility will 
not contribute anything useful to this discussion because of a lack of concrete action 
potential in the short term which could with any certainty influence the likelihood of the 
emergence of such radical enhancement in the long term.72 Below in section 6.5.3.1, first a 
descriptive overview is given of the types of resources needed for nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement and the current way responsibility is taken for the development of relevant 
nanotechnologies and applications. In this more descriptive part, responsibility is 
considered as a moral concept on its own. This interpretation is flexible and open to 
multiple interpretations of what would constitute responsible decision making. 
Subsequently in section 6 .5.3.2, a morally more substantial concept of responsibility 
prescribing the protection of individual Human Rights, the common good of society and the 
environment is applied to nano-enabled Human Enhancement. This substantial concept 
should help to avoid organised irresponsibility foreseen by Arie Rip (2008), because all
72 c.f. Collingridge dilemma: in early stages of technology development the potential long 
term implications are hard to predict, whereas in late stages the consequences are clear but 
the developments can no longer be influenced very well
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actors are required to benchmark their actions as to their contributions to these three values, 
not limit themselves to properly doing their job.
6.5.3.1 Description of responsible resource use
Currently, nanotechnology and other technologies converging on the nanometre scale are 
not so far developed that they already enable enhancement of the human body or mind 
beyond species-typical boundaries in any substantial way. There are a few exceptions like 
ICT implants for tagging individuals or experimental implants integrated in the human 
nervous system played with by scientists in the laboratory. So to reach a stage where 
nanotechnology may one day enable Human Enhancement with large scale societal 
implications, considerable investment in R&D is needed harnessing public as well as 
private resources. A good part of these resources should then be taken away from furthering 
other goals.73
The resources in question include “the best and the brightest” human resources (leading 
senior scientists, young researchers, students, assistants), well-equipped laboratories with 
the most advanced research instruments, tax payers money and reinvested profits of private 
enterprises, and of course depletion of fossil fuels and other non-renewable resources, and 
environmental degradation. Once the nano-enabled Human Enhancement Technologies are 
developed far enough, they must be tested for safety and efficacy. This will require more 
similar resources but also animal and human test subjects because the technologies are 
expected to be incorporated in the human body.
Once the Human Enhancement Technologies have been developed and tested, they should 
be mass produced in factories which can then not be used for producing other goods at the 
same time and distributed to the users by transport companies also using up valuable 
resources. Subsequently different scenarios of resource use are possible depending on how 
the Human Enhancement Technologies can be applied. If they take the form of drugs which 
can be swallowed or otherwise brought into the body in a non-intrusive, self-medication 
way, the technologies should be distributed by retailers or specialised shops (like 
pharmacists). If they have to be implanted in the body of healthy individuals, their 
distribution requires well-equipped hospitals and trained and skilled medical professionals.
Restrictions on use of resources
It is hard to impose restrictions on the use of all these different resources from a Human 
Rights perspective because of the dominant value of individual Freedom. On the other 
hand, several distinct actors already have responsibilities for making decisions regarding
73 Because of the inherent unpredictability of scientific and technological progress, 
resources targeting nanotechnology for Human Enhancement may contribute to other goals 
and vice versa.
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the use of part of the resources. Public and private actors are generally expected to take 
different responsibilities. All actors should avoid doing harm to individuals, society as a 
whole and the environment. In order to avoid doing harm, they should invest a reasonable 
amount of resources in exploring foreseeable future implications of the activities the 
resources under their control are expected to enable (Environmental Impact Assessment, 
Technology Assessment). The outcome of such assessments should influence their 
decisions. The problem is of course the inherent unpredictability of scientific and 
technological progress as well as natural processes at work in our ecosystem. The debate on 
the right interpretation of the precautionary principle is still ongoing.
In the case of nano-enabled Human Enhancement, private actors are expected to explore 
and avoid potential harm, but it is not a priori illegitimate for them to be developing such 
Human Enhancement Technologies altogether. In reality, their investments in R&D are 
dictated by perceived market opportunity in the short to medium term. Private actors 
involved in development of nanotechnology for Human Enhancement may target relevant 
mass markets like cosmetics, games, telecommunication, sports, finance and security (e.g. 
retailers interested in theft prevention). They may also target markets dominated by 
collective buyers like healthcare and defence and homeland security. Several of these 
private actors take on additional voluntary responsibility to contribute to the common good 
(Corporate Social Responsibility), together with public actors.74
In addition to avoiding harm, public actors target the resources to contributions to 
foreseeable future common societal and environmental problems requiring technological 
solutions. Therefore, they can be expected to apply the theory of double effect in decision 
making on targeting investments. The theory of double effect investigates under which 
circumstances good or bad consequences of actions can be tolerated. The theory includes 
four limiting principles:
- An intrinsically evil action is always forbidden
- A bad effect is only allowed if the action in question aims at the same time for a 
good or neutral goal and if the actor intends this other effect
- The bad effect can only be tolerated if this is unavoidable and not considered as a 
means to achieve the good purpose
- The bad effect can only be tolerated if the good effect can not be reached in any 
other way and if the good effect is greater than the non-intended bad effect. (Wils, 
2007, pp 81-82)
Proper public actors’ future scenarios are not only designed to best avoid foreseeable harm, 
but also to compare alternative technical (e.g. robotics) as well as non-technical solutions to 
the societal problems under their responsibility. Relevant areas for nanotechnology in 
relation to Human Enhancement include healthcare, defence and homeland security but also 
general industrial policy (jobs, economic competitiveness) and fundamental research 
(create new knowledge). The responsibility of public actors for decisions on investment in 
science and technology is subdivided in several levels. On the national or supranational
74 E.g. work on solutions for poverty related diseases, sustainable energy, food security.
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level in the case of the EU, politicians decide the division of the public budget for S&T 
over different public policy areas such as education and sciences, economic affairs, 
healthcare, security and defence, environment, energy, housing, transport, 
telecommunication, agriculture, etc. In the next stage, policy makers decide on targeting 
specific technologies and societal problems. On both levels, investment in R&D commonly 
should balance two approaches: problem solving and creating new opportunities. The more 
limited the available resources, the larger the part that should be dedicated to primarily 
solving societal problems benefiting the weakest societal groups in particular (in 
accordance with the theory of justice discussed in chapter 2, c.f. Law, Nussbaum, Sen). 
Naturally, science and technology development is likely to also create new unforeseen dual 
use opportunities in a second instance. Creating new opportunities without a primary 
societal goal may include basic research and industrial policy / job creation. In this case, 
application of the theory of double effect is limited to articulating the general aim to gain a 
better understanding of the observable world. This is expected in the long term to 
contribute to more human control over the living environment. Pursuing this aim should be 
balanced by reasonable investment in technology assessment and ethical reflection to 
identify potential harm which may be caused by the developments in the long term and take 
timely measures to avoid it. This is already practiced for nanoscience and nanotechnology 
in EU and nationally funded research in many countries. In the following, the likely effects 
on Human Enhancement of three cases of responsible development of nanotechnology are 
examined. Responsibility is here considered as a normative concept on its own.
Case 1: Healthcare
Within the public budget for healthcare R&D, it would be irresponsible to dedicate scarce 
resources to radical nano-enabled Human Enhancement lacking any therapeutic application, 
while there are still so many people suffering from incurable diseases and disabilities. One 
unintended consequence would be to hamper development of a solution for these patients. 
That would be more significant than the intended improvement of the quality of life of the 
healthy beneficiary of the Human Enhancement. The latter may in many cases arguably be 
achieved by other technical or non-technical means as well. Who wants to be able to see in 
the dark could switch the light on or use a torch. However, this same responsibility could 
unintentionally foster incremental nano-enabled Human Enhancement, because of the dual 
use character of the technologies erasing the boundary between therapy and enhancement, 
such as brain implants, artificial eyes, limb prostheses etc. Applying the theory of double 
effect to nano-enabled medical implants, the development of such implants should not be 
forbidden per se as long as the expected harm is less significant than the expected benefits, 
but governance in order to avoid non-intended bad effects as much as possible is 
mandatory. Such governance may not only take the form of applying legal instruments, but 
also ethical reflection on societal implications of research, and value sensitive design. 
Several proposals for such governance instruments are currently being discussed by 
philosophers and policy makers but no ideal solution has been found yet. (e.g. Stahl, 2010)
279
A classical task of modern States is the protection of not only their own but also their 
citizen’s security from external as well as internal threats to life, physical well-being and 
property. The protection of this first generation Human Right is furthered by different 
means, including technological developments. Nano-enabled Human Enhancement is 
expected to be applied in the long term to improving the performance of individual soldiers 
as well as professionals engaged in civil protection (police, fire fighters, paramedics). 
However, remote controlled or autonomous robots are also expected to play similar roles 
and are more advanced already. These and other alternatives have not been compared as to 
their likelihood to solve problems and to give rise to new ethical or societal consequences. 
Information from public sources indicates that development of radical nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement for security applications is probably very limited. E.g. in the Netherlands, 
soldiers are strictly forbidden to use illegitimate drugs for improving their performance. 
Most reported research is either secondary application of pharmaceuticals or medical 
devices primarily developed for healthcare, or robotics including exoskeletons applied 
external to the human body. In addition, especially in the United States, considerable 
resources are invested in developing implants and prosthetics for wounded and disabled 
war veterans. This overlaps with healthcare.
Any comparison of alternative investments in R&D for security should put more weight on 
more imminent developments in robotics and non-technical alternatives such as 
psychological operations aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the population in 
conflict areas, peace education and removing causes for conflicts such as unequal 
distribution of scarce resources, migration etc. Provided such a comparison is carried out 
thoroughly, it could well reveal that every euro invested in conflict prevention is likely to 
contribute much more to security than if it were invested in soldier enhancement or military 
robots. The root problem is of course that responsibility for security implies not only 
refraining from hostile actions, but also preparing for hostile actions by other countries or 
non-state actors who could apply new technologies in new weapons or military systems. 
Therefore, mere responsible development of security technologies does not exclude the 
option of nano-enabled Soldier Enhancement.
Case 3: Sports
The societal sector of sports is dominated by competitiveness and the ambition to stretch 
individual human physical and mental capabilities to or even beyond the species-specific 
limits. Apart from intensive training programmes and strict diets, the latest advanced 
technologies are used in never-ending pursuit of new world records or simply beating one’s 
opponents. The means applied are only limited by strict regulations (e.g. anti-doping rules) 
and the ability of authorities to enforce these regulations, and of course by the available 
resources. The regulations should be adapted regularly to accommodate scientific and 
technological progress. Decision making on innovation in sports is distributed over many 
private as well as public actors. In addition, sports research has a lower status than medical 
research, illustrated by the much lower impact factors of peer reviewed sports journals
Case 2: Security
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compared to medical journals. All in all, it is difficult to get insight in the state of the art of 
innovation in sports.
It is expected that Nanotechnology could one day (il)legitimately be applied in Human 
Enhancement of Sports professionals. The UK House of Commons Science and 
Technology Committee reviewed legal and illegal uses of Human Enhancement 
Technologies in Sports. It made recommendations for governance, monitoring new 
technological developments which could contribute to illegal doping and improving the 
international testing regime for use of illegal Human Enhancement Technologies. On the 
other hand, the Committee advised to promote use and development of legal Human 
Enhancement Technologies, and knowledge transfer among relevant disciplines. Relevant 
sciences and technologies for legal Human Enhancement included biomechanics, 
immunology, nutrition and hydration and physiology. Nanotechnology was not explicitly 
mentioned. (UK House of Commons, 2007) Also in this report, the distinction of Human 
Enhancement and more traditional means to improve performance including medical 
therapy, training and diets is rather fuzzy. Nano-enabled Human Enhancement of sports 
professionals could well be a secondary use of technologies developed for healthcare or 
other primary uses.
6.5.3.3 Conclusions responsible development of nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement
In this section 6.5.3, a stand alone concept of collective forward looking moral responsible 
resource use was applied to three domains where nano-enabled Human Enhancement could 
be developed. Such a stand-alone concept of responsibility uses state of the art policy 
support techniques including scenarios, deliberations and decision making in light of 
uncertainty. The three discussed cases where there may be a demand for nano-enabled 
Human Enhancement overlap considerably. Arguably, the primary domain where 
nanotechnology with implications for Human Enhancement may be developed is in 
Healthcare. Both the security and the sports sectors are more likely to form secondary 
markets for nano-enabled Human Enhancement Technologies primarily developed for 
assisting disabled or healing ill people (including wounded war veterans). In such a 
constellation, responsible decision making on priorities in the use of resources needed for 
nano-enabled Human Enhancement (and other applications) is likely to restrict and slow 
down radical Human Enhancement as a primary goal. However, responsible decision 
making in this common, narrow sense is likely to foster incremental Human Enhancement 
especially through primary applications in healthcare.
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6.5.4 Substantiated responsibility for resource use for nano­
enabled Human Enhancement
What happens if prescriptive criteria to determine what constitutes responsible development 
are incorporated in a more substantial concept of responsibility? Below, individual Human 
Rights, the common good and preserving the environment are used as independent multiple 
criteria for deciding on responsible decision making regarding the use of resources needed 
for nano-enabled Human Enhancement in the Healthcare domain. Examples could be limb 
prostheses or artificial sensory organs or implants combining restoration of normal human 
functioning and superhuman extras in one single device. Responsible development of 
applications of nanotechnology in such implants should respect individual Human Rights 
especially of the weakest people involved (patients, test subjects), contribute to the 
common good of society (actively contribute to participation of deprived groups) and 
preserve the environment (restrict, refine and replace animal testing, avoid unnecessary 
depletion of scarce resources). Arguably, the development of such healthcare-plus devices 
will require more resources and imply more risks than purely medical devices.
In this substantiated sense, responsible development of nano-enabled implants and 
prosthetics ought to be restricted to designs that only restore species-specific human 
functioning. E.g. artificial eyes or retina implants should only enable vision in the visible 
light range and not extend sight into infrared, X-ray or other non-species specific domains. 
Limb prostheses should be designed to replace missing limbs or recover strength of 
paralysed limbs up to a species specific level. Superhuman functioning such as the ability 
to jump 10 metres high should not be enabled by implanted body parts. Expose of 
vulnerable humans (patients, test subjects) to risks due to implants is only acceptable from 
an individual Human Rights perspective if it is voluntary and intended to contribute to 
assisting the disabled or healing the sick and if there are no less intrusive alternatives. 
Whereas there are currently no alternative techniques that don’t have to be incorporated 
into the human body for restoring sight of the blind or enabling paraplegics to walk, there 
are such alternatives enabling healthy individuals to see in the dark or to jump very high 
(exo skeletons). Additionally, justice and equity prescribe that limited healthcare resources 
should be reserved to enabling the disabled and sick to lead a healthy life and participate in 
society on an equal footing as other citizens. It is not justified to divert these resources to 
increasing the gap between disabled and super-abled citizens leading to additional demand 
for scarce resources for compensating measures to overcome discrimination of even larger 
groups of comparatively disabled citizens compared to enhanced citizens. Finally, 
preservation of the environment prescribes that unnecessary suffering of animals needed for 
testing and depletion of fossil energy and raw materials needed for development of nano­
enabled Human Enhancement ought to be avoided. Under the present circumstances, 
substantiated responsible development of nanotechnology for healthcare applications 
implies avoiding the wasting of resources for incremental human enhancement.
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To conclude, the hypothesis that in addition to Human Rights, theories of responsibility can 
give clearer guidance what forms of human enhancement enabled by nanotechnology 
would still be acceptable has been corroborated. A stand-alone version of collective, 
forward looking moral responsibility is only suitable to rule out development of radical 
nano-enabled Human Enhancement, but could foster incremental enhancement. However, a 
more encompassing substantial concept of responsibility incorporating moral criteria for 
respecting individual Human Rights, the common good of society as a whole and 
preserving the environment can give solid grounds for rejecting the use of scarce resources 
for developing incremental nano-enabled Human Enhancement as well.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, possible implications of nanotechnology for the shifting boundary between 
natural and artificial have been discussed for the case of nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement. Nano-enabled Human Enhancement is distinguished from other forms of 
Human Enhancement and expected to only give rise to new implants applied inside the 
body of an individual after birth. Nano-enabled Human Enhancement is not expected to 
lead to genetic alterations or the extinction of the Human Race. In the current discussion 
about nano-enabled Human Enhancement among philosophers, scientists, policy makers 
and stakeholders, different anthropological positions appear to play a more important role 
than ethical conflicts. Four to six distinct answers can be distinguished to the question 
“what it means to be human”. Religious minded discussants tend to see human beings as 
Imago Dei (either in a more Cosmo centric or in a more anthropocentric interpretation). 
Modern thinkers apply the Kantian Person concept, following either the 
“Erweiterungsthese” distinguishing physical human and intelligent person, or the 
Convergence thesis, equating human and person. As a critique of Kant, some prefer the 
Aristotelian concept of Rational Animal emphasizing the bodily nature humans share with 
animals, and yet others consider humans as mere Biological Machines. In three of these 
cases, humans have a distinct Human Dignity that should be protected. The problem is that 
Human Dignity is a rather vague notion, which is not very suitable for imposing limits on 
Human Enhancement by (nano)technological means. However, Human Dignity is related to 
two other ethical concepts that may be suitable as foundation for such limits: Human Rights 
and Responsibility for other humans, society as a whole and the environment.
Two hypotheses have been tested: Hypothesis 1 assumed that Human Rights or 
Fundamental Rights (subjective Natural Rights) could give more solid grounds for such 
limits. It turned out that Human Rights or Fundamental Rights can give more solid grounds 
for limits to nano-enabled Human Enhancement than Human Dignity, but not 
unambiguously. There are different roles for pre-positive respectively positive rights. 
Remaining issues include global differences in interpretation, and philosophical grounds for 
designation of responsibilities and for imposing limits on long term radical enhancements. 
These issues can not be solved by Human Rights concepts and theories alone.
Hypothesis 2 assumed that in addition to Human Rights, theories of responsibility can give 
clearer guidance what forms of human enhancement enabled by nanotechnology would still
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be acceptable and what not. To examine this hypothesis, the concept of Responsibility and 
its relations with Human Dignity, Human Rights and Fundamental Rights were clarified. In 
the literature and debate on responsible technology development, different concepts of 
responsibility are distinguished. In the current case, moral collective forward looking 
responsibility is most suitable. This responsibility was targeted to choices in allocation of 
limited resources for R&D which could contribute to nano-enabled Human Enhancement. 
In the philosophical and stakeholder debate on this issue, the question who should decide 
and proposals for democratising science are a key topic. Criteria to determine what 
different actors are responsible for are also being discussed. These include not only 
individual human rights, but also society as a whole and the environment. The contribution 
to this debate in this chapter examined what responsible development of nanotechnology 
contributing to Human Enhancement could imply in practice, through R&D in three 
relevant societal sectors: healthcare, security and sports. Responsible decision making on 
investments in nanotechnology R&D in these areas is likely to restrict and slow down 
radical nano-enabled Human Enhancement. Responsible decision making on its own could 
well stimulate incremental Human Enhancement mainly through primary applications in 
healthcare. A substantiated concept specifying Responsibility for Human Rights of weaker 
individuals, the common good and the environment is more suitable for imposing limits to 
use of resources needed for incremental nano-enabled Human Enhancement for Healthcare 
applications. This can be considered the primary area where nano-enabled implants are 
developed, including those that may in a second instance be used for security or sports 
applications. This concludes the discussion on “Nanotechnology and shifting boundaries 
between natural and artificial” in this chapter. One loose end of the discussion on Human 
Rights as grounds for limits on nano-enabled Human Enhancement remains: the lack of 
global agreement on the right interpretation of Human Rights governing science and 
technology development. Such lack of global normative agreement is not specific to 
shifting of the boundary between natural and artificial caused by nanotechnology, but a 
more general problem in globalisation of governance of (nano)science and technology. 
Therefore it will be addressed in the final separate chapter concluding this thesis on 
nanotechnology and ethics.
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Chapter 7: Governing nanotechnology in a 
multi-stakeholder world
7.1 Introduction
Until well into the second half of the 20th century technologies were predominantly 
controlled by nation states and the actors involved in developing and using the technologies 
operated mainly in a national legal and socio-economically structured context. The 
international level was organised by external relations between sovereign States. Rawls’ 
Theory of Justice gave an adequate model for organising a Just society within each country 
and Just War Theory was an adequate model for Just conduct of international affairs by 
legitimate national authorities. Fundamental Human Rights constituted a sufficient basis for 
protecting the individual citizen against the power granted to the sovereign State constituted 
by a social contract between citizens and State.
Increasing globalisation has gradually undermined the relevance of these theories to a Just 
organisation of 21st century global society. In our current globalised world order, the 
economy is dominated by multinational companies producing goods anywhere in the world 
for mass markets in any country. New legislation is increasingly agreed on at a global (UN) 
or at least supranational level (e.g. European Union) before being formally codified by 
national legislative, interpreted by judiciary and enforced by executive powers in each 
country. Extensive cheap telecommunication networks and intensive affordable air, rail, 
road and water traffic and transport have enabled cooperation and dialogue between 
corporate and individual actors across the world irrespective of geographical distances. 
Citizens no longer identify solely with their national or local community but behave 
increasingly as global citizens. Progress in science and technology is no longer controlled 
by a few powerful states, but distributed over an increasing number of industrialised, 
transition and emerging economies almost anywhere in the world. Some new and emerging 
technologies require so little investment in research infrastructure that new kinds of non­
state actors enter the ranks of the stakeholders influencing technological development, 
traditionally reserved to the academic scientific community, industry and governments. The 
new phenomenon of garage companies not only creating new software but also biochemical 
technologies with dual use potential for weapons of mass destruction, is looked at 
suspiciously by national authorities responsible for State security.
In section 6.5 a moral collective forward looking concept of responsibility for progress in 
science and technology has been discussed, substantiated with criteria for protecting 
individual human rights, the common good and the environment. This model is not only 
suitable for decision making on allocation of resources needed for nano-enabled Human 
Enhancement, but also for other new and emerging technologies and other applications in a
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globalised world order. This concept of responsibility does not presuppose a social contract 
between atomistic citizens and a sovereign state. However, as discussed in section 6.4, 
global agreement on the right interpretation of Human Rights governing science and 
technology development is lacking. In fact, this problem is broader: currently there is no 
global agreement on the right interpretation of moral norms governing progress in science 
and technology. Which underlying values are shared between local communities worldwide 
that will allow for global agreement on responsible governance of nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies? Social contract thinking is not suitable for grasping this problem 
because it does not recognise the significance in the public domain of intermediary groups 
between the individual citizen and the formal structures of the State nor for the relevance of 
supranational entities. In this chapter as in section 6.5 a communitarian perspective on the 
organisation of society is proposed to help lay a basis for global governance of 
(nano)science and technology.
7.2 A communitarian perspective
In this section, use is made of discussions of communitarism by Ishay (2004), Bell (2009), 
Rosa (2006), Wils (2010) and Walzer (1994). A communitarian perspective is apparent in 
the principle of subsidiarity. This is applied to determine the appropriate level of authority 
in the European Union (responsibility should be allocated to the lowest possible level of 
government). In Catholic Social Teaching, subsidiarity is a personalistic concept. It means 
that decisions affecting an individual person should be taken by social bodies as close as 
possible to the person in question. What can be decided by a more localised body should 
not be taken over by a body at a higher level. Another form of communitarism is group 
sovereignty, e.g. to allocate different domains of authority over individuals to States (body) 
and Churches (soul). There is a current debate on “The shifting allocation of authority in 
international law” (Broude & Shany, 2008). In this debate, sovereignty, supremacy and 
subsidiarity are key concepts indicating the remaining authority of the modern State 
(sovereignty), overtaking of national authority by supranational bodies (supremacy) and 
regionalisation of powers to lower levels below the State (subsidiarity). In particular, 
analysing the emergent role of the World Trade Organisation as a new body prescribing 
rules for global governance of international trade, Robert L. Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis 
(2008) suggested new forms of democracy without State sovereignty. They argued for a 
new political ethics based on the value-systems of the participants in different parts of the 
world. Norms informing this political ethics include inclusiveness, mutual respect, 
transparency, value pluralism, procedural justice and rational deliberation. Their analysis 
appears very suitable as a starting point for global governance of (nano)science and 
technology.
Contemporary communitarism represents a position in political philosophy criticising 
liberalism. Four main controversies can be distinguished in this debate: the constitution of 
the self, legal neutrality, democratic ethos and conception of a universal moral theory. 
Leading proponents of communitarism (e.g. Walzer, MacIntyre, Sandel and Taylor) don’t 
consider themselves communitarian thinkers but are placed in that corner by their critics.
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Especially the democratic ethos is relevant to the present attempt at finding a solution for 
global governance of (nano)science and technology. However, the aim is not so much to 
criticise liberalism based on fundamental moral principles, but to explore the pragmatic 
usefulness of another point of view as basis for broad agreement on responsible governance 
in a multi-stakeholder world. Therefore, this chapter will probably not resolve the 
controversy between contemporary communitarism and liberalism.
Communitarism can be used in two distinct ways: Firstly, as a descriptive theory for 
understanding the roles of different types of stakeholders in the current governance and 
debate on nanoscience and nanotechnology. Secondly, as a prescriptive model of how 
global governance of nanotechnology should be organised.
7.3 Communitarian perspective on nanodebates in different 
parts o f the world
Using communitarism as a descriptive theory it is not necessary to take position for or 
against liberalism as a moral theory of how the ideal society should be organised. Instead, 
descriptive communitarism just makes it possible to observe intermediary social groups 
between the individual and the state, but also at a supranational level as significant entities 
in which people engage in collective action. The discussion in section 6.5 on collective 
prospective moral responsibility made sense from this perspective as an observable 
alternative route taken by actual individual and collective public and private actors aiming 
to govern the development of nanotechnology in the absence of positive applicable law. In 
this section, observed examples of nanodebates in different parts of the world are analysed 
using a communitarian model. The aim is to understand the contributions different 
collective actors make in governing nanotechnology in those cases. The first case examines 
debates on nanotechnology and security in the USA, Argentina, Europe, Israel and Iran. 
This is called “Nanotechnology and Peace” to shift the focus from the need to protect one’s 
own (national) security to the moral goal to achieve global peace ensuring the security of 
anyone anywhere in the world. The second case examines debates relevant to sustainable 
development of nanotechnology on an international level. This is called “Nanotechnology 
and Justice” to clarify the common ground in the diversity of fragmented debates and 
initiatives. The third case examines debates on nanotechnology and the shifting boundary 
between natural and artificial. This is called “Nanotechnology and Creation” to highlight 
the controversial issue of “playing God” as well as the underlying conflicting 
anthropological and worldviews. It is no coincidence that these three chapters refer to the 
agenda of the ecumenical process of the World Council of Churches: Peace, Justice and 
Integrity of Creation. From my point of view, that is what global governance of 
nanotechnology in a multi-stakeholder world should aim for.
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7.3.1. Nanotechnology and Peace
Taking a global perspective based on what is known from public sources, the USA is the 
main investor in security applications of nanotechnology, not only inside the USA but also 
by funding relevant projects with partners in other countries from the budget of the 
Department of Defense or its related funding council DARPA. This actual situation does 
not fit in the traditional model of a social contract between citizens and the sovereign state 
exercising its authority to guarantee security of its citizens inside the boundaries of its own 
territory and engaging in international relations with other sovereign States governed by 
Just War Theory. In addition, some dual use nanosciences and nanotechnologies could 
possibly be abused by non-state actors for terrorist attacks. Simultaneously, many countries 
stimulate international cooperation in nanotechnology for civilian applications with a 
potential military dual use. This cooperation includes partners in countries engaged in 
conflicts where military means are or could be used against other states or non-state actors. 
These security aspects of nanotechnology have in recent years been discussed by different 
types of actors in different parts of the world.
7.3.1.1 Different perspectives in nanosecurity debate
USA
National security is one of the main priorities in the US National Nanotechnology Initiative 
(NNI) and military nanotechnology receives structurally ~30% of the federal NNI budget. 
A large majority in the US Congress wants information about foreign nanotechnology R&D 
which is useful for defence including foreign military nanotechnology activities (2008). 
“The defence objectives are to discover and exploit unique phenomena at these dimensions 
to enable novel applications enhancing war fighter and battle systems capabilities.” Societal 
dimension aims a.o. to educate skilled workers for defense industry and to avoid adverse 
environmental or health impact from defense utilization of nanotechnology. (DoD, Defense 
Nanotechnology R&D program, 2007) Inside the USA, there is little opposition to defence 
applications of nanotechnology.
Argentina
Not everyone is happy with the US interest in foreign nanotechnology which could be used 
in defence, as a heated public debate in Argentina in 2005 illustrates. There was a 
controversy on US military investment in (nano) research in Argentina. The President of 
the Commission of Science and Technology of the Argentinean Chamber of Deputies Lilia 
Puig de Stubrin submitted a resolution asking for information on Argentinean research 
funded by foreign armed forces (USA) (16/09/2005). As a result, 3 projects were identified
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including one on nanotechnology at the National Atomic Energy Centre CNEA. This gave 
rise to public debate in the media and among researchers. The Argentinean National Ethics 
committee recommended to the government and scientific community to analyse the 
necessity to distinguish between foreign funding sources and eventually to restrict funds 
from foreign armed forces oriented to weapons production (etc). However, the controversy 
apparently did not stop researchers benefiting from foreign military funding. (sources: 
Ferrari (journalist Pagina 12), Foladori, 2006 etc)
Which moral positions and arguments can be distinguished in this controversy? 
Researchers benefiting from foreign military funding and research policy makers were in 
favour of accepting US military funding for Argentinean research. They argued as follows: 
It is basic research, not aimed at military uses and intended to contribute to peace and the 
interests of our country. There is no other funding. Results may be published. We favour 
individual academic freedom to investigate.
The National Ethics Committee gave the following advice: “The authorities of the sector 
together with the scientific community and scientific associations should analyse the 
necessity to distinguish between foreign funding sources and eventually restrict those from 
foreign armed forces oriented towards arms production. The state should ensure that 
research results are public and freely accessible. Scientific institutes and societies should 
contribute to a favourable environment for scientific integrity including transparency in use 
of resources, models of responsible conduct and intellectual honesty and the creation of 
authorities which permit resolving ethical controversies. Academic institutions should 
stimulate their researchers to follow their conscience regarding science in society and be 
committed to make their scientific work be in accordance with principles of justice, respect 
for human integrity and rights, the wellbeing equality and peace.” (21/10/2005)
A group of 230 critical scientists rejected US military funding for Argentinean research, 
and condemned research policy makers “stimulating professionals to act as mercenaries 
running after funding”. They also condemned a researcher for saying: “ethics ends where 
the money runs out”. They argued that ends, means and consequences of scientific work 
imply ethics and individual and collective responsibility for society over personal interests 
and funding and economic interests. They condemned foreign military funding for ethical 
reasons and because: “in such projects public resources are used, paid by our society, to 
benefit institutions, groups and countries like the USA who can use them to kill and invade 
and submit sovereign states”. (Pagina 12, 9/12/05)
Netherlands
In the Netherlands, research groups engaged in nanoscience have been receiving funding 
from the US DoD and DARPA as well, but contrary to Argentina, this has not given rise to 
public debate in parliament or the media. An official from the Dutch ministry of Defence 
indicated informally that this ministry is aware of such foreign military funding and may 
discuss its strategic aspects with the scientists in question. It is not considered a major
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issue. The fact that unlike Argentina, the Netherlands is allied to the USA in the NATO 
could be part of the explanation of this different response.
Early in 2010, the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD, 2010) warned that the 
current Dutch open innovation system is vulnerable for espionage by hostile regimes or 
non-state actors. They explicitly mentioned a recent international mission to 
nanotechnology research infrastructure consisting for 50% of intelligence officers. Another 
issue is access to higher education for foreign engineering students from non-allies (such as 
Iran). This has given rise to some public debate in parliament and the media. The main 
issue was who should be responsible for security, the State (i.c. AIVD) or universities. The 
Dutch ministry of Homeland Affairs and Kingdom-relations (BZK) allocates citizens, 
private companies and government bodies’ specific roles in protecting national security. 
The Intelligence Services organise discussions with representatives of Higher Education 
and Research Institutes to raise awareness of the security risks. In 2011, AIVD and MIVD 
will continue analysing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Technologisation and 
internationalisation may enable (non-)state actors to get access to CBRN weapons.
Contrary to Argentina, in the Netherlands the discussion about foreign interest in domestic 
(nano)science and technology development is tabled by a State body (AIVD), not by public 
entities such as the media, parliamentarians or scientists. Nanotechnology is not at the core 
of concern. The discussion is part of a longer debate on security and non-proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction. In this discussion, the Dutch government has forced the 
Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences to develop and adopt a bio security code of conduct 
(KNAW, 2006) and disseminate it in the academic community. The government has also 
imposed restrictions on access of in particular Iranian academics and students to nuclear 
research facilities in the Netherlands, giving rise to public protest from academics and 
human rights activists. More in general, civil rights and freedoms of citizens are restricted 
increasingly in order to protect State security against terrorists, expected to be hiding 
among the civilian population. The overall dilemma is how to balance the fundamental 
rights to security and freedom. This is of course a universal dilemma giving rise to 
continuing adaptation to ever changing circumstances. What is new in the current time are 
shifting power relations, not only between sovereign states (industrialised countries versus 
emerging economies), but also between States and non-state actors. The interesting thing 
about the Dutch response is that the State actively attributes parts of the responsibility for 
security to non-state actors (citizens, private companies and the academic community). At 
least the academic community is not so keen to take over this responsibility and defends its 
academic freedom and open innovation system, the fruits of which are in principle 
accessible to all who want to use them. Whereas the collective responsibility allocated to 
non-state actors is of a forward looking, moral kind (e.g. through voluntary codes of 
conduct rather than formal legislation), the discussion includes attempts at enforcing 
behaviour desired by the state, e.g. by forbidding access to higher education and research 
facilities for Iranian students and academics.
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Europe
In response to a changing global security context and in an attempt to overcome 
fragmentation and improve the efficiency of European investments in defence and security, 
the EU and its member states are working on a Common Foreign and Security Policy and a 
Common Security and Defence Policy. At the level of the European Union, common EU 
investment in security research has only recently been permitted. There is still a two-tier 
approach. The European Defence Agency is coordinating a budget for defence research, 
and the European Commission has been funding civil security research (including some 
nanotechnology) under its Framework Programme for Research and Technology 
Development since 2005. Because of the controversial nature of such research at 
supranational EU level, accompanying research in ethical and societal aspects (privacy, 
balance security-freedom) is included as part of this research programme. A key issue is of 
course how much sovereignty national states should hand over to the supranational 
community level, which is particularly sensitive in the case of national security.
Another issue is the dual use character of emerging sciences and technologies useful for 
weapons of mass destruction as well as conventional weapons (e.g. military robots, 
miniaturisation of satellites and outer space technologies). Traditional export controls of 
dual use goods may loose its meaning in preventing proliferation of military technologies to 
non-allied countries or countries engaged in armed conflicts. On the one hand, more and 
more countries are building up their own defence technology base. On the other hand, 
international research cooperation for primarily peaceful purposes may be spun into 
military applications in a secondary instance. Israel and Iran are examples of countries 
where politicians have expressed interest in military applications of domestic 
nanotechnology research. Simultaneously, both countries are very active in international 
cooperation in nanoscience and technology for primarily peaceful purposes.
Israel
Shimon Peres (Knesset, spring 2003) proposed to approach technology in the context of 
values. Technology demands transparency, truth and democracy. “Nanotechnology is the 
re-alignment of nuclear structures and molecular structures, making it possible to produce 
new materials, new dimensions, new engines and new energies, unknown to the world 
beforehand.” And “The pursuit of nanotechnology is an extension of the nuclear policy in a 
constructive form.”
“[With nanotechnology] it might be possible to create military units without soldiers. After 
all, unmanned aircraft already exist.”
Three years later, after Israel-Lebanon war (2006) Shimon Peres was more explicit about 
military nanotechnology: “Nanotechnology is the key to Israel’s defence in future armed 
conflicts.” “The missiles threatening Israel and the terrorists threatening to hurt the people 
of Israel should be handled using weapons that will be developed by the technology of the 
future -  nanotechnology. This is my lesson from the war and I’m operating today, as I
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always have, with a vision in a bid to change the realities of the Middle East.” (YNet, 10­
05-2006)
A few months later in The Guardian, he wrote: “This War has taught us that Israel must 
revise its military approach. The frontlines have disappeared in this new kind of conflict, 
and our old deterrent weapons are no longer enough. Terrorists hide among civilian 
population and target civilians. New weapons are needed for deterring them, including new 
surveillance tools for detecting them in large crowds based in miniaturised arms or remote­
control robots operating on the battlefield. Perhaps even in a form of intelligence hitherto 
unknown, grounded in revolutionary nanotechnology. ... A war deterrent is supposed to 
prevent war. The goal is peace. ”75
The terrorists from the Israeli perspective may be considered legitimate freedom fighters 
from another perspective. Current asymmetric warfare among the people is increasingly 
globalised, no longer contained by national borders or concentrated in renowned instable 
regions such as the Middle East.
Iran
Another country where nanotechnology is considered of strategic interest is Iran. The 
President of Iran installed the Iranian Nanotechnology Initiative INI in August 2003 to 
promote nanotechnology. The INI Council is headed by the deputy president for science 
and technology and includes relevant ministers and five senior nanotechnology experts. The 
Minister of Defence Brig. General Mostafa Mohammad Najjar is a member of the Council. 
The INI research follows the “Future Strategy” national nanotechnology development plan. 
This plan aims to make Iran one of the 15 world leading nations in nanotechnology 
research.76 Iran is actively forging international cooperation in nanoscience and 
nanotechnology, not only in Asia, but also with European and Latin American countries.
Jane’s reports that Iran wants to develop military technology to become less dependent on 
imports. The priorities include nanotechnology, information systems, modern ammunition 
and electronic warfare equipment.77
In 2005, Defence Minister Najjar said: “We must increase the Defence Ministry’s budget 
by reducing costs, omitting parallel organisations, using the industrial sector and increasing 
exports. The ministry intends to improve the quality of its products, develop 
nanotechnology, improve air defence systems for missiles, gain access to new resources, 
produce advanced and intelligent arms, improve armoured systems, develop intelligent 
systems for artillery and ships and command equipment, and produce equipment for 
asymmetric warfare, future soldier and electronic war. Moreover, cooperation with the
75 The Guardian, 4-09-2006,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/sep/04/svria.israel
76 INI website, 10-04-09, http ://www.en.nano.ir/
77 Jane’s 02-12-2008, http://www.ianes.com/extracts/extract/gulfsu/irans090.html
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scientific centres and universities, and the absorption of skilled people as well as 
encouraging innovation are among the ministry’s aims.”78 Among Iran’s priorities for 
military nanotechnology is nanorobotics applied in mechanical robots for military robots or 
explorers.79
In all these discussions, (state) security appears to be more dominant than peace. When the 
word peace is mentioned, the connection with the proposed strategy is not argued very 
clearly or it is a required intention of the involved researchers.
7.3.1.2 Contributions by different types of actors
Overall, national states are still the dominant actors responsible for developing and 
regulating nanotechnology for security. However, state sovereignty is restricted by three 
trends. The first, more traditional one is overt or covert interference by other states (US 
publicly visible military funding of foreign nanoresearch, high tech espionage in the 
Netherlands). The second is gradual strengthening of supranational regional authorities 
such as the European Union at the expense of national sovereignty combined with other 
factors in global security. This is becoming apparent in the development of a common 
security policy including technological developments. The third is the increased importance 
of spinning in civilian technologies to secondary military applications after the end of the 
cold war. This has limited the control of sovereign states over military technology 
developments, at least in the perception of states and some policy analysts. Others point out 
that such dual use technology development still requires considerable investment in 
research infrastructure and human resources not easily affordable for anyone other than 
governments of industrialised countries and multinational companies.
Still, in contemporary asymmetric war fighting, the borderline between state and non-state 
actors has already disappeared. In the future, democratisation of access to military and dual 
use technologies is also to be expected. As a response, governments not only strengthen 
their control over individual citizens and societal groups by legal and technological means, 
but also call upon citizens, companies and the scientific community to contribute to 
national security. Part of these expected contributions is simply abiding by the existing law, 
raising awareness of students and researchers of their legal obligations and collaborating 
with legitimate authorities if they notice possible illegal activities by others. This is 
probably what governments will enforce upon the scientific and business community 
engaged in research and development of technologies and products with dual use potential 
for weapons of mass destruction. The current public and political debate focuses on two 
issues. The first concerns the contributions that can reasonably be expected from non-state 
actors in the framework of overall responsibility of governments for enforcing the law. The
78 Mehr News Agency, 23 August 2005, cited by RedOrbit News 
www.redorbit.com/modules/news/tools.php?tool=print&id=297326
79 http://www.iranembassy.or.id/law detail.php?idne=1618
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second concerns the adequate balance between (academic and business) freedom and (state 
and human) security in the current circumstances.
The interesting question is what civil society groups could contribute to forward looking 
collective moral responsibility for future implications of (nano)science and technology 
currently in development for global peace. In section 6.5, an overview was given of how 
different actors could take responsibility for long term implications of their work on 
individual human rights, the common good and the environment. These means include 
ethical reflection on research, public dialogue and policy advice, technology assessment 
and foresight. In this chapter, the focus is more on the perspectives different non-state 
actors could contribute to the debate on what ought to be done.
Currently, public deliberations on nanotechnology and security are fragmented and 
dominated by conflicting interests and virtual absence of significant stakeholders such as 
the peace movement and parliaments. In the absence of a coherent all-inclusive global 
debate, security enhancing proposals for common international preventive arms control of 
military nanotechnology by Jürgen Altmann (2005, 2006, 2008, see also chapter 4) may not 
be heard let alone have a chance to be implemented. Altmann’s approach is legalistic, 
relying on the authorities of sovereign states to punish perpetrators after the fact, and on 
international confidence building measures to convince other states that their security is 
reasonably protected.
The proposed new chapter on the “right to arm” in Just War Theory (Chapter 4)80 has the 
advantage that it gives an ethical rather than legal framework for decision making on 
technological developments which could be applied in future weapons and military 
systems. This broadens its usefulness beyond those cases which are already covered by 
existing law. Another advantage is that despite the name, the aim of the ethical Just War 
Theory is to contribute to more Just Peace as end result, not just to (state) security. 
However, the criteria for the “right to arm” proposed in chapter 4 are mostly applicable to 
technology developments with an explicit military or civil security application under public 
control. The criterion “just intent” is meaningless in case of non-security oriented 
technology development with a potential military dual use (e.g. nanomedicine), because 
that is almost by definition done for a just intent, such as healing the sick or assisting the 
disabled. The criterion “legitimate authority” in the traditional sense (of a sovereign state) 
would be too restrictive for non-security oriented research and conflict with (academic) 
freedom. “Socio-economical proportionality” assumes a decision maker with the authority 
to decide on allocation of a budget to primary application domains (e.g. security, 
healthcare, education etc). Such decisions don’t exclude unintended dual use.
Balancing the human rights to liberty and security may be suitable to governance of all 
sorts of research, civil and security oriented. However, it is not up to private actors to make 
such decisions, but to governments and judiciaries. Non-state actors can and do participate 
in public debate on what should be the right balance and how current legislation should be
80 Just Intent, Legitimate (Human) Authority, Socio-economical Proportionality, Balance 
Liberty-Security, Human Dignity.
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adapted to accommodate changing global security conditions and technological 
developments. Human Dignity should indeed always be respected by all actors, but as 
discussed in chapter 6 this rather vague concept is interpreted differently by people with 
different worldviews. To sum up, for dual use nanotechnology two of the five proposed 
criteria in chapter 4 could play a role in stakeholder deliberations on unintended security 
consequences of nanoresearch: balancing liberty and security, and human dignity.
Both ethical criteria are indeed very suitable for broad debate on global governance of dual 
use nanoresearch in a multi-stakeholder world. The bare fact that both are flexible and 
evaluated differently from the perspective of different world views makes them ideal for 
reflection on the issues that should be addressed and the underlying value conflicts. Indeed, 
both concepts already play such a role in current debates: as discussed in chapter 6 , 
different interpretations of Human Dignity can be identified in the debate on Human 
Enhancement. And in the current debate on ICT and security, liberals and collectivists have 
different views on the right to moral autonomy and self representation. (Hoven, 2010) In 
both cases, the different worldviews overlap to a large extent, giving rise to common 
grounds for reaching agreement on governance. The remaining disagreements could be 
settled in different ways, e.g. by a majority vote, through political bargaining or allowing 
room for local differences. Before reaching a decision, more emphasis should be laid on the 
feasibility of the proposed means to achieve intended goals. Are the technological solutions 
likely to contribute to real security or will they merely give a false sense of security? 
Furthermore, arguments for and against technological and non-technological solutions and 
combinations of both should be evaluated on an equal basis. Unarticulated prior choices for 
a particular solution should be avoided.
A key point is to limit such value deliberations to research on new technologies that are 
expected to go beyond the current legislative framework in the future, not to products that 
are already on the market. Ethics should not be interpreted as soft law enabling too slow 
legislators to impose accountability on companies introducing products on the market for 
which the current legislation is not adequate. Likewise, elitist groups of unelected experts 
(e.g. in ISO and other non-governmental standardization bodies) should not be given the 
opportunity to delay political decision making on adapting or specifying legislation 
covering products with nano inside as is currently the case. As mentioned before, Howse 
and Nikolaides (2008) pointed out the same problem in the case of WTO negotiations. An 
unrepresentative technological elite meeting in closed circles in practice restricts the 
freedom of legitimate representatives of sovereign states to decide on new legislation.
The boundary between voluntary ethics and obligatory law must be articulated. Whereas 
good laws must be in conformity to basic ethical principles, morally sound behaviour of 
individuals and groups should not be limited to abiding to current enforceable laws. What 
might be a suitable role for such multi-stakeholder deliberation on governance of 
nanotechnology is to generate arguments for and against proposed or ongoing research 
projects that could be used by all stakeholders involved to make decisions on this research. 
Such deliberation could for instance complement the current ethical review of research 
project funded under the EU FP7, which now only take into account research ethics
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considerations, not expected impacts on society after the end of the project. This could 
mean that the European Commission decides to stop funding the current INDECT project 
because of conflict with values meaningful to a considerable group in the European 
population. INDECT is a typical example of a “big brother” project aiming to prevent crime 
by multimedia surveillance of the general public. The current ethical review criteria are not 
adequate to prevent funding such controversial research.81
Peace
Where military, security or dual use applications of nanotechnology are currently discussed, 
the focus remains on (state) security and its repercussions for citizens’ rights. The purpose 
of this thesis is not only to generate more discussion on these issues and convince more 
civil society representatives to participate in it, but also to shift focus from nanosecurity to 
nanopeace. Security is not an aim in itself but merely a means to achieve peace. The 
question should be how different individuals and groups, including states and non-state 
actors, can contribute to peaceful uses of nanotechnology. One contribution they can make 
is raising awareness of potential military uses of nanotechnology. Another is participating 
in public debate on their governance. As has become clear from the discussion on Just War 
Theory and military, security and dual use nanotechnology, the main responsibility for 
actions should remain with states responsible for the security of their citizens. Non-state 
actors can and should contribute to debates. They should also inform the legitimate 
authorities of new technological developments with military potential. Another contribution 
to nanopeace could be by removing the causes of conflicts such as the nanodivide between 
groups with and without access to the benefits of nanotechnology, and between those 
reaping the benefits and those confronted by the risks to health and environmental 
degradation. To that aspect of nanopeace, non-state actors can contribute not only opinions 
in a public debate or expertise advising decision makers but also actively create and make 
available new technologies that help to alleviate suffering. This will be discussed in the 
next section.
7.3.2 Nanotechnology and Justice
The second case where nanodebates in different parts of the world can be compared is the 
discussion on sustainable development of nanotechnology. This is called “Nanotechnology 
and Justice” to clarify the common ground in the diversity of fragmented debates and 
initiatives. In chapter 5 this discussion has been analysed from the perspective of Martha 
Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. Even though she stayed close to social contract thinking 
and Rawls’ Theory of Justice, she introduced concepts from other philosophical traditions 
including communitarian thinking (see section 5.2.4). In the international capability 
approach, national autonomy with foreign intervention was favoured, and distributed 
responsibility for sustainable development divided over State and non-state actors, 
including institutions, companies, groups and individuals. As argued in section 3.2.2.2 the
81 http://www.indect-proj ect.eu/
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international debate on sustainable nanotechnology agglomerates around two key ethical 
issues: precaution and distributive justice. For fruitful global governance of 
nanotechnology, the debates on these two issues should be linked and connected to a third 
debate on competitiveness of world regions and countries. After all, sustainable 
development intends to balance the interests of present generations with future generations 
and the environment, and of wealthy and poor individuals and groups. Self-interest of the 
strongest parties with responsibilities for global governance: industrialised countries and 
multinational companies will and should always play a role, because the people whose 
interests are represented by these institutions are also members of humankind and hence 
should be treated as goals in themselves rather than mere means (to paraphrase Kant).
The adapted model for international cooperation on sustainable nanotechnology 
development (section 5.3) includes seven elements: public engagement, national 
sovereignty, foreign and private investment, fair structures of the global knowledge 
economy, access to higher education and research jobs, target research to poverty and 
health related problems and environmental sustainability. In chapter 5, the focus of the 
analysis was on case studies of individual countries. In this chapter, the focus is on the 
international level (“global governance of nanotechnology in a multi-stakeholder world”). 
At this level, the three elements of the problem of sustainable development: precaution, 
distributive justice and competitiveness are currently disconnected. Precaution is discussed 
by State representatives in OECD circles and at the level of world regions and countries in 
multi-stakeholder forums. A broad range of different interest groups is engaged in this 
discussion which focuses on potential risks of engineered nanomaterials. The global debate 
on distributive justice is mostly disconnected from technological development in general, 
let alone nanotechnology. Those responsible for policy making and funding of development 
aid are usually not aware of nanotechnology and those responsible for research policy and 
funding don’t usually have insight in what is needed for alleviating poverty. Those engaged 
in this discussion specific for nanotechnology tend to be a select group of critical social 
scientists who are increasingly coming together in international networks. On the other 
hand, natural scientists and engineers who are interested in distributive justice for 
nanotechnology tend to cooperate in international projects, or student and staff exchanges 
between nanotech research centres in industrialised countries. There are few occasions 
where different relevant groups meet and join efforts to contribute to distributive justice for 
nanotechnology by itself.82 Competitiveness as a goal for nanotechnology development is 
an even more fragmented insiders-debate, mainly limited to the “triple helix” of 
government, industry and research community involved in innovation in each country or 
world region (traditionally USA-Europe-Japan, but increasingly incorporating emerging 
economies).
82 Examples are the EU funded ICPC-NanoNet project which stimulates research 
cooperation in nanotechnology between Europe and Developing Countries and Emerging 
Economies including not only natural sciences and engineering but also social sciences and 
humanities and policy makers: www.icpc-nanonet.org and the project Nanorecht en Vrede, 
supported by Nanopodium www.nanopodium.nl in the Dutch Societal Dialogue 
Nanotechnology.
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The key problem in global governance for sustainable development of nanotechnology in a 
multi-stakeholder world is not so much disagreement on applicable values. On the surface, 
there appears to be disagreement on the right interpretation of the precautionary principle 
with positions ranging from laissez-faire to moratoria. However, because this debate is 
limited to managing risks of engineered nanomaterials, underlying conflicts of interest are 
not addressed sufficiently. If economic and employment interests of the involved States and 
non-state actors would be addressed in connection to management of health and 
environmental risks, apparent disagreements on a reasonable level of precaution might well 
turn out to be surmountable. The main problem which needs to be tackled at an 
international level is connecting the debates and initiatives on the three elements 
precaution, distributive justice and competitiveness in a coherent global nanogovernance 
triangle.83 The common denominator in all three cases is taking collective forward looking 
moral responsibility for foreseeable future benefits and risks of nanotechnology in a context 
of expected societal and environmental changes. Relevant societal changes include 
globalisation and a growing world population. Relevant environmental changes include 
climate change and emerging infectious diseases. Viable solutions should distribute 
resources over the three goals in a way that is acceptable to all engaged state and non-state 
actors and motivates them to contribute their share to the common agenda for just global 
governance of nanotechnology.
7.3.3 Nanotechnology and Creation
The third case of currently unresolved global nanocontroversies focuses on nanotechnology 
and the shifting boundary between natural and artificial. This section is called 
“Nanotechnology and Creation” to highlight the controversial issue of “playing God” as 
well as the underlying conflicting anthropological and worldviews. As argued in section
3.2.3.3 the controversy circulates around two ethical issues: Human Dignity and 
Precaution. In chapter 6 the distinct anthropological philosophies playing a role in the 
debate on nano-enabled Human Enhancement were discussed and the moral implications of 
the concept of Human Dignity further examined in two directions: Human Rights and 
Responsibility. The latter is also closely connected to Precaution. What remained 
unresolved were global disagreements on applicable values to (nano)technology 
development with the potential to recreate the world and humankind as we know them.
From a communitarian perspective, the disagreements are not simply a matter of individual 
preferences or national interests, but intimately connected to religious and philosophical 
worldviews shared in groups in society outside the social contract between individual 
citizens and the State whose territory they belong to. The concept of group sovereignty
83 These three values could be considered a shorter version of the seven principles proposed 
by the European Commission in its Code of Conduct for Responsible Nanotechnology 
Research: meaning, sustainability, precaution, inclusiveness, excellence, innovation and 
accountability.
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distinguishing state sovereignty over bodies and church sovereignty over souls is quite 
revealing in this respect. An interesting aspect of the discussion on nanotechnology and 
creation is that due to applications of nanotechnology integrated in the human nervous 
system what is considered body by some stakeholders may be considered soul by others. 
This means that the communitarian solution of a division of labour between state and 
church authorities could break down. In other words, governments can’t unilaterally 
regulate nanotechnology that shifts the boundary between natural and artificial on their own 
without infringing on the right to freedom of religion. Vice versa, religious leaders can’t 
unilaterally prescribe the right conduct of their followers without influencing the 
organisation of secular society. Nanotechnology is not unique in this border-crossing. In 
many bioethics controversies, relations between religious and state authority are also at 
stake, such as in the right to abortion, euthanasia and gay marriage and conscientious 
objections of medical staff or municipal officials asked to assist. On a collective level, the 
controversy on the right to birth control not only has repercussions on the lives of 
individuals but also on demographics. In practice, most controversies are decided upon by 
individuals following their own conscience. They may then have to face repercussions of 
either religious or state authorities. Such repercussions of course are imposed after the fact 
in accordance with pre-existing (state or church) laws. Furthermore, there are considerable 
national differences in current legislation, even between European Union member states 
sharing a common history and religious and cultural heritage. E.g. German researchers 
working on Human Embryonic Stem Cell research in the UK could face criminal charges 
when returning to their country. (Euractiv, 2007)
In the case of potential future implications of nanotechnology for the shifting boundary 
between natural and artificial, the good news is that the technology mostly does not exist 
yet and that there is still time for public dialogue involving representatives of religions and 
other value-communities in line with suggestions by the European Group on Ethics for 
nanomedicine and synthetic biology. The bad news is that the current debate is not specific 
to nanotechnology, but a continuation of centuries old deep-rooted value conflicts 
dominated by differing anthropological and worldviews. However, as became clear in the 
analysis of anthropological concepts in the discussion on nano-enabled human 
enhancement, there is also considerable overlap in the moral implications of different 
views, e.g. philosophers from different traditions can agree on the need to respect Human 
Dignity (albeit with slightly different meanings). Furthermore, thinkers sharing a particular 
worldview (Christian theologians or Kantian philosophers) can use the same starting point 
to derive varying moral theses (Cosmo centric versus anthropocentric Imago Dei concept, 
erweiterugsthese versus convergence thesis regarding human being and person). An 
international public debate on nanotechnology and creation involving representatives of 
different religious and philosophical traditions can lead to fruitful outcomes provided that 
the participants closely examine the arguments for and against each position and aim for 
clarifying both common grounds and unresolved issues.
It could help to broaden the discussion and include not only whether or not nanotechnology 
may be used to recreate the world in our human image, but also the potential of 
nanotechnology to contribute to or distort peace and justice in the world. As mentioned
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above, those central concepts in the ecumenical process of the World Council of Churches 
are not introduced here without a purpose. The communitarian concept of group 
sovereignty distinguishing state sovereignty over bodies and church sovereignty over souls 
is a pragmatic solution to avoid conflicts by each withdrawing to one’s own turf. It does not 
help building a common value community in cooperation between individuals and groups 
of all denominations. Paraphrasing Jürgen Habermas (2005) it is important that religious as 
well as non-religious people actively participate in the development of and public debate on 
new technologies by making explicit their fundamental beliefs and values that inspire them 
to contribute to a better society. So far, religious people participating in the public debate 
on nanotechnology tend to limit themselves to one dimension of their faith: the relation 
between human and God, thereby neglecting the relation between one person and his 
neighbour: charity, contributing to the common good of society. It is the duty of (at least 
Christian) religious people to contribute in a balanced way to all three values: Peace, Justice 
and the Integrity of Creation. In this light, there may turn out to be more common ground 
underlying different worldviews than is apparent in the current fragmented debates on 
ethics and governance of nanotechnology.
7.4 Conclusion: recommended global governance o f  
nanotechnology
To recuperate, the central research question examined in this thesis is: What could 
constitute ethically sound global governance of nanotechnology in a multi-stakeholder 
world order? Before one can govern anything one must of course know the object that 
should be governed. As discussed in chapter 1, nanotechnology is a container term for 
materials and devices with functional structures in one or more dimensions between about 1 
and around 100 nanometres. All sorts of materials can be used and nanotechnology can be 
applied in a wide variety of applications. Apart from materials, instruments and 
intermediary products, nanotechnology can be applied in healthcare, information and 
communication technologies, transport and aerospace, energy, environmental technologies, 
consumer products, construction, agriculture and food and defence and security. Even 
though there are already nano-enabled products on the market, it is still mostly the topic of 
research in universities and research centres in an increasing number of countries anywhere 
in the world. Consequently, the discussion on nanotechnology governance is to a large 
extent inspired by future scenarios of what nanotechnology could mean for society in the 
future, as reviewed in chapter 2. The time scales of these scenarios are variable, from just a 
few years to several decades. A wide variety of different actors have published such future 
visions, including leading scientists, technology policy analysts, technology and risk 
assessment specialists, NGO’s and politicians. As became apparent in chapter 3, the 
discussions on current and future nanotechnology include ethical and societal aspects as 
well as technological trends. The aspects discussed so far are of three types. The dominant 
public and stakeholder nanodebate focuses on risk assessment and precaution related to 
engineered nanomaterials. Another debate involving policy makers, stakeholders, 
philosophers and social scientists, but also quite present in science fiction films and books
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deals with long term scenarios for converging technologies with radical impacts on 
humankind and the world as we know it. The third type of debate constitutes continuations 
of debates in the application domains of nanotechnology such as biomedical ethics, privacy 
and security aspects of ICT, consumer acceptance of food technologies, the technological 
divide between haves and have-nots, military, security and dual use technologies. Not all 
groups participate in discussions on all issues. It depends on whether they perceive their 
(stakeholder) group interests to be at stake and how much priority the issues have compared 
to other issues. Another important factor is the capacity of key individuals to understand 
science and technology development and its potential implications for matters that concern 
them. This is not only the case for NGO’s and politicians but also for government 
departments responsible for application domains of nanotechnology and for philosophers 
and social scientists. So there is not one nanotechnology but a plurality of nanosciences and 
nanotechnologies with a wide range of very different applications and potential issues and 
there is not one global debate on how to govern nanotechnology but there are several more 
specialised debates between subgroups of the affected stakeholders and government bodies. 
Given this fragmentation, it is not so obvious to determine which characteristics of 
nanotechnology and which applications and societal implications are and would be 
acceptable or desirable to which stakeholders.
Any attempt at making recommendations for global governance of nanotechnology will 
have to step down from the holistic perspective and take a closer look at some of the ethical 
issues related to specific application domains of nanotechnology. Three such cases have 
been examined in this thesis, selected because the ethical issues related to them had not 
been discussed sufficiently yet and because of personal interests of the author. The cases 
are nanotechnology and security, sustainable development of nanotechnology, and 
nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between natural and artificial. The aim is to 
determine ethically sound solutions, not polling public opinions on these issues. Therefore 
philosophical ethical theories were consulted that were expected to be relevant to each case 
at hand in order to get a deeper understanding of the issues at stake and possible ethical 
ways to resolve them. In the case of nanotechnology and security, Just War Theory was 
adapted to cover the development of new weapons and military systems in a pre-war 
period. For sustainable nanotechnology development, the capabilities approach and theory 
of Justice of Nussbaum, Sen and Rawls was used for a framework for a more coherent view 
on unrelated discussions on nanotechnology for the poor, and potential environmental risks 
and benefits. In the case of nanotechnology and the shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial, philosophical anthropology and theories of human rights and responsibilities were 
used to understand different positions and identify ethical grounds for imposing limits on 
technological developments. In all three cases, the theory enabled deeper understanding of 
key dilemma’s and supplied arguments for determining which actors and stakeholders 
should be involved in decision making or in public debates. They also placed 
(nano)technology development in a broader context of relevant societal and environmental 
factors. It turned out to be difficult to distinguish ethics and law as separate sources of 
norms governing actions of individuals and groups. This is problematic because of two 
main reasons. Firstly, (nano)science and technology development are expected to contribute 
to major changes of individual human beings, society and the ecosystem which may not be
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covered by current laws and escape the capacity of sovereign states to enforce applicable 
laws. So there is a need for a collective forward looking voluntary ethics not backed up by 
the established legal system. The second problem is globalisation: (nano)science and 
technology is developed in many countries with to some extent different legal norms. 
Furthermore, non-state actors are increasingly empowered and could escape law 
enforcement by any state. So it is important to propose ethical values that are shared by 
representatives of different stakeholder groups who will practice them voluntarily.
The main reason why ethics and law are hard to distinguish is because of the underlying 
worldview that is predominant in the philosophical theories applied: a modern worldview 
based on a social contract between atomistic individuals and sovereign states. It is almost as 
if in such a worldview citizens are deemed to have delegated not only power but also ethics 
to the state. The powers of sovereign state governments to govern (nano)science and 
technology on a global level have eroded, but does this mean that ethically sound 
governance in the multi-stakeholder world order is impossible? The communitarian 
perspective adopted in this chapter made it possible to perceive a broader range of relevant 
state and non-state actors who referred to norms and values which were often shared with 
other groups. In most cases the issues were not different values but conflicts of interests 
which were difficult to resolve because they were not explicitly addressed or discussed in 
fragmented forums. Also, the wording of the issues at stake could frame the discussion in a 
negative or a positive way. E.g. nanotechnology and security emphasises threats to (state) 
security requiring (nano)technological solutions under state control. On the other hand 
nanotechnology and peace emphasises the opportunities for a common agreement on 
peaceful uses of nanotechnology and stimulates non-state actors to take their own 
responsibility for removing causes of conflicts. In other cases conflicting values are at stake 
such as in shifting the boundary between natural and artificial. Those discussions could 
benefit from organising dialogue with representatives of religions and other worldviews 
examining the arguments for and against each position and balancing more than one 
relevant value. In addition to discussion on how nanotechnology could interfere with 
creation, how nanotechnology could help fulfil the social task of religious people: 
contribute to peace and justice should be discussed.
The underlying modern worldview in many philosophical ethical theories in a way makes 
non-state actors lazy as it comes to ethics and morals. They are expected to delegate 
responsibility for morals to the Trias Politica in modern states and limit themselves to 
abiding by pre-existing laws. In addition they are encouraged to demand their own freedom 
and equality and expect the state to guarantee these individual human rights. A 
communitarian perspective can contribute to common agreement on norms and standards 
for global governance of nanotechnology, by emphasising the own responsibility and 
inherent moral traditions of non-state actors including individuals, organisations and 
groups. Ideally, communitarism should not replace state sovereignty of modern democratic 
states but complement this sovereignty with voluntary ethical agreements reached in public 
debates open to all relevant stakeholders on common norms governing new (nano)science 
and technology development in areas outside of state control. Such voluntary agreements 
may lead to new or adapted formal legislation and law enforcement as the technology
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enters the market. They may also contribute to increased trust and international cooperation 
in shaping (nano)technologies respecting human rights, the common good and 
environmental protection.
This brings us back to the central research question: What could constitute ethically sound 
global governance of nanotechnology in a multi-stakeholder world order? This thesis has 
hopefully contributed sufficient arguments to convince the reader of the following proposal. 
The aims of governance should be to contribute to global Peace, Justice and Integrity of 
Creation in a balanced way. For such governance to succeed it is essential to build order on 
an international level not only engaging sovereign states, but also different kinds of non­
state actors with an interest in nanotechnology. It is important to achieve a clear and 
publicly transparent division of labour between governments and different kinds of non­
state actors. The authority to regulate, judge and enforce formal laws and the authority to 
protect the security of its citizens should in principle be reserved to legitimate state 
governments.84 Non-state actors including the research community, industry and 
government representatives but also interested civil society groups can contribute to the 
development of applications on nanotechnology in agreement with common values (value 
sensitive design of individual products, allocation of budgets contributing to peace and 
justice and respecting integrity of creation). In addition to this domain where actors shape 
nanotechnology and its applications and impact on society, there is a need for a coherent 
public debate on the underlying values and interests which should be taken into account in 
governance of nanotechnology. In this public debate both the states and non-state actors 
involved in creating nanotechnology and other interested stakeholders and representatives 
of the general public should participate. It is important that both agreements and 
disagreements on applicable values and the underlying arguments for and against them are 
articulated and that the different issues are examined in a coherent way. The outcomes of 
this public dialogue should influence the priorities in nanoresearch programmes and 
projects and the values expressed in design of products.
I am quite aware that this ideal model of ethically sound global governance in a multi­
stakeholder world order is difficult to achieve given today’s realities, but as has hopefully 
also been demonstrated in this thesis: there are encouraging initiatives and dialogues which 
may turn out to be seeds of change in the preferred direction. Simply connecting the dots by 
bringing people involved in relevant activities in contact with each others could make a 
great difference. It is at least worth a try.
84 Whose authority can only be overruled in exceptional circumstances by the international 
community in accordance with Just War Theory.
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Samenvatting
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt hoe nanotechnologie ethisch verantwoord ontwikkeld kan 
worden in het huidige tijdperk van mondialisering. De vraagstelling komt voort uit de 
kwestie waar beleidsmakers op nationaal en internationaal niveau het afgelopen decennium 
mee geworsteld hebben: hoe voorkomen we dat grote publieke en private investeringen in 
nanotechnologie uiteindelijk stuiten op publieke tegenstand, zoals het geval was met 
Genetisch Gemodificeerde Voeding in Europa. Voor het oplossen van deze “governance” 
vraag zijn veel verschillende discussies en onderzoeken gestart. De auteur heeft deze 
discussies en projecten als consultant gedurende 15 jaar van nabij meegemaakt. Het 
proefschrift bevat een poging de breedte van het debat weer te geven met nadruk op 
verschillen en overeenkomsten tussen landen en op het internationale niveau. Na verdieping 
vanuit filosofisch-ethisch perspectief wordt teruggekomen op de praktische governance 
vraag en een bijdrage geleverd aan die lopende discussie.
Om de centrale vraag van dit proefschrift te kunnen beantwoorden is eerst in kaart gebracht 
wat nanotechnologie nu is. Nanotechnologie is een containerbegrip, losjes gedefinieerd als 
materialen en componenten met functionele structuren met een formaat tussen 1 en 
ongeveer 100 nanometer in één of meer dimensies. Een nanometer is een miljardste meter, 
of een miljoenste millimeter of een duizendste micrometer. Heel klein dus. Alle soorten 
materialen kunnen gebruikt worden, van metalen en halfgeleiders tot biologische materialen 
en chemische stoffen. Nanowetenschap is een multidisciplinair vakgebied waarin 
onderzoekers van verschillende disciplines samenwerken aan problemen op de grens tussen 
hun vakgebieden.
Hoewel er al producten met nanotechnologie op de markt zijn, is de grote belofte van 
nanotechnologie voor bedrijven en de samenleving als geheel nog voornamelijk 
toekomstmuziek. Daarom is tevens verkend welke verwachtingen verschillende betrokken 
personen en organisaties hebben over de toekomstige toepassingen en maatschappelijke en 
ethische implicaties. Visies van vooraanstaande onderzoekers, technologiebeleidsanalisten, 
technology assessment specialisten, civiele organisaties en politici uit verschillende delen 
van de wereld zijn hiervoor geanalyseerd en vergeleken. Zoals aangenomen was hebben 
vooraanstaande onderzoekers meer inzicht in mogelijke technologische ontwikkelingen. 
NGO’s en politici hadden meer inzicht in maatschappelijke omstandigheden en 
ontwikkelingen waarin nanotechnologie een plaats moet krijgen. De aanname dat 
technologiebeleidsanalisten en technology assessment specialisten begrip van 
technologische en maatschappelijke aspecten van nanotechnologie zouden verenigen werd 
niet bevestigd. Technologiebeleidsanalisten concentreerden zich op praktische vragen in 
onderzoeksbeleid en technology assessment specialisten op maatschappelijke discussies 
over technologie die al gebruikt werd. Sinds het nieuwe millennium zijn de perspectieven 
van beide laatste groepen wel meer geïntegreerd in overheidsbeleidsstrategieën in 
Nederland en de EU. Voor andere landen is onvoldoende informatie verzameld om 
soortgelijke trends waar te nemen. Het overzicht in hoofdstuk 2 bevat expres visies en
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rapporten uit verschillende delen van de wereld. Deze breedte is nodig om bij te kunnen 
dragen aan governance van nanotechnologie op mondiaal niveau.
In een derde stap zijn de verschillende discussies onder belanghebbenden en ethici en 
sociale wetenschappers over ethische aspecten van nanotechnologie geanalyseerd. Drie 
soorten discussies kunnen onderscheiden worden: ten eerste over de vraag hoe met 
voorzorg om te gaan met onbekende risico’s van kunstmatige nanomaterialen. De tweede 
soort discussies gaat over toepassingen van nanotechnologie in producten en systemen waar 
al ethische en maatschappelijke kwesties in het geding zijn die mogelijk door 
nanotechnologie beïnvloed kunnen worden. De derde soort discussies gaat over hoe de 
ontwikkeling van nieuwe opkomende technologie het beste bestuurd kan worden. 
Voorgestelde oplossingen zijn ethische reflectie, regulering en democratisering van 
besluitvorming over technologieontwikkeling. De vraag is welke kwesties nog onvoldoende 
zijn uitgediscussieerd. Op basis van de analyse en eigen interesse van de auteur zijn drie 
problemen gekozen: nanotechnologie en veiligheid, nanotechnologie en duurzame 
ontwikkeling, en nanotechnologie en de schuivende grens tussen natuurlijk en kunstmatig. 
In alle drie gevallen is de internationale dimensie van belang in de lopende discussies.
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt ethisch verantwoorde ontwikkeling van nanotechnologie. 
Daarom zijn filosofisch-ethische theorieën toegepast en aangepast aan de vragen die 
opgeroepen worden door de drie onderscheiden probleemgebieden. De relatie tussen 
militaire en civiele veiligheidstoepassingen en dual use aspecten van nanotechnologie en de 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog is onderzocht. Dit resulteerde in een voorstel om de 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog uit te breiden met een hoofdstuk over (militaire) 
technologieontwikkeling. De verbrokkelde discussies over kansen en risico’s van 
nanotechnologie voor het milieu en arme mensen in ontwikkelingslanden zijn 
samengebracht en geanalyseerd vanuit het perspectief van de theorie van rechtvaardigheid 
en vermogensbenadering van John Rawls, Amartya Sen en Martha Nussbaum. Een 
aanpassing van Nussbaum’s internationale vermogensbenadering voor de duurzame 
ontwikkeling van (nano)technologie is getest op een aantal Latijns Amerikaanse landen die 
actief zijn op het gebied van nanotechnologie. De invloed van nanotechnologie op de 
schuivende grens tussen natuurlijk en kunstmatig is vooral onderwerp van langer lopend 
debat over futuristische toekomstscenario’s waarbij verschillende mensbeelden botsen. Aan 
de hand van filosofisch-antropologische literatuur zijn vier mensbeelden die een rol spelen 
in de huidige discussie over mensverbetering geanalyseerd: de mens als beeld van God, het 
Kantiaanse persoonsbegrip, de mens als rationeel dier en de mens als biologische machine. 
In drie van deze concepten speelt de menselijke waardigheid een rol. Aangezien de 
menselijke waardigheid een vaag en betwist filosofisch concept is, is het niet geschikt om 
de toepassing van (nano)technologie voor mensverbetering aan banden te leggen.
Aan menselijke waardigheid zijn filosofische theorieën van mensenrechten en 
verantwoordelijkheid gerelateerd. Daarom is vervolgens onderzocht in hoeverre deze 
concepten geschikt zijn als basis voor beperkingen aan toepassingen van nanotechnologie 
in mensverbetering. Mensenrechten zijn inherent ambigu. Naast een ethische component 
van universele fundamentele rechten is er een juridische component van positieve
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formuleringen van rechten van burgers in nationale wetgeving. In lange termijn discussies 
over radicale mensverbetering kan een minimale inhoud van fundamentele mensenrechten 
helpen om de ethische dilemma’s boven tafel te krijgen. Voor het aan banden leggen van 
incrementele mensverbetering op korte termijn zijn de positieve juridische regels die de 
rechten van individuele burgers beschermen geschikter. Deze regels zijn afdwingbaar door 
de Trias Politica in moderne democratische staten.
Individuele mensenrechten ingekaderd in het sociale contract tussen de individuele burger 
en de staat zijn niet genoeg om mogelijk ongewenste invloed van nanotechnologie op de 
schuivende grens tussen natuurlijk en kunstmatig tegen te gaan. Daarom is onderzocht in 
hoeverre het filosofische concept verantwoordelijkheid bruikbaar is als aanvulling op 
individuele mensenrechten. (Nano)technologieontwikkeling ontsnapt aan formele nationale 
regelgeving omdat juridische regels alleen achteraf gehandhaafd kunnen worden, en nieuwe 
effecten van nieuwe technologie pas in de toekomst zullen optreden. De huidige regels 
kunnen dan ongeschikt blijken te zijn om ongewenste ontwikkelingen tegen te gaan. De 
soevereine overheid kan zich bovendien te laat bewustworden van nieuwe ongereguleerde 
kwesties. Daarom is onderzocht welke rol een toekomstgericht collectief moreel concept 
van verantwoordelijkheid kan spelen. Hierbinnen kunnen verschillende statelijke en niet­
statelijke actoren de ontwikkeling van nanotechnologie samen in goede banen leiden. 
Verantwoordelijkheid is op zichzelf een zwak begrip dat door verschillende actoren 
verschillend ingevuld kan worden. Voor zover het een moreel concept is ontbreekt een 
autoriteit die een bepaalde interpretatie kan voorschrijven en overtreding straffen. Daarom 
moet het morele begrip verantwoordelijkheid ingevuld worden met substantiële ethische 
concepten die vrijwillig onderschreven worden door alle betrokkenen: individuele 
mensenrechten, maar ook het algemeen belang en milieubescherming.
Technologieontwikkeling vindt plaats op mondiaal niveau. Dat niveau wordt van oudsher 
gekenmerkt door verschillen in regelgeving en belangen tussen verschillende soevereine 
staten. Door mondialisering spelen ook private groeperingen waaronder bedrijven en civiele 
organisaties een rol in de ontwikkeling en beheersing van (nano)technologieontwikkeling. 
Vanuit een communitaristisch perspectief kunnen de bijdragen van verschillende niet­
statelijke groeperingen hieraan zichtbaar gemaakt worden. Het moderne wereldbeeld 
waarin het sociale contract tussen atomistische burgers en de soevereine staat centraal staat 
heeft een blinde vlek voor de rollen en potentiële bijdragen van deze groeperingen. Het 
expliciet maken van de rollen en belangen van dergelijke private actoren is onderdeel van 
communitaristische kritiek op het democratische ethos van het liberalisme. Vanuit dit 
perspectief blijken belangentegenstellingen een grotere rol te spelen dan verschillende 
waardensystemen in de ontwikkeling van nanotechnologie op mondiaal niveau. Verder 
blijken de discussies over verschillende ethische en maatschappelijke aspecten van 
nanotechnologie in versnipperde fora gevoerd te worden.
De centrale vraag van dit proefschrift is: hoe kan ethisch verantwoorde ontwikkeling van 
nanotechnologie vorm krijgen in een mondiale wereldorde waar verschillende soorten 
belangengroepen deelnemen? De aanbeveling is tweeledig.
343
Ten eerste zou nanotechnologie moeten bijdragen aan de drie doelstellingen van het 
conciliaire proces van de wereldraad van kerken: vrede, gerechtigheid en behoud van de 
schepping. De lidkerken en andere religieuze groepen redeneren vanuit een 
communitaristisch perspectief. De waarden van het conciliaire proces zijn algemeen genoeg 
om onderschreven te worden door mensen met andere levensovertuigingen. Door vrede in 
plaats van veiligheid centraal te stellen wordt de traditionele verantwoordelijkheid van 
soevereine staten voor het burgerrecht op veiligheid enerzijds gerespecteerd. Anderzijds 
wordt het aangevuld met bijdragen die private groeperingen kunnen leveren aan het 
voorkomen en oplossen van conflicten. Deze bijdragen kunnen enerzijds de vorm krijgen 
van een dialoog. Anderzijds dragen ook projecten waarin nanotechnologie ontwikkeld 
wordt voor duurzame milieuontwikkeling en armoedebestrijding eraan bij. Deze projecten 
dragen tevens bij aan de tweede doelstelling: gerechtigheid. Kerken en andere religieuze 
groeperingen die vanuit een communitaristisch perspectief redeneren, beperken zich tot nu 
toe tot discussie over de invloed van nanotechnologie op de schepping. Hier is het zaak om 
zorgvuldig te argumenteren en te luisteren naar de argumenten van groeperingen die een 
ander beeld van mens en wereld aanhangen. Binnen verschillende waardengemeenschappen 
is namelijk ook ruimte voor verschillende interpretaties van wat het menszijn inhoudt. Of 
mensen wel of niet voor God mogen spelen, daarover wordt ook binnen religieuze 
groeperingen verschillend gedacht. Vanuit hun eigen verantwoordelijkheid zouden 
religieuze groeperingen daarnaast hun bijdrage moeten verbreden naar alle drie doelen van 
het conciliaire proces. Hun overtuiging is een sterke inspiratiebron om bij te dragen aan een 
verantwoordelijke ontwikkeling van (nano)technologie.
Ten tweede is de huidige dialoog over en ontwikkeling van nanotechnologie versnipperd, 
waardoor de doelstelling van verantwoordelijke ontwikkeling van nanotechnologie op 
mondiaal niveau niet gehaald kan worden. Het is daarom zaak de verschillende losse 
dialogen en initiatieven te verbinden. Hierbij moet ook de discussie over economische 
concurrentie betrokken worden om een rechtvaardige uitkomst te bereiken die recht doet 
aan de belangen van alle betrokkenen, inclusief burgers van geïndustrialiseerde landen.
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Summary
This thesis examines how ethically sound governance of nanotechnology may be possible 
in the current global world order. This central research question is inspired by the main 
issue on the agenda of national and international policy makers in the last decade. How to 
avoid making the same mistake with nanotechnology as with genetically modified food in 
Europe? As for nanotechnology, great public and private investments had been made in the 
development of GGO’s, but market introduction was inhibited strongly by unexpected 
public resistance. In order to solve the issue of nanotechnology governance, a wide range of 
debates and projects have been started. The author has been engaged in these discussions 
and investigations as a consultant for 15 years. The thesis contains an attempt to present the 
debate in all its wide-ranging facets in different parts of the world. The emphasis is on 
differences and points in common between countries and at an international level. A 
selection of cases is investigated from a philosophical ethical perspective. Finally, the 
author returns to the governance issue and proposes a contribution to the ongoing debate.
Before answering the central research question, an overview is given of the current state of 
the art of nanotechnology. Nanotechnology is a container term, loosely defined as 
“materials and components with functional structures between 1 and around 100 nanometre 
in one or more spatial dimensions.” A nanometre is a billionth of a metre, or a millionth of 
a millimetre or a thousandth of a micron. All sorts of materials can be used, from metals 
and semiconductors to biological materials and chemical substances. Nanoscience is a 
multidisciplinary research domain. Scientists from different disciplines cooperate in it 
aiming to solve problems on the boundary between the disciplines.
Several products based on nanotechnology are already available on the market. However, 
the big promise of nanotechnology for industry and society at large is still mainly a future 
dream. Therefore expectations of different engaged persons and organisations about future 
applications and societal and ethical implications are also explored. Visions of leading 
scientists, technology policy analysts, technology assessment specialists, NGO’s and 
politicians from different parts of the world are analysed and compared. As was assumed 
leading scientist were be more realistic in their assumptions of technological trends. NGO’s 
and politicians were more realistic in their assumptions of societal circumstances and 
developments in which nanotechnology will have to be embedded. Technology policy 
analysts and technology assessment specialists were expected to combine understanding of 
technological as well as societal trends. This was not really the case. Technology policy 
analysts tended to focus on practical research policy questions and technology assessment 
specialists on issues related to more mature technologies. Since the start of the new 
millennium, the perspectives of technology policy analysts and technology assessment 
specialists were more integrated in overall government strategies, at least in the Netherlands 
and European Union. For other countries insufficient information was collected to see if a 
similar trend occurred. The overview presented here includes visions and reports from
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different parts of the world on purpose. This is needed to be able to contribute to global 
governance of nanotechnology.
In a third step, the variety of discussions among stakeholders and ethicists and social 
scientists about ethical aspects of nanotechnology are analysed. Three types of discussions 
can be distinguished. The first is about the question of precautionary governance of 
unknown risks of engineered nanomaterials. The second deals with applications of 
nanotechnologies in products and systems that have already given rise to ethical and 
societal issues that may be influenced by the uptake of nanotechnology. The third type of 
discussions is concerned with early governance of new emerging technologies. Proposed 
solutions are ethical reflection, regulation and democratising decision making on 
technology development. The question addressed in this chapter is which issues have so far 
been discussed insufficiently. Based on the analysis in the first three chapters and on the 
author’s own preferences, three cases were selected: nanotechnology and security, 
sustainable nanotechnology development and nanotechnology and the shifting boundary 
between natural and artificial. In all three cases, the international dimension influences the 
current discussions.
This thesis examines ethically sound development of nanotechnology. Therefore, 
philosophical ethical theories are applied and adapted to the issues raised by the three 
distinguished cases. The relationship between military and civil security and dual use 
applications of nanotechnology and Just War theory is investigated. This resulted in a 
proposal to expand Just War theory with an extra chapter on (military) technology 
development. The fragmented discussions on opportunities and risks of nanotechnology for 
the environment and poor people in developing countries are brought together. They are 
analysed from the perspective of the theory of justice and capabilities approach of John 
Rawls, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum’s international capabilities 
approach is adapted to sustainable nanotechnology development and applied to several 
Latin American countries active in nanotechnology. Nanotechnology’s influence on the 
shifting boundary between natural and artificial is mainly the subject of long term debate on 
futuristic scenarios. These debates are characterised by conflicting underlying views on 
what it means to be human. Philosophical anthropology has been used to analyse four 
concepts of human that play a role in the current debate on human enhancement. These are 
humankind as image of God, the Kantian person concept, rational animal and biological 
machine. In three of these concepts, human dignity plays a role. Human dignity is a vague 
and contested concept. Therefore it is not suitable for imposing limits on nano-enabled 
human enhancement.
Subsequently, the suitability of related philosophical theories of human rights and 
responsibility is examined as foundation for imposing limits to nano-enabled human 
enhancement. Human rights are inherently ambiguous. They combine an ethical side of 
universal fundamental rights with a legal side of positive formulations in national 
legislation. In long term discussions on radical human enhancement, a minimum content of 
fundamental human rights may help to articulate ethical dilemmas. The aim of controlling 
incremental human enhancement in the short term is better served by positive legal
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regulations that protect the rights of individual citizens. These rules can be enforced by the 
Trias Politica in modern democratic states.
Individual human rights are framed in the social contract between the individual citizen and 
the sovereign state. These human rights give insufficient grounds for counteracting possibly 
undesirable implications of nanotechnology for the shifting boundary between natural and 
artificial. In an attempt at overcoming this gap, the usefulness is examined of the 
philosophical concept of responsibility. (Nano) technology development escapes formal 
national regulation because formal laws can only be imposed after the fact. Furthermore, 
new impacts of emerging technologies will only occur in the future. The current rules may 
then turn out to be unsuitable for fighting undesirable developments. In addition, the 
sovereign state on its own is not capable of spotting emerging unregulated developments in 
time. Therefore, the role is investigated of a moral collective forward looking concept of 
responsibility in organising shared governance of nanotechnology involving governments 
and private actors. Responsibility in itself is a weak concept, interpreted differently by 
distinct actors. Moral responsibility lacks an authority entitled to imposing a particular 
interpretation and to punishing perpetrators. Therefore the moral concept responsibility 
must be substantiated with ethical concept adhered to voluntarily by all stakeholders: 
individual human rights as well as the common good and environmental protection.
Technology development is a global process. The global level has always been 
characterised by differences in legislation and interests between sovereign states. 
Globalisation increasingly engages private groups including companies and NGOs in the 
development and governance of (nano) technology development. Taking a communitarian 
perspective on the current international landscape around nanotechnology helps to 
articulate the roles of different non-state groups. The modern worldview based on the social 
contract between atomistic citizens and the sovereign state turns a blind eye to the potential 
contributions these groups could make. Articulating the roles and interests of such private 
actors is inherent in the communitarian criticism on liberalism’s democratic ethos. From 
this perspective, conflicts of interest turn out to be more influential than value conflicts in 
the development of nanotechnology on a global level. Furthermore, discussions on a variety 
of ethical and societal aspects of nanotechnology turn out to be discussed in fragmented 
forums.
The central research question is: how can ethically sound development of nanotechnology 
be governed in a multi stakeholder global world order? This thesis results in two 
recommendations from the personal point of view of the author.
Firstly, nanotechnology should contribute to the three core values of the ecumenical 
process of the World Council of Churches: Peace, Justice and Integrity of Creation. These 
values are inspired by a communitarian perspective, yet sufficiently universal to be 
supported by adherents of other religions and worldviews. By replacing security with peace 
as a core value, the traditional responsibility of sovereign states for guaranteeing its 
citizens’ right to security is respected. In addition, it gives private stakeholder groups room 
for contributing to preventing and solving conflicts. These contributions include
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participation in dialogue. Furthermore, private actors can participate in projects aimed at 
sustainable environmental development and at fighting poverty. These same projects can 
contribute to the second value: justice. Churches and other religious groups have so far 
limited themselves mainly to discussions about the impact of nanotechnology on integrity 
of creation. In these discussions, it is important to carefully weigh different arguments and 
listen carefully to representatives of groups adhering to different views of humankind and 
the world. Each distinct value community gives room for different interpretations of what it 
means to be human. Based on their own responsibility, religious groups should furthermore 
broaden their engagement to encompass all three core values of the ecumenical process. 
This is because their conviction is essential for contributing to responsible development of 
(nano) technology.
Secondly, the current dialogue on and development of nanotechnology is fragmented. This 
endangers the aim of responsible development of nanotechnology at global scale. Therefore 
the distinct loose dialogues and initiatives should be connected. This includes discussions 
on competitiveness. This is a precondition for achieving a fair outcome balancing the 
interests of all stakeholders, including citizens of industrialised countries.
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